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Philosophy East & West

Vol. 19
1969

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A Quarterly of Asian and Comparative Thought



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All articles and features are printed in English. If a contribution is written in another language, the original and an English translation are requested.

The system of transliteration of foreign terms and names should be consistent within each article and should conform with generally accepted practice. Style sheets prepared by the Language Consultant for *Philosophy East and West* are available upon request. Manuscripts should be prepared according to the specifications of *The MLA Style Sheet, Revised Edition*, obtainable from The Modern Language Association of America, 6 Washington Square North, New York, New York, 10003, at 50¢ per copy. Authors are responsible for the accuracy of all quotations and for supplying complete references.

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a quarterly journal of Asian and comparative thought

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On December 16-20, 1968, a Symposium on Aesthetics East and West, sponsored by the Department of Philosophy of the University of Hawaii and directed by Eliot Deutsch, was held in Honolulu. The theme of the Symposium was "The Nature and Function of Symbolism in Eastern and Western Art." Formal papers were presented by the following invited speakers:

Albert Hofstadter: Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Cruz. Ph.D., Columbia University. Vice-President, American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, 1967-68; Co-editor of *Philosophies of Art and Beauty,* author of *Truth and Art* and over thirty articles in professional journals.

William P. Malm: Professor of Music, University of Michigan. Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles. Author of *Japanese Music and Musical Instruments, Nagauta: The Heart of Kabuki Music, Musical Cultures of the Pacific, the Near East, and Asia,* and many articles for scholarly publications in the field of Japanese music.

Stephen C. Pepper: Professor Emeritus. University of California, Berkeley; Chairman, Department of Art (1938-1952); Chairman, Department of Philosophy (1953-1958). Ph.D., Harvard University; Honorary degree of L.H.D. from Colby College (1950), Tulane University (1961), and LL.D. from University of California (1960). Principal books: *Aesthetic Quality, World Hypotheses, The Basis of Criticism in the Arts, A Digest of Purposive Values, Principles of Art Appreciation, The Work of Art, The Sources of Value, Ethics,* and *Concept and Quality.*.

Donald Keene: Professor of Japanese, Columbia University. M.A., Cambridge, Ph.D., Columbia. First non-Japanese recipient of Kikuchi Kan Prize. Among fifteen volumes of original studies of Japanese literature and civilization and translations of classical and modern Japanese literature are: *Anthology of Japanese Literature, Modern Japanese Literature, Japanese Literature: An Introduction for Western Readers, Living Japan, Major Plays of Chikamatsu, Bunraku: The Japanese Puppet Theatre, Nō: the Classical Theatre of Japan,* and *Essays in Idleness.*

David T. Wieck: Associate Professor of Philosophy; Acting Chairman, Department of Philosophy, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Ph.D., Columbia University. Author of forthcoming *Theory of the Comic* and numerous articles in professional journals.

Panel discussions by the invited speakers and by experts among the University of Hawaii community were held on each paper. The Editor is grateful for these contributions to the work of the Symposium. He also wishes to express his appreciation to Professor James Manley for his assistance in attending to many of the details involved in the meeting and to Mr. William Griffis and Mr. H. William Thomas, graduate students in the Department of Philosophy, for their work as reporters.

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Art is a language by which the human mind gives utterance to its own integrity. It holds the two main sides of mind, objective and subjective, in their appropriate unity and it articulates that unity in an image for intuition.

One side of mind is theoretical, devoted to the formation of knowledge of reality. It attends primarily to the object of consciousness and concerns itself with ascertaining the being and content of that object. Its aim is truth, the agreement of the subject's intention with the reality. In the whole economy of life its function is the development of science, the illumination of reality. Within art, it gives rise to the tendencies known as realism and naturalism.

The second side of mind is practical, devoted to the exercise of freedom. It sets its attention on the subject's appetites and goals and concerns itself with realizing his desire and will in existence. Its aim is the goodness and rightness of things, actions, and persons, their agreement with the subject's chosen norms. Hence it aims at the agreement of the reality with the subject's intention. In the economy of life its function is the development of man's governance over things, including himself, in accordance with standards he determines as suitable for them—as in technology, law, morality, and politics. In art, this aim at freedom gives rise to counter-naturalistic, counter-realistic tendencies such as constructivism, surrealism, expressionism, and dada.

Theoretical and practical mind are necessary factors in the integral unity of the psyche, just as the objective and the subjective are necessary factors in the unity of consciousness. What is the unity of consciousness and what is the corresponding psychical unity of which art is the language? The nature of this unity is already indicated by the language we use to describe the ideals of its two indispensable sides, the theoretical and practical. One is truth, the other freedom. In one, intention agrees with reality; in the other, reality agrees with intention. In both, the union is one of agreement. The ideal of mind in its integrity is: agreement, the mutual agreement of intention and reality. But the intention has to be not merely the cognitive intention of theoretical mind and not merely the elective intention of practical mind, but the full intention of mind in its integrity, namely, the affective intention of the love that binds spirit to its affinity.

The third and unifying principle of mind is the spiritual one, whose aim is to reach the mutual agreement of intention and reality. It includes knowing, on the one hand, but is not mere science. It includes freedom, on the other hand, but is no longer merely freedom, for it yields itself completely to its other in devotion to it. Its essential aim is to exist in the mutual ownness of love, an ownness for which the classic formula is found in the words of the *Song of Songs*: "My beloved is mine, and I am his" (2. 16).

Albert Hofstadter is Professor of Philosophy, Adlai E. Stevenson College, University of California, Santa Cruz. *This paper was read on October 26, 1968 at the meeting of the Association for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Yale University.*

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This mutual ownness of love is the ultimate and true form of ownness. It transcends and includes the validity of all merely cognitive appropriation and all merely practical appropriation of reality, for in it is finally realized the basic underlying aim that gives rise to knowledge and practice, to consciousness of objects in their objectivity and consciousness of objects in their belonging to the self, their "mineness." The consciousness that belongs to this mutual ownness of love I call, by an obvious metaphor, *kin-consciousness*. It is the consciousness of self and other in their mutual belonging to one another, their mutual fitness, harmony, accord, kinship. The negative form of kin-consciousness is the consciousness of unbelonging, unfitness, discord, disharmony; and there are many modifications of it, complications of the positive and negative forms, among which are to be found notably the consciousness of the tragic and of the comic. Goethe celebrated it under the name of "elective affinity." Plotinus quite properly took it for the foundation of his interpretation of beauty:

> Our interpretation is that the Soul—by the very truth of its nature, by its affiliation to the noblest Existents in the hierarchy of Being—when it sees anything of that kin, or any trace of that kinship, thrills with an immediate delight, takes its own to itself, and thus stirs anew to the sense of its nature and of all its affinity.[1]

This mutual ownness is the ultimate form of being, in which a person's being-toward-an-other is one in which the estrangement and alienation of otherness is completely—not merely partially—overcome. It is a reconciliation of self and other that consists not in a mere eradication of opposition or a mere quieting of otherness but in an affirmative and reciprocally enhancing appropriation of one another in, and through, and if need be despite, the reality of opposition. Love forgives the finite for what it is and takes it to itself precisely for what it is.

The language of art is the language of this mutual ownness, its negation, and its modifications. In art man's spirit utters its meanings as unities of the subjective and objective which are not merely one-sided but reveal the essential bond between the two. The one-sided tendencies in art, namely, realism and naturalism on the one hand and the tendencies of abstract freedom on the other (constructivism, surrealism, etc.), all nevertheless contain this unity of both sides, since they are art first and foremost. So expressionism, for example, because of the tortured character of its love, must torture the object into a fitting distortion. Dada and surrealism, out of an indefeasible craving for the spontaneity of infantile being or of absolutely uninhibited freedom, must destroy every vestige of maturity or rational order in their object; only the nonsensical, absurd, and irrational shows itself to them as their very own. Still, neither the one side nor the other reveals in art the true wholeness and purity of spiritual unity. Only those art-forms that do justice to both sides of

[1] *Enneads* (trans. Stephen Mackenna) I. vi. 2.

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consciousness and the spirit—the theoretical and practical, object-consciousness and own-consciousness, consciousness of the other in its objective being and consciousness of it in its essential relation to the self, truth, and freedom—only such art-forms give an ultimately true image of spiritual unity. These are the great classical forms of art that come into being and endure as long as a culture comes into the maturity of its conscious life and endures—normally, perhaps, only after the great military, political, and economic achievements are behind it. They are the arts that belong to periods like the Gupta in India (A.D. 320-647), the T'ang (618-907) and Sung in China (A.D. 960-1279), or the mature Classical period in ancient Greece and the High Renaissance and Baroque in Europe. The greatest of artists and art works arise in these periods because they are periods in which the spiritual consciousness of the culture arrives at its natural fullness and demands utterance, and the material means are available in power and riches to give the artist scope for his task.

As an illustration of the language of art in its articulation of the unity of subjective and objective as a unity of mutual belonging, I choose a relatively minor work, yet one that brings out clearly the character of this unity by a certain inner contrast. It is a poem written in a period of somewhat low key, written out of a mood of melancholy which realizes that it has lost the golden splendor of the great classical age, which knows it has to come to terms with an austerely real natural world, but which, in its very utterance of itself, in its own very moment of being, realizes for itself in its own way the essential unity whose loss it deplores. It is Matthew Arnold's "Dover Beach."

The sea is calm to-night.
The tide is full, the moon lies fair
Upon the straits;—on the French coast the light
Gleams and is gone; the cliffs of England stand
Glimmering and vast, out in the tranquil bay.

Come to the window, sweet is the night-air!
Only, from the long line of spray
Where the sea meets the moon-blanch'd land,
Listen! you hear the grating roar
Of pebbles which the waves draw back, and fling,
At their return, up the high strand,
Begin, and cease, and then again begin,
With tremulous cadence slow, and bring
The eternal note of sadness in.

Sophocles long ago
Heard it on the Aegean, and it brought
Into his mind the turbid ebb and flow
Of human misery; we

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Find also in the sound a thought,
Hearing it by this distant northern sea.

The Sea of Faith
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furl'd.
But now I only hear
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,
Retreating, to the breath
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear
And naked shingles of the world.

Ah, love, let us be true
To one another! for the world, which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.

What is the form of outwardness here by which the kin-consciousness of art shows itself to the intuitive imagination? Let us begin by distinguishing between the particular dimensions of the showing and the essential connection between them. The particular dimensions are two: the presentation of objectivity and the expression of subjectivity.[2] The essential connection lies in the fitness, the kinship, by which they belong to one another.

In all art something has to be presented objectively as that to which the self in the work attends and with which it is concerned. Most familiar of the modes of objective presentation is the representation of objects. The work will be a painting of figures, animals, a landscape, a city scene; it will be the sculptured image of a god or man, the story of an event, the dramatic representation of a conflict, a lyrical representation of the self's world. But objective presentation also operates in modes other than literal representation. Art uses, as modes of presentation of objective matter, a symbol of an abstract concept, an allegory of a universal meaning, a metaphor, a simile, or other figure for an objectively thinkable content. It can present objectively that which transcends all finitely thinkable meaning, the mysterious, the infinite, the transcendent, by means of inscrutably suggestive images.

Even in the most subjective form of art, the lyrical, or the most subjective

[2] Some discussion of these dimensions will be found in the author's *Truth and Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), chap. 4, "Language as Articulation of Human Being."

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of the arts, music, there is present a strong and indelible objectivity. I do not merely mean that musical tones, fleeting as they may be, stand forth for themselves, insist upon themselves, and build the strongest structure out of the gossamer web of their relations in time—a Bach fugue, a Mozart sonata. That is the objectivity of the utterance itself. I mean rather to point to the fact that when music is at its most lyrical and subjective, as in the romantic melody of Schumann, Chopin, Brahms, and Wagner, it remains at the same time, however strangely and mysteriously, evocative of an unheard world, a world unnamed and undescribed, toward which nevertheless the subjectivity in the melody comports itself; and this merely adumbrated objectivity, the ghost of objectivity that remains with subjectivity when the latter retires into itself, is more truly representative of the function of objective presentation than the actual sounding of the tones! Lyrical art, generally, is the self pouring forth its utterance; but it utters its feelings in tones, words, verses, lines, and colors, which are themselves powerful in the presentation of objectivity.

> Red lips are not so red
> As the stained stones kissed by the English dead.

Wilfred Owen (in "Greater Love") makes his speaker, in regarding the soldier's sacrifice, express the irony he feels by an image as objective as any image can be: the contrasting vision of the living, pulsating, warm red lips of the beloved kissed by the lover and the stone stained red with the blood of the slain lover of his fellow, his dead lips pressed against that cold, resisting, dead thing, his outpoured blood the actual kiss of death itself.

In a sense, abstract art shows this feature of objective presentation most clearly. In its most extreme form, so-called nonobjective art, it is precisely the presentation of a pure objectivity. It abandons the representation of objects familiar in the world outside the work and it concentrates on presenting only objects that are imagined purely through the medium of the work. The whole of the objectivity in the work is thus absorbed and exercised by the work itself, in its own purity of medium, freed from having to bring into itself objects from the external world. A pure design by Mondrian is stunning in its objectivity, just because it disdains to copy trees, mountains, rivers, cows, men, buildings, and other such ordinary objects.

Objective presentation, thus, is essential to the constitution of the art work. But it is only a necessary condition, and it is not sufficient of itself to fulfill the artistic function of showing ownness and love. It is in itself indifferent to the artistic content of ownness, as is evident, for example, in mere photography and mere scientific illustration, from maps to electronic circuit diagrams. There is, however, one exception: namely, to present something objectively is to make it an image or an element in an image. This makes it present and accessible to the intuiting mind that apprehends it as an image. Hence it makes

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it the mind's own in an abstract and formal sense; it is the mind's in the sense that, whatever its content may be, it is appropriated by intuition in the form of an image. Objective presentation is a phase of theoretical activity and consequently partakes of the formal, abstract ownership practiced by the theoretical mind merely as such. Cognition, and *a fortiori* presentation of objects, is indifferent, not to the merely theoretical appropriation of the object, but to what remains over and above its mere appropriation as an object. The indifference extends to everything in the object except the objectness of it. Once objective presentation has made the object intuitable, it is finished with it; whereas love has only then begun with it.

The second dimension of showing is subjective expression. This is as essential a function of art as is that of objective presentation. If objective presentation may be called the epical function in art, then subjective expression is art's lyrical function. A painting has to be made as something envisioned, a piece of music as something sounded, a poem as something spoken.

> The sea is calm to-night.
> The tide is full, the moon lies fair
> Upon the straits;—on the French coast the light
> Gleams and is gone; the cliffs of England stand
> Glimmering and vast, out in the tranquil bay.
>
> Come to the window, sweet is the night-air!

There is someone speaking here, from a personal point of view, bringing out in simple and strong imagery a visual scene from the window, speaking with a surface calm that, as the poem proceeds, proves to be a transparent medium for depths of disenchantment, and appealing in the end to his companion for the mutual trust of love. The poem is a short dramatic monologue; through the role it assigns to the speaker it lets him express a complex attitude, containing within it a vision of the present actuality, an understanding of the state of modern man's deliverance from religious illusion, the deep sadness that accompanies disillusion, and the hope for and the will to find in finite human love something of a finite answer to an infinite problem. The speaker expresses something of his own subjective experience and being—his perception, imagination, thought, feeling, aspiration, character, and temperament—while he is at the same time presenting an aspect of the world objectively in his language.

Everywhere in art something similar happens. Art articulates both the objective and the subjective components of human experience. It does this in such a way as to keep the objective objective and the subjective subjective. Objectivity is presented—pictured, symbolized, suggested, designated—and subjectivity is expressed in its role of viewing, thinking, feeling, willing. The visual arts construct not simply objects, but visions of objects; music makes not just sounds, but sounding expressions; in a poem, or other literary work,

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there is articulated an experience *of* something, a concrete consciousness that utters itself in words, both the objective aspect and the subjective aspect and, eventually, the unity of the two. In a drama, a mind broods over the struggles of men in their world; the audience, sitting with that world presented before it in immediate presence, is given the opportunity to participate in that silent contemplation, full of complexities of thought and feeling, as the pathos of *Romeo and Juliet,* the satirical contempt of *Tartuffe,* or the profound understanding of the human in Euripides' *Electra.*

As subjective lyrical art makes essential use of objective presentation, so objective epical art makes essential use of subjective expression. Every story has its narrator or narrators; every object seen has its seer, every thought its thinker, everything presented presupposes the emotion that feels it. The supposed pure objectivity of *Madame Bovary* is only the inverse side and reflection of an intensely passionate observation, insight, and moral judgment passed upon Emma, her husband Charles, the pharmacist Homais, and their bourgeois world and life, a complexity of attitude that is as much a phase of the composition of the novel as any objective situation represented therein.

Of the dimension of subjective expression we must say also that, taken by itself, it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for artistic revelation. It too is in itself indifferent to the artistic content of ownness—as is evident in forensic rhetoric, passionate argument, cursing and blessing, and what not else. There is, to be sure, a formal element of appropriation in the very achievement of expression, for in it, the subjective attitude has been made accessible to intuition and thereby appropriated by the mind as an intuitive content, part of an image. But the appropriation thus far is limited only to the formality of becoming an image; it has not yet extended to the substantiality of being an image of mutual ownness, of kin-consciousness.

We begin to approach the articulation of kin-consciousness itself only with the union of subjectivity and objectivity. For here, insofar as the artist is successful, the objective material presented and the subjective attitude expressed belong to one another, fit together into a unity of essential appropriateness. If, in Arnold's poem, the mood of disenchantment and muted consolation in human love is to be veritably expressed, the vision and thought of the world given to the speaker must work, must be suitable to the attitude. The sea, with its ever-recurrent surf, has actually to work as an image, and, indeed, it does so powerfully in this poem. The calmness with which it is presented at the beginning will belong to the subjective attitude at the end. The slow tremulous cadence with which the sounds of the waves make themselves heard—drawing back pebbles and flinging them at their return up the strand, beginning and ceasing, beginning and ceasing, again and again—is telling in its ability to

bring
The eternal note of sadness in,

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without the slightest hint of a let-down into sentimentality. This sound that Sophocles heard long ago, that master of insight into suffering, brought into his mind, too,

> the turbid ebb and flow,
> Of human misery,

and we northerners, far in time and far in space from that golden age,

> Find also in the sound a thought.

The thought is of the vanishing of faith in the reality of beauty, joy, love, light, certitude, peace, help for pain, in the world. That faith was once a Sea, like this, which

> at the full, and round earth's shore
> Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furl'd.
> But now I only hear its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,
> Retreating, to the breath
> Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear
> And naked shingles of the world.

The objectivity that is seen, thought about, and presented for feeling, acts to bring out with distinctness and vitality the dominant mood. Dover Beach becomes an effective figure for the world—that darkling plain

> Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
> Where ignorant armies clash by night.

Here, then, where art does what it is able to do, the two dimensions of its configurative action, the objectivity presented and the subjectivity expressed, occur together in a relationship of mutual belonging. The symbol of the sea, its tide, its surf, the rhythm of its recurrence, the coast, the cliffs, the beach, the vanished light, the whole content of the history of faith, all function to give a stand for the sad consolation, and the mood itself functions to hold them all together in the unity of its own meaning.

The poem articulates a certain truth. By this I refer not to the thought that the world is no longer a habitation of the divine, but rather to truth of a unique sort, an agreement between subjective and objective of the kind that occurs here between the expressed mood and the presented matter. There is a rightness of each to the other, a reciprocal accord. They belong together as do the tones of a harmonious chord. They feed on one another, being true to each other. They are kin. The mood lives, flashes up into a vibrant resonance, through the shape of the objective matter; and the scene and world that are imagined live, flashing up into an equally vibrant resonance, through the inspiration of the mood.

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Here, in this inner truth of presentation and expression to each other, is our first glimpse of the ownness that is constitutive for art. The objective matter is own to the mood, the mood is own to the matter. The matter does not copy the mood; it does not express the mood—it is the *words* of the poem that both present the objective matter and express the subjective mood. The matter and the mood stand in a special relationship, of own to own, mutual kinship. Here we encounter a relationship of spiritual content to figural form, inside the work, which can begin to show us how ownness finds its outward form.

The question is how the poem as words, the outward poetic image or figure, the shape of the words as a poem, is able to reveal the content of ownness, the mutual kinship or truth of presented objectivity and expressed subjectivity, the content of truthful being that is constituted by these two inner constituents that are true to one another. The words of the poem, shaped into the poem, are the poetic image in the most literal sense: the image that is the poem. The content which this image exists to figure forth, the poetic content as such, is the unity of the objective and subjective constituents within the poetic meaning, the unity of the objectivity presented and the subjectivity expressed. How does the linguistic shape do this?

It is not a copy of it. That is evident. The verbal structure does not look like a union of the two dimensions of consciousness.

It is not a physiognomic expression of it. The verbal structure is not like, say, a man's face as it expresses an inner feeling or character. It cannot be this, because the reciprocal truth, which is a union of the two dimensions of consciousness, is not a suitable content for physiognomic expression: it is not something merely subjective, but a union of the subjective and the objective, a truth, a freedom.

The poem is not a symbol of the ultimate unity in the sense in which a symbol represents its meaning as something different from itself, separate from itself, in place of which it stands here to point to the absent content there. The clearest example of such a symbol comes not from art, but from science, as when the physicist uses the letter "G" to stand for the force of gravitation. But the poem as shape does not stand for the truth, to remind us of it as G reminds us of gravitation.

The poem *speaks* the truth. As the sentence "burlap is made from jute" *says* what it does, uttering this flat piece of information, so the poem—more than merely says, it speaks in its own way, it poetizes, so to speak, its meaning, the truth it exists to utter. The sentence is not a symbol that merely stands for something else, even though it is made of symbols. It is a piece of language that speaks in its flat way of saying. The poem speaks in its full way—intoning, singing, weaving its rhythmical way through its utterance. As the truth which the sentence speaks is spoken *in* the sentence, so the truth which the poem speaks is spoken *in* the poem. It is spoken not by one or other of the

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words in the poem; it is not in the poem as a word or words. (But is it not? Does not the poem speak the sentence: "Ah, love, let us be true/To one another!")

In the poem a man speaks. It is, I suppose, a man speaking to a woman. It is this man whose perceptions, memories, thoughts, wishes, moods receive expression and whose world comes to objective appearance in the poem. It is he who is doing the actual speaking, or through whose voice the poem speaks as it does. He begins:

The sea is calm to-night.

Both the sea that he perceives and the mood in which he perceives it begin thereupon to come to utterance. He reaches out with his words and brings into picture the sea, calm, tonight. By his noun he begins to disclose to the imagination of the understander of the language a marine image; it is stilled by an adjective and brought to time by an adverb.

At the same time, by the same words, in the same sequence, he begins to disclose to the same imagination, not an outward picture alone, but also an inner consciousness, a disenchantment, a disconsolate consolation, which now just begins to be felt, but will grow and gain definiteness as the reading of the poem continues. The understander of the language is able to imagine this subjective phase in the manner in which subjectivity is understood. That happens not by looking at the mood, as though one were turned toward it as an object, but by an empathic participation in it. As we are conscious of our own mood, not by looking at it objectively, but by being in it and being inwardly and non-reflectively conscious of it, so we are aware in imagination of the mood of the poetic speaker. Our own mood is conscious of itself not as an object but precisely as itself, in itself, by means of itself. It knows itself along-with itself, *con-scius*.

At the same time, by the same words, the speaker brings to imagination the unity of the objective and subjective components. The disenchantment intends the calm sea. This is an essential constituent both of the disenchantment and the sea. The disenchantment is of and about the sea—among other things, naturally—and it permeates both the seeing of the sea and the sea as seen. So, later, we hear the tremulous cadence of the grating roar of the pebbles, which brings in the eternal note of sadness—the sadness is out there in the moaning of the surf as well as in here in the breast of the man. The words of the speaker make us understand, they give to our intelligent imagination, this essential unity, by which the sea belongs to the mood and the mood to the sea.

Why does the disenchantment choose the sea? Why not something else, somewhere else? Why do you choose the city in which you live? Why not a village, in another country? In and through the sea that the disenchantment chooses, or by which it is itself chosen, it lives its own being, comes to articu-

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lated shape in its intentional congruence with it, as you come to be what you are in your living dwelling within your city. The sea is own to the disenchantment because the sea is precisely the object of which the disenchantment is the subject; the sea is the disenchantment's other, which the disenchantment has been able to make its own, in the way in which disenchantment can own things. The sea has captured the disenchantment, perhaps through capturing the disenchantment's imagination, fascinating it, casting a spell over it. Is it through the power of this spell that the disenchantment perhaps comes to spell the name of the sea, to tell its own story through telling the story of the sea? Is it this spell, permeating the sea and the disenchantment, that reaches out into the man's language and seizes upon the words that spell its own name and story?

What makes sea and disenchantment own to each other makes the language of sea and disenchantment own to itself.

But this is only half the story. It tells only how the mutual ownness of the disenchantment of this poem and the sea of this poem find the verbal form of this poem to be its very own utterance. It is therefore the story only of a particular poem, but not of poetry; and only of a poem, but not of the work of art as such. The question is, what happens not just with this poem and not just with poetry but with art and with every art work?

Wherever there is a work of art, there is an utterance of some particular union of the subjective and objective in their concrete being own to each other, as the disenchantment and the sea are to each other. The way in which objective matter is presented and subjective matter expressed varies from art to art, genre to genre, and work to work. Dancing is in some respects a more objective art than music, and in some respects a more subjective art than architecture. Lyric poetry is more subjective than dramatic or epic, and poetry in general is more subjective than drama or epic or novel. Chopin is more subjective than Haydn, Keats than Dryden. Architecture makes an external world, painting represents it, music adumbrates it, poetry imagines it through meaning, drama presents it in a semblance. The self in lyrical poetry utters itself, in drama it silently looks on, in the novel it narrates. Music does not make use of the sentences of the intellect's language; literature is full of them. Music is auditory, painting visual, literature imaginative. And so forth. The changes can be rung on all the different ways in which subjectivity and objectivity occur in the arts; but throughout the arts and in all the works, one essential universal prevails—the reciprocal ownness, the kinship, of the subjective and objective components to one another, the inner truth to each other by which, together, they form a true unity. As with "Dover Beach" so with every other work: one could, given the means of investigating and understanding, discriminate the objective and subjective components in the intention-structure of the work, and in the same process bring out for awareness

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the way in which the two belong to each other and to the whole, and the way in which that whole finds its utterance in the external shape, the existence of the work in the world.

El Greco's "View of Toledo" (Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York City) transforms hills, buildings, river, clouds, and sky into an image full of mystery and foreboding, as though some awful miracle is about to happen; it is seen with an intensely passionate concern that transcends everything merely earthly, looking beyond to the infinite for the meaning of what happens in time and space. We learn to live our way into an understanding of the transcending concern by learning to see the tremendous image, and conversely; and as we accomplish both at the same time, we rise to a concrete intelligence of the interior truth by which the two belong to each other, which we are able to partake of in imagination. This painting, like the poem, is able to stand for all works; each stands for all and all for each.

What makes the work a work of art is the interior truth that takes the outward shape as its vehicle of utterance and articulation. Art is the uttering and articulating of just the interior belonging to one another of subject and object, an uttering which itself belongs to that belonging, is true to that truth. The artist is the locus in which this process takes place, in and through whom the poetic content finds its language and the language articulates the content.

Art is a way of being possessed by ownness itself, or, as we may say, by love itself. The artist is the creature of love and art is love's way of uttering itself, by finding the language that belongs to it. Deeper than the disenchantment and the sea, deeper than the truth that unites them in the poem, is another kind of attitude, and object, and unity. For the poet, the disenchantment is not the final mood—not so long as he is and remains a poet. The disenchantment is a constituent in a poem—other poems, other attitudes, enchantment perhaps, gaiety, terror, or whatnot. For the poet, again, the sea is not the final image—other poems, other images, eagle, shipwreck, bridge, West Wind, or whatnot. These too are constituents in poems. The unity of disenchantment and sea, elation and eagle, transcending piety and miraculous mystery—these, too, are constituents of poems, unities of content that have, belonging to them, the unity of the outward shape of the poem, the painting, the work. It is this ultimate unity of inner content and outer shape, of total meaning and external vehicle, that casts its spell over the artist, making him an artist.

Here is where art becomes something real, something that exists in the world, and where the artist is at work in the world as an artist. The meaningful totality that consists in the unity of the subjective and objective—the concreteness of full consciousness—needs to be given utterance; indeed, it needs to find utterance in order to articulate itself. The spirit needs the world to give shape to itself by finding and shaping something in the world that is kin to it, of which it can truly say "That is mine and I am it." It needs the

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world as it needs its own kin. Art is the spirit's attaining to its kinship with the world. The artist is seized by the spirit of ownness—that is, of truth and freedom and love—in search of its own utterance. Every poem he makes, or every painting, or dance, or building, is one sound in the grand utterance. In each of them the ultimate subjectivity, the love of truth, freedom, and love, reveals itself, not by casting itself forth into the world, but by speaking its own language. The concealment by which the speaker says what belongs to him is the revelation by which he gives himself to us to have as our own. As we receive this gift, we come to our own self, giving it to him, and in that gift coming at the same time to possess it for ourselves.

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Nolan Pliny Jacobson

The possibility of Oriental influence in Hume's philosophy

It might be easier for Asia and the West to understand their different religious and social philosophies if they knew how deeply these philosophies had affected one another in the past. European thought from 1600 to 1789 is especially important in this connection, for these are the years when the Orient contributed most to Western thought, and they are the years when the very foundations of modern philosophy in the West were being laid.

The conceptual links between the Buddha and David Hume have been observed by numerous scholars East and West, such as Murti and Whitehead, to mention only two who may be nearest to our time. Writing fifty years ago, La Vallée Poussin may have been the first to express surprise that "the yellow-garbed monks of yore" propounded essentially the same theory of the self "found in Hume or Taine and many scientists."[1]

As far as I know, however, no one has ever investigated the other side of the problem, the possibility that Buddhist thought may have played a major role in the initial formulation of Hume's *Treatise*. If the venture seems slightly absurd, it may be worth remembering that almost any result from such a venture, even the most negligible, could have more than ordinary significance, considering the fact that it is the founder of modern philosophy of science, on the one hand, and a major philosophic tradition of Asia, on the other hand, with which we have to do.

SIMILARITIES IN HUME AND THE BUDDHA

In depriving the concepts of substance and causality of all rational justification, by showing that they rest upon the fictitious substitution of ideas that arise in the mind rather than from "matters of fact and existence," David Hume attacked the fundamental conceptions around which seventeenth century metaphysics had largely revolved. Locke's "unknown substratum," Berkeley's spiritual substances, and the *res cogitans* which rescued Descartes in his sea of doubt—all are called in question as the mere customary conjunction of ideas upon the stage of experience, a stage which itself is only a "bundle of perceptions."

As Murti observes in his recent study of the Mādhyamika, "Denial of substance is the foundation of Buddhism down the ages."[2] We have before us here a very strange agreement between Hume and Gotama Buddha. "The whole history of Buddhist philosophy," Stcherbatsky says, "can be described as a series of attempts to penetrate more deeply into this original intuition of

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[1] L. de la Vallée Poussin, *The Way to Nirvana* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1917), pp. 38-39.

[2] T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960), pp. 26-27.

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Buddha, what he himself believed to be his great discovery."[3] The Belgian Buddhist scholar whose writings were being read and published at Cambridge fifty years ago puts it this way:

> According to the Buddhists, no Self, that is, no unitary, permanent feeling or thinking entity, comes into the field of inquiry. We know only the body, which is visibly a composite, growing and decaying thing, and a number of phenomena, feelings, perceptions, wishes or wills, cognitions—in philosophic language, a number of states of consciousness. That these states of consciousness depend upon a Self, are the product of a Self or arise in a Self, is only a surmise, since there is no consciousness of a Self outside these states of consciousness . . . . 'There are perceptions, but we do not know a perceiver.'[4]

There is no thinker but the thoughts, no perceiver but the perceptions, no craver but the cravings. The conclusion was explicitly drawn by the Buddha that there is suffering but none who suffers.

The similarity here with Hume is striking. "There are some philosophers," Hume says,

> who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our *self;* that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself,* I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. . . . I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.[5]

For Hume, too, the only thinker is the thought, the only perceiver the perception, the only craver the craving.

There are Buddhist scholars, such as Nyanatiloka of Ceylon, who contend that the Buddhist concept of self "has been clearly and unreservedly taught only by the Buddha."[6] This, however, is not true. Both Hume and the Buddha insist that it is wrong-headed to call some enduring, ever-identical self more real than our changing states. Both insist that the experiences themselves are spread upon no substance and upon no substantial self but constitute a process

[3] T. I. Stcherbatsky, "The Soul Theory of the Buddhists," *Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R.* (1919), pp. 824-825.
[4] La Vallée Poussin, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39.
[5] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* ed. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), II. ii. 5 (363).
[6] Nyanatiloka, *Buddhist Dictionary* (Colombo: Frewin & Co., Ltd., 1956), pp. 11-12. "'Non-Ego, Not-Self' (*anattā*), i.e. the fact that neither within these bodily and mental phenomena of existence, nor outside of them, can be found anything that in the ultimate sense could be regarded as a self-reliant real Ego-entity, personality, or any other abiding substance. . . . All the remaining Buddhist doctrine may, more or less, be found in other philosophic systems and religions, but the Anattā-Doctrine has been clearly and unreservedly taught only by the Buddha."

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in and for themselves. Both affirm that whatever self is conceived will be less concrete than the experiences themselves. Both see in other concepts of the self the propensity, widespread in the human community, for attributing ultimacy to the wrong things.

The Buddhist position is that there is no self-identical self, only "the perpetual flux and movement," the abiding flow, but that each of us is "a numerically new actuality every moment," as Hartshorne has put it. Hartshorne presents what he calls "the Buddhist-Whiteheadian doctrine" as a "radical pluralism" that takes its stand with our "successive experiences" or "successive actualities," arguing that these are "the primary units of the plurality" constituted by "the momentary experiences or selves." Hartshorne applauds both Hume and the Buddha for returning us to an honest empiricism in which "the concrete subjects are the momentary actualities."[7] Existence is momentary in the Buddha's thought; at no two moments is a thing identical; thus things are different every moment.[8] This is the way Murti puts it.

This radical pluralism is offered by Hartshorne as a far more acceptable account of "matters of fact and existence" than two other views of the self or soul, the superficial and unclear conventional pluralism which has been "standard in most Western thought for over two thousand years," and the doctrine of Hindu monism that holds plurality of selves to be only appearance relative to the primary reality of Brahman, which is beyond all numerical diversity. He credits India with first producing the genius required "to make us aware of the limitations" of these two non-Buddhist views, and he blames Western philosophy and religion prior to Hume, "and in large part since Hume," for having "failed to grasp these limitations."[9]

Professor David Richardson of Utah State University was moved to explore the remarkable similarities between Western philosophy and Buddhist thought in its Indian background by Babbitt's study of Rousseau and Romanticism, which compares the Romantic movement to Taoism in China. Following this trail through Taoism backward into Buddhism, Richardson concludes that the doctrine of momentary actualities out of which all things are made, a doctrine involved in the Occasionalism of Malebranche, points to Hindu and Buddhist

[7] Charles Hartshorne, "The Buddhist-Whiteheadian View of the Self and the Religious Traditions," *Proceedings of the 9th International Congress for the History of Religions* (Tokyo, 1960), pp. 298-302.

[8] Murti, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-178, 121-123. "All theories of causation are conceptual devices and make-shifts."

[9] Hartshorne, *op. cit.*, p. 301. This radical pluralism, as Masson-Oursel writes in *Comparative Philosophy* (London: Kegan Paul, 1936), received its earliest expression in Indian Buddhism, whence it passed naturally into Chinese Buddhism beginning with the first century A.D., viz., "the antisubstantialism of Hume . . . is only equalled by the anti-substantialism of the Buddhists which likewise only acknowledges phenomena linked together by causality, and which exorcises the phantom of the object as object and teaches a phenomenology including a psychology 'without a psyche'" (p. 159).

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origins. The ancient Buddhist theory of causation, like that of Leibniz, Richardson observes, is a theory of "the functional dependency of all point-instants on their preceding points." A thing is not a cause "producing" something; rather, "the whole universe of point-instants immediately brings about the result in a functional dependence." The same relation of causality is stated as follows: "a thing is truly defined by its relations to *all* the other things of the entire universe." Thus it is, Richardson writes, for early Buddhist philosophy, for Leibniz, and for Hegel [and the writer would add, for Whitehead and Hartshorne as well, with fewer reservations for these two than with respect, perhaps, to early Buddhism]. The literature and ideas encountered by Leibniz, Richardson concludes, must have included Buddhist and Indian modes of thought, and he is persuaded that even the metaphor of the monad mirroring the entire universe of monads from its own concreteness is a metaphor that made its way into Western Europe from Buddhist and Indian origins.[10]

For Hume, however, unlike Leibniz, there can be no thought of events being related to all the other things of the entire universe. The more primitive teaching of the Buddha is closer to Hume in the Whiteheadian sense indicated by Hartshorne above, accepting events and objects in their momentariness. This is what we find in the early Pāli texts.[11] Only the momentary event itself, co-present with others, is what we perceive. Events contiguous in time and place, Hume observed, can be and are considered in terms of cause and effect, but this is chiefly a way of thinking, a manner of speaking, a cultural habit which leads us to look at one event as cause, the other as effect, and the bond between them as the "supposititious cause." When we really analyze our experience, all we find is the momentariness of events and the cultural habit or "propensity to feign" supposititious causes, which habit or propensity deadens our sensitivity to the sheer momentariness and co-arising (dependent origination) of the events.

Buddhist meditation and analysis is a process of heightening awareness of the momentariness of events, wherein all conditions are combined in a simultaneous correlation, as Govinda puts it; it is precisely because of this living juxtaposition and succession of the events in their momentariness that "the possibility of becoming free is conceivable."[12] "Life knows no absolute units but only centres of relation, continuous processes of unification, because reality cannot be broken up into bits; therefore each of its phases is related to the others, thus excluding the extremes of complete identity or non-identity."[13]

[10] D. B. Richardson, "The Leibnizian Reason of 'Matter-of-fact,'" *Scientia: Revue Internationale de synthese scientifique* [Como, Italie], 6th ser. (1965), pp. 11 and 13.
[11] E. R. Sarathchandra, *Buddhist Psychology of Perception* (Colombo: Ceylon University Press, 1958), p. 42.
[12] Lama Anagarika Govinda, *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy* (London: Rider & Co., 1961), p. 56.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

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Murti formulates the Abhidhamma's position as follows: "The Buddhist view . . . reduces change to a series of entities emerging and perishing; each entity however rises and perishes in entirety; it does not become another. Movement for the Buddhist is not the passage of an entity from one point to another; it is the emergence, at appropriate intervals, of a series of entities, like the individual pictures of a 'movie' show; it is a series of full-stops."[14]

Buddhist schools of philosophy wrestled for centuries with these questions, and the results by 1700 were as much a part of Chinese as of Indian thought. Our inability to find anything more substantial than a "supposititious cause" drives us "logically," according to Murti, into occasionalism,[15] which is what Richardson has in mind in linking these Buddhist reflections with Malebranche. Since we are interested here in relations between Hume and the Buddha, we will want to reserve judgment for the time being on the comparison with Malebranche, and especially on Murti's conviction that the Mādhyamika moves the Buddhist denial of substance closer to Kant than to Hume. There are many alternatives, the present one between viewing the conceptual link between cause and effect in the framework of a transcendental psychology, as in Kant, and viewing it more simply as a mere social convention, as in Hume.

As with the substantial self and with causality, so likewise with substance in the broadest philosophical sense. Whitehead used to say that most modern forms of immorality are traceable to the Christian-Aristotelian concept of substance. The issue, therefore, is hardly insignificant. Just as "we have no idea of external substance, distinct from the ideas of particular qualities," so likewise "we have no notion of it [the mind or self], distinct from the particular perceptions."[16] The unauthorized roving of thought beyond its proper territory, as in the case of the quail in the Buddhist parable,[17] results in the misuse of the mind, populating it with diversionary entities which mislead the human adventure. In actuality, we do not and cannot go behind the phenomena of matters of fact and existence. "Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there would be no difficulty in the case."[18]

Infer an entity behind an individual man, and you will logically infer it behind every individual thing; and so the mishandling of sensory experience creates the supposititious ghost-world of metaphysical entities beyond our own. Plato accepts both worlds and tries unsuccessfully to account for their participation. Buddha and Hume reject both, seeing everywhere only those functional unities that spring into being and pass away, arising and ceasing. "The mind," Hume says, "is a kind of theater, where several perceptions

[14] Murti, *op. cit.*, p. 75. Cf. pp. 121, 175, 177.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 175.
[16] Hume, *op. cit.*, p. 635.
[17] *Samyutta Nikāya*, V. 146 (PTS V. 125-126).
[18] Hume, *op. cit.*, p. 636.

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successively make their appearance, pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is no *simplicity* in it at one time, nor *identity* in different [times]."[19] We invent the links we seem to need to hold our world together—Self, Cause, Substance, God. None of these can be logically inferred from matters of fact found in our sense impressions. In this way Hume attacked the fundamental conceptions around which the formative centuries of modern philosophy revolved.

According to Ramanan, this is the full force of Nāgārjuna's philosophy as well, not to weave the tangled web of our experience into a unitary all-embracing view of the world, but to become mature in the realization that the world can be formulated in many different ways with unique value to each different perceiver, provided only the false sense of the real can be overcome and the error of misplaced absoluteness avoided.[20]

Malalasekera attributes the notion of a permanent self to the impurity of conventional language, an explanation also proposed by the Buddha, such that we are in the habit of saying that "it rains" and "I think" when we should say merely that "there is rain" and "there is thinking."[21] This is what Descartes would have said if he had had the analytic habit of mind found in Hume and the Buddha. The Buddha, indeed, anticipates by twenty-five centuries Wittgenstein's struggle to overcome the bewitchment of the intellect by language. In both there is the same meticulous handling of small items of consciousness, in themselves often of no apparent significance, until as a final cumulative impact of the analysis one is struck silent, as silent as the Buddha, instead of running out on all sides in fragments of discursive thought. Through analysis we penetrate each matrix of meaning, until clarification leaves nothing on which to cling.[22]

No one has ever exposed more relentlessly than Hume our illogical tendencies to leap from causal sequences to a First Cause, from history to super-history, from nature to supernature, from species of goodness to Perfect Being, from the inexplicable to a divine miracle-worker. Logic and science require us to stop where our evidence runs out; beyond this point the Buddha referred to what he called the "indeterminables." The Buddha stopped all these speculations because they leave us in the grip of our compulsive drives, which function in the Buddha's thinking as a sort of original sin tearing the

[19] *Ibid.*, I. iv. 6 (253).
[20] K. Venkata Ramanan, *Nāgārjuna's Philosophy* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 320-321.
[21] G. P. Malalasekera, "Some Aspects of Reality as Taught by Theravāda Buddhism," *Essays in East-West Philosophy*, ed. C. A. Moore (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1951), p. 185.
[22] Nolan Pliny Jacobson, *Buddhism: The Religion of Analysis* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966), chaps. 3 and 4.

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aboriginal harmony of existence asunder. In this way, Gotama Buddha discouraged belief in God without denying his existence; Hume did the same.

There are other similarities between Hume and the Buddha, such as their belief in the natural anthropocentric character of all knowledge, the belief that man's own nature is implicated in everything he knows, and the conviction held vigorously by both that reason is the slave of the passions,[23] that man's intellect but carries out what it is bidden by the sensitive side of our nature to do. This is what the Buddha calls *taṇhā*.[24] In reversing the role previously ascribed to the rational and the passionate sides of man's nature, both the Buddha and Hume shift mankind away from reliance upon established beliefs as a guide and directive for behavior. They are for this reason major turning points of history.

THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE RELIGIOUS LEADER OF MANKIND

The similarities mentioned above are more than remarkable when one remembers that Hume and the Buddha were separated by twenty-three hundred years and by different cultural traditions. There are reasons why Hume and the Buddha have been linked together more frequently than any other representatives of Eastern and Western thought. To avoid being entirely misleading, however, the major differences, at least, should be mentioned along with the emphasis that the differences certainly outweigh the similarities.[25]

The chief aim of the Buddha's thought is to distinguish sharply a path of salvation, a way of extricating the individual from the suffering which is the dominant feature of human living. The Buddha wishes to lead men to a supernormal type of vision and experience which can become the ballast and underpinning of man's life. In Hume there is nothing comparable to the concept of *Nibbāna,* and Hume is not trying to distinguish a path of salvation. He is not tortured with any fundamental wrongness in the way man lives; he is almost exclusively preoccupied with faulty reasoning and with certain steps which he believes may be taken to throw more light upon the sources of error in the way men use their minds. Although he was concerned with moral problems and with the grounds upon which men make judgments of value,[26] his chief aim was to analyze various ways of knowing and to discover principles which would stand up under critical examination. It is for this

[23] Hume, *op. cit.,* II. iii. 3 (415).
[24] Jacobson, *op. cit.,* pp. 57 ff., 72 ff.
[25] Nolan Pliny Jacobson, "Gotama Buddha et David Hume," *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l' Étranger* (1964), pp. 145-163.
[26] Hume, *op. cit.,* I. iv. 7 (271). Cf. Norman Kemp Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1960), p. 12.

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reason that Hume is everywhere viewed as the founder of the analytic movement in modern thought.

Hume is a philosopher pure and simple; the Buddha is a philosopher with few peers and also a religious leader of mankind. Hume considers honest skepticism a natural accompaniment of a good life, and to the very end viewed himself as an inquiet skeptic. Buddha's analysis of experience is undertaken to achieve a life centered in tranquility, like a flame in a windless place.

Even in their similar conclusions about the self, their differences stand out. The fact that the self as unitary and persisting is not found in the Buddha's analysis of experience comes as the solution of a problem and not as an enigma. Hume experiments with the possibility of explaining the self as a bundle of sensations held together with a sort of psychological gravity, after the manner of Newton's great discovery in the world of nature, while the Buddha finds man's freedom assured partly in the fact that this inner monitor which men everywhere accept as the governing principle of life turns out to be an illusion. Hume's rejection of the conventional view of the self follows upon his method of rejecting all concepts about the world which are not based in some sensory perception. For the Buddha, however, discovery of the illusory nature of the self represents a victory over the predicament of man.

The Buddha finds man's freedom also assured in the fact that the constituents of personality, like all other entities in nature, are a series of entities constantly emerging and perishing in the momentariness of *anicca*. His view of "dependent origination," therefore, is inseparable from his confidence in the extinction of suffering, since what has no independent existence loses its grip upon the individual who is oriented toward *Nibbāna*. Life is constituted by neither rigid necessity nor blind chance, but only by centers of relation. Any sequence of events and their possibilities can be removed. These views are bound together in the very heart of the *dhamma*. The tendency to cling to the relative as a substantial entity, and to the fragmentary, vanishes when their impermanence has been disclosed.[27]

Unlike Hume, the Buddha considered it possible to destroy the hold of unconscious motivations and the whole passional side of man's nature, "to transcend the experience of this conditioned world"; indeed, to achieve clarity of mind in what is called "supernormal perception."[28]

Hume, on the contrary, held the view that clarity of mind was at the sensory level and that ideas about the world (as distinct from mathematical concepts) grow increasingly confused the farther sense impressions are left behind. While he recognized with the Buddha that man "must strive against the current of nature"[29] if he is to loosen the shackles that bind him to an ignorant

[27] Ramanan, *op. cit.*, p. 48. Cf. Govinda, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-59.
[28] Shwe Zan Aung, *Compendium of Philosophy* (London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1956), pp. 55 and 60.
[29] Hume, *op. cit.*, I. iv. 7 (269).

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enactment of whatever uncriticized convention and personal bias dictate, Hume in no sense of the word *knows* a reality beyond transitory sense data and their combinations. Most people have concluded that Hume defended the principle of continuity in human experience and inquiry, though the nature of this continuity remained in doubt. The Buddha, however, testified to a depth-dimension in experience that defies naming and conceptual thought, yet yields more certitude than either sense impression or theoretical construct. His analytic leads into this dimension by way of meditation.

What distinguishes Hume most sharply from the Buddha, particularly as he is interpreted in the Theravāda tradition, is the fact that their philosophies lead in opposite directions. Hume leads the individual, chastened and enlightened, back to the social interchange in which he believed the "ultimate propensities" of human nature to be rooted. The Buddha's thought leads to a loosening of the individual's social involvement, at least in the conventional sense, into a type of metalingual meditation which frees the individual from ego-centered and social drives, freeing from all coercions, so that the outline of a fundamentally more humane social order may arise spontaneously from the activity of the liberated man.

Buddha sees into the solitariness of man, into the inexpressible and unshareable dimensions where one must walk alone; Hume sees man as a social being from first to last. This is a side of Hume's philosophy which has been neglected and distorted by English philosophers beginning with Moore, who misconstrued the role of sympathy and saw only the epistemology in Hume. We shall have occasion to wonder how much he drank at the well of Mencius' concept of universal sympathy, and how deeply it may have affected both Hume and Adam Smith. The capacity of man to project himself into the experiences of his fellow man was one of the world's marvels to David Hume.

Both Hume and the Buddha underwent a conversion and "enlightment" in which they were redirected in their basic commitments. The Buddha's analysis led him to the basic problem of man in society, which is not why he has the habits he has but why he refuses to change them even when it is transparently clear to everyone else that continuance in his present style of life may wreck his entire civilization. For the answer to this problem we are directed to *Nibbāna*. Hume's conversion led him into a deep appreciation of bio-social interchange as the natural element of human living.

Both Hume and Buddha sought to lead men away from egotism and from rule by logic and doctrine. "What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe?"[30] In a world which both Buddha and Hume view as transient, man seeks to hold on to the tangibles which sooner or later slip away

[30] David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, ed. H. D. Aiken (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1951), p. 22.

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like sand between his fingers. The usual reaction to this is to make everything center in and around the self. Both Hume and Buddha contend that the self is a false center around which to organize life. Buddha offers *Nibbāna,* which is not a social experience in any sense of the term. Hume offers as the alternative a kind of natural, sub-verbal communication, a sub-rational matrix in which the sources of mentality and meaning lie hidden. Just because of this, Hume is able to burrow beneath reason, loosening the shackles of concepts and language, not unlike the Buddhist analytic here, to arrive, not in *Nibbāna,* but in the sympathetic communication which is the fundamental bonding agent of human society and in which Hume found "the ultimate propensities of human nature." As I have attempted elsewhere to show, "spiritual, non-verbal communication of this sort is possible, and according to Hume constitutes the reality 'beyond which we cannot hope to find any principle more general' or more basic. It is the ultimate and irreducible fact. To stand upon this ground, in Hume's own words, is 'to stand with security.' "[31] This is what sympathy means in Hume, not a feeling or a "moral sense," but fellow-feeling; not an emotion or intuition, but the non-verbal matrix of interpersonal relations to which Hume fled whenever he became "afrighted" at the solvent power of his philosophy.

HOW TO ACCOUNT FOR THE SIMILARITY?

The differences between the teachings of the Buddha and the philosophy of David Hume will surprise no one, for they are what anyone would expect in the light of different cultural traditions and periods in history. But what about the similarities? How can the remarkable similarities be explained? In their rejection of traditional concepts of substance and causality, and in their view of the self, they are in closer agreement with one another than with people antecedent to them in their own tradition.

There are three possible explanations. First, the amazing convergence may be one of those rare parallel discoveries, like that of the zero in the subcontinent of India and in the Central American culture of the Mayas at approximately the same time, without any discoverable cultural influence (unless the Kon-Tiki expedition provides a clue). Second, there may be cultural diffusion at work from East to West, providing Hume and the entire eighteenth century in Western Europe with an intellectual environment unimaginably rich in Oriental ideas, whose influence upon Western philosophy has not yet been acknowledged by authors who write our histories of philosophy. Third, it could be a case of sheer historical miracle, so that there were no historical circumstances functioning in the elaborating of either of the philosophies, Hume's

[31] Nolan Pliny Jacobson, "The Uses of Reason in Religion: A Note on David Hume," *Journal of Religion,* XXXIX (Apr., 1959), p. 104.

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or the Buddha's. We might even follow Hume's famous criterion of a miracle here, holding that falsification of the case in favor of the miracle would itself be more miraculous than the miracle itself.

As indicated in the title of this essay, it is the second alternative that seems the most plausible when all the known facts are taken into consideration. This becomes increasingly clear when we consider the relevant features of Oriental influence which come directly to bear upon Hume's favorite authors, his closest friends, and his most provocative themes. Since Hume mentions no Asian materials of any kind in his writing, while many of those closest to him do, we are forced to build our case upon evidence wholly circumstantial in nature. However, two considerations support us at this point: (1) Circumstantial evidence is sometimes even more compelling than direct evidence in a court of law. As a precedent here, Carter's history of early European typography may be mentioned, in which the case for Asian models for early European playing cards and religious drawings is said to rest "on such strong circumstantial evidence as to be accepted with a reasonable degree of certainty."[32] (2) A very special circumstance giving powerful support to the case for Oriental influence is provided in the fact that Hume and the intellectuals of his time felt themselves under no obligation whatsoever to document the source of their ideas, and the evidence for this is boundless. The philosophical fraternity today follows such strict practices in this respect that it is easy to forget how largely if not exclusively this is a twentieth-century custom.

One of the major sources of Oriental thought for Hume is Pierre Bayle, as we shall indicate in some detail below; yet Hume mentions him only once by name in the *Treatise* (I. iv. 5 [243 n.]), and only once in the *Enquiries* (I. 12 [155 n.]). Kemp Smith and Richard Popkin have given us lengthy discourses on the uses Hume made of Bayle's treatment of identity and substance. Bayle's essay on Spinoza was a major influence upon Hume in many respects such as these, and Hume follows Bayle almost slavishly in discussions of these subjects, simply repeating Bayle's arguments in many places as though they were his own. *Yet no credit is given.* "The fact that Hume does not mention Bayle by name, and gives no reference to the *Zeno* article," Smith says in one connection, "and follows him with almost verbal consistency, is but one illustration of how different from our own was the practice in this regard at the time when Hume was writing."[33] "All too often," Popkin says, "the presentation of the problems, the terminology, and the ideas at issue derive directly from Bayle."[34]

[32] T. F. Carter, *The Invention of Printing in China and its Spread Westward* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1925).
[33] Kemp Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 43 n., 284 n., 514-515.
[34] Richard H. Popkin, "Bayle and Hume," *Communicaciones Libres* (Memorias de XIII Congreso Internacional de Filosofía, México, 1963), I, 316.

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In the light of these facts, Hume's failure to say anything about Oriental sources in both Bayle's and his own philosophy is worth nothing whatsoever, and we are left with circumstantial evidence developed from the massive Oriental influence in the intellectual climate of the time and from the remarkable similarity of some of these ideas with Hume's. We have already indicated the striking similarity between the central concepts of Hume and the Buddha. It remains for us to see how this Oriental influence is a major feature of the total intellectual climate of Western Europe at the time, and a philosophical influence Hume could not escape. In some ways, as we shall see, and especially in the areas of ethics, political thought, and philosophy of science, Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was more interested in Oriental ideas than in its own classical background.

ASIAN INFLUENCE IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE

By the time Hume arrived in France to begin writing the *Treatise,* Europe had been in the orbit of Oriental influence for two centuries and more, and in his own century was experiencing what has been called a "craze" for everything Chinese.

China by this time had become a repository for all the major ideas of the entire continent of Asia, and far too much coalescence of Hindu, Buddhist, and Chinese philosophy had occurred over the centuries to permit any dissociation for our purposes here between the influence of Chinese thought, on the one hand, and the influence of Buddhist and other Indian ideas, on the other.

Buddhism had made its way into China during the first century A.D. The Mādhyamika was introduced to the Chinese by Kumārajīva shortly after 400 A.D. It is also unnecessary for our purposes to decide the precise nature of the influence these Buddhist inroads each had had in China.[35] From the first to the fifth centuries a general homogenizing of Taoist, Confucian, and Buddhist concepts had occurred. Between the ninth and the fifteenth centuries this coalescence had been carried much further, so that among Chinese intellectual historians today this condition is taken for granted. This is not to deny that certain types or schools of Buddhism confined themselves rather successfully to Indian traditions and, while in China, managed to keep the original Indian tradition intact. Fung Yu-lan calls this "Buddhism in China" to distinguish it from the "Chinese Buddhism" which made contact with Chinese thought and had far-reaching influence on Chinese philosophy, literature, and art. Buddhist

[35] Richard H. Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika in India and China* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), chaps. 3-7. This is a study of the interpretation of the Mādhyamika by Kumārajīva and three of his Chinese contemporaries, Hui-yüan, Seng-jui, and Seng-chao.

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and Taoist ideas, especially, were blended together, one outcome being the Ch'an school (the Japanese "Zen"). Taoist terminology was used to explain Buddhist ideas, *Yu* as Being, *Wu* as Non-Being, *Yu-wei* as action, *Wu-wei* as non-action.

Thus a synthesis took place during these centuries, "a synthesis of Indian Buddhism with Taoism, leading to the foundation of a Chinese form of Buddhism."[36] The culmination of this synthesis during the twelfth century is suggested by Fung Yu-lan, with remarkable grasp of the deepest meaning of Buddhism, when he quotes Wang Shou-jen saying, "The claim of the Buddhists that they have no attachment to phenomena shows that they do have attachment to them. . . . They are forced to escape because they are already attached to them." To which Fung adds that this is an instance of a Neo-Confucian being "more Buddhistic than Buddhists."[37] One is reminded of numerous Buddhist warnings against becoming attached to the yearning for *Nibbāna*.

In his discussion of the Sung Neo-Confucians, Needham says that "they accomplished their great synthesis of Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist elements just before the greatest synthesiser of European scholastic Christian-Aristotelian thinking entered upon his career. [Chu Hsi died in 1200; Aquinas was born in 1225.] If the contemporaneity of these two synthetic enterprises is but a coincidence, it is a rather remarkable one."[38] Passing over Needham's belief that Oriental influence upon European philosophy came much earlier than the period we are discussing, and that it entered Europe through such philosophers as the Moslem Averroes and the Jew Maimonides, let us note that Chu Hsi, whom Needham considers "the greatest of all Chinese thinkers," the great synthesizer of Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist elements as indicated above, had been studied by Leibniz through the good offices of the Jesuits, who transmitted Chu Hsi in "translations and despatches."[39] Of Leibniz' concept of pre-established harmony, Needham suggests that this was "the first appearance of organisms upon the stage of occidental theorising. . . . That things should not react upon one another but all work together by a harmony of wills was no new idea for the Chinese; it was the foundation of their correlative thinking."[40]

The role of Leibniz as a major vehicle for bringing Taoist, Confucian, and Buddhist ideas into the intellectual climate of Europe has already given rise to an extensive literature into which we need not go, except to indicate two

[36] Fung Yu-lan, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, trans. Derk Bodde (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), p. 242, chaps. 21-26.
[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 318-319.
[38] Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), II, 457.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 291.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 292.

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trails leading out of the Orient into the very heart of Hume's philosophy; one leading from Leibniz to Bayle to Hume, the other from Quesnay to Adam Smith to Hume.

Leibniz learned his Chinese thought from Jesuit missionaries, who had kept up a running battle with rival monastic orders and incurred their hostility century after century by insisting upon probing deeply into the thought world of those to whom the Christian faith was to be brought. We are working here with philosophical resources that testify to the value of this Jesuit struggle which in every century risked the disfavor of Rome.[41] After Leibniz, Oriental philosophy was a major feature of European thought.

We may conclude, then, that Indian, Buddhist, and traditional Chinese ideas, in process of synthesis over more than a thousand years in China, came into Europe with powerful impact upon the intellectual climate from before Leibniz to the French Revolution.

The China "craze" lasted too long to be called a fad, and it penetrated far beyond the preoccupations of philosophy into all the major areas of culture. Admiration for Chinese rationality, virtue, and art was especially prevalent in England and on the Continent. Houses had Chinese rooms; the Duke of Kent had a beautiful Chinese garden created, complete with the pagoda; Chippendale had designed a Chinese bedstead for a room with Chinese wallpaper, mirrors, and chairs. Porcelain, lacquer, silks, and Chinese landscape painting are part of the substance of this learning from the East.

Everything Chinese was in fashion and indiscriminately admired in the French coffeehouse and salon of the mid-eighteenth century where Hume was a frequent celebrity. The Chinese were admired chiefly for their achievement in education, for their thinking about the nature of man, the reliability of his natural interests, his perfectibility, the idea that virtue can be taught and that the ethical is the highest level of human fulfillment, the doctrine of universal sympathy found in Mencius, which came to figure in the reflections of both Hume and Adam Smith, and in all this the complete absence of any need for a religious metaphysics, or even for bringing religious doctrines into accord with reason. This was the century that saw in China, as Hudson puts it, "the religion of the philosopher enlarged to the status of a national cult."[42] Are there any ideas in Hume more central to his philosophy than these? Is it likely that books and discussions of issues such as these would have completely escaped his attention?

To look a bit more at the broad scope of the impact of the Far East, the Oriental source of Europe's movable block printing is well known, as is the case of gunpowder, the mechanical clock, the equine harness, the stirrup, and

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 496-505.

[42] G. F. Hudson, *Europe and China* (London: E. Arnold & Co., 1931), pp. 287 and 328. Cf. Beacon Press edition, p. 319.

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the wheelbarrow. Less well known is the case of the magnetic compass, known in China from about 300 B.C. There is every likelihood that the Vikings, who were in contact with Asia through their colonies in Moscow and Kiev, acquired by the ninth century the compass they must have had to cross the Atlantic and sail up the Saint Lawrence five hundred years before Columbus.

One can hardly imagine a more substantial and many-sided influence than the impact China was having upon seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe. "The spread of knowledge about Asian beliefs, institutions, arts, and crafts was of genuine and serious interest," Lach's recent work observes, "to European rulers, Humanists, churchmen, governmental reformers, religious thinkers, geographers, philosophers, collectors of curios, artists, craftsmen and the general public. . . ."[43]

Except for the authors of our histories of philosophy, the influence of the Orient upon western European thought, and particularly upon the following major figures, is so generally known by historians as to be assumed. In France those chiefly influenced include Pierre Bayle, Malebranche, Fénelon,[44] Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Quesnay. In Germany they include Leibniz and Christian Wolff, who had to leave Halle and Prussia briefly because of a lecture given in 1721 in which he praised Confucian morality and placed it on the same level as Christian morality.[45] In England, Anthony Ashley Cooper (Lord Shaftesbury) and Alexander Pope stand out in this connection, Shaftesbury having founded the so-called "moral sense" school worked out in systematic form by Hutcheson and considered by some (erroneously, I am sure) to find its clearest formulation in Hume. In Scotland the major figure

[43] Donald Lach, *Asia in the Making of Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), I, xx.

[44] Fénelon is one of the French authors with whom Hume was making a conscious effort to come to terms while at La Flèche. Archbishop of Cambray and philosopher of Quietism, Fénelon had acquired one of Hume's countrymen, Chevalier Ramsay, as an ardent disciple. Ramsay was awarded an honorary degree of LL.D. at Oxford University and was a well-known man of letters. Dr. John Stevenson, an eminent Edinburgh physician, recommended David Hume as a possible translator for some "Chinese Letters" that Ramsay was writing. The arrangement was never consummated, but it is another indication of the proximity of China to the French intellectual climate in which Hume was living. See E. C. Mossner, *The Life of David Hume* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1954), pp. 79 f., 93-96.

[45] Wolfgang Franke, *China and the West: The Cultural Encounter, 13th to 20th Centuries* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 63. Better fortune attended Tindal in England, who saw no difference in the "simple maxims" of Confucius and Christ except that the former helped to illuminate the "more obscure ones of the latter." *Christianity As Old As Creation* (2nd ed.; London, 1731), p. 314. Father Lecomte, member of the French Jesuit mission, who went to China in 1685, was less fortunate than either Wolff or Tindal, his writings being condemned by the Theological Faculty of the University of Paris because he praised the morality of the Chinese and the beneficent philosophy of Confucius. See p. 177 of Arnold H. Rowbotham's article, "China and the Age of Enlightenment in Europe," *The Chinese Social and Political Review*, 19 (July, 1935), 176-201.

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for our purposes is Adam Smith, whose doctrine of the "invisible hand" and concept of sympathy bear too close resemblance to Taoism's idea of the rational adjustment of all interests to one another in human society to let us think that the influence of the Orient could have been less than prominent. It can hardly be accidental that one of the concepts most central to Hume, the doctrine of universal sympathy, originates in Mencius and underlies the ethics of several European contemporaries of Hume, the chief one being Adam Smith. Maverick writes that Mencius' doctrine of sympathy was probably a major influence in both Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) and the work of a French public servant named Silhouette, also well known to Quesnay.[46] This is where Hume went beyond the "moral sense" concept of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.

All of these people were in more or less close communication, reading each other's books and discussing one another's ideas, so that the implications of Oriental ideas in such a community of scholars would have been in a continuous process of unfolding. A group of Chinese studying theology at the Jesuit college in Naples kept up a lengthy correspondence after returning to China and seem to have had a profound influence in shaping the theories of the physiocrats, the leading one being Quesnay, with whom Hume talked at length on numerous occasions, and to whom Hume's closest friend, Adam Smith, had intended to dedicate *The Wealth of Nations,* but for Quesnay's unexpected death. The dependence of Quesnay's political and economic theories

[46] Lewis A. Maverick, *China: A Model for Europe* (San Antonio: Paul Anderson Co., 1946), p. 32. One paragraph of Silhouette's work calls to mind the subsequent work of Adam Smith in *Moral Sentiments*: "The good man has for the basis of all his virtues, humanity. The love which one man should feel for all men is not a thing foreign to man; it is the man himself . . . it is the quality that distinguishes him from other creatures; and it is the basis of all his laws" (quoted by Maverick, p. 32).

Cf. Lewis A. Maverick, "Chinese Influences upon the Physiocrats," *Economic History,* III, nos. 13-15 (Feb., 1938), 54-67; and "The Chinese and the Physiocrats: a Supplement," *Economic History,* IV, no. 15 (Feb., 1940), 312-318.

Consider the following striking similarity between Hume and Mencius. "'Tis certain, that sympathy is not always limited to the present moment, but that we often feel by communication the pains and pleasures of others, which are not in being, and which we only anticipate by the force of imagination. For supposing I saw a person perfectly unknown to me, who, while asleep in the fields, was in danger of being trod under foot by horses, I shou'd immediately run to his assistance; and in this I shou'd be actuated by the same principle of sympathy, which makes me concern'd for the present sorrows of a stranger." Hume, *op. cit.,* II. ii. 9 (385). Mencius puts it this way: "When I say that all men have a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others, my meaning may be illustrated thus: —nowadays, if men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress. They will feel so, not as a ground on which they may gain the favor of the child's parents, nor as a ground on which they may seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor from a dislike to the reputations of having been unmoved by such a thing." *The Works of Mencius* (trans. James Legge), II. i. 6 (3).

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upon the Chinese, a dependence Quesnay gladly and frequently confessed, is, as one writer puts it, "astonishingly clear."[47] One idea which is central to the Enlightenment, the idea that virtue can be taught, was thought by Quesnay to have been universally neglected except among the Chinese.[48] The school program of Turgot, another member of Hume's French community, was based upon the same ideas.

Bayle was also a friend of Leibniz, with whom he debated their different philosophies at length, to the profit of everyone who heard these two eminent minds come to grips with the philosophical issues of the time. Leibniz, indeed, was the first eminent European to recognize the great intellectual importance of Chinese culture for the development of the West. More circumspect in public pronouncements than his fellow countryman, Christian Wolff, and capable of misleading us regarding his high estimate of Chinese thought with remarks unfavorable to features of Chinese behavior which his readers might be expected to find objectionable, Leibniz seems actually to have done more than anyone to interest serious European students in the subtleties of Chinese philosophy. "The influence of Leibniz," Lach says, "upon his contemporaries and upon his successors was just as important in the field of Chinese studies as it was in general philosophy and mathematics."[49] Lach goes further to affirm that Leibniz considered Chinese philosophy "not a foreign system of thought, but simply an alien counterpart of his own monadology and the Christian religion. . . . His was not a mystical longing for union with the 'enchanting' Orient; his was a carefully outlined plan to bring together in intellectual harmony the East and West which Kipling later contended would never meet."[50] It is beyond believing that Leibniz would have failed to exert this kind of influence upon Bayle, who as we shall see was the major philosophical influence upon Hume's life.

This is the natural scene of Europe going to school to civilizations of great antiquity. Voltaire speaks in the tempo of the period as follows: "If as a philosopher one wishes to instruct oneself about what has taken place on the globe, one must first of all turn one's eyes towards the East, the cradle of all arts, to which the West owes everything."[51]

This intellectual atmosphere, moreover, is the natural fruition of communica-

[47] Adolf Reichwein, *China and Europe* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1925), p. 107.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 108. Quesnay asserts that the government of the Middle Kingdom is "the most ancient, the most humane, the most widely extended and the most flourishing which has ever existed." Auguste Oncken, *Oeuvres économiques et philosophiques de F. Quesnay* (Paris, 1888), p. 627.
[49] Donald Lach, "Leibniz and China," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, VI, no. 4 (Oct., 1945), 453.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 455.
[51] Reichwein, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

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tion with the East, which had been going on for a very long time. Jesuits had been in the Far East for over two hundred years, and in Burma since 1600. Franciscans had been throughout the East as early as the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and a Franciscan, Jean de Montecorvin, had actually built a church in Peking by 1369.[52] The "first European to gain any insight into the doctrines of the Buddhists of Burma was the Franciscan friar, Pierre Bonifer, a Frenchman and a doctor of the University of Paris."[53] This is the mid-sixteenth century.

Jesuits had acquired some 40,000 volumes in their college at La Flèche, where Hume wrote his famous *Treatise* and, according to Mossner, spent three years, 1734-1737, reading French works which "seem so astonishing for a foreigner to have consulted."[54] Hume not only made full use of the library; he also refers to his Jesuit acquaintances there as men "of some parts and learning."

The first ambassador Louis XIV had ever received from the Far East was from Siam; "the same ship taking this ambassador home also had on board M. Vachet from the Society for Foreign Missions in Paris, who was returning to his mission in Siam, bringing with him three priests of his Society, after having accompanied the Siamese ambassador to Paris. There were several Jesuits traveling aboard the same ship bound for Siam and other nations of the Far East."[55] Only the person who has never been to Thailand could believe that Europeans could live there without coming face to face with Buddhist forms of beauty and authentic Buddhist attitudes and viewpoints toward life. Dominicans and Benedictines add to the lines of communication.

Considering the amount of Asian influence that had been present in Europe, particularly in the eighteenth century and in France in a special way since before 1600, and considering both the nature of David Hume and the kind of ideas he spent his life writing and discussing, his exposure to major concepts of Asian civiilizations would appear to have been unavoidable. Hume would seem to have been reading Asian materials which passed out of print and into discard with the French Revolution, when Europe's attraction with the East came to an abrupt end under the mounting pressures of the new age of science and industry. According to Lach, "by 1776 the variety and wealth of materials available to any European scholar such as Hume was overwhelming"; and "no systematic analysis of these materials has so far been undertaken."[56] It is more than tempting to conclude, therefore, that Hume's cultural matrix included a

[52] Virgile Pinot, *La Chine et la Formation de l'Esprit Philosophique en France, 1640-1740* (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1932), pp. 17-18.
[53] Lach, *Asia in the Making of Europe*, I, bk. II, *op. cit.*, p. 557.
[54] E. C. Mossner, *The Life of David Hume* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1954), p. 102. This is the college that had educated Descartes.
[55] Pinot, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

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great deal of Chinese, Hindu, and Buddhist thinking, some of it but poorly understood, but nonetheless provocative for all that. Hume lived in a flood of Oriental ideas that had been around for so long that people more often than not would have become unconscious of its source.

We can sharpen the focus of Oriental influence upon Hume by choosing Bayle as the specific vehicle for ideas that are central in Hume, particularly his treatment of causality, his refutation of all rational arguments for God, and the solvent he applied to the philosophic concepts of substance and the substantial self. Among the people Hume was reading intently, the man most likely to have grasped the significance of ideas in full flood from the Far East would have been Bayle, who Popkin contends was *"the* major intellectual figure of the early 18th century."[57] Hume, moreover, Popkin says, "is more Bayle's successor than any French Enlightenment figure can claim to be."[58]

Leibniz, Bayle, and Shaftesbury all died within a single decade, the decade in which Hume was born. The influence of Oriental philosophy is an established fact, and an acknowledged fact, in all three. Popkin believes that Hume received the most from Bayle. As early as 1732 he was avidly reading Bayle, and as we noted above there is a great deal of Hume's writing which follows Bayle even slavishly without any acknowledgement of the origin of his ideas. This reading of Bayle occurred, it should be emphasized, during Hume's deepest and most formative reflections and particularly during the writing of the *Treatise*. He picks up the battle against efforts to give religious doctrines rational justification. It had been Bayle's labor to show that all dogmatic doctrines, all knowledge which carries us beyond the senses, is contrary to reason. Arguments for the existence of God and for the immortality of the soul lose their cogency with Bayle. Everything we find in the *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* had been anticipated in Bayle.

Bayle's skepticism has two major philosophical sources, however, one being his frank admiration for China, where men seemed to understand that religion succumbs to intolerance only at the cost of losing its soul. Bayle wrote admiringly of the tolerance of the Chinese emperor for Jesuit missions. He writes with understanding of the "real nothingness" of Buddhism as "that which has no properties of sensible matter."[59]

The other source of Bayle's skepticism reaches back to Pyrrho, who accompanied Alexander to India, and who in Greece subsequently established Skepticism, a doctrine which confers freedom upon man in the Hindu-Buddhist

[56] Donald F. Lach, personal correspondence with the author, March 30, 1966.
[57] Popkin, *op. cit.*, p. 318.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 319.
[59] Pierre Bayle, *Historical and Critical Dictionary*, trans. R. H. Popkin (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1965), pp. 290-294.

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style by detachment and disentanglement from knowledge-claims regarding the true constitution of things.

Efforts to seek out the sources of Hume's major ideas must soon come to acknowledge the wide range of influences, both Western and Oriental in origin, to which Hume was part deliberately, part unconsciously subjected. Ideas propounded by "the yellow-garbed monks of yore" climbed the Himalayas, and were linked with an unexpected destiny by being synthesized and sharpened in a thousand years of Chinese philosophic discourse, whence they traveled the Old Silk Road and ocean trade routes to make a major contribution to the struggle of Western man to wriggle free from the fading philosophic tapestry of the ancient world.

It is worth wondering whether western Europe, without this unconfessed assistance from the East, could have succeeded in the secularization and desacralization of life which is now the dominant feature of that great venture in civilization whose headwaters lie around the Mediterranean, and whose values, until the quiet invasion of the East, were enshrouded in the authoritarianism of a divinely instituted church and a supernaturally revealed scripture.

If the history of philosophy is to be written at all, it ought to be written in the light of the East-West encounter which has really been going on now for a very long time. Nowhere is provincialism and cultural hypnotism more disastrous, perhaps, and linked more intimately with continued ignorance, mutual suspicion, and hostility between the various fragments of the emerging world civilization, than in our ethnocentric histories and conferences of philosophy. The present essay has selected one major Western figure, David Hume, in order to attempt to discover whether and how far the similarities between him and the dominant philosophic figure of the East, Gotama Buddha, point to the East-to-West influence which one might immediately suspect. We have found that the trails are many, but that the direction points ever Eastward. One of the most convincing results, however tangential it may be to the main line of the inquiry, is this, that in the only really significant gulf that opens between Hume and the Buddha, the non-verbal communication which Hume views as the fundamental bonding agent of human life and the ultimate ground of human nature, the philosophic trail leads, not backward into the Mediterranean, but to another major Asian tradition that rises in the concept of universal sympathy in Mencius.

To put it with the utmost brevity, it appears that Oriental influences were so much a part of the intellectual climate in which Hume moved that neither he nor anyone of comparable prominence in the debates of the time could have formulated his thoughts apart from these influences. Asia played a dominant role in the thinking of the eighteenth century, especially in that thinking which had the largest future to play in the secularization of modern life; it played a

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prominent role in the shaping of Hume's thought, particularly in his working over of the notions of causality, substance, the role of reason in religion, and the enduring, ever-identical self. Hume's position in the history of philosophy belongs, not to the West alone, but to the world of man; and his great eminence as a founder of modern philosophy rests, not on the originality of his conceptual tools, but on the fact that he developed the implications of these ideas with a rigor and thoroughness probably unmatched in the history of thought.

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Looking at the varied and complex nature of Indian systems, it would appear that it is impossible to detect any central or pivotal problem common to all of them. Although we find that they discuss questions regarding the nature of self, God, causation, substance, universals and so on, yet these are particular questions and are neither central nor common. We are in search of a central question which is common to all systems. The problem of creation cannot be called a common question, as Buddhism and Jainism do not bother about it. Nor can we regard the problem of substance as common, because not only Buddhism, but also the Sāṁkhya and Yoga systems, do not raise it. The same is true about the question regarding the nature of reality. These problems are neither common nor central. If any other suggestion is made, we will try to see whether it satisfies our two conditions: first, whether it is common to all the systems, and second, whether it is of central metaphysical importance to every system in the sense that all other doctrines of the system depend on it.

Needless to say, we are trying to discover that basic problem which determines the peculiar logic of every system so that any change in that logic affects the whole metaphysical structure. The problem of relation is, in our view, such a central problem. It is, as will be shown, on their attitude to the nature of relation that the various doctrines of the different systems seem to hinge, and it is a problem which every system has to discuss. Before we proceed to develop our thesis, let us point out that the problem raised here is not the same as that raised by Hume. There is no doubt that Hume brought the problem of relation to the forefront in modern philosophy for the first time. He pointed out that the central problem of philosophy was the problem of relation in general and of causal relation in particular. The problems regarding substance and quality, etc., were really secondary. All the same, it must be noticed that Hume's formulation of the problem was different, as he was attacking the problem in the context of British empiricism. His problem—whether there is any cognitive basis for our belief in necessary relations—is epistemological, while the problem raised in the Indian systems is metaphysical. The question asked here is whether relations are real. We are going to read the whole of Indian philosophy in the light of this question and as such, we will be making generalizations which will expose us to all the risks to which generalizations are open. Let us see how far we succeed.

Commonly speaking, there are two basic aspects or features of our experience: identity and difference. We find these two in ourselves as subjects as well as in the objects we perceive. All pairs of categories, such as substance and quality, permanence and change, subject and object, body and soul, universal and particular, one and many, can be reduced to these two basic features of experience, identity and difference. But identity and difference, whether in

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the subject or in the object, are not just juxtaposed with an air of indifference to each other; they are believed to be somehow related; the one seems to belong to the other or the one seems to imply the other. There is change and yet there is somehow permanence also. This is our common natural belief and we do not feel bothered about their relation except when we become reflective and metaphysical. But is the relation between the two real? If so, how can both belong to one and the same thing, diametrically opposed as they are to each other? The various systems of Indian metaphysics seem to us to be different attempts to answer the above question.

It is possible to formulate *a priori* all the possible basic approaches to this question. First, it may be held that identity, difference, and the relation between the two are all equally real. Second, it may be contended that while identity and difference are real, the relation between the two is false. Third, it is possible to maintain that not only the relation but also one of the relata—either identity or difference—must be false. Fourth, one may take the position, which is the exact opposite of the first position, that identity, difference, and the relation between the two are all equally false. To put it briefly, either all the three are real or all the three are false, or only the relation is false or relation as well as one of the terms are both false. These alternatives are exhaustive and exclusive, and every system of Indian philosophy can be brought under one or the other of these four possible views.

That all the three—the relation as well as the relata—are equally real is the fundamental metaphysical doctrine of all the realist systems of India. It is a tenet common to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṁsā, Jainism and all the realist interpretations of Vedānta, such as Dvaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Śuddhādvaita, etc. This is because a pluralist view of reality cannot be sustained without accepting the reality of relation. The question raised here is: How can there be an unreal relation between two reals? Realist systems therefore rightly emphasize the reality of relation. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is the most thorough and consistent elaboration of this viewpoint. It is easy to see how the doctrine of *samavāya* (inherence) is central in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system; the categories of *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality), *karman* (action) and *sāmānya* (universal) hang on *samavāya* even as does the doctrine of *asat-kāryavāda* (the theory that the effect does not pre-exist in its cause). Because of its centrality, critics such as the Vedāntins and the Buddhists concentrate their attention on this concept and attack it vigorously. The Buddhists, as empiricists, ask the question: If relation is as real as the relata, why is it not seen as a thing? The Vedāntins press the question: If relation is as real as the relata, then it would itself need another relation to relate it to the relata and there would be a regress ad infinitum. In any event, our concern at present is not whether the acceptance of the reality of relation is tenable, but only that

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the reality of relation is pivotal in all the realist systems. Their merit is that they keep us near common sense.

The weaknesses of the realist view of relation were easily noticed by the Sāṁkhya-Yoga thinkers, who took the position that although the terms are real, the relation between them is false. Relation cannot be of the same status as the relata. *Puruṣa* (consciousness; spirit) and *prakṛti* (nature; material force)—the one representing identity and the other representing difference—are both real, but the relation between the two is not real or ultimate; it can be removed by *viveka* or discriminating knowledge. There is no real relation either between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* or between two *puruṣas*. The question here is: How can there be a real relation between two such incompatible and exclusive realities as *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* or identity and difference? One is here reminded of the Buddhist dictum: *yo viruddha dharmādhyāsavān na asau ekaḥ*. That cannot be one which has opposite attributes. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga fondly believes that the dissolution of relation will result in the separation and security of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. The Sāṁkhya philosophers fail to see that a relation has two aspects—that of relating as well as of separating. The presence of a relation between two things means connection as well as separation. But the Sāṁkhya philosophers thought that a relation means only connection and so as soon as the relation is rejected, the relata will fall apart. It does not occur to them to ask the question: If the relation between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is false, why do the two not become one? What is there to stand between them? In other words, they are not able to see that there cannot be two independent things or that the conception of two absolutes is self-contradictory. Further, they do not see that if relation is false, then the relation between cause and effect also would be false, and that would mean the *vivartavāda* (the doctrine of appearance) of Advaita Vedānta. Nor do they see that the logic of accepting identity behind difference would lead to the acceptance of one *puruṣa* behind the appearance of the plurality of *puruṣas*. The merit of the Sāṁkhya is its appreciation of the difference in the status of the relata and their relation.

The Buddhists and the Vedāntins took no time in noticing that the Sāṁkhya view of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* as two absolutes or two independent realities was an impossible position. They both agreed with the Sāṁkhya as against the realists that relation could not be as real as the relata, first, because relation is not given like the relata and second, because if relation also were real, then it would itself become a term. So relation must have a status different from that of the relata; it must be false. But they argued further that if relation is false, one of the terms also must be false—"difference" for the Vedāntin and "identity" for the Buddhist. It is for this reason that the Vedāntin is in favor of the unifying category of self or *Ātman*, while the Buddhist rejects all unifying categories such as self, substance, universals, etc. Their common logic is that

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if relation is false, it is because one of the terms is false; there cannot be an unreal relation between two reals, or the falsity of relation entails the falsity of one of the relata.

The intriguing question that arises here is this: Though the Buddhists and the Advaitins seem to accept the same logic—the falsity of relation entails the falsity of one of the terms—how is it that while the one comes to accept the reality of difference, the other takes only identity as real? The Advaitin advocates the reality of identity on the basis of the logic that identity is more basic or fundamental than difference—*abheda purvako bhedaḥ*. The analysis of sleep and the possibility of *nirvikalpa samādhi* (dualityless concentration) show that identity is independent of difference, while difference cannot even be known unless there is identity. So the Advaitin accepts identity and rejects difference. The Buddhist argues in a different way. His point is that reality must be *arthakriyākārin* or efficient, and identity or permanence cannot be *arthakriyākārin,* and so it is unreal. Difference is real as it can explain change. It is obvious that this step of the Buddhist to start with an *a priori* definition of reality is rather dogmatic; it is like saying that reality is what I like it to be. But the merit of the Buddhist and the Advaitin is that they accept at least one feature of experience as real and do not cut both the wings of experience, as it were. It is for the Mādhyamika to take that step.

The fourth alternative, that all the three—the two terms and the relation between them—are equally unreal is advocated by the Mādhyamika, who detects an element of dogmatism in both the Advaitic and the Buddhist schools. His point is that identity and difference, being correlated, must go together; if one is false the other is also, and if you accept the one you must also accept the other. Identity and difference—*ātmavāda* and *anātmavāda*—being incompatible, both cannot be accepted but both can be rejected. If the logic of the Advaitin and of the *anātmavādin* is that falsity of relation means the falsity of one of the terms, the logic of the Mādhyamika is that the falsity of one of the terms means the falsity of the other also, the two being relative. The Mādhyamika refuses to accept either the Advaitin's claim that identity is more basic or the other Buddhist's claim that reality is efficient (*arthakriyākārin*). He points out that neither pure identity nor pure difference can explain change, as change requires both identity and difference, and yet both cannot be accepted. That is the paradox of all categories according to the Mādhyamika; *tattva* (reality) must be beyond all categories. While the logic of the Mādhyamika seems to be inexorable and ruthless, its shortcoming seems to be that it throws *tattva* completely out of experience, and one wonders whether such a *tattva,* which has nothing to do with us or our experience, can ever be realized. There seems to be no point of contact with *tattva.* In order to be free from contradiction *tattva* must be transcendent, but in order to be realized it must also be immanent in experience. This is a point appreciated by the Advaitin.

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Our brief survey of the metaphysical position of the different Indian systems brings out two things. First, all the different systems can be exhaustively comprehended under the four possible views regarding relation, and so the question of relation is common to all of them. Second, the main doctrines of the various systems can be derived from their attitude to the status of relation; in fact, their attitude to relation gives them their fundamental logic, and so it can be regarded as the pivot of the system. It is for this reason that we maintain the thesis that the problem of relation is the central problem of Indian metaphysics.

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Gerald J. Larson

Classical Sāṃkhya and the phenomenological ontology of Jean-Paul Sartre

The designation "classical Sāṃkhya" in this paper refers to the definitive formulation of Sāṃkhya theory as set forth by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the text *Sāṃkhyakārikā,* written in the first centuries A.D.[1] It is not meant to include what the present writer has elsewhere called "proto-Sāṃkhya" (i.e., the Sāṃkhya of the *Gītā* or the *Mokṣadharma*), nor to include "Renaissance Sāṃkhya" or "Neo-Sāṃkhya" (i.e., the Sāṃkhya of Vijñānabhikṣu, Aniruddha, etc.).[2]

The purpose of this study is to bring to light some parallels between "classical Sāṃkhya" and the thought of Jean-Paul Sartre. Our procedure is, first, to set forth a brief interpretation of the meaning of classical Sāṃkhya, and second, to compare classical Sāṃkhya with some of the major assertions of Sartre in *Being and Nothingness.*

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1 Henry Thomas Colebrooke, ed. and trans., *"The Sánkhya Kárikā . . . by Íswara Krishna" . . . Also "the Bháshya or Commentary of Gaurapáda"; translated, and illustrated by an original comment, by Horace Hayman Wilson* (Oxford: Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland, 1837). Also, *"The Sáṅkhyakárikā," with an exposition called "Chandrikā" by Nárāyaṇa Tirtha, and Gauḍapádáchárya's commentary,* ed. Paṇḍit Bechanaráma Tripáṭhi, Benares Sanskrit Series, work 5, no. 9 (Benares: Braj B. Das and Co., 1883). For best available newer editions of *Kārikās,* see *The Sāṃkhyakārikā of Íśvara Kṛṣṇa,* ed. and trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras: University of Madras, 1948); and *"Les Strophes de Sāṃkhya," avec le Commentaire de Gauḍapáda, Sanskrit text and translation,* trans. Anne-Marie Esnoul (Paris: Société d'Édition, Les Belles Lettres, 1964).

The present writer has also consulted the following commentaries on the *Kārikās:* Paramārtha's Chinese version: M. J. Takakusu, ed. and trans., "La Sāṃkhyakārikā (II)," *BEFEO* [Hanoi], IV (1904), 978-1061; *Bhāṣya of Gauḍapāda:* Colebrooke-Wilson (*op. cit.*), and *"The Saṇkhyakārikā," with an exposition called "Chandrikā" and Gauḍapādāchārya's commentary,* ed. B. Tripathi (Benares: Braj B. Das, 1883); *Mātharavṛtti: "Sânkhya Karika by Iswara Krishna" with commentary of Matharacharya,* ed. Vishnu Prasad Sarma, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, work 56, no. 296 (Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1922).

Also, *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudi: An English translation with the Sanskrit text of the "Tattvakaumudî" (Sânkhya) of Vâchaspati Miśra,* by Gangânâtha Jha (Bombay: Theosophical Publication Fund, 1896), and *Vācaspatimiśra's "Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudi,"* ed. Ramesh Chandra Tarkatirtha, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, no. XV (Calcutta, 1935); Richard Garbe, "Der Mondschein der Sâmkhya-Wahrheit, Vâcaspatimiçra's Sâṃkhya-tattva-kaumudî in deutscher Uebersetzung," *Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,* Phil. Kl. 19, 3 (1892), 517-628; *Jayamaṅgalā: Śrīśaṅkarācāryaviracitā jayamaṅgalā nāma sāṃkhyasaptatiṭīkā,* ed. H. Śarmā, Calcutta Oriental Series, 19 (Calcutta: Narendra Nath Law, 1926); *Yuktidīpikā: Yuktidīpikā,* ed. P. Chakravarti, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, no. 23 (Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing and Publishing House, Ltd., 1938).

2 For a discussion of this periodization of the history of Sāṃkhya, see Gerald J. Larson, *Classical Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning,* Chapter II, "An Interpretation of the Historical Development of Classical Sāṃkhya" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1967).

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SOME INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS ON CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

A. In classical Sāṃkhya the world is not derived from the *puruṣa,* but it is understood or comprehended in terms of *puruṣa.* This *puruṣa* is not personal, but it is individual.[3] The presence of this individual *puruṣa* results in the emergence or appearance of the manifest world. Without that presence the world remains simply "unmanifest" (*avyakta*). Thus, the manifest world serves the purpose of the individual *puruṣa: puruṣārtha.*[4] The world is that which is witnessed. It is an instrument used by the *puruṣa,* and all of the evolutes from *buddhi* down through the gross elements are instrumental in serving *puruṣa's* purpose. This individual *puruṣa,* moreover, is simply the fact of consciousness. It is transparent, translucent; it is a witness.[5] It functions by witnessing or seeing the world, and by so doing it appears as what it is not. It appears as if it were the world, and the world appears as if it were possessed of consciousness. In other words, a kind of double negation takes place.[6] The *puruṣa* appears as what it is not, and the world appears as what it is not. This negation occurs, however, because of the very nature of *puruṣa,* that is, its function as witness is to reflect or to appear as what it is not. Only by appearing as what it is not can it be what it is.

B. As a result of the centrality of the doctrine of the individual *puruṣa* and the doctrine of *puruṣārtha* ("for the sake of the *puruṣa*") in classical Sāṃkhya, no conscious Spirit or deity functions in the system to bring about the manifest world. The world in and of itself is simply "unmanifest" (*avyakta*) apart from the presence of the *puruṣa.*[7] The ultimate *mūlaprakṛti* or *avyakta* is made up of the three *guṇas,* but these *guṇas* do not become active or creative until the *puruṣa* is present. The world in and of itself, although containing potentially everything in the manifest world, is simply an undifferentiated, unmanifest plenitude of being. It is completely unconscious.[8] When the *puruṣa* comes into proximity with this unmanifest plenitude, however, the manifest world then begins to unfold or emerge. The *buddhi, ahaṃkāra, manas,* the five senses, the five organs of action, the five subtle elements and the five gross elements then appear to the *puruṣa.* These evolutes are made up of various admixtures or collocations of the three *guṇas,* which materially make up the *avyakta* or *mūlaprakṛti.*[9] The *guṇa, sattva,* is extremely subtle and light, and functions both as the quality of thought and goodness. The *guṇa, rajas,* is active and aggressive, and functions both as the quality of energy and passion. The *guṇa,*

[3] *Kārikā,* XVIII.
[4] *Ibid.,* XXXI, XLII, LXIII, LXIX.
[5] *Ibid.,* XIX and LV.
[6] *Ibid.,* XX.
[7] *Ibid.,* XXI.
[8] *Ibid.,* X and XI.
[9] *Ibid.,* XII-XIV.

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tamas, is passive and dull, and functions both as the quality of matter and delusion. These *guṇas* extend throughout the manifest and unmanifest world, and they undergo continual modification and transformation in the presence of *puruṣa.* With respect to man they constitute the psychophysical makeup of his nature. They similarly constitute the nature of everything that is not man. They represent the fundamental structure of the manifest and unmanifest world. In themselves, however, they are quite unconscious. Like the *mūlaprakṛti* or *avyakta* they are absolutely separate from the *puruṣa.*[10] Thus, the classical Sāṃkhya recognizes no conscious Absolute or Creator God. To be sure, the gods may exist, but they too are simply products of the interaction of unconscious *mūlaprakṛti* and the conscious *puruṣa.*

C. In classical Sāṃkhya, therefore, the fundamental dualism is that between individual consciousness, on the one hand, and the unconscious world, on the other. The Sāṃkhya dualism is not a dualism of mind and body, or a dualism of thought and extension. All such dualisms are included or comprehended on the side of the unconscious world. The mind, the intellect, the self-awareness of man are all evolutes emerging out of the *mūlaprakṛti.* Similarly, all of man's emotions and strivings and urges are also comprehended in classical Sāṃkhya on the side of the *mūlaprakṛti.* The psychological functions of man are brought together in the notion of the thirteenfold instrument, which together with the subtle elements makes up the *liṅga* or the *liṅga-śarīra.*[11] The gross or physical body of man together with the gross or physical world is understood in terms of various admixtures and collocations of the five gross elements. Thus, in classical Sāṃkhya man is viewed as a psychophysical unity. Thought and extension, mind and body, etc., are viewed simply as different dimensions or attributes of the manifest world. This unity is maintained by the doctrine of the *guṇas,* which function on the psychological level as well as on the gross or physical level.

The dualism of classical Sāṃkhya centers or focuses on the distinction of the conscious and the unconscious. The *puruṣa,* which is consciousness, is not part of the manifest world, which is unconsciousness. Yet the *puruṣa,* which is consciousness, is not a cosmic consciousness. It is, rather, simply the fact of individual, impersonal consciousness, the consciousness which renders man's life and the manifest world possible. This individual, impersonal consciousness is not to be confused with the *buddhi,* the *ahaṃkāra,* the *manas,* or with any other evolute or emergent of the manifest world. Thus, it is neither intellect, thought, self-awareness, life-force, etc., nor is it the source of any of these dimensions of man's experience or life.[12] Likewise, the *puruṣa,* which is con-

[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Ibid.*, XL and XLI.
[12] *Ibid.*, XI.

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sciousness, is neither the strivings, the urges, the impulses, nor any other emotional forces which make up man's nature. The *puruṣa* is simply the fact of consciousness.[13] Putting this another way, one might say that since the *mūlaprakṛti* together with its *guṇas* or qualities makes up everything that *is* in the manifest world including both the psychological and the physical dimensions of the world and man, the *puruṣa* is nothing, or the presence of nothingness in the world. It is a kind of emptiness at the very heart of the world and man, but it is the nothingness or emptiness which reveals being or the world. We suggested above in our discussion of the nature of *puruṣa* that by its very nature it appears as *not* what it *is*. That is, as pure consciousness it simply witnesses or sees. It appears as what it is not, but this appearance is what it is. It is pure, translucent emptiness which only has content insofar as it reflects *something*. The content of *puruṣa* can only be what the *puruṣa* is not. Consciousness is always consciousness of something, and this insight is the heart of the Sāṃkhya dualism.

D. In classical Sāṃkhya what a man becomes is determined by his fundamental strivings, which reside or exist in the *buddhi*.[14] In other words, a man's place in the world depends upon his basic inclinations. The *buddhi* is not only the evolute or emergent which "determines" or "decides," but it is also the locus of the *bhāvas,* those "conditions" or "urges" which establish the fundamental life-style of man. These *bhāvas* impel or motivate man to become a particular kind of man in the manifest world, and the dominance or ascendancy of some of these *bhāvas* over others is related to what a man has done previously. From the point of view of ordinary existence in the world, the basic *bhāva,* of course, is *ajñāna,* or "un-knowledge," or "lack of knowledge."[15] This "lack of knowledge," however, means lack of salvation-knowledge. It does not mean the lack of ordinary everyday knowledge or discrimination. The other *bhāvas*—e.g., "virtue," "vice," "non-attachment," "passion," etc.—come into play in the course of man's life according to how he lives his life.[16] What a man does, therefore, in classical Sāṃkhya is directly related to what he becomes. The Sāṃkhya understands and interprets this doctrine of action in terms of the traditional Indian doctrine of transmigration, which is accepted almost universally in Indian thought. Thus, this doctrine of the importance of action and the fundamental strivings of man is not unique to the Sāṃkhya, yet it nevertheless is an important aspect of the system.

E. In classical Sāṃkhya an important role or function is played by what one might call affective or emotive states. The manifest world is comprehended

[13] *Ibid.,* LV.
[14] *Ibid.,* XXIII.
[15] *Ibid.,* XLIV.
[16] *Ibid.,* XL, XLI, XLII.

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not only in terms of individual, impersonal consciousness—that is, the presence of *puruṣa*. It is also comprehended or viewed from the perspective of the emotional conditions and longings of man.[17] In other words, the world is not understood in itself apart from the fact of human existence. The world, rather, at every point is inextricably bound up with the presence of human existence. In a sense, then, the world is uniquely human. The *guṇas,* for example, are interpreted in classical Sāṃkhya not simply as the qualities of thought, energy, and matter; they are also interpreted in their very nature as the sources or foundations of pleasure, pain, and dullness.[18] Even the gross elements are not interpreted simply as physical entities or things; they are also characterized as being "tranquil" (*śānta*), "turbulent" or "violent" (*ghora*), and "delusive" or "stupid" (*mūḍha*)—that is, they are apprehended or comprehended primarily from the perspective of concrete human existence (*Kārikā* XXXVIII). The Sāṃkhya emphasis that human existence in the world is suffering (*duḥkha*) is another example of the importance of affective states. Suffering pervades all of life and the world, and the manifest world is never understood in Sāṃkhya apart from this fact.[19] The world in itself does have a rational structure, but this rationality is never separated or abstracted in classical Sāṃkhya from the longings, strivings, emotions, etc., which make up concrete human existence.

F. Finally, in classical Sāṃkhya it is important to emphasize that *ajñāna* or "lack of knowledge" or "ignorance" is really equivalent to ordinary, everyday knowledge, for it is because of the "lack of knowledge" that ordinary knowledge arises. Man's knowledge of the world and his place in the world is because of the "lack of knowledge." This "lack of knowledge," however, as we suggested briefly above, means the lack of salvation-knowledge—i.e., the lack of the knowledge that *puruṣa* is apart or separate from the manifest and unmanifest world.[20] Thus, *ajñāna* or "ignorance" or "lack of knowledge" is not a kind of mistake or blunder which originally set the process of creation in operation. It is, rather, the natural or normal result of the coming together of the *puruṣa* and the *mūlaprakṛti.* Here again the dialectic or interplay of the two basic principles must be fully appreciated. The *puruṣa* is pure, translucent consciousness, a kind of transparent emptiness, which by its nature is only a witness. It is only consciousness of something. The *mūlaprakṛti,* on the other hand, is simply undifferentiated, unconscious thing-ness, or that which is witnessed. Each one of these two principles appears as what it is not. Thus, the "lack of knowledge" or "ignorance" is the result of the presence of these two principles to one another, and is the reason for the appearance of the manifest world.

[17] *Ibid.,* XLIV, XLV, and LII.
[18] *Ibid.,* XII.
[19] *Ibid.,* I. [20] *Ibid.,* XLIV.

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Salvation, then, involves the reversal or undoing of this dialectic or interplay.[21] Salvation-knowledge is a special kind of "knowledge" which reverses ordinary knowledge and brings one to the realization of the *puruṣa* itself apart from its appearing as what it is not.[22] This salvation-knowledge represents a most unnatural reversing or turning back from ordinary knowledge.

SUMMARY

In our interpretation of classical Sāṃkhya we have focused attention on the fundamental dualism between individual consciousness (*puruṣa*), on the one hand, and the mass of undifferentiated being (*prakṛti*), on the other. We have stressed the importance of the fact of consciousness in the emergence of the manifest world (*vyakta*), and we have emphasized the dialectic or interplay which takes place when *puruṣa* comes into proximity to *prakṛti*. Our interpretation has attempted to show that classical Sāṃkhya is a system of religious thought which seeks to understand the world and man's place in the world from the perspective of this fact of consciousness. This fact is the reason why there is a manifest world, although in itself *puruṣa* adds nothing to the world. The *puruṣa* only witnesses the world, but since its nature is to witness, it thus uses the world as an instrument for its own purposes and ends.

In classical Sāṃkhya the world is not derived from consciousness, nor is consciousness derived from the world. There is a fundamental dualism or split at the very heart of reality, and this dualism or split is the fundamental fact of existence. The classical Sāṃkhya refuses to understand the world simply as a product of consciousness. It refuses to see the world as an illusory projection of consciousness, and thus it rejects any idealistic monism. Similarly, it refuses to see consciousness simply as a product of the world, and thus it rejects any kind of materialism or naturalism. Thus, it steers an intermediate course or path between the Indian notion of a conscious, cosmic Self or its equivalent, which is the ground of all being, on the one hand, and the notion of a conscious self which is only an empirical, relative construction, on the other. It maintains, rather, a fundamental dualism, the opposite poles of which function in a kind of dialectical interaction.

The ultimate ground or foundation of man in classical Sāṃkhya is this fact of consciousness, but this consciousness is not man's intellect or mind or self-awareness, or emotions, etc. It is, rather, the pure, translucent witness, which is at once the source of man's freedom and his suffering. This fact of consciousness makes man what he is. It is the radical foundation of his existence. The purpose of the classical Sāṃkhya analysis is to grasp or comprehend this ultimate, translucent consciousness in order to overcome suffering and to find

[21] *Ibid.*, LXV.
[22] *Ibid.*, LXVIII.

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that condition of freedom and isolation which is consciousness in itself. Because the *puruṣa* or the ultimate ground of man's existence is only a witness, however, it can only be grasped or comprehended in terms of what it witnesses. Thus, the classical Sāṃkhya attempts to analyze and comprehend what consciousness sees or witnesses in order ultimately to comprehend and discover that which witnesses. In other words, it describes everything that appears to consciousness for the purpose of eventually penetrating to consciousness itself. Ultimately, everything that appears to consciousness is eliminated or expelled. The *puruṣa* in itself is apart from all strivings, all self-awareness, all discursive thought, etc. In itself the *puruṣa* is a kind of translucent emptiness, a pure witness.

Thus, the classical Sāṃkhya might be described as a kind of "logos" of that which appears to consciousness. The purpose of the analysis or study of that which appears is to reach or penetrate to that for which and by means of which everything appears. The purpose of the analysis is *puruṣārtha*—i.e., "for the sake of the *puruṣa*." By coming to know what *puruṣa* is not, one then has access to what *puruṣa* is. When one has access to what *puruṣa* is, one then has access to the intuitive discrimination that *puruṣa* is radically distinct from everything that appears. When one has access to this intuitive discrimination, one then has access to the ultimate ground of human existence, which, according to classical Sāṃkhya, is *puruṣa* itself. One then has reversed the normal tendency of human existence in the world, and one has attained the condition of "isolation" or "aloneness" or "solitariness" (*kaivalya*). One dwells in pure, translucent consciousness, but this consciousness is radically emptied of all content. It is, thus, a kind of pure, translucent emptiness which transcends everything in the manifest and unmanifest world.

CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA AND SARTRE'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY

Various interpreters of classical Sāṃkhya have attempted to relate the system to certain kinds of Western thought. The purpose of such comparisons has usually been to render this subtle Indian system more intelligible and familiar to the Western reader. If one is able to show certain parallels or similarities, then one is able to gain greater insight into the value or significance of Indian thought both in itself and in its relationship to the problems of religion and thought in general. The danger in drawing such parallels or similarities, of course, is that one might do an injustice to Indian thought itself or to the various Western systems used in one's comparison. If one is careful to make precise distinctions, however, showing both similarities and differences, then perhaps an attempt to draw parallels and similarities is valid.

Garbe, for example, who was the first Western scholar to work with the Sāṃkhya in depth, devoted a full chapter in his *Die Sâṃkhya-Philosophie* to a

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comparison between Greek thought and the Sāṃkhya.[23] Garbe's main interest was in the Sāṃkhya notion of *prakṛti,* and, as a result, he frequently compares this dimension of Sāṃkhya with various theories of natural science and naturalism. Likewise, Dasgupta was also intrigued with the Sāṃkhya analysis of *prakṛti,* and devotes much space in his treatment of the system to the relationship between the Sāṃkhya and various theories of physics and physical science.[24] On the other hand, various interpreters have tended to emphasize the analysis of thought in classical Sāṃkhya, and have compared this dimension of the system with various kinds of Western thought. Davies, in his *The Sānkhya Kārikā of Īśwara Kṛishṇa,* compares the Sāṃkhya notion of *prakṛti* with the notion of God or Nature in Spinoza. He also compares the classical Sāṃkhya with the notions of Will and Idea in the thought of Schopenhauer. Moreover, he points up similarities between the notion of suffering, etc., in classical Sāṃkhya and the thought of von Hartmann.[25] Still other interpreters have emphasized the Sāṃkhya psychology. Zimmer, in his *Philosophies of India,* compares the Sāṃkhya notions of self-awareness and will with certain similar notions in Western theories of psychoanalysis.[26] Similarly, Hauer, in *Der Yoga,* compares both Sāṃkhya and Yoga with Jungian psychotherapy.[27]

The present writer would like to offer one more such attempt at comparison and contrast in the hope that such an effort will shed more light on the meaning and significance of classical Sāṃkhya. This attempt at comparison is meant to serve only as a tentative suggestion. As a result the comparison is rather brief, but hopefully it will offer a somewhat new perspective on the possible relevance of classical Sāṃkhya.

The classical Sāṃkhya analysis as interpreted in this paper bears some interesting resemblance or similarity to the phenomenological ontology of Jean-Paul Sartre as contained in the well-known work, *Being and Nothingness* (*L'Être et le néant*).[28] The present writer does not claim that there is any kind of identity in the two analyses, but the claim is made that there are certain interesting parallels or similar concerns in the two systems. There is, apparently, no historical connection between Sartre's analysis of human existence

[23] Richard Garbe, *Die Sâṃkhya-Philosophie* (2nd ed.; Leipzig: H. Haessel, 1917), pp. 113-137.

[24] S. N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922-1955), I, 241 ff.

[25] John Davies, *Hindū Philosophy. The Sānkhya Kārikā of Īśwara Kṛishṇa,* Trübner's Oriental Series (London: Trübner and Co., 1881), pp. vi, 151.

[26] Heinrich Zimmer, *Philosophies of India,* ed. Joseph Campbell (New York: World Publishing Co., 1951), pp. 314-332.

[27] J. Wilhelm Hauer, *Der Yoga* (rev. ed.; Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1958), pp. 407-439.

[28] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology,* trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956); in the French, *L'Être et le néant, essai d' ontologie phenomenologique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1943).

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and that of classical Sāṃkhya. Both systems grew up under quite different historical conditions, and the ultimate answers or solutions to the problem of human existence in the two systems are quite opposite.[29] Nevertheless, there are some striking similarities between the two with respect to the basic analysis of the human condition and with respect to man's understanding of the world.

Since it would be impossible and inappropriate to undertake a detailed study of these similarities in this paper, our approach is simply to suggest some of these parallels in a preliminary or tentative manner as possible directions for further thought and research.

1. To begin with, both classical Sāṃkhya and the phenomenological ontology of Sartre set up a fundamental dualism between consciousness, on the one hand, and undifferentiated nature or being, on the other. In classical Sāṃkhya, as we have shown, the dualism is understood in terms of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti,* and it represents an attempt to establish the ultimate basis of man's life apart from the determining forces of existence in the world. Sartre likewise attempts to penetrate to the ultimate basis or foundation of man's existence, and he likewise understands this basic dimension of man in terms of consciousness. Sartre, following the lead of Husserl, suggests that consciousness is always consciousness *of.* Consciousness implies by its nature that there is something which is not itself—i.e., consciousness is always grasped in terms of what it is conscious of.[30] It is pure subjectivity which in itself can never be an object. The world in itself is simply a mass or fullness of being, and it only takes on distinctions when consciousness is present to it. Thus, according to Sartre, there are two basic kinds of being: the "for-itself" (*pour-soi*)—i.e., individual consciousness; and the "in-self" (*en-soi*)—i.e., the unconscious world.[31] Describing this basic duality, Sartre tells us, "The in-self is full of itself, and no more total plenitude can be imagined, no more perfect equivalence of content to container. There is not the slightest emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack through which nothingness might slip in. . . . The distinguishing characteristic of consciousness, on the other hand, is that it is a decompression of being."[32] Again, "To what being does the For-itself make itself presence? The answer is clear: the For-itself is presence to all of being-in-itself. Or rather the presence of the For-itself is what makes being-in-itself exist as a totality."[33] Sartre,

[29] For good discussions of the background of Sartre's thought, especially its relations to phenomenology, see Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement, A Historical Introduction* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), II, 445-515; Pierre Thévenaz, *What is Phenomenology?,* trans. J. M. Edie, C. Courtney, and P. Brockelman (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1962), pp. 67-83; and H. J. Blackham, *Six Existentialist Thinkers* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1952), pp. 110-148.

[30] Sartre, *Being and Nothingness,* pp. li ff.

[31] *Ibid.,* p. lxvii.

[32] *Ibid.,* p. 74.

[33] *Ibid.,* p. 121.

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thus, asserts a dualism of two kinds of being. "Thus we have left 'appearance' and have been led progressively to posit two types of being, the in-itself and the for-itself."[34]

2. Both classical Sāṃkhya and the phenomenological ontology of Sartre strip consciousness of all content. We saw in our analysis of classical Sāṃkhya that the *puruṣa* is something like the simple fact of consciousness apart from all thought, self-awareness, etc. The *puruṣa* is described in terms of its being a witness. It is not a something or an evolute of *prakṛti*. Similarly, Sartre understands consciousness as impersonal yet individual. On this point Sartre has moved beyond Husserl, who maintained a conception of the transcendental ego as a part of the domain of consciousness. Sartre, on the contrary, includes both the transcendental ego and the psychological ego in the realm of the in-itself. This elimination of the ego from consciousness in-itself was first suggested by Sartre in *The Transcendence of the Ego*.[35] He refers to this elimination also in *Being and Nothingness*.

> In an article in *Recherches Philosophiques* I attempted to show that the Ego does not belong to the domain of the for-itself. I shall not repeat here. Let us note only the reason for the transcendence of the Ego: as a unifying pole of *Erlebnisse* the Ego is in-itself, not for-itself. If it were of the nature of consciousness, in fact, it would be to itself its own foundation in the translucency of the immediate. But then we would have to say that it is what it is not and that it is not what it is, and this is by no means the mode of being of the "I." . . . Thus the Ego appears to consciousness as a transcendent in-itself, as an existent in the human world, not as of the nature of consciousness.[36]

Consciousness is impersonal, yet as in classical Sāṃkhya consciousness is individual. In discussing the problem of the existence of others, Sartre says, "What does this mean? It means that the for-itself arises in a world which is a world for other for-itselfs. Such is the given."[37]

Sartre also is driven to use such notions as "witness" in his understanding of consciousness. ". . . the For-itself realizes its birth in an original bond with being; it is a witness to itself of itself as not being that being. Due to this fact it is outside that being, upon being and within being as not being that being."[38] Ultimately Sartre describes individual consciousness as nothingness, but he means "nothingness" in the sense of that which is opposite to all of being. "Thus the for-itself must be its own nothingness. The being of consciousness qua consciousness is to exist at a distance from itself as a presence to itself, and this empty distance which being carries in its being is Nothingness."[39] The

[34] *Ibid.*, p. lxvii.
[35] Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Noonday Press, 1957).
[36] Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, pp. 102-103.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 520.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 122.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

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classical Sāṃkhya, of course, would never go so far as to call the *puruṣa* a "nothingness," but such negative terminology is sometimes helpful in trying to describe the ultimate nature of *puruṣa* in itself apart from its relationship to *prakṛti.*

3. Both classical Sāṃkhya and the phenomenological ontology of Sartre view the world in instrumental terms. That is, the world is to be understood in terms of its usefulness to consciousness. In our interpretation of classical Sāṃkhya we emphasized the doctrine of *puruṣārtha:* "for the sake of the *puruṣa.*" The *prakṛti* in itself is simply "unmanifest" (*avyakta*). It becomes *vyakta* or "manifest" when the *puruṣa* comes into proximity, and the whole manifest world functions for the sake of this *puruṣa: puruṣārtha.* Thus, even though the classical Sāṃkhya engages in a detailed analysis of the emergence and functioning of the evolutes of *prakṛti,* the *prakṛti* with its manifestations is never an end in itself. It is always for the sake of the *puruṣa.* Likewise, Sartre's interest in the world is from the perspective of individual consciousness. The world is used by consciousness. "Thus to the extent that the for-itself is its own lack as a refusal correlative with its impulse toward self, being is revealed to the for-itself on the ground of the world as an instrumental-thing, and the world rises as the undifferentiated ground of indicative complexes of instrumentality."[40]

4. Both classical Sāṃkhya and the phenomenological ontology of Sartre see human existence in the world as suffering. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* opens with the assertion that all of life is suffering. This suffering is the basic fact of existence, and it is the reason why the Sāṃkhya system is constructed. That is, the purpose of the Sāṃkhya is to remove or eliminate the fact of suffering in man's life. Similarly, Sartre sees life in the world as suffering. Moreover, the reason for the fact of suffering is somewhat similar in the two systems. In classical Sāṃkhya suffering is a result of *puruṣa* appearing as what it is not—i.e., as bound up and determined by the world. Yet the *puruṣa* is not really a part of the world; the ultimate foundation of man as *puruṣa* is forever separate or apart from the world. To be sure, it is because of this split that man is ultimately able to be free, but it also is because of this split that man suffers. Sartre also centers his notion of suffering upon this basic duality. "The being of human reality is suffering because it rises in being as perpetually haunted by a totality which it is without being able to be it, precisely because it could not attain the in-itself without losing itself as for-itself. Human reality therefore is by nature an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state."[41]

5. Both classical Sāṃkhya and the phenomenological ontology of Sartre de-

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 201.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

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velop a doctrine of freedom on the basis of the analysis and nature of individual consciousness. In Sāṃkhya the *puruṣa* is by its very nature separate from the *prakṛti* and its manifestations. The *puruṣa* or the deepest dimension of man's existence is not determined by the evolutes or emergents of *prakṛti*. It simply witnesses or sees them. In the process of witnessing, however, it appears as what it is not. Turning back or reversing this process by means of intuitive discrimination, which expels or eliminates everything from consciousness except consciousness itself, one then achieves salvation-knowledge, the content of which is the realization that *puruṣa* is separate from *prakṛti*. This realization is the basis of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of freedom, and this realization leads ultimately to a condition of "isolation" (*kaivalya*). Sartre similarly relates his understanding of freedom to the fact that individual pure consciousness exists apart from the determining forces of the world and man's own past. Says Sartre,

> To say that the for-itself has to be what it is, to say that it is what it is not while not being what it is, to say that in it existence precedes and conditions essence . . .—all this is to say one and the same thing: to be aware that man is free. Indeed by the sole fact that I am conscious of the causes which inspire my action, these causes are already transcendent objects for my consciousness; they are outside. In vain shall I seek to catch hold of them; I escape them by my very existence. I am condemned to exist forever beyond my essence, beyond the causes and motives of my act. I am condemned to be free.[42]

Sartre relates this notion of freedom to his key idea of consciousness as nothingness. He tells us,

> Thus freedom is not a being; it is *the being* of man—i.e., his nothingness. If we start by conceiving of man as a plenum, it is absurd to try to find in him afterwards moments or psychic regions in which he would be free. As well look for emptiness in a container which one has filled beforehand up to the brim! Man can not be sometimes slave and sometimes free; he is wholly and forever free or he is not free at all.[43]

It is important to note at this point, however, a fundamental difference between classical Sāṃkhya and the thought of Sartre. Sartre conceives of consciousness as nothingness which exists over against all of being. Consciousness is always consciousness *of*, and thus Sartre would not allow the possibility that this consciousness could exist in a state of isolation apart from what it is conscious of. Referring to this problem, Sartre says,

> This being comes into the world along with consciousness, at once in its heart and outside it; it is absolute transcendence in absolute immanence. It has no priority over consciousness, and consciousness has no priority over it. They form a dyad. Of course, this being could not exist without the for-itself, but neither could the for-itself exist without it.[44]

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 439.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 441.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

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To exist apart from the in-itself, the for-itself would simply be in a condition of non-being. Such a condition would be absurd to Sartre, and would mean turning away from being a man in the world. As such, there is no way out of suffering in Sartre's thought. Man's freedom centers in his discrimination or realization that his consciousness is not determined by the world, but this freedom cannot exist apart from the world. Thus, suffering is the basic, unalterable fact of existence, and man is condemned to be free within this suffering. "Man," says Sartre, "is a useless passion."[45] Therefore, even though there are some similarities between the analysis of the problem of human existence in classical Sāṃkhya and Sartre's phenomenological ontology, nevertheless they are quite different with respect to the answer or solution offered to the basic problem.

6. Finally, both classical Sāṃkhya and the phenomenological ontology of Sartre maintain the irrelevance of a conception of God or a deity. In classical Sāṃkhya the basic problem is the dualism between pure, individual consciousness and the reality of the world. A god can be dealt with in such a system in one of two ways. Either a god can be a *puruṣa* as classical Yoga suggests, or a god can be conceived as being a part of *prakṛti.* In either case the god is irrelevant from the perspective of the salvation of the individual *puruṣa.* A third possibility is to conceive of a god or an absolute in terms of its being a synthesis of both *puruṣa* and *prakṛti.* Such a conception, however, then throws out both the reality of the world and reality of the individual consciousness. Both principles are then reduced to a kind of transcendent ideal, which robs the principles of their pressing immediacy. In other words, the classical Sāṃkhya implies that to take refuge in an ultimate deity or absolute is to avoid facing the fundamental problem—i.e., the fact of human existence as suffering in the world. Similarly, Sartre disposes of the notion of God by suggesting its irrelevance. He says, for example, in *L'Existentialisme est un humanisme,* "Existentialism is not an atheism in the sense that it would wear itself out in trying to demonstrate that God does not exist. It declares rather: Even if God existed, that would change nothing."[46] According to Sartre, God is only what man tries to become insofar as consciousness strives to overcome the fundamental dualism of the *pour-soi* and the *en-soi.* Such an attempt is doomed to failure, however, and thus God or a god is irrelevant from the perspective of human existence in the world.[47]

These similarities or parallels between classical Sāṃkhya and the phenomen-

[45] *Ibid.,* p. 615.

[46] Cited in Thévenaz, *What is Phenomenology?,* p. 80. Also, see another translation of the passage in Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism,* trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), p. 61: "Existentialism isn't so atheistic that it wears itself out showing that God doesn't exist. Rather, it declares that even if God did exist, that would change nothing."

[47] Sartre, *Being and Nothingness,* p. 615.

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ological ontology of Sartre are illuminating insofar as they suggest that the classical Sāṃkhya in its time was dealing with issues in religion and thought which are to some degree still issues in the contemporary world. At the same time, it must be said, of course, that Sartre goes much beyond the Sāṃkhya, both in the range of his concern and the sophistication of his arguments. Sartre takes up issues like temporality, the being of others, and the possibilities of a life lived in society and history, all of which issues are barely dealt with in the classical Sāṃkhya. Nevertheless, classical Sāṃkhya stands in its time as a fascinating and subtle attempt to work out some of the most pressing and difficult questions of existence and thought. Whether or not one agrees with the ultimate solution to the problem of human suffering offered by the classical Sāṃkhya, one can still admire both the seriousness and the honesty with which classical Sāṃkhya approached the problem.

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Against the absolutist theory of knowledge set forth by various orthodox philosophies in India, *syādvāda* (the doctrine of "may be," or the relativity of judgments) in Jainism has the unique virtue of being a liberal relativistic epistemology. With *syādvāda,* philosophy in India put forward a partly skeptical and partly agnostic standpoint, and interestingly deviated from traditional Vedic thought. And although this standpoint, considering the widespread influence of the idealist metaphysics of the Vedānta, proved to be feeble, its contribution to the receptive-to-all-isms temper of the Indian mind is undeniable. One may also say, without any exaggeration, that for his pacifism and universal brotherhood Mahatma Gandhi owed much to Jainism, whose *syādvāda* approach he had consciously and unconsciously adopted. Yet, having hit upon one of the most remarkable epistemic concepts, the Jainas were unable to determine its pragmatic basis. They failed, in short, to grasp the philosophical foundations of their relativism, and they thereby failed to understand it correctly.

Syādvāda, the doctrine of the relativism of judgments, states that all actual and possible assertions in regard to an object are relative and, therefore, conditionally true or false. No judgment can be absolutely true, or absolutely false. What is judged about a thing by one person may be valid from his own standpoint. A standpoint is circumscribed by the point of time and the sense in which it occurs. Thus, when one makes an assertion about something, one's assertion is as true as, or as false as, any other assertion. No judgment is final; no predication is wholesome; no description is complete.

As a matter of course, *syādvāda* suggests that every statement must be prefaced by *syāt* or "relatively." The word *syāt* denotes uncertainty, a sort of "may-be" ness, and attributes to the statement in which it is used limited truth or relative validity. We should say when we describe the earth, for instance, that *relatively speaking* it is round, *relatively speaking* it is flat, *relatively speaking* it is elliptical, and so on. It is only a specific view of the object that any single statement refers to; and this very statement, in relation to statements embodying other persons' views or views at other points of time, would be fallible. So every statement may be true from one single point of view and untrue from another; each statement mirrors one aspect (called by the Jainas *naya*) and misses all other aspects. By extending the same argument to our knowledge of the universe, the Jainas argue, we have to say that, there being an infinite number of views and statements the universe offers itself to, no finite number of such views and statements could embrace a complete knowledge of the universe. All knowledge is incomplete, piecemeal, valid up to a point, in a sense true and in a sense false, a series of *syāt* or "may-be" assertions.

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All statements with regard to a given thing reflect different aspects of that thing. Now, an aspect is something that a person obtains exclusively from his encounter with the given. The word *naya,* used by the Jainas to signify the aspect or view of a thing, suggests the ontological counterpart of a *syāt* statement, for it represents a partial cognition, a partial knowledge, of reality. For instance, a statement S_1, containing a *naya* N_1 perceived at time T_1, would be, according to *syādvāda,* a "may-be" statement in relation to other statements, say S_2, S_3, S_4 containing N_2, N_3, N_4 obtained at times T_2, T_3, T_4 respectively. Of course, between S_1 and N_1, both fastened upon T_1, there is bound to be a necessary relation; and to that extent one could say that S_1 is absolutely true, or absolutely false, by virtue of its relation with N_1. However, it is not this problem that the Jainas are concerned about. Since any single aspect of a thing can never stay inert, insofar as the human mind is concerned, one has to refer to N_1 only retrospectively or from a *naya* other than N_1. When referred to in this manner, N_1 would be seen as merely one in an infinite number of *nayas* and, consequently, as relatively valid. Notwithstanding the fact that S_1 and N_1 are inseparable, neither S_1 nor N_1 can prevent the other statements and *nayas* from taking place. The status of N_1 is as relative as that of any other *naya,* the status of S_1 is as relative as that of any other statement, and the status of N_1 is as relative as that of S_1. The relativism of statements (*syādvāda*) and the relativism of aspects (*nayavāda*) are two sides of the same epistemic thesis. To hold that a particular statement may be true, or is relatively true, is the same thing as to hold that the particular aspect of the world that it expresses is related to an infinite number of other aspects in respect of which that aspect constitutes only a fractional knowledge of the world.

According to the Jainas, while a *syāt* statement and a *naya* stay tied together so that diverse *syāt* statements reflect diverse *nayas,* all of these have for their metaphysical foundation the multiplicity of reality. The doctrine that reality is multiple—called by the Jainas *anekāntavāda*—is an important correlative of Jainism's relativistic epistemology, and the unique support behind their ethic of self-improvement. There is an infinite number of atoms and souls, each one of which is real and open to limitless perspectives. It is impossible for an individual mind to grasp all the perspectives. Therefore, whatever the apparent richness of knowledge in any given age, the total acquisition of human intellect as such is bound to remain always inadequate. Consistent with the tenets of *syādvāda* and *nayavāda, anekāntavāda* describes the relativistic manyness of all the primordial elements of reality and underlines the fact that, if we take into consideration the frightful innumerability of the "reals," of their *nayas,* and of the possible assertions about both, then it would be proper to state that what man actually knows is only a fragment of what *is.* However, when a philosopher, without recognizing the inherently restricted nature of his per-

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spective, mistakes a fragment of knowledge, a single *naya,* for the entirety of the known, he commits the fallacy of *nayabhāsa* (a particular *naya* taken as the absolute). In order to avoid such a fallacy, the Jainas hold, one must be so open-minded as to concede that one has no access to the knowledge of a thing, or of the world for that matter, more than that which comes within one's grasp. The eminent text[1] emphasizing the basic relativism in the knower's approach to the known mentions the "seven-standpoint system" known as *saptabhaṅgī.*

According to the *saptabhaṅgi* system, there can be seven possible forms of a statement about any single entity or its attributes: (1) somehow a thing is (*syād asti*), (2) somehow it is not (*syād nāsti*), (3) somehow it both is and is not (*syād asti ca nāsti*), (4) somehow it is indescribable (*syād avaktavya*), (5) somehow it is and is indescribable (*syād asti ca avaktavya*), (6) somehow it is not and is indescribable (*syād nāsti ca avaktavya*), and (7) somehow it is, is not, and is indescribable (*syād asti ca nāsti ca avaktavya*).[2] What is suggested by these seven statements is that nothing can be asserted as absolutely existent or absolutely non-existent, absolutely describable or absolutely indescribable. Thus, every judgment is situational and superficial. It emerges from and dwells on a *darśana,* a perspective, an angle of reality that meets one's mind.

In fact, it would have been only a short step further for a *syādvādin* to evolve what may be called a dogmatism of doubt and maintain, as, for instance, the Greek skeptic Pyrrho did, that not only in knowledge, but even in conduct, there could never be any legitimate basis for preferring one action to another. But the Jainas did not take such a step, and the reason for this is that they tacitly preserved the separation between their relativistic epistemology and ethical perfectionism. The perspectivism of Jainism's epistemology does not permeate their reflections about life and its ultimate aim.

The operative effectiveness of *syādvāda* must have proved greater than its logic, and in polemics, in particular, the people who practiced it must have had an edge over their opponents. The *syādvādin,* acting as a *nayavādin* on the one hand and as an *anekāntavādin* on the other, must have functioned in all matters of intellect like a mind oscillating between skepticism and agnosticism, with an admirable tolerance and integrating spirit toward all sorts of dissenters. However, he dared not carry his intellectual uncertainty to such a point as to suggest ethical anarchism, or to support what Russell, while commenting upon Greek skepticism, has called "a lazy man's consolation."[3]

The Jainas do not seem to have acknowledged that if *syādvāda,* or *nayavāda,*

[1] Śrī Mallişeṇasūri, *Syād-vāda-mañjarī,* trans. F. W. Thomas (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1960), p. 137.
[2] See S. Radhakrishnan and C. A. Moore, eds., *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 261.
[3] Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), p. 234. CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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is to become a consistent intellectual description of the actual state of affairs in human experience, it has to have a subjectivist and pragmatic foundation. The relativeness of every "may-be" assertion or every point of view (*naya*) can be understood, necessarily with a reference to some mind and its specific purposiveness. No relative judgment, no *naya,* can be self-explanatory. A person's selection of a *naya*—or, its empirical counterpart *nikṣepa*—involves his interests and attitudes, needs and beliefs, preferences and prejudices. The Jainas might have been unaware of the fact that the justification of a relatively true or relatively false judgment, of a *naya,* a *darśana,* an opinion, a perspective, is to be sought in an individual mind's pose. Otherwise, what is the ground of a materialist's commitment to interpret everything materialistically, a yogin's commitment to dissolve it in spirit, and a nihilist's intellectual marriage to nothingness? As F. C. S. Schiller, in an attempt to correlate relevance with the subjectivity of the thinker, puts it: "To say that relevance means subjectivity merely means that it is conceived not as a quality residing in the thing thought of *per se* but only in its relation to us; *it lies in its value for us and in our attitude towards it.* It implies a relation to a human purpose by its very etymology."[4] Both in thought and moral conduct, relativeness does not make sense if it is abstracted from the subject. When an individual mind takes a pose in its encounter with the world, a kind of selectiveness is generated within itself. Indeed, many of the factors conditioning this pose, internally and externally, can be ascertained by a scientific analysis. But there will remain in it something strictly subjectively oriented, something incomprehensible in all its intents, something aligned to the mind's purposive attitude, whose role in the very exercise of the pose is beyond doubt. It would have been fitting had the Jainas argued, as, for instance, pragmatists in general and Schiller in particular argue, that what is selected in perception or reflection is plainly a part, an extract, and not the whole, because of a peculiar "act of will," a special "logic of values," inherent in the unique mode of a subject's consciousness. ". . . The relevant is only part of the Truth, which must include all that has been or can be judged true, as well as what is relevant to the particular inquiry."[5]

Thus in any intercourse between the knower and the known, or in any selection by the knowing subject of a *naya,* mind exhibits a purposiveness of cognition, a disposition, to which something is revealed, opened out, and becomes known. The entire structure of this purposiveness, in which, perhaps, intellect, impulse, and desire are exceptionally blended, cannot be brought under definable concepts. Consequently, its functioning is largely shrouded in obscurity. However, as it goes on manifesting itself, laying hold of this or that *naya* and reading the world in this or that manner, it projects its own teleological mean-

[4] F. C. S. Schiller, *Logic for Use: An Introduction to the Voluntarist Theory of Knowledge* (London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd., 1929), p. 77.
[5] *Ibid.,* pp. 77-78.

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ings. All such meanings have their anchorage in a human system, with all its enduring aspirations, values, and practical exigencies. The world that human minds perceive or make judgments about is a world generating an unending diversity of excitements, that is, a world emitting forces in order to stimulate innumerable human responses. Every judgment is a *syāt* judgment, or every object of knowledge is a *naya,* because it denotes only that which human purposiveness at a particular point of time is able to catch of the given. Had the Jainas directed their inquiry to the psychological background of *naya*-formation they would have unfailingly come upon the central thesis of pragmatism, namely, that all perceptions and judgments have at their bottom man's concrete needs and aims, in reference to which the relative truth, the adequacy, and the emergence itself of them all can be demonstrated.

As in the case of every other inwardly oriented school in Indian philosophy, the Jainism epistemology centers mainly upon the question of the conditions of mundane knowledge. The Jainas were not unaware of the fact that the relativism they were propounding suggests a verdict of disfavor of all knowledge obtained and obtainable by us in the phenomenal world. For a world which is divisible into an ever inexhaustible number of points of view and whose entirety we never comprehend is just inaccessible to empirical sensibilities or rational statements. While pragmatism, therefore, could complement the Jainas' relativistic epistemology by supplying it with a logical basis, a subjectivist and teleological justification, it would not change in any way their conception of the most ideal kind of knowledge, described by them as "complete and full, the unobstructed, unimpeded, infinite and supreme, best knowledge and intuition called *Kevalajñāna.*"[6] When looked at from this kind of knowledge, the whole sphere of relative truths—pragmatically risen *nayas* and *syāt* statements—would be found to belong to some lower tier of consciousness where things glide from the stage of being known to that of being semi-known, and further to that of being obscure. Besides, it is the absolutely self-evident and illuminating nature of this knowledge that renders every form of relative knowledge not only inauthentic but also ultimately useless.

The philosophical tendency underlying the relativistic epistemology of the Jainas is toward transcendentalism *par excellence.* It is in fact through a wholehearted adherence to this tendency that they chose to profess a relativistic way of meeting earthly situations. Their emphasis on the method of knowledge was never central to their discipline. Most probably they imagined that by constructing a non-absolutist skeptical epistemology they would teach themselves and others that any experience short of the experience of the transcendental, short of *kevalajñāna* or omniscience, would amount to pseudo-experience. Their *syādvāda* does not seem to have had a direct bearing on their study of

[6] Sinclair Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1915), p. 39.

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the origin and requirements of knowledge. And this is the reason why they left their ingeniously conceived relativism incomplete. While being beckoned by the ultimate aim of realizing the innermost stratum of experience, where the knower-known distinction would no more prevail, they, rather negatively, embarked upon a program of proving that what is known or expressed by man during his unenlightened existence is merely a fragment of what *is* in all its totality. All debates and discussions, as, for instance, between one group of Jainas and another, or between the Jainas and the Vedāntins, are basically collisions of *nayas, darśanas,* points of view, springing from different purposes in different minds. Their diversity is due to the immanent limitedness of the very conduct of intellect. The only plane from which the Jainas would want to resolve them is the plane of *kevalajñāna* or universal vision.

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D. J. Kalupahana A Buddhist tract on empiricism

Since the time Western scholars came to be interested in the study of Buddhism, we find various views expressed on the nature of early Buddhist thought, especially in comparison with the different trends in Western philosophy. One of the pioneers in this field, Professor T. W. Rhys Davids, whose main studies on Buddhism were confined to the Theravāda canon, especially the Pāli Nikāyas consisting of the discourses attributed to the Buddha himself, pointed out at a very early date the relationship between Buddhism and the positivistic thought of the French philosopher Auguste Comte, where the claims of science received a full recognition.[1] Following this we find many scholars making random observations on the modernistic trends in Buddhism. For example, H. H. Price, speaking on the appeal of Hīnayāna Buddhism to the Western mind, wrote: "There are indeed some passages in the early part of the *Questions of King Milinda* which have a modern ring, and might almost have been written in Cambridge in the 1920's."[2] Of the scholars from the Orient, we find Radhakrishnan occasionally referring to the positivistic trends in early Buddhism.[3] All of these appear to be cursory glances at the nature of early Buddhism. None of these themes were worked out in full until Professor K. N. Jayatilleke made an exhaustive study of almost all the material, especially that embodied in the Pāli Nikāyas, to show that early Buddhism compares with modern Empiricism, with the exception that unlike modern Empiricism, Buddhism recognized the validity of the data of extrasensory perception and of the experiential content of mysticism.[4] Professor Jayatilleke has examined most of the statements in the Pāli canon embodying empiricist ideas, but a very important discourse, which could have been usefully utilized to prove his point of view, appears to have eluded him. It is a discourse included in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya,*[5] and is called the "Discourse on 'Everything' " (*Sabbasutta*). Its Āgama version is found in the Chinese translation, the *Tsa-a-han-ching.*[6]

PĀLI VERSION

Evaṃ me sutaṃ. Ekaṃ samayaṃ Bhagavā Sāvatthiyaṃ viharati Jetavane Anāthapiṇḍikassa ārāme. Tatra kho Bhagavā bhikkhū āmantesi bhikkhave'ti.

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[1] *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by some points in the History of Indian Buddhism,* The Hibbert Lectures, 1881 (London: Williams and Norgate, 1881), p. 31.

[2] "The Present Relations between Eastern and Western Philosophy," *The Hibbert Journal,* LIII (April, 1955), 229.

[3] *Indian Philosophy* (New York: The Macmillan Co., London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), II, 472.

[4] *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963).

[5] Ed. M. Leon Feer (London: Pali Text Society, 1960), IV, 15.

[6] *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō,* ed. J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe (Tokyo: Taishō Issaikyo Kanko Kwai, 1924-1929), II, 91a-b.

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Bhandante'ti te bhikkhū Bhagavato paccassosuṃ. Bhagavā etad avoca. Sabbaṃ vo bhikkhave desissāmi, taṃ suṇātha. Kiñ ca bhikkhave sabbaṃ. Cakkhuñ c'eva rūpā ca, sotañ ca saddā ca, ghānañ ca gandhā ca, jivhā ca rasā ca, kāyo ca phoṭṭhabbā ca, mano ca dhammā ca. Idaṃ vuccati bhikkhave sabbaṃ. Yo bhikkhave evaṃ vadeyya, aham etaṃ sabbaṃ paccakkhāya aññaṃ sabbaṃ paññāpessāmîti, tassa vācāvatthur eva'ssa, puṭṭho ca na sampāpeyya, uttariñ ca vighātam āpajjeyya. Taṃ kissa hetu. Yathā taṃ bhikkhave avisayasmin ti.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Thus have I heard. Once the Exalted One was living at Sāvatthi, in the monastery of Anāthapiṇḍika (situated) in Jeta's Grove. Then the Exalted One addressed the monks: "O monks!" They responded: "Yes, O Lord!" and the Exalted One spoke thus: "Monks, I will preach to you 'everything'. Listen to it. What, monks, is 'everything'? Eye and material form, ear and sound, nose and odour, tongue and taste, body and tangibles, mind and concepts. These are called 'everything'. Monks, he who would say, 'I will reject this *everything* and proclaim another *everything*', he may certainly have a theory (of his own). But when questioned, he would not be able to answer and would, moreover, be subject to vexation. Why? Because it would not be within the range of experience."

ĀGAMA VERSION IN ITS CHINESE TRANSLATION

如是我聞。一時佛住舍衛國祇樹給孤獨園。時有生聞婆羅門。往詣佛所共相問訊。問訊已退坐一面。白佛言。瞿曇。所謂一切者。云何名一切。佛告婆羅門。一切者謂十二入處。眼色耳聲鼻香舌味身觸意法。是名一切。若復說言此非一切。沙門瞿曇。所說一切。我今捨別立餘一切者。彼但有言說。問已不知。增其疑惑。所以者何。非其境界故。時生聞婆羅門聞佛所說。歡喜隨喜奉行。

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Thus have I heard. Once the Buddha was staying in the country of Śrāvasti, in the monastery of Anāthapiṇḍika, situated in Jeta's Grove. At that time there was a Brahmin named Sheng-wen who came to the place where the Buddha was and greeted the Buddha. Having greeted the Buddha, he sat on a side and addressed the Buddha thus: "Gautama, (people) speak of 'everything'. What is the meaning of 'everything'?" The Buddha addressed the Brahmin: " 'Everything' means the twelve 'gateways' (i.e., bases of cognition): eye, material form, ear, sound, nose, odour, tongue, taste, body, tangibles, mind and concepts. These are called 'everything'. Again, there may be those who say that this is not 'everything'. (They may say) 'That which the Śramana Gautama describes as *everything*, I will give up and proclaim another *everything*'. There could always be such a theory. But, if questioned, (he) would not know. It increases doubt and confusion. Why? Because it would not be within the range of experience." The Brahmin Sheng-wen listened to what the Buddha said and being pleased, went away.

The close similarity between these two versions cannot fail to impress the

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reader. As far as the contents are concerned, there is hardly any difference between the two versions. The only difference is that in the Chinese version, the question as to what is meant by "everything" is put to the Buddha by a Brahmin named Sheng-wen, while in the Pāli version, the Buddha himself raises the question and provides the answer. Sheng-wen is, no doubt, the Chinese rendering of the name Jāṇussoṇi.[7] Jāṇussoṇi is generally known to be a person who was interested in finding out the validity of some of the speculative theories current at the time. Once he is represented as questioning the Buddha regarding the two extreme views, namely, the Eternalist theory that "everything exists" (*sabbam atthi*), and the Materialist theory that "everything does not exist" (*sabbaṃ n'atthi*).[8] It is therefore natural that this discourse, which purports to examine the basis of speculative theories, is presented as the Buddha's reply to a question raised by an interlocutor like Jāṇussoṇi.

The importance of the above discourse as a *locus classicus* in any attempt to show the empiricist trends in early Buddhism should be very evident. It does not deal with the problem of extrasensory perception and the speculation regarding the content of such experience. It only purports to reject all the speculative theories which go beyond the data of sensory experience. It refers to the twelve "gateways"[9] of cognition as the primary sources of our knowledge of empirical reality, and points out that any theory which goes beyond the data of sensory experience could lead to a lot of unnecessary speculation and diatribes resulting in vexation. The key word in the discourse is *avisaya,*[10] which represents a direct statement of the empiricist trend in early Buddhism.

[7] Akanuma Chizen, *Indo-Bukkyo Koyumeishi Jiten, Genshiki Hen* (Nagoya: Haijinkaku Shobo, 1930-1931), pp. 240b-241b.

[8] *Saṃyutta Nikāya,* ed. M. Leon Feer (London: Pali Text Society, 1960), II, 76-77.

[9] To use a term from modern psychology, *vide* Norman L. Munn, *Psychology: The Fundamentals of Human Adjustment* (4th ed.; London: George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1961), p. 507. The Chinese phrase 入處 , which literally means 'place of entry', is a rendering of the term *āyatana.* It has been noted that there is no English equivalent for the word *āyatana,* because *āyatana* refers to the sense organ as well as the object of sense. *Vide* Shwe Zan Aung, *Compendium of Philosophy* (London: Pali Text Society, 1963), p. 183, n. 1.

[10] The Chinese rendering is非境界. This phrase occurs in the Chinese translation of the *Laṅkâvatāra Sūtra* (*vide Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō,* XVI, 524a) and the Sanskrit text (ed. Bunyiu Nanjio, Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1956) reads *aviṣaya* (p. 49).

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Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, *by K. N. Jayatilleke*
London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963, 519 pp., 70 *s.*

This book contains much less and much more than the title promises. Many topics that one expects to meet in a modern European or medieval Indian treatise on epistemology are either wholly absent or barely mentioned: the nature and operation of memory; theories of error; the faculties, objects, and processes of thinking (in contrast to perception); and the faculties and operations involved in paranormal (yogic) cognition. In good part these topics are omitted because the Pāli Canon has nothing much to say about them. But a major limitation of the book under review is that, though it cogently demonstrates that Early Buddhist thought is the most sophisticated and technically advanced of all the archaic Indian schools, it does not indicate either its shortcomings or its relation to the later evolution of Indian philosophy. The impression conveyed is that the significant history of Indian thought began with the *Ṛg-veda* and ended with the *Abhidhamma-piṭaka.* Despite this limitation, the book is a masterpiece of Indology and of history of philosophy. It surveys the antecedents and contemporaries of Early Buddhism more fully and more definitively than any previous work, and it deals superbly with the questions of authority, reason, and experience in the Pāli Canon, especially the *Sutta-piṭaka.* The Western philosopher who is not daunted by the copious citations in Pāli and Sanskrit (most but not all accompanied by translations) will be rewarded with an intelligible and accurate picture of archaic Indian thought on certain epistemological questions. This much can be said for no other book.

Though Jayatilleke does not go out of his way to find fault with Early Buddhist theories, his treatment is objective and his judgments are fair. He vindicates Gotama's philosophical honor against some biases and misunderstandings of A. B. Keith, E. J. Thomas, Mrs. Rhys Davids and L. de La Vallée Poussin, but he makes no claims that are not substantiated by the texts. In a few places he shows that Theravāda orthodoxy deviates from the canonical doctrine (e.g., pp. 361, 365-368), and he takes it for granted that there are earlier and later strata in the *Sutta-piṭaka* (e.g., p. 384, concerning faith). He says that the authority of omniscience is not claimed for the statements of the Buddha until the very latest strata of the Pāli Canon (pp. 380-381). Nevertheless, he appeals to text-critical constructs only when necessary, and avoids all far-out theories about a primitive, pre-canonical Buddhism.

A key text for Jayatilleke's interpretation of Gotama's teaching is the address to the Kālāmas, which lists six kinds of authority and four kinds of reasoning that are not to be taken as sufficient grounds for accepting or rejecting an assertion. A good fifth of the book (pp. 169-276) is a commentary on

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this *Sutta,* the laconic phrases of which have hitherto been much misunderstood. He examines exhaustively the Pāli and Brahmanical usage of the two chief terms, *anussava* and *takka,* concluding that *anussava* means "sacred, holy or revelational tradition" (p. 177), and *takka* means "the reasoning that was employed to construct and defend metaphysical theories" (p. 206), and not mere quibbling or destructive argument. Chapter V, "The Attitude to Reason" (pp. 205-276), elucidates the four rational grounds. Chapter IV, "The Attitude to Authority" (pp. 169-204), establishes the following meanings for the six kinds of authority: (1) *anussava,* sacred, holy, or revelational tradition, particularly the Vedic tradition (p. 177), (2) *paraṃparā,* the unbroken succession of the teaching or the teachers (p. 194), (3) *itikirā,* at least: hearsay or rumor; at most: legendary history (p. 198), (4) *piṭaka-saṃpadā,* the authority of scripture, either Vedic or non-Vedic (pp. 199-200), (5) *bhavyarūpatā,* the competence (or reliability) of the person (p. 201), and (6) *samaṇo no garu,* "our recluse is a respected teacher" (p. 201), that is, acceptance of a statement on the prestige-value of the person uttering it.

The *Kālāma Sutta* concludes with an exhortation to reject beliefs when you yourself realize that when put into practice they conduce to unhappiness, and accept beliefs when you yourself realize that when put into practice they make for well-being (p. 359). This has often been considered a pragmatist theory of truth ("a belief is true if it works"), but as Jayatilleke points out, "it would have been held to be logically or causally impossible for what is false, i.e. what is morally evil to result in what was useful in the sense of being morally advantageous or good" (p. 359). He shows that in Early Buddhism truth is chiefly correspondence with fact, but also consistency or coherence (pp. 352-353). Accordance with fact is more important because the highest means of knowledge is paranormal perception (*abhijñā,* "superknowledge"), through which one confirms and directly realizes what had previously been known only partially and indirectly through valid testimony, rational faith, and intellectual wisdom (*prajñā*).

The author, who is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Ceylon, is a renowned champion of Buddhism. He dedicates his book to "The Torchbearer of Mankind." He is also a professional philosopher schooled in the British empiricist tradition. For a couple of years he attended Wittgenstein's classes at Cambridge, and he is at home with the writings of Ryle, Warnock, etc. The reader need not fear, however, another specious attempt to show that ancient India really possessed modern science and philosophy. Prof. Jayatilleke never so much as suggests that the teaching of the Buddha is any truer or better because it occasionally coincides with that of some contemporary philosopher. He deals matter-of-factly with the paranormal powers—clairvoyance, clairaudience, telepathy, and ante-natal retro-cognition—cites Pāli texts and modern research on the subject, and concludes: "We have reason therefore to believe

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that genuine claims were made about having such experiences. The other question is whether these experiences were veridical or delusive. This falls outside the scope of our study, and we do not propose to examine it here" (p. 459).

This is a welcome change after T. W. Rhys Davids, who said, "Buddhism, it thus appears, has not been able to escape from the natural result of the wonder with which abnormal nervous states have always been regarded during the infancy of science,"[1] and La Vallée Poussin, who said, "The historian has not to deal with Latin notions worked out by sober and clear-sighted thinkers, but with Indian 'philosophumena' concocted by the ascetics whom we shall describe presently: men exhausted by a severe diet and often stupefied by the practice of ecstasy."[2] Rhys Davids and Poussin both came to judge Buddhist contemplation and its fruits less harshly after writing these quaintly provincial verdicts, and Poussin in 1925 affirmed that Early Buddhist doctrine is chiefly an elucidation of yogic experience.[3] Jayatilleke is fairer, in that he allows that claims may legitimately be based on paranormal experience of this kind, and more discriminating, in that he distinguishes genuine from true experience, and proposes that the claims be verified empirically rather than prejudged.

The first three chapters deal with the historical background to Early Buddhism, Vedic and non-Vedic (Materialism, Skeptics, Ājīvikas, and Jains). In the sequel it appears that Buddhism inherited much from each of these schools, and that its theory of knowledge fairly accurately represented and criticized the range of opinions current in the Buddha's time. These thinkers fall into three classes:

(1) The Traditionalists, who based their doctrines on scriptural authority. Chief of these were the Vedic schools.

(2) The Rationalists, who sought knowledge through reasoning and speculation but did not rely on extrasensory perception. Among these were the metaphysicians of the Early Upaniṣads, the Skeptics, the Materialists, and most of the Ājīvikas.

(3) The "Experientialists," who founded their doctrines on direct personal knowledge and experience, including extrasensory perception. Many thinkers of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads, some Ājīvikas, and the Jains belong here. The Materialists, though empiricists, denied the validity of claims based on yogic experience. The Buddha seems to have classified himself as an Experientialist, though he did not hold that paranormal experience is ipso facto true.

The discussion of Upaniṣadic thought in Chapter I is subservient to the investigation of Early Buddhism, but merits study for what it contributes to

[1] Davids, *Buddhism* (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1886), p. 176.
[2] Poussin, *The Way to Nirvāṇa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1917), p. 111.
[3] Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *Nirvāṇa* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1925).

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the history of Brahmanical thought. Jayatilleke distinguishes the Rationalists from the Yogins, and effectively counters the Neo-Vedāntin tendency to make them all Yogins. His essays on representative Rationalists—Uddālaka (pp. 33-36), Prajāpati (pp. 36-39) and Yājñavalkya (pp. 40-42)—should be read by every student of Indian philosophy. These thinkers are restored to their historical place as bold, naive pioneers standing at the very beginning of rational thought. Their views, moreover, illustrate what Early Buddhism called *diṭṭhi* (views), and show why yogic insight soon seemed a better path to sure knowledge.

Chapter VI, "Analysis and Meaning," deals with kinds of statements (categorical versus non-categorical, analyzable and non-analyzable), types of questions (to be explained categorically or analytically, to be counter-questioned, or to be set aside), definitions and classifications, delimitation of terms, and ideas about language, meaning, and meaninglessness. The author attributes the cautious critical and analytic approach to the influence of the Materialists (who had rejected baseless belief and affirmed only what could be perceived or inferred from perception) and the Skeptics (who had doubted the possibility of any knowledge at all). He indicates that the Upaniṣadic tradition responded by warning Vedic students not to associate with those who "love to distract the Vaidikas by the jugglery of false arguments, comparisons and paralogisms" (p. 278). He says that the Buddhists and Jains, who wished to propagate their doctrines among the critical intelligentsia, had to be critical themselves. He does not mention the probable reason why the Middle and Late Upaniṣads show so little critical analysis—that a school which recruited boys from sacred lineages had no need to vie for the approval of adult intellectuals.

Chapter VII, "Logic and Truth," discusses the *catuṣkoṭi* form (which Jayatilleke calls "the four logical alternatives," "the fourfold logic," or "the logic of four alternatives"); the relation between truth-value, utility, and pleasantness; truth, correspondence, and coherence; truth and verification; and the theory of double truth (conventional versus absolute). In a brief note on the Middle Way, he considers whether it was dogmatically assumed that the truth must lie in the middle, or whether it just happened that the truth lay between the extremes "everything exists" and "nothing exists," between extreme hedonism and extreme asceticism (pp. 359-360). He thinks the latter alternative is more plausible. "Logically, there is no reason why the truth should lie in the middle rather than in one of the two extremes though most people would think that a moderate view . . . is more likely to be true" (p. 360). The question is intriguing, but Jayatilleke treats it too briefly and superficially, especially since the rejection of both extremes seems to be the fourth, "neither X nor non-X," of the "logical alternatives" to which he devotes so much space.

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The *catuṣkoṭi* figures prominently in the Pāli Canon as in most later Buddhist philosophical literature. Until recently, modern scholars have not made much sense of this form, and Jayatilleke quickly demonstrates that "neither Poussin's view that this logic is due to a failure to understand or respect the principle of Contradiction nor the views of Mrs. Rhys-Davids and Barua that they are laws of thought, bear critical examination" (p. 334). He then refers to his own 1950 article,[4] and states that in none of the several articles on the subject since then is there a serious attempt to clarify the problems involved. He gives short shrift to P. T. Raju,[5] but concedes that Archie Bahm[6] makes a significant contribution in proposing that in the four assertions not-P is the contrary and not the contradictory of P (p. 337). This is the cornerstone of Jayatilleke's theory. He goes on to summarize and criticize an article by Shōson Miyamoto,[7] concluding, "On the logic of the four-fold formula itself he sheds little light" (p. 338). Schayer's work on the *catuṣkoṭi*[8] is alluded to parenthetically ("following Schayer," p. 350), but not discussed. Hajime Nakamura's articles[9] are not mentioned at all, and though my article on Nāgārjuna[10] is criticized briefly (p. 350), there is no mention of my article on Seng-chao,[11] in which Indian and Chinese Mādhyamika interpretations of the *catuṣkoṭi* are presented and discussed.

Though it is untrue that none of the articles save Jayatilleke's seriously attempts to clarify the problems concerning the *catuṣkoṭi,* no other scholar has pursued the subject with such unremitting zeal, or worked out so fully and clearly the logical facets of this form. It is regrettable that the author decided merely to summarize his 1950 article, which is inaccessible to most readers of the book. It is also disappointing that he only considers a few examples from the Pāli Canon, as many of his statements seem to be at variance with the data, some of his theory is unclear for want of examples, and some statements seem

[4] K. N. Jayatilleke, "Some Problems of Translation and Interpretation II," *University of Ceylon Review,* 8 (1950), 45-55.

[5] P. T. Raju, "The Principle of Four-Cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy," *Review of Metaphysics,* 7 (1954), 694-713.

[6] Archie J. Bahm, "Does Seven-Fold Predication Equal Four-Cornered Negation Reversed?," *Philosophy East and West,* VII, 3-4 (1957), 127-130.

[7] Shōson Miyamoto, "The Logic of Relativity as the Common Ground for the Development of the Middle Way," in *Buddhism and Culture,* ed. Susumu Yamaguchi (Kyoto, 1960), pp. 67-88.

[8] Stanislaw Schayer, "Altindische Antizipationen der Aussagenlogik," *Bulletin de l'Académie Polonaise,* classe de philologie (1933), pp. 90-96.

[9] Hajime Nakamura, "Kūkan no Kigō-ronrigaku-teki kaimei" [Some Clarifications of the Concept of Voidness from the Standpoint of Symbolic Logic], *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū,* III, 1 (1954), 223-231; "Buddhist Logic Expounded by Means of Symbolic Logic," *IBK,* VII, 1 (1958), 375-395.

[10] Richard H. Robinson, "Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjuna's System," *Philosophy East and West,* VI, 4 (1957), 291-308.

[11] Richard H. Robinson, "Mysticism and Logic In Seng-chao's Thought," *Philosophy East and West,* VIII, 3-4 (1958-59), 99-120.

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to waver and manifestly need clarification; for instance: "If we do so, we treat [the first *koṭi*] as an universal affirmative proposition, which it is not (at least always)" (p. 351). Jayatilleke interprets one of his chief examples (pp. 340-341) as follows:

I. Text: "This world is finite (and bounded all round)."
Interpretation: "The world has the characteristic 'finite' *in all respects*."

II. "This world is infinite (and not bounded all round)."
"The world has the opposite or contrary characteristic of being 'infinite' *in all respects*."

III. "This world is both finite and infinite."
"The world is both finite *in some respect* and infinite *in another respect*."

IV. "This world is neither finite nor infinite."
"IV is said to be the point of view of a 'reasoner' (*takkī, loc. cit.*), according to whom the epithets 'finite' and 'infinite' cannot be predicated of the world and hence it is said that he disagrees with I, II, and III." (*Loc. cit.*)

This is tantamount to saying that IV is a rejection rather than a negation of the first three *koṭis*. If this is so, Jayatilleke's apparently sharp distinction between negation and rejection becomes confused. He says that the Buddhists "considered at least one of the alternatives to be true in any particular case. . . . They also rejected all four alternatives when they considered the question meaningless" (pp. 344-345). Jayatilleke thinks that at least some of the *avyākṛta* points were set aside (i.e., rejected) because they were considered meaningless and by their very nature logically unanswerable (p. 291). He cites one example where this is certainly the case: whether the Tathāgata exists after death, does not, both does and does not, or neither does nor does not. It is the only one of the four *avākṛta* problems which is discussed in the *Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta*,[12] where the analogical counter-question is: In which direction does a fire go when it goes out? The analogy confirms that the question was considered meaningless, but does not prove that this set of questions, much less the others, was rejected solely because it is meaningless. Nonetheless, if the fourth alternative indicates that the predicate cannot meaningfully be applied to the subject, its rejection would mean: "It is meaningless to assert that it is meaningless to assert that the world is finite, is infinite, or is both finite and infinite."

Another *catuṣkoṭi* from the Nikāyas is cited in Jayatilleke's latest article,[13]

[12] *Majjhima Nikāya* No. 72.

[13] K. N. Jayatilleke, "The Logic of Four Alternatives," *Philosophy East and West*, XVII, 1-4 (1967), 69-83. (Hereafter cited as "Logic.")

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but not in the book. The *Sutta* says: "They say the soul after death, not subject to decay, and conscious, is (I) altogether happy, (II) altogether unhappy, (III) both, or (IV) neither."[14] Jayatilleke substitutes "a person" for "the soul after death, not subject to decay, and conscious" ("Logic," p. 80). His revised version, "A person is neither happy nor uphappy," is meaningful in that "happy" and "unhappy" are commonly allowed predicates of "person." The statement would mean that the person was "experiencing a neutral hedonic tone" ("Logic," p. 80). In such a case, IV cannot be interpreted as the *takkī* would do. But "the soul, after death, etc." is a different matter from "a person," since the latter refers to a commonsense entity, while in Buddhist doctrine the *ātman* is not an admissible subject of predications. "The world" is an admissible subject (predicates such as "arises" and "ceases" are applied to it), but "the Tathāgata after death" is not. The form "X is neither Y nor non-Y" obviously requires further study, as neither Jayatilleke's work nor anyone else's accounts for the heterogeneity of the examples and identifies a common denominator. I might suggest that when the subject is an admitted (*prasiddha*) entity, the interpretation is: *"In some respects,* this world is not finite, and *in other respects,* it is not infinite." This is the case in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* in the famous discourse to Kaccāna, where it is stated that in one sense the world is not existent (because it ceases) and in another sense it is not non-existent (because it arises).[15] But "existent" and "non-existent" are not logically the same as "happy" and "unhappy". The IV-form containing them does not mean "the world possesses a neutral ontological status."

Jayatilleke assumes that all examples of the *catuṣkoṭi* in the Nikāyas are logically homogeneous. This assumption calls for proof, as it is anything but self-evident. Semantic multivalence hovers around most of the instances, and is only occasionally marked by qualifiers such as "in some respects." Where if anywhere is the border between logic and semantics? And is it justifiable to call this fourfold form logical at all, when one term can be used in two senses, and when the predicates are so diverse—contradictories, contraries, opposites, and mere differents? Some modifiers in the Pāli instances look like predicate quantifiers—"altogether, wholly"—but are not easily convertible to ordinary subject quantifiers, as Jayatilleke shows in criticizing my comparison between the *catuṣkoṭi* and the Aristotelian A, E, I, and O forms ("Logic," p. 77). The III-form, though, is self-contradictory if taken to mean "X is altogether Y and altogether non-Y." So it has to be understood, "X is partly Y and partly non-Y" ("Logic," p. 79). But the *Pāli Suttas* do not use modifiers such as "partly" in this III-form, though "in some respect" and "in another respect" are passable cover phrases for "(infinite/finite) up-and-down" and

[14] *Brahma-jāla Sutta,* Dīgha Nikāya No. 1, PTS edition I. 31.
[15] Cf. Richard H. Robinson, "The Classical Indian Axiomatic," *Philosophy East and West,* XVII, 1-4 (1967), 141.

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"(finite/infinite) crossways." What, in logical terms, is a "respect," and is it not perilously close to a "standpoint" (*naya*)? Jayatilleke says that if each of the four alternatives were true from some "standpoint," this would involve the Jain relativistic logic, to which Buddhism was opposed ("Logic," p. 82). But unless each term is used in the same sense throughout the four alternatives, multiple standpoints are in fact involved.

It is hard to see how Jayatilleke can call the *catuṣkoṭi* a "logic," since it is merely a set of four clause patterns constructed with "and" and "not," and connected by "or." It is not a calculus, it produces no theorems, and it participates in no forms of inference such as Aristotle's or Dignāga's syllogisms. The subjects of the clauses are usually singular nouns—"*Tathāgata,* world, *ātman, jīva* (soul)"—which may stand for a unique individual, or for a class. In the latter cases, we face an undistributed subject and the unresolved question whether the III-form means "Some X's are Y and some other X's are non-Y," or "All X's are partly Y and partly non-Y." Later Buddhist thinkers exhibit instances of each kind, not necessarily because, as Jayatilleke declares, they did not "understand the logic of the four alternatives as formulated and utilized in early Buddhism" ("Logic," p. 82), but more likely because this archaic dialectic device was originally so vague that it permitted quite a few variants. Furthermore, until we understand better what this fourfold set meant in Early Buddhism, it is premature to say that Nāgārjuna, Vimalākṣa, and Candrakīrti did not understand it. And since the *catuṣkoṭi* is not a doctrine but just a form, later writers were at liberty to use it in new ways, doing which does not of itself prove that they misunderstood the early forms.

Jayatilleke says that I call the *catuṣkoṭi* the 'tetralemma' (p. 350; "Logic," p. 73), leaving the suggestion that I invented the term. This is not so. Schayer uses it in the very article (*op. cit.*) which Jayatilleke in the same sentence (p. 350) says he is following. Jayatilleke's objection to 'tetralemma' is that "we do not call Aristotelian logic 'the dilemma' because it is a logic of two alternatives" (p. 350). I have already registered some objections to calling the *catuṣkoṭi* a logic. It is simply a pattern consisting of four propositions. By derivation, 'dilemma' means "double proposition," and 'tetralemma' means "quadruple proposition." "The four logical alternatives" and "the logic of four alternatives" contain too many syllables for practical use. "Tetralemma" and "*catuṣkoṭi*" are equally compact. The former looks less outlandish to the Western reader, and provides a stylistically useful synonym even when writing for Indologists. Nowadays, though, Sanskrit is no more foreign than Greek to the world philosophical audience, and perhaps "four-pointer" would be a more transparent and less controversial translation than "tetralemma."

To conclude this subject in an irenic vein, here are some positive points on the *catuṣkoṭi* as used in the Pāli Nikāyas:

(1) The third alternative, "X is both Y and non-Y," is a conjunction of

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contraries, not of contradictories. Thus there is no violation of the rule of contradiction.

(2) The fourth alternative, "X is neither Y nor non-Y," is meaningful when X exists and when Y and non-Y are contraries rather than contradictories. The non-existence of X may have been sufficient reason for rejecting the fourth lemma, though this one, like the first three, was evidently rejected wherever the Buddhist took exception to the questioner's or listener's *concept* of X. This, as I have said,[16] is Nāgārjuna's position. As he considers own-being (*svabhāva*) to be a self-contradictory concept, any proposition containing a term to which own-being is ascribed is to be denied.

(3) Each of the four alternatives is intended to exclude the other three. The questioner Vacchagotta (*loc. cit.*) appends to each proposition in turn, *"etaṃ eva saccaṃ, aññaṃ, aññaṃ moghaṃ"* (this alone is true, another is false).

(4) The four lemmas were intended to be jointly exhaustive. Jayatilleke assumes that the historically correct interpretation must fulfill the logical claims of the earliest proponents. This, though, is not to be assumed without proof. The early claim may be untrue.

(5) The predicates of the first two *koṭis* are sometimes contradictories ("finite or infinite in all respects"), sometimes contraries ("east or west"),[17] and sometimes just phrases containing opposites ("torments himself, or torments another"—p. 342).

(6) The *catuṣkoṭi* forms are exemplified in ordinary English usage. We often say things like "America and North Vietnam are neither at peace nor at war," without intending a contradiction. Maybe there is a non-Aristotelian, non-Russellian logic implicit in ordinary usage (p. 344), or perhaps the form should be considered rhetorical rather than logical.

(7) The Nikāyas contain assertions attributed to Gotama of propositions in each of the four forms. "Self (*ātman*) is the lord of self" (*Dhammapada* 160). "There isn't a self in the self" (*Dhammapada* 62). "All the *dharmas* have no self" (*Dhammapada* 279). Some householders (those of good conduct) attain what is right, just, and good, and other householders (those of bad conduct) do not.[18] The Tathāgata avoids the extremes "There is an *ātman*" and "there is no *ātman*."[19] Candrakīrti is unable to quote any *Āgama* which says that the

[16] "Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjuna's System," pp. 299, 303.
[17] Cf. Yüan-k'ang, quoted in Robinson, "Mysticism and Logic In Seng-chao's Thought," p. 114, and Richard H. Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika in India and China* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp. 135-136. Jayatilleke gives an example with "east" and "west," but adduces no canonical or extra-canonical instance.
[18] Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 278. See *Majjhima* II. 197.
[19] *Saṃyutta* IV. 400-401. Cf. Étienne Lamotte, *Traité de la grande vertu de Sagosse* (Louvain: Bureau du Muséon, 1944), I, 32, n. 3.

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self both exists and does not exist.[20] His opponent quotes *Dhammapada* 160, to which he replies with *Dhammapada* 279, and goes on to explain the theory of accommodated teachings. As *ātman* is used in its commonsense meaning when affirmed and its metaphysical sense when denied, the exegetical distinction between *neyārtha* (indirect meaning) and *nītārtha* (direct meaning) texts[21] is involved. This distinction, as Jayatilleke says (p. 366), is the origin of the theory of twofold truth (conventional and absolute). Nāgārjuna says first that the Buddhas have taught *ātman,* non-*ātman,* and neither *ātman* nor non-*ātman* (*Madhyamaka-kārikās* 18. 6) and then that all is real,[22] or unreal, or both real and unreal, or neither real nor unreal. As Candrakīrti shows, in so doing Nāgārjuna is merely interpreting scripture. He is applying the *catuṣkoṭi* form as a classificatory device, which, as Jayatilleke says (p. 344), was the use to which early Buddhists put it. He is not maintaining that one and the same can be both true and false, or neither true nor false.

(8) The *catuṣkoṭi,* like other Buddhist dialectic, assumes a two-value logic. No truth-values other than true and false are countenanced either in Early Buddhism or in Nāgārjuna. As the silence of the *āryas* is non-propositional, it is out of order to consider inexpressibility as a true-value.

Chapter VIII, "Authority and Reason within Buddhism," begins by asking and answering three questions concerning authority. First, does Buddhism or the Buddha accept uncritically any doctrines on authority from the prevalent traditions? Answer: Rebirth, the chief doctrine which the Buddha is accused of uncritically adopting, was not universally accepted by Indian religions prior to the advent of Buddhism (p. 372). The Materialists denied after-death survival, and in denying the *ātman* the Buddha seemed to his contemporaries to incline toward Materialism. The Buddha had to answer the Materialist critique, and in certain *Suttas* he argues the case on purely rational grounds, with no assumption of the belief in survival (pp. 374-375).

Second: Is the same attitude recommended toward the authority of the Buddha as toward that of external traditions? Did the Buddha expect his statements to be treated as those of an omniscient being? Answer: We cannot hold that the Buddha claimed authority for his statements on the grounds that he was omniscient. Nor can we say that he received his knowledge from an omniscient divine source, that "Buddhism was a faith in revealed truths" (p. 381). The problem hinges on the role of *saddhā* (faith, belief) in Early Buddhism. In the course of a solid and discriminating essay (pp. 382-401),

[20] Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti,* ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin (St. Pétersbourgh, 1903-1913), pp. 354 ff.

[21] Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,* pp. 361-368. See *Aṅguttara* I. 60.

[22] Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā* 370. 1, explains this as meaning that the *skandhas, dhātus,* and *āyatanas* are real. Jayatilleke, in "Logic," p. 82, mistranslates: "Nāgārjuna, however, says that according to the Buddha, propositions could be true, false, both true and false, and neither true nor false."

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Jayatilleke establishes that in the earlier stratum of the Pāli Canon, the acceptance of *saddhā* is strictly consonant with the *Kālāma Sutta's* exhortation not to take anything on mere authority. This kind of faith is based on understanding, and serves as a preparation for confirmatory knowledge (pp. 382-386). In a later stratum, the Buddha is considered omniscient, and the *arhant* does not practice the *jhānas* (meditative trances) and so cannot verify for himself the facts of Karma and rebirth. He is *paññā-vimutta* ('emancipated by intellectual knowledge alone'), and has to accept the cardinal doctrines on faith (p. 400).

Jayatilleke cites as an instance of this later view a passage from the *Saṃyutta:* "One becomes an arhant by perfecting and fulfilling these five faculties (indriya) . . ." (p. 399). But the five *indriyas*—faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom—are given as the path by which Gotama realized the Dhamma of *Āḷâra Kâlâma* in the canonical autobiography.[23] This pentad looks like a pre-Buddhist *mārga* (path), and the view that fulfilling it constitutes arhantship may be a survival rather than an innovation. The *Saṃyutta* passage does not elucidate the relationship between perfect faith, the first faculty, and perfect wisdom, the last. Possibly faith is fulfilled when it is subsumed in knowledge. Or perhaps faith in this context is absence of doubt and distraction, a state that would accompany perfect wisdom.

Though it is true that Gotama's knowledge is not said to derive from an omniscient divine being, the *Vinaya* and *Suttas* afford numerous instances of gods and spirits informing the Buddha of some fact. Jayatilleke says: "The injunction on the part of Brahmā to the Buddha to preach his religion . . . does not imply that the Buddha gained his knowledge from Brahmā, especially when we see it said that Brahmā was ignorant of the deeper spiritual truths of Buddhism" (p. 381). According to the *Vinaya,*[24] when the new Buddha was inclined to remain silent and not preach the Dharma, Brahmā told him that there were beings whose mental eyes are darkened by very little dust, and that they would understand. The Blessed One then regarded the world with his Buddha-eye, saw those beings and that it was so, and consented to proclaim the Dharma. Next he considered preaching his Dharma to his two former teachers, and in each case a spirit informed him that the teacher had recently died, whereupon "knowledge arose in the Blessed One's mind" that this was so. The texts do not say whether Gotama could or could not have come to know these facts if the spirits had not told him. But as the story stands, he was first apprised by the deities, and only afterwards confirmed the matter with his own paranormal powers. The Canon abounds in incidents where Gotama, his disciples, and even ordinary citizens like Tapussa and Bhallika

[23] *Majjhima* I. 240 ff. Cf. E. J. Thomas, *The Life of the Buddha* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1927), p. 63.
[24] *Mahāvagga* I. 5. 1-13.

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(*Vinaya, Mahāvagga,* 1. 4. 2) receive a revelation from a spirit. No account of the Early Buddhist theory of knowledge should slide so lightly over this question.

Third: Do the disciples of the Buddha accept any doctrines on the authority of the Buddha? Answer: The *paññā-vimutta* had no alternative but to accept the Dharma permanently on faith. "It is possible that this new conception of saddhā was accompanied by a dogmatism which condemned the free inquiry which the earlier attitude was based on and encouraged" (p. 401). As evidence that free inquiry was the original norm, Jayatilleke refers to the scene of Gotama's deathbed in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta,* which "still represents [the Buddha] as being anxious that his seeming authority should not stand in the way of the doubts of the monks being dispelled by questioning" (p. 401).

Though this is more liberal than the dogmatist threat that whoever doubts the claims of the Tathāgata will have an unhappy rebirth (p. 400), it is still a far cry from Socratic inquiry. Throughout the *Suttas* and *Vinaya,* though the inquirer may be at liberty to doubt or challenge Gotama's statements, it is taken for granted that Gotama is right and the inquirer is wrong so long as he persists in disagreement. Gotama never once concedes that his opponent is right and he himself is wrong.

Coming to the role of reason, Jayatilleke says that though there is little evidence that any of the basic doctrines of Buddhism are derived by reason, we sometimes meet with the Buddha recommending his doctrines on rational grounds (p. 405). The Buddha's attitude to the numerous theories which were being propagated and defended on rational grounds in his day seems to have been to ignore them. He evidently considered that "when a debate has arisen, the sage does not enter it." This attitude probably explains why the Pāli Canon contains very little rational criticism even of doctrines which Buddhism opposed (p. 407).

Chapter IX, "The Means and Limits of Knowledge," deals first with the "knowing and seeing" through normal and paranormal perception which in Early Buddhism was the preferred means of knowledge. Such knowledge and insight is "mainly though not exclusively . . . a by-product of 'mental concentration' (*samādhi*) in jhāna or yoga" (p. 418). It is possible to misinterpret such intuitive experiences, and the claims of some contemplatives were rejected by Gotama (p. 462). The example shows that such errors result from generalizing from an inadequate body of insights. The question whether the higher trance states are subject to delusion is not broached in the Pāli Canon, and Jayatilleke does not discuss it. The knowledge and insight attained through the super-knowledges (*abhijñā*) was not considered incommunicable or subjective, and it was held that a sincere and intelligent person, properly instructed, could reproduce it and verify it for himself (pp. 426-427).

This last chapter contains an excellent essay on causation (pp. 443-457),

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refuting the allegation of Keith that "to assign to Buddhism faith in the uniformity of the causal process or of nature is absurd" (p. 450).

Jayatilleke says, "The approach of Buddhism results on the one hand in the elimination of metaphysics and on the other in the retention and development of some of the empiricist findings in Upaniṣadic theories of perception" (p. 433). Later he again shows the cloven hoof of the Positivist: "The Buddhist theory [of causation] is therefore empirical since it spoke only of observable causes without any metaphysical presuppositions of any substrata behind them" (p. 453). God may have died since 1961, when this book was written, but metaphysics has been resurrected, and the above statements are at least out of philosophical fashion. Not positing substances underlying observed phenomena does not suffice to obviate all metaphysical assumptions or to make a theory of causation empirical. The role of induction in Gotama's discovery of dependent co-arising is obscure in the canonical texts and is not clarified in Jayatilleke's disquisition. Quite possibly it played a large part in Gotama's enlightenment, but it certainly did not count for much in the Early Buddhist theory of knowledge. This being the case, Jayatilleke is not justified in agreeing with Warder when the latter says that "The Buddha legend synthesizes the quest for truth on scientific principles regardless of past traditions . . ." (p. 464). Jayatilleke has shown that Gotama, without being uncritical of archaic Indian traditions, was manifestly influenced by them both in his quest for truth and in the expression of his insights. To believe that the Buddhist seeks truth on "scientific principles," one must (a) believe that science is good, (b) believe that the Buddha-dharma is good and true, and (c) ignore the radical difference between the non-definitiveness of scientific knowledge and the definitiveness that the Buddha claimed for his teaching, the explicit induction of the former and the unacknowledged induction of the latter, the Buddhist tradition's conviction that everything of importance was discovered by the Buddha and need only be confirmed by the disciples, and the scientific view that past discoveries are liable to disproof as well as proof and that future discoveries will in all probability dwarf anything found out so far.

I began to review this book intending to summarize its main theses and arguments for the benefit for the non-Indologist. But the contents are so rich and the exposition is so tightly woven that a summary can no more do it justice than a prose digest can express the meaning of a poem. All I can hope is to encourage and facilitate the study of a work which is by any standards a masterpiece.

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Sociology for India, *edited by T. K. N. Unnithan, Yogendra Singh, Narendra Singhi, and Indra Deva.* New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India Pvt. Ltd., 1967. Pp. ii + 219. Rs. 12.00.

An "All India Seminar on Sociology for India: Teaching and Research" was convened in 1964 by the Department of Sociology of the University of Rajasthan. Fourteen of the seminar papers are published in this volume along with excerpts or summaries of a dozen others. The papers are concerned with three broad topics: the scope and methodology of contemporary sociology in India, the possibilities of developing an "Indian sociology," and the major problems connected with sociological teaching and research in India. An excellent final paper summarizes the themes emerging from the papers and discussions. There is also a forthright presentation of a proposed code of ethics for sociologists in India, with twenty-one items, drawn up by the organizers of the seminar. Anyone familiar with Indian universities will readily recognize the relevance and timeliness of most of the items included, not only for sociologists but also for those in other disciplines.

The papers present a fascinating spectrum of the views of Indian sociologists, reflecting differing degrees of adherence to, and departure from, the position that sociology is a sub-field of Indian philosophy. Those still close to the philosophical orientation see "Indian sociology" as mainly concerned with the study of Indian society as portrayed, and prescribed, in Hindu sacred texts. Others see sociology as hardly distinguishable from Indology, with primary emphasis on India's historical tradition. Still others see a place for an "Indian sociology" based on concepts and generalizations derived from, and relevant only to, India's distinctive culture. Others see contemporary, "international" sociology as largely relevant to India, with Indian traditional society amenable to analysis within the framework of sociological concepts and methods developed for the study of changing peasant societies. Those in the last group are chiefly oriented toward European and American sociological theories and methodologies, with structure-functional theories seen as most useful. In the perspective of this latter group, the phrase "Indian sociology" is hardly applicable to what is going on in sociology departments in India now, and will not become relevant until Indian sociologists make contributions to international sociology that are somewhat comparable to those of "American sociology" as exemplified by the contributions of Parsons, Merton, and Lazarsfeld.

It is regrettable that the book was inadequately edited and proofread, and that there is no index.

CLARENCE E. GLICK
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Four Religions of Asia, *by Herbert Stroup.* New York: Harper & Row, 1968. Pp. x + 212. $6.00.

The title of this book is a precise description of its contents. It concisely surveys the four religions which are indigenous to India: Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, and Sikhism. The author is friendly to the subject and aims his material at the level

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of the educated layman, providing explanatory data necessary for that readership. All of the salient facts, words, and principles are lucidly explained, so that the non-specialist can grasp some of the lasting values and philosophic insights of these religions. They are treated as social systems which make their impact on society and are, in the process, molded by socio-political forces. The author arranges his material under four headings: Founder, History, Scriptures, and Teachings (God, the person, society).

Speaking of the person, Prof. Stroup accuses Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism of denying the "intrinsic worth of the person" (p. 125). Unfortunately, this negative assessment is contradicted by other positive assessments in the book. For example, in respect to Hinduism he acknowledges that "the teaching of rebirth lays great stress upon human worth" (p. 69). In respect to Jainism, he admits that "one of the several elements taken into Hinduism was a stress upon the individuality of persons and their worth" (p. 87).

When the author castigates these religions for being "essentially world-rejecting or unworldly," it becomes evident he has fallen for the usual Western stereotypes that Asians are uninterested in the pleasures of this world, are indifferent to social and material progress, lack a sense of history, and attitudinally are passive and fatalistic.

The impression given of Zen is that it is tantamount to unreason. To the contrary, Zen's enemies are not logic and reason, but the false usages to which these are put in the effort to grasp the meaning of existence. Zen repudiates reason only when reason becomes unreasonable or rationalizing.

The book shares all the disadvantages of an author steeped in Western culture. However, by the same token it has the advantages of an objective approach to the religio-philosophic traditions, politics, and prejudices of the Asian people. As such, the book is a "cool medium," involving the reader, and must be commended as a straightforward introduction to the living religions of Asia.

S. Cromwell Crawford
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Wen-Lin: Studies in the Chinese Humanities, *edited by Chow Tse-tsung.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968. Pp. 8 + 325. $8.50.

This book is the first in a series designed to present to Western readers the most recent critical scholarship in the expanding field of Chinese humanities. In format, use of critical apparatus, and reliance upon original material, *Wen-Lin* offers a depth and quality usually found only in the more obscure serials of lesser circulation. Full use is made of Chinese characters.

This volume deals largely with literature: seven articles are concerned with poetry, two with longer literary forms, and one each with dialects, Taoism, and legal history.

In general, the contributions are of a fairly even pace, although some articles are

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quite technical in nature, others noticeably easier to read. The first three articles, "T'ao Ch'ien's 'Drinking Wine' Poems," by James R. Hightower, "The Double Ninth Festival in Chinese Poetry," by A. R. Davis, and "Ambiguities in Li Shang-yin's Poetry," by James J. Y. Liu, are of the latter kind, as are H. G. Creel's article on Taoism, W. A. C. H. Dobson's on the legal instruments *ming* and *meng,* and articles on the *Yüan-hun Chih,* by Albert E. Dien, and on the *Hsi yu chi* and *Hsi yu pu,* two Ming novels, by C. T. Hsia and T. A. Hsia. Of the technical contributions, Richard B. Mather's "A Note on the Dialects of Lo-yang and Nanking During the Six Dynasties," Chow Tse-tsung's "The Early History of the Chinese Word *Shih* (Poetry)," E. Bruce Brooks' "A Geometry of the *Shih-p'in,*" and Wayne Schlepp's "Metrics in Yüan *San-ch'ü*" all provide varying degrees of exhaustive historical and analytical inquiry and critical handling of manuscripts. These are weighty, intense, even dense, accounts of their respective subject matters. Brooks is the one exceptional case. His concern with the *Shih-p'in* appears to stem from a personal dislike of its author, and his somewhat extreme interpretation of the early literary criticism seems to involve a considerable amount of imaginative conjecture. Hellmut Wilhelm's account of the *Shih-p'in* is milder and safer. Brooks alone uses the Yale system of romanization, which requires a little interpolation after reading Wilhelm.

The book is nicely bound and printed. Full English and Chinese character and inscription indices fill out this first volume in the series, and leave one anticipating the second.

Robert Baricovich
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Japanese Culture (Its Development and Characteristics), *edited by Robert J. Smith and Richard K. Beardsley.* Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966. Pp. x + 193. $7.95.

Despite its relatively small size this volume is, as the title would suggest, immense in scope. The essays, all of which originated as papers given at the Tenth Pacific Science Congress (Honolulu, 1961), cover a wide range of problems, from language to personality. When taken together, they provide a rather comprehensive survey of the recent developments and trends in the research being conducted in various aspects of Japanese culture by scholars in Japan as well as the United States. The four problem areas into which the essays are grouped (Origins, Social Structure, Village Organization, and Culture and Personality) each exhibit a strong degree of cohesiveness without thereby becoming isolated. Indeed, one of the strongest impressions one receives is that of the necessity for and the fruitfulness of the interdisciplinary approach. The eighteen essays themselves are uniformly quite short, the longest being less than twenty pages, and can be conveniently classified into two types: (1) general surveys of a rather large problem together with an exposition of the various hypotheses offered as solutions to this problem, e.g., Ishida's

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"Nature of the Problem of Japanese Cultural Origins"; and (2) reports of particular investigations or experiments which are suggestive of future lines of research and possible explanatory hypotheses, e.g., Caudill's "Patterns of Emotion in Modern Japan." By bringing together papers from diverse fields in a systematic and coherent fashion, the editors expose the reader to research in areas with which he might not otherwise have had the occasion to become acquainted. If it was the editors' intention not merely to give a sample of recent research but to whet the reader's academic appetite, they have succeeded admirably.

One of the most significant features of the collections is that nearly half of the articles are the work of eminent Japanese scholars whose work is not, for the most part, readily available in English. Because of this the editors have included short biographical sketches of the Japanese contributors for the information of those readers not familiar with the work of these scholars. This presentation of work formerly unavailable in English would alone make this volume a welcome addition to the library of any student of Japanese culture. The volume has an even greater import than that, however, for it demonstrates that a cooperative effort on the part of scholars from Japan and scholars outside of Japan can be extremely rewarding, in spite of differences of approach and basic assumptions.

The greatest disappointment, aside from the fact that one cannot help wishing that some of the essays were longer than they are, is that the articles by the Japanese scholars have no accompanying bibliography. The appetite has been stimulated but there is provided no means of satisfying it. The fact that the bibliography would be almost entirely of Japanese sources is not sufficient reason to exclude it, for many of the most pertinent works in the bibliographies which are given are available only in Japanese.

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Buddhism (The Light of Asia), *by Kenneth K. S. Ch'en.* Woodbury, New York: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1968. Pp. viii + 297. $1.95. Paper.

In this single volume, Dr. Ch'en presents a clear and concise survey of the origin and development of Buddhism. Within the limits imposed by its size, the book adequately presents the history, doctrines, and the problems which arise in dating, interpreting, and understanding Buddhism, with the views of both the scholars and the Buddhists themselves given. Dr. Ch'en aims at a scholarly and historically accurate and fair treatment of Buddhism from the earliest times to the present. His approach is primarily historical rather than philosophical—doctrinal developments are presented in relation to their historical setting.

Dr. Ch'en begins with a survey of the philosophic, political, and social background prevailing in India at the time of the Buddha. He then investigates the life of the Buddha, establishing dates and chronology according to the most acceptable sources. The third chapter is devoted to the central doctrines of Buddhism—the middle path,

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the four noble truths, morality, concentration and wisdom, reality, dependent origination, the path to arhatship, *nirvāṇa,* and the indeterminate questions.

The author goes on to discuss the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism—Mahāyāna concepts and the Indian Mahāyāna sects. He returns to Theravāda Buddhism in the next two chapters, describing the development of the *saṅgha* and the spread of Theravāda (and the role played by Aśoka) to the various countries—Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia. He then turns to Buddhism in China, Japan, and Tibet, devoting a chapter to each, and discusses its accommodation and development in each country.

The last four chapters deal with Buddhist literature, art, ceremonies and festivals, and Buddhism and the modern world. In the last, Dr. Ch'en attempts to show the relevance of Buddhism in the modern world by discussing its relation to Communism, science, race relations, and war and peace.

This volume provides an excellent introduction to Buddhism for one not familiar with the religion, and a handy reference for those who have already been introduced to it. The presentation is historically oriented, but the doctrines and their development are described clearly and concisely (perhaps too concisely for one interested in understanding Buddhism philosophically). It enables the reader to see Buddhism in its proper perspective, historically and doctrinally.

Two things may be criticized in the book as being disconcerting. The first, a minor defect, is the presence of a few typographical errors (e.g., Mahayan, teachinks, pounted). The second is inconsistency in romanization, particularly in the Sanskrit and Pāli terms, which may confuse the reader who is not familiar with the technical terms used. Perhaps the avoidance of diacritical marks in foreign terms can be justified in some way, but the deletion of these marks should be compensated for by a consistent system of romanization (what system is used is not important as long as the system is explained). A primary example of the inconsistency may be seen in the romanization of the three Sanskrit sibilants, which ought to be differentiated from one another. The failure to differentiate these sibilants leads to wrong pronunciation; i.e., the author writes *shudra* and *sunyata* as though the sibilants were different, but in fact they are the same. The fault, of course, lies not only with Dr. Ch'en, but with many other scholars as well, and it would seem to be desirable to have a uniform system of romanization, either with or without the diacritical marks.

Harold T. Hamada
University of Hawaii

The Religious Situation: 1968, *edited by Donald R. Cutler.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1968. Pp. xlvii + 986. $15.00.

The Religious Situation: 1968 is the first in a series of annual volumes which deals with the manifestations and repercussions of man's religious impulse in contem-

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porary society. It is composed of a series of essays organized and edited by Donald R. Cutler.

The first division of this large volume deals with the experience and expression of religion. Particular essays are directed at such varied topics as black power, abortion, relativism in American theology, the "just war" concept, and the Japanese peace movements.

Huston Smith opens the second section, entitled "Defining the Religious Dimension," with a perceptive article suggesting that although traditional religion is losing influence, man nevertheless is finding new and more relevant expressions of what is sacred. This section also deals with religion as a cultural system, and includes six essays on ritual by such men as Julian Huxley and Erik H. Erikson.

Section three begins with an article by Guy E. Swanson, who argues that religious communities will continue to exist in spite of increasing secularization. Entitled "Social Indicators of the Religious Situation," this chapter focuses on America's institutions of faith, churches and taxation, and religion in Eastern Europe.

Although the articles offer a remarkably wide range of topics, their main emphasis is social. The impact of phenomenology and existentialism on religious thinking is largely neglected, as are the philosophical traditions of earlier centuries upon which the twentieth century has largely been built. Further, the space devoted to the East-West dialogue is insufficient in relation to the effect it has had on Western religious thought.

This collection of articles, then, does not aim at providing the general reader with a background sufficient to discuss issues of contemporary religion. The particular insights and the originality of the essays will best benefit those who are already aware of the dominant religious themes of the twentieth century.

T. G. O'Connor
University of Hawaii

Political Thought in Early Meiji Japan, 1868-1889, *by Joseph Pittau.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. vi + 250. $6.95.

Did the leaders of the Meiji Restoration, in framing the Constitution of 1889, work toward setting up a strongly authoritarian and militarist state, or was such a development a degeneration of their original concept? This is the central question to which Father Pittau addresses himself in this book. After going through the book, the reader is convinced that the answer defies a simple "yes" or "no."

During the Meiji period Japan was a new and emerging nation, eager to make a place among the world powers. Given the general unrest and the disenchantment of the then recently dispossessed *samurai* class, the need for a strong unified central government was paramount in the minds of the leaders. The "ins" as well as the "outs" of Meiji Japan agreed on this point. Also strong was the hold of *kokutai,* the peculiarly Japanese belief that the imperial line descends directly from the sun

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goddess Amaterasu Omikami, that all the land and the privileges belong to the Emperor, and that the supreme duty of the subject lies in unquestioning loyalty to him. To this must be added the Meiji leaders' close contacts with and their being influenced by the German organic theories of the state. Roesler, who was particularly influential, stressed in addition the need for adopting a constitution that would be suited to and in harmony with the established tradition of the country, which in this case clearly was *kokutai*. These manifold factors help to explain the authoritarian character of the constitution. It declares the Emperor as the seat of sovereignty and holds the cabinet responsible to the Emperor alone. At the same time it seeks to keep the Emperor above any real and meaningful participation in politics, and fails to spell out any strong checks against extension and misuse of power by the government.

There were, however, other influences at work: the liberal French thought, the natural rights theories, and the British and American systems of government, in which the government was responsible to the people, the rights of the people were jealously protected, and the powers of the government were well defined and strictly limited. In their travels in the West, the Meiji leaders had seen, in addition to the Prussian constitution, the British and the American constitutions in practice. Anglo-French literature had been translated into Japanese and had made its impact not only on the opposition but also on those within the government. Thus, they incorporated into the constitution provisions to separate the judiciary from the legislative and the executive and to uphold the rights of the people, and included measures, ineffective though they proved to be, with which to check and limit the government's power. The Meiji leaders worked on the constitution with great seriousness, as is evidenced by the fact that it took them seven years—during which they travelled extensively to study other constitutions, made numerous drafts, and debated endlessly—to write it in the form in which it was finally accepted.

When attacked by the conservative Mori, Īto, the spokesman of the framers of the constitution, defended the liberal aspects of the constitution with force and conviction. The people are *citizens* and not merely subjects, they have certain rights and do not merely owe unquestioning loyalty to the Emperor, as Mori argued. These points, and the fact that Īto asserted repeatedly and unhesitatingly that "the spirit behind the establishment of a constitutional form of government is . . . to impose restrictions on the powers of the monarch" and to secure the rights of the people, form a weighty consideration against the view that the Meiji leaders of this time were intent solely on establishing an absolutist form of government. After reading this carefully written, well-documented and generally fair narrative, one is left in little doubt that the scholars holding the latter opinion have grasped only a half-truth. The view that emerges from this study may be summed up best in Father Pittau's own words: "The Meiji political system both in theory and practice was a mixture of authoritarianism and constitutionalism, a hybrid 'absolute constitutional monarchy'" (p. 201).

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Studies of Governmental Institutions in Chinese History, *edited by John L. Bishop.* Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1968. Pp. 267. $5.50.

This volume is the twenty-third in the Harvard-Yenching Institute Studies—a series consisting primarily of bibliographical studies, grammars, reference works, and translations. Thus, one should look upon this work as a study and research aid, and not as a primary philosophical source. The text is made up of seven articles from the *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* which have long been in demand as basic study materials.

The first article is "An Outline of the Central Government of the Former Han Dynasty," by Wang Yü-Ch'üan [*HJAS* 12 (1949), 134-187]. The importance of this topic can be seen if one notes that the governmental machinery China abandoned only in 1911 had its inception in 221 B.C. From this inception there have been modifications in the organization but not in the basic structure. Therefore, this detailed view of the government of the Former Han dynasty (202 B.C-8 A.D.) shows the establishment of a two thousand year political institution. The article is extremely technical and contains much factual historical data, but is philosophically relevant as a reference showing the practical effects of Chinese political philosophy—especially Confucian.

The second article, by Charles O. Hucker, is on the "Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty" [*HJAS* 21 (1958), 1-66], and is complete with an index [*HJAS* 23 (1960-61), 127-151]. This article points to an ideological conflict between Legalistic principles and Confucian principles (p. 79) and explains the regulation of the various schools—i.e., Taoist, Buddhist, and Yin-yang (pp. 93, 105). Other than these two references to political philosophy, the article is strictly an historical study.

Third is a short article by Lien-sheng Yang on the "Female Rulers in Imperial China" [*HJAS* 23 (1960-61), 47-61]. A section is included on "Empress Dowagers as Regents" found in *The Woman's Position in Chinese Law,* by Chao Feng-chiai. After giving Chao's text, Yang discusses some of the political and social problems that are raised.

Next is an article by E. A. Kracke, Jr., entitled "Family vs. Merit in Chinese Civil Service Examinations Under the Empire" [*HJAS* 10 (1947), 103-123]. Kracke treats the question whether civil service examinations permitted a free rise of talent from non-bureacratic families or formed a "distinct, exclusive, hereditary bureaucratic class."

Closely related to this latter article is one by Ssu-yü Têng on the "Chinese Influence in the Western Examination System" [*HJAS* 7 (1943), 267-312]. Têng shows how the West was influenced by this rather concrete aspect of Eastern governmental theory, and in so doing points to such noted Westerners as Voltaire and Adam Smith.

The last article is by Chao-ying Fang—"A Technique for Estimating the Numerical Strength of the Early Manchu Military Forces" [*HJAS* 13 (1950), 192-215]. Thus the book ends on a rather unimportant note, at least from a philosophical or political point of view.

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As noted above, the book should be viewed as a reference or research tool, and it derives its importance from being such a tool. It would seem to be philosophically useful only insofar as its factual data mirrors the practical application of Chinese political philosophy.

DONALD W. MITCHELL
University of Hawaii

A Critical Study of the Philosophy of Rāmānuja, *by Anima Sen Gupta.* Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1967. Pp. xxxi + 263. Rs. 20-00.

Among the recent works on Vedāntic *ācāryas,* few have been primarily concerned with Rāmānuja, and fewer yet with making an intense evaluation of his philosophy. Dr. Anima Sen Gupta, a brilliant scholar with an exceptionally clear control of Indian philosophy, has now made a worthy and valuable exposition of Rāmānuja's thought, completely in harmony with the Sanskrit texts. Following her books and essays on the *Sāṁkhyavāda,* we could only expect the best scholarship turned toward *Vedānta.*

The purpose of her critical study of Rāmānuja's philosophy is not to attack, but rather, as she states, "to evaluate the comparative worth of the system." Indeed, the evaluation is elaborate in the manner of a true scholar. She states Rāmānuja's view, the opposition, and then answers the opposition, in a constructive way. After passing through the necessary background, in life, times, and literature, she centers on four divisions of the entire system: first, the epistemology of Rāmānuja, emphasizing his ideas on fallacies and valid modes of experience, including the nature of illusion and perception; second, the metaphysical theories in terms of *cit* (consciousness) and *acit* (the material domain), with detailed information concerning causality and *avidyā* (ignorance); third, the ethical realm of liberation and the nature of *bhakti* (devotion). The fourth division is the most important for comparative purposes within the Vedāntic commentators—that of theology. This section deals with the *saguṇa* (describable) nature of God, and with the synthesis of *karmakāṇḍa* (way of works) and the *jñānakāṇḍa* (way of knowledge) in his final system.

Dr. Sen Gupta finds in the philosophy of Rāmānuja "a very apt blending of the rationalistic attitude of the *Sāṁkhya* and *Advaita-vedānta* with the ethico-religious tendencies of the *Upaniṣads,* the *Purāṇas* and the *Gītā.*" The book employs a great deal of Sanskrit but supplies no translation. There are detailed appendices on topics the author found appropriate to the graduate student doing research in Indian philosophy.

This book will be extremely useful to the advanced student or scholar of Indian thought for reference and insight into the system of Rāmānuja.

JOHN JOHNSON
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Folk Religion in Japan (Continuity and Change), *by Ichiro Hori. Edited by Joseph M. Kitagawa and Alan L. Miller.* Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1968. Pp. xv + 278. $7.00.

While much has been written on the individual religious systems in Japan, there have been only a few attempts to outline the total pattern of religious development. In this book, Ichiro Hori attempts to make transparent this development on the "folk" level. Thus he is not so concerned with portraying for their own sake Shinto, Buddhism, or the so-called new religions which have mushroomed since the end of World War II, but rather views them from the perspective of folk religion and discusses them only to the extent that they contributed to the development of the folk religious tradition.

Folk religion has greatly conditioned political, economic, and cultural development in Japan, for it is followed by the majority of the Japanese populace. Therefore, by delineating the nature of the total pattern of religious development in Japan on the folk level, Hori brings to light what may be the most enduring framework for the Japanese world view. This world view is philosophically important in that it is influenced by and, in a way, is a fusion of such traditions as Confucianism, Taoism, the Yin-Yang school, Neo-Confucianism, and various forms of Buddhism. These systems have been interpreted and appropriated in terms of the particular religious outlooks and experiences of the Japanese people.

This book is based on six lectures sponsored by the Haskell Lectureship on Comparative Religions at the University of Chicago in the fall of 1965. There has been an attempt to retain the oral style as much as possible.

The book is divided into six chapters. The first chapter points out the main characteristics of folk religion. Hori shows that the rites, beliefs, and rituals of natural religion in Japan are closely tied to Shinto and religious Taoism in folk religion. Confucianist and Buddhist theories were introduced in opposition to these, but in the end intermingled so completely that they all lost their individual identities.

The purpose of the second chapter is twofold: to discuss the relationship between the basic social structure and religious organization in Japan, and to explain the circumstances and processes leading to present Japanese folk religion.

The third chapter clearly explains, by way of the Nembutsu, the process by which Buddhism was secularized into a uniquely Japanese form. The Nembutsu is derived from animistic and magical beliefs and practices and is embodied in the present-day Pure Land sects.

Chapter four is concerned with the importance of mountains for the idea of another world. It is extremely interesting from the standpoint of myth and symbol, and is primarily of religious importance.

The next chapter—on Japanese shamanism—is also of importance to the history of religion, but is philosophically relevant when Hori points to the mutual influence between Buddhism and the way of Yin-Yang, on the one hand, and shamanism, on the other.

The final chapter shows the survival of shamanistic tendencies in the contemporary "new religions" of Japan. It is shown that the new religions, while they reject the doctrines of the older religions, are not based on new or creative insight; rather,

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they are modeled on established precedents in folk religion—especially shamanism. This last chapter is followed by a very extensive bibliography, and an index that includes a glossary with Japanese characters.

This book does much to bring about an understanding of the concepts, ideas, and beliefs that act as presuppositions to the life style and world view of a great number of Japanese people—past and present. It also clearly shows how the philosophies of the East were popularized on the folk level to meet the needs of the "common man."

DONALD W. MITCHELL
University of Hawaii

The Heritage of Śaṅkara, *by S. S. Roy.* Allahabad: Udayana Publications, 1965. Pp. xiv + 230. $6.50; Rs. 25; 45 *s.*

The Heritage of Śaṅkara contains chapters on: (1) The Indictment of Śaṅkara's Heritage; (2) The Alternative Interpretations of the Upaniṣads; (3) The Legacy of Gauḍapāda; (4) A Re-examination of Śaṅkara's Heritage; (5) The Criteriological Reaction Against Realism; and (6) The Heritage of Śaṅkara: A Meeting of Extremes.

This is a work of outstanding scholarship—and it presupposes a solid grasp by the reader of the Upaniṣads, Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās,* the *Brahma Sūtra,* and the thought of Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, Sureśvara, Maṇḍana, Śrī Harṣa, Citsukhā, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. In short, the reader has to be familiar with all the basic literature in Sanskrit of the Mādhyamikas, the Yogācāras, and the Śaṅkarites. The purpose of the book is to discredit totally the charge that Śaṅkara is a crypto-Buddhist. The author accomplishes this in a scholarly and philosophical manner in the first four chapters of his book. The fifth chapter does real credit to the author and is, I think, the best chapter of the book. It deals with the "transcendentalists" of Śaṅkara's Vedānta and the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools, along with the realists of these schools, in a very convincing manner.

In the chapter entitled "The Indictment of Śaṅkara's Heritage," the author examines the doctrinal and other evidence for and against the charges of Buddhist influence, and gives a detailed examination of *asparśa yoga* and *ajātivāda* of the *Āgama Śāstra.* The chapter ends with a summary of arguments that could possibly be levied by the opponents of Śaṅkara. In the next two chapters, the author examines the empty "transcendentalism" of the Buddhists and Realists. In the "Legacy of Gauḍapāda" *asparśa yoga* and *ajātivāda* are examined more fully; it is maintained that there *is* a difference in the "Absolute" of the Advaita and the formalism of the Mādhyamika, and that Gauḍapāda is a representative of the Vedāntic tradition. The identification of Gauḍapāda's position with Buddhistic absolutism is, according to Roy, a misreading of his creed. His conclusion is that Gauḍapāda is a Vedāntin in spite of his use of Buddhistic terms and dialectics; that just as no Indian who uses German or English terms in his writings can be called an Englishman or a German, so Gauḍapāda is a true Vedāntin who used Buddhist terminology.

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In the next chapter, he deals with such topics as "Transcendentalism" and *Vijñānavāda, Ātman* and *Śūnya, Ātman* and the *Vijñānavāda* of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, negation, truth, and error and, finally, the bi-functional character of language. The following chapter contains a masterly account of Nāgārjuna, Śaṅkara, and Śrī Harṣa, the ultimate validity of the *pramāṇas,* and the author's plea for a transcendental logic and a logic of concrete existence.

In the last chapter on "Meeting of Extremes" the author holds that in the larger truth of Śaṅkara's philosophy not only do all the extremes of Indian philosophical schools meet, but actually all the extremes meet regardless of their nativity. In this chapter, the author also makes a valuable appraisal of Kant's philosophy and, without meaning any indictment of Kant, points out some gaps and imperfections in his epistemology.

I have only one or two minor faults to find with the book. Most Indian philosophers take it for granted that the reader is as familiar as they are with both English and Sanskrit, and therefore write in a language which is a free mixture of Sanskrit and English. The book also suffers from a mixture of untranslated Sanskrit passages—e.g., on pages 10, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 26, where whole *Kārikās* are given in untranslated Sanskrit. I hope every Sanskrit term or passage is translated into English in the next edition for the benefit of English readers.

The author has not given any philosophical sources for the charge that Śaṇkara is a crypto-Buddhist. He makes just one allusion in the beginning of the book to the charge that Śaṅkara is a crypto-Buddhist in the *Padma Purāṇa.* Nowhere else is it mentioned who these persons and authorities are in the history of the philosophical literature. I would have liked a whole catalogue of specific persons and literature where these charges are made. I would not take the charge so seriously if it is found only in the *Padma Purāṇa.*

A last word about the price of the book. I do not understand why Indian publishers would price a book of 230 pages for Rs. 25/. At that price the book can be sold in India only to university libraries.

S. K. Saksena
Colby College

Theater East and West (Perspectives Toward a Total Theater), *by Leonard C. Pronko.* Berkeley, Los Angeles, New York: University of California Press, 1967. Pp. x + 230. $7.50.

This book is thoroughly exciting and will, I have no doubt, provoke a tidy little storm of controversy. Although the format seems to be that of a description of several Oriental theater forms, i.e., Balinese theater, Chinese opera, Noh, and Kabuki, the author disclaims from the outset any pretensions to descriptive completeness of these forms. Of course, he does supply the reader with a brief descriptive and historical account of each, but this is done purely to insure that the reader and he will have some common ground from which to proceed.

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The author's interest, one might say passion, is to see these forms as forms of the *theater,* not "quaint" and "amusing" or "exotic" shows but thoroughly professional, polished modes of artistic expression. He constantly seems to be asking "What is the theater? What can it be?" He tries to answer these questions in terms of the concepts of total theater and participative theater. The theater becomes a multidimensional experience—not merely cerebration but an involvement on various levels produced not just by dialogue but also by music, dance, gesture, and spectacle. The audience no longer merely observes but participates. The theater is not merely something which one goes to see but something which one experiences.

One soon realizes that in the author's estimation this ideal is not realized in the cult of verbalism and photographic realism which so often characterizes modern theater in the West. On the other hand, he is most definitely not advocating a wholesale imitation of Noh, for example, and indeed goes to great lengths to show what disastrous and ludicrous results ensue upon blind imitation. He is also not suggesting that what the Oriental theater has to offer is some "mystical insight" of a general sort. What he does suggest is that the Oriental theater can offer ". . . specific lessons in technique and approaches to particular theatrical problems." To illustrate that this is not just an empty claim he cites examples of the influence of these Oriental forms on dramatists such as Artaud, Beckett, Brecht, Claudel, and Genet. Here again the influence is not in terms of vague, saccharine platitudes but hard-core techniques. The notion that stylization need not mean woodenness and that there are techniques for weaving music, dance, and dialogue into a whole which is much more powerfully expressive than any one could be by itself are but two examples of the content of this influence.

What is wanted is an attempt to understand these techniques and, further, the boldness to experiment with them. Not all experiments will be successful, to be sure, but one cannot decide on purely *a priori* grounds that they will be doomed to failure. The strength that can be conveyed by such a stylized form as the *mie* of Kabuki is a clear indication that stylization itself does not necessarily imply lack of expressive power. The *mie* may not be extractable from the Kabuki context, but an understanding of the technique may provide a clue to the fashioning of a technique which is adaptable to the theater in the West. What is wanted are new techniques to realize the ideals of total and participative theater and, the author maintains, one of the most abundant sources of materials for creating these techniques is the Oriental theater.

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Members of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy Research in progress

A large amount of significant research is being carried out today by philosophers and scholars interested in Asian thought. In order to facilitate correspondence between scholars and, in general, to know what research one's colleagues are engaged in, *Philosophy East and West* will periodically publish short statements of work in progress by members of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy. The Editor welcomes the receipt of the appropriate information from all members.

ALDRICH, VIRGIL C. Philosophical reflections on "Linguistic Mysticism"—possibly becoming a book.

AMES, VAN METER. Preparation of paper on "The Humanity of Zen."

ANDERSON, ROBERT S. Analysis of the development of the culture of science in India and its relationship with the structure of traditional Indian civilization, in modes of thought as well as patterns of behavior.

BAHM, ARCHIE J. Preparation of books: *Bhagavad Gita: The Wisdom of Krishna; Chung Yung* and *Ta Hsueh* of Confucius; *Comparative Philosophy: An Introduction.*

BEIDLER, WILLIAM. A series of concept studies in the *Bhagavad Gītā:* faith, knowledge, will, and reality; "Santmat," a Study in Indian Eclecticism—a series of studies in a North Indian Hindu-Sikh Sect; "Religious Philosophies of Asia"—a text for world religions.

BLACKWOOD, R. T. Work on "Metalogical Comments on the Thought of al-Ghazali."

BODDE, DERK. Articles on "Winter Solstice Ceremonies in Han Ching"; "Prison Life in Eighteenth Century Peking"; "Age, Youth, and Infirmity in the Law of Ch'ing China."

BROOKS, RICHARD W. Development of the problem of self-referential statements in the context of Advaita Vedānta; challenge of the division of post-Śaṅkara Advaita into "three schools"; analysis of the use of analogy in Advaita.

BROWN, W. NORMAN. Study of Rig Veda 1. 164 (*asya vāmasya* hymn).

BURCH, GEORGE B. Alternative goals in religion (comparative study of Christianity, Buddhism, and Vedānta).

BURTT, EDWIN A. Preparing for publication a series of lectures recently given at the University of Calcutta on the role of the religions of civilized humanity in building a world community. Several major philosophical problems are discussed in a worldwide setting, such as the problem of the nature of truth and the relation between science and religion. The book will probably be entitled *Towards and Beyond the Community of Man.*

CAUVEL, JANE. Western artists' interests in Buddhist philosophical concepts.

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CHAN, WING-TSIT. Chu Hsi's completion of Neo-Confucianism: commentary and annotation of Chu Hsi's *Chin-ssu-lu.*

CHANG, CARSUN. Preparation of book on the comparative study of Chinese and Western philosophy to bring out what are the differences and similarities in regard to the philosophical language, style, and topics on both sides.

CHANG, CHUNG-YUAN. Research on the analysis of basic philosophy of Chinese art and research on the philosophy of Chinese yoga.

CHENG, CHUNG-YING. Work on article "Toward a Theory of Subject Structure in Classical Chinese"; completion of monograph on a comparative study of Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming and an essay on Yen Yuan; work on book *Topics and Interpretations in Chinese Philosophy.*

CHI, RICHARD S. Y. Preparation of "Humorous Zen Literature", and "Semantics and Syntax"; working on books: *The Importance of Being Intuitive (Two Crucial Buddhist Controversies of the Eighth Century)*—Vol. I: Shen-hui vs. Ch'ung-yuan (A.D. 732); Vol. II: Kamalaśīla vs. Mahāyāna (A.D. 792-794). (Vol. I is completed and will be published by the Indiana University Press.) *Buddhist Formal Logic* (to be published by Royal Asiatic Society, London).

CONZE, EDWARD. Edition and translation of the Golgit Ms. of the Large Prajñāpāramitā (18.000 and 25.000 ślokas).

DEBARY, WILLIAM THEODORE. Chinese political thought (Confucian thought) in 17th century.

DEUTSCH, ELIOT. (In collaboration with J. A. B. van Buitenen) preparation of *A Source Book in Vedānta;* selections in depth from the major thinkers of the various schools of Vedānta, with introductions to the philosophies of the schools and the place of Vedānta within classical Indian culture.

DIMBERG, RONALD G. Annotated translation of the *Ho Hsin-yin chi (Collected Works of Ho Hsin-yin)*; Ho's biography and a discussion of his thought. (Columbia University doctoral dissertation.)

GARLAN, EDWIN N. Contemporary interpretations of central concepts of Theravada Buddhism.

GERBER, WILLIAM. Integrated preparation of pithy answers by philosophers of East and West (from antiquity to the present) to philosophical problems expressed in interrogative form.

GOKHALE, BALKRISHNA GOVIND. Studies in Theravada Buddhism.

GRIFFIN, PHILLIP. The concept of citizenship in Hindu thought. The transition from family loyalty to community, society loyalty in modern India.

HAY, S. N. Work on research on Gandhi: (1) early influences: Vaishnava, Jain, Pranami, etc.; (2) later concepts of Hinduism, Islam, and Hindu-Muslim Unity.

HERMAN, ARTHUR. A book on comparative philosophies of education called *Philosophy of Education East and West.*

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HIRSCH, ELISABETH F. "Martin Heidegger and the East."

HUANG, SIU-CHI. Chang Tsai's Ethics.

JACOBSON, NOLAN PLINY. Buddhism and modern science; or, "the religion of analysis and the spirit of modern science."

KOLLER, JOHN M. Research on the concept of *ātman* in the early Upaniṣads; work on a book entitled *Oriental philosophies: An Introduction.*

KULKARNI, H. B. (1) "Myth and Symbol in India's Literature"; (2) "Herman Melville: An Oriental Approach."

LANCASTER, LEWIS R. Buddhist literature in Chinese translation.

LEIDECKER, KURT F. *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Buddhism,* dealing with events, places, and personalities in the history of Buddhism in various countries, Buddhist schools of thought, movements and groups, including contemporary ones, thumbnail sketches of Buddhist scholars, principal works and authors of Buddhist literature, important temples, shrines and other structures and art forms, iconography, and basic concepts in all fields in which Buddhism has exerted an influence throughout Asia and the West.

LESTER, ROBERT C. The Patañjali Yoga in Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita.

LIU, SHU-HSIEN. A critical examination of Paul Tillich's and Hsiung Shih-li's philosophy.

MATILAL, BIMAL KRISHNA. "The Nyāya Critique of the Buddhist Doctrine of Non-Soul" (based on Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka* and Jñānaśrī's *Nibandha*); "The Development of the Analytic Tradition in India": A critical survey of what is called *Pramāṇa-śāstra* in India; translation of Jagadīśa's *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā.*

MAYEDA, SENGAKU. Śaṁkara's *Upadeśasāhasrī,* critically edited, translated, and annotated with introduction.

MEI, Y. P. Ancient Chinese Logic; The Philosophy of Yen Yuan, a 17th Century Chinese Thinker.

MORRIS, CHARLES. Preparation of a book, *The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy;* completion of publication of the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.*

MUNK, ARTHUR W. A two-volume work, *The Riddle of Existence: A Synoptic Metaphysical Response to Crisis.* (Every major problem is viewed both in the perspective of Western and Oriental philosophy.)

MUNRO, DONALD J. An analysis of the concept of man in Chinese Communist thought and its implications for the philosophy of education and social control theory.

MCCULLOUGH, JAY R. Research in Buddhist Tantra (Tibet), Kegon.

MCDERMOTT, AGNES C. Applications of techniques of linguistics to problems in the philosophy of language; Tibetan Buddhism.

MCDERMOTT, ROBERT A. Completing dissertation on "Radhakrishnan and Comparative Philosophy."

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NORTHROP, F. S. C. Papers on "The Arts in Relation to Science" and "Philosophy of Western Classical Music"; book on Western legal science in collaboration with (Canadian lawyer) Joseph Smith.

NORTON, JAMES. Critical edition and translation of *Nyāyakuliśa of Atreya Rāmānuja,* 13th Century Viśiṣṭādvaita philosopher and teacher.

ORGAN, TROY. Completed manuscript on *The Hindu Quest for the Perfection of Man*—to be published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

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PLOTT, JOHN C. Preparing for publication Vols. VIII and IX of *Global History of Philosophy* (unabridged version).

POLITELLA, JOSEPH. Papers on "What Zen Buddhism is Bringing into Western Intellectual and Religious Life," and "Three Transfigurations—Hindu, Buddhist and Christian"; *Mysticism, Its Principles and Practice, Illustrated from the World Religions.* (To be published as a paperback in the "Crucible Series" by Sernoll, Inc., this fall.)

POTTER, KARL H. The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to Gaṅgesa (second volume of projected Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy); What False Statements are About (projected book).

RIEPE, DALE. Completion of books: *India and American Philosophy* and *Contemporary Indian Philosophy.*

ROUNER, LEROY S. Studies in the classical Hindu conception of the "four stages" of life.

SAKSENA, S. K. Preparation of manuscripts on "Modern Indian Philosophy" and "Indian Social Philosophy."

SCHMIDT, PAUL. Comparisons of Nāgārjuna and Whitehead.

SHAFER, ROBERT L. Translation of Poussin's *Nirvāṇa* (A Study in Comparative Soteriology).

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SMITH, HUSTON. A book comparing the basic philosophical outlooks of India, China, and the West.

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Man, a general introduction to the problem of understanding the nature and forms of religious expression.

THURSBY, GENE R. The Ārya Samāj Movement in the United Provinces.

TILDEN, NANCY. A study in the philosophy of Swami Vivekananda.

TOTTEN, GEORGE O. Buddhist philosophy and social movements in Japan, China, and Southeast Asia.

TU, WEI-MING. Wang Yang-ming's intellectual biography; The philosophical and religious dimensions of Confucianism.

WAYMAN, ALEX. (In collaboration with Hideko Wayman) "The Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmālā, a Mahāyāna Scripture, translated from the Tibetan with modifications based on the Chinese and Japanese renditions and Sanskrit fragments"; The Arcane Lore of Forty Verses; A Buddhist Tantra Commentary on the Guhyasamāja-nidāna-kārikā; A synthetic exposition of the Guhyasamāja system; Buddhist Meditational Sources—basic documents translated from Pāli, Sanskrit, and Tibetan.

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WIENPAHL, PAUL. A book on mysticism, East and West.

WILHELM, HELLMUT. Forthcoming books: *Trends of Thought in 19th Century China;* and *On Ming Orthodoxy.*

WU, JOSEPH S. Articles on "Whitehead and the Philosophical Meeting of the East and West," and "Chinese Language and Chinese Thought"; preparation of books: *Logic and Existence: A Study of John Dewey's Theory of Logic;* and *A Text in Comparative Philosophy.*

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A HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY. By *Lao Sze-kwang*. Vol. I. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1968. Pp. 341. $9.00.

PROBLEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY (AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS). Edited by *Paul W. Taylor*. Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Co., Inc., 1967. Pp. viii + 517. (Price not given.)

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THE ARYAN PATH (Bombay), XXXVIII (12), December, 1967: *E. Nageswara Rao,* Indian Thought in Emerson.
XXXIX (1), January, 1968: *Donald H. Bishop,* First Impressions of the *Bhagavad-Gita.*
XXXIX (2), February, 1968: *K. Krishnamoorthy,* The Concept of *Avidya* in the *Adhyatmaramayana. S. Viswanathan,* Whittier's Links with India.
XXXIX (3), March, 1968: *G. Srinivasan,* Choice and Value.

BULLETIN OF THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION INSTITUTE OF CULTURE (Calcutta), XIX (2), February, 1968: *Tripura Sankar Sen,* Western Psychiatry and the Spiritual Discipline of Ancient Indians.
XIX (3), March, 1968: *H. K. De Chaudhuri,* Indian Philosophy and Martin Heidegger.
XIX (4), April, 1968: *E. A. Burtt,* The Future of Religion.

CHING FENG (Hong Kong), XI (1), 1968: *Shih Chih-P'ing,* A Brief Summary of Sung and Ming Neo-Confucian Thought.

THE DIVINE LIFE (Himalayas), XXX (2), February, 1968: *Gauri Prasad,* The Problem of Free-Will in Human Life.
XXX (3), March, 1968: *Charles A. Moore,* The Spiritual Approach to East-West Understanding.

EAST AND WEST (Ismeo), 17 (3-4), September, December, 1967: *Timoteus Pokora,* The Concept of Progress in Confucianism: Some Observations on the Utopia of K'ang Yu-wei and Its Historical Presuppositions.

JOURNAL OF THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE (Baroda), XVII (1), September, 1967: *P. M. Modi,* The Doctrine of Prasthānatrayī.

THE JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES (Ann Arbor), XXVII (3), May, 1968: *Chan Lien,* Chinese Communism versus Pragmatism.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY (New York), LXV (9), May 2, 1968: *Barry Stroud,* Transcendental Arguments.

THE MAHA BODHI (Calcutta), 75 (12), December, 1967: *N. Alexeyev,* Buddhism in the USSR. *Ram Nath Sharma,* Negation of Extremes in Buddha's Philosophy.

THE MIDDLE WAY (London), XLIII (1), May, 1968: *Christmas Humphreys,* The Field of Mahayana Buddhism.

MONUMENTA NIPPONICA (Tokyo), XXIII (1-2), 1968: *Alfonso M. Nebreda,* The Japanese Legacy: The Japanese University Student Confronts Religion.

PRABUDDHA BHARATA (Calcutta), LXXIII, February, 1968: *Max Nolan,* Śaṅkara and the Causal Concept (Part II).
LXXIII, March, 1968: *Anima Sen Gupta,* Sāmkhya Conception of Liberation.
LXXIII, April, 1968: *Devaprasad Bhattacharya,* Causality: An Analysis.

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The first workshop of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy was held in Rochester, Michigan, November 14-17, 1968. Support for the Conference was provided by the Association for Asian Studies and by Oakland University. The topic of the workshop was "Problems of Meaning and Truth." The purpose of the workship was to bring together philosophers whose training represented different areas, but whose professional interests were concentrated on topics in epistemology, philosophy of language, and logic, and to discover whether it is possible to have fruitful discussions on philosophical problems despite the varied backgrounds of the participants.

Papers for the workshop were presented by Chung-ying Cheng, "Modes of Referring in Critical Chinese Philosophy"; B. K. Matilal, "Perception and Language—Some Indian Theories Examined"; Richard S. Y. Chi, "Interpreting the *catuṣkoṭi* of Early Buddhism"; Karl Potter, "Negation, Speech-Acts, and the Justification of Realism"; and Henry Rosemont, "Critique of Suzuki's Treatment of Zen Buddhism's Philosophy of Language."

The participants in the workshop were: Richard Brooks, Oakland University; Chung-ying Cheng, University of Hawaii; Richard S. Y. Chi, Indiana University; Dalsukh Malvania, University of Toronto; Robert Martin, State University of New York at Buffalo; B. K. Matilal, University of Toronto; Charlene McDermott, University of Wisconsin; T. R. V. Murti, Brock University; Gerald Myers, Queens College of the City University of New York; James H. K. Norton, Wooster College; Karl Potter, University of Minnesota; Richard Robinson, University of Wisconsin; Henry Rosemont, Oakland University; Dhirendra Sharma, Michigan State University; G. M. C. Sprung, Brock University; J. Frits Staal, University of California, Berkeley.

As a result of the workshop two panels were arranged for forthcoming conferences. The first, to be presented at the 1969 meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, will be on the problem of reference to non-existent entities in Indian and Western thought. It is expected that Professors Potter, McDermott, Matilal, Malvania, and Murti will participate in this panel. The second, to be presented at the 1969 meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, will concern negation and semantic categories in China, India, and the West; participants will include Professors Martin, Cheng, Staal, and Chi.

The 42nd annual meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association was held in Honolulu, Hawaii, under the host sponsorship of the University of Hawaii, from August 29 to September 2, 1968. Invited addresses were delivered by the following: Paul Wienpahl (University of California, Santa Barbara), "Spinoza and Wang Yang-Ming"; Terrence M. Penelhum (University of Calgary), "Necessary Being Again"; Carl G. Hempel (Princeton University), "On the Limits of Scientific Understanding"; John Hospers (University of Southern California), "Liberty, Rights, and Government."

The Presidential Address was delivered by Professor V. J. McGill of San Francisco State College. Individual papers were presented by the following: Keith Lehrer (University of Rochester), "Induction, Reason, and Consistency"; Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. (University of Rochester), "On a Certain Form of Philosophical Argument"; Bruce Vermazen (University of California, Berkeley), "Analyticity, Necessity, Probability and S4"; Jerry S. Clegg (Mills College), "Symptoms and Criteria"; Joseph Ransdell (University of California, Santa Barbara), "Speaking of Standards"; Adrienne Lehrer (University of Rochester), "Indeterminancy in

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Semantic Description"; Richard L. Purtill (Western Washington State College), "Properties of Necessary Being"; Desmond J. FitzGerald (University of San Francisco), "Necessary Being and Sufficient Reason"; Rendell M. Mabey, Jr. (Harvard University), "Anselm's and Aquinas's Proofs for the Existence of a Necessary-Being-God"; John Wellmuth (St. Mary's College), "Necessary Being and Logical Impossibilities."

Also, Hermann F. Schott (Los Angeles), "Clusters of Qualities: The Looking Glass Version of Classes of Things"; Michael J. Carella (San Diego State College), "The Principle of Complementarity: Is There an Alternative?"; Rolf A. Eberle (University of Rochester), "Universals as Designata of Predicates"; Chung-yuan Chang (University of Hawaii), "Pure Consciousness as Approached by Chinese Buddhism"; Eliot Deutsch (University of Hawaii), "The Theory of Intrinsic Validity of Knowledge in Indian Philosophy"; Stuart F. Spicker (University of Wyoming), "Inner Time and Lived-Through Time: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty"; John K. Roth (Claremont College), "Farber's Critique of Merleau-Ponty"; Richard Rorty (Princeton University), "The Incommunicability of 'Felt Qualities'"; Elizabeth Wolgast (California State College at Hayward), "Certainty About Other People's Pains"; Richard Taylor (University of Rochester), "The Anatta Doctrine and Personal Identity."

Papers were also read by Stanley Munsat (University of California, Irvine), "What in the World Is a Faculty"; James L. Jarrett (University of California, Berkeley), "A Kind Word for the Sophists"; Paul Kashap (Brown University), "Spinoza and Moral Freedom"; Richard P. Haynes (University of Florida), "Aristotle and Virtuous Activity"; Oliver A. Johnson (University of California, Berkeley), "Mitigated Scepticism"; D. C. Emmons (C. W. Post College), "Refuting the Egoist"; Jon Wheatley (University of California, Santa Barbara), "Reasons for Acting"; Gerald Dworkin (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), "Of Human Freedom"; Lionel Ruby (Roosevelt University), "Are There 'Recognition Criteria' of Works of Art?"

The Department of Religion in McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, now offers advanced courses in Asian religions toward the M.A. or Ph.D. degrees.

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The Department of Religion has a faculty of twelve full-time members, of whom the following are specialists in Asian religions: J. G. Arapura, S.T.M., M.A., Ph.D.—Indian religions, philosophy; Yun Hua Jan, M.A., M.Th., Ph.D.—East Asian religions, history; P. Younger, M.A., M.Th., Ph.D.—Indian religion, history; and T. R. V. Murti, M.A., D.L.H.—Indian philosophy.

T. R. V. Murti, a well-known scholar of Hindu and Buddhist Philosophy, is a distinguished addition to the faculty. Professor Murti was formerly Vice Chancellor of Sanskrit University, Banaras, Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy, and Director of the Centre for Advanced Philosophical Studies, Banaras Hindu University.

The Asia Society, 112 East 64th St., New York, New York announces the publication of *Asia: A Guide to Paperbacks* (revised edition) with annotated lists of approximately 1,100 titles. It includes in-print titles listed in the original guide and the supplement, new titles which have appeared between December 1965 and December 1967, and a few books with a 1968 publication date. New features include dates of publication and an author-title index.

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The Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan is expanding its publication of papers on China, which will appear henceforth in a new and more convenient format, under the title of *Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies.* Forthcoming numbers include *The Chinese Economy 1912-1949,* by Albert Feuerwerker, and *Two Studies in Chinese Literature,* by Dale Johnson and Li Ch'i.

The *Papers* will continue to be distributed directly by the Center for Chinese Studies, to which all orders should be addressed.

The California Institute of Asian Studies, a new graduate school, opens in September, 1968 in San Francisco. Dr. Haridas Chaudhuri is the President of the Institute.

Programs in philosophy, theology, sociology, and Asian art and languages will be offered to candidates for the master's degree and doctorate. Adult students may arrange to attend as special auditors for occasional classes.

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Faculty selected, to date, all hold doctorates. Those on the staff include, among others: Richard Marsh, Ph.D., University of the Pacific; A. K. Sarkar, Ph.D., D. Litt., Patna University, India; James Plaugher, Ph.D., Stanford University; Dryden Phelps, Ph.D., University of California; and T. H. Yu, Ph.D., Clark University.

Admission forms and further information may be obtained by writing to: California Institute of Asian Studies, 3494 21st Street, San Francisco, California 94110, or by calling (415) 648-1489.

The Council for Philosophical Studies announces a competition for the best philosophical essay on the topic of violence. Essays must be in English, previously unpublished, and of interest to the educated general reader, as well as to those professionally concerned with philosophy. The essay should be approximately 6,000 to 12,000 words long. It must be submitted before September 30, 1969. A prize of $2,000 will be awarded to the winner. The Council plans to publish the winning essay and others of high quality, and reserves the right to first publication of essays submitted. Any royalties, after expenses, will accrue to the authors of the essays.

The judges of the essay competition will be: Henry Aiken, Brandeis University; H. L. A. Hart, University College, Oxford; and John Rawls, Harvard University.

The funds for this contest come from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, one of whose charges to the Council is to encourage philosophers to bring their professional resources to bear on substantive issues which are matters of concern to the general public.

One typewritten copy, double spaced, should be sent to Jerome Shaffer, Council for Philosophical Studies, The University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06268, U.S.A. To allow the anonymous submission of the essay to the judges, the author should provide a separate title page which will be the only place where his name and address will appear. If a self-addressed return envelope is included, the

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copy will be returned after the judges make their decision, which will be announced in 1970.

The Institute of Advanced Projects at the East-West Center, University of Hawaii, announces the awarding of Senior Specialist grants for 1968-1969 in seven sub-groups: Cultural Values and Change, Education and International Understanding, Rural and Urban Development, Law and Politics—National and International, International Cooperation and National Development, Language and Society, and Man and His Environment.

The following projects will be of special interest to readers of *Philosophy East and West:*

Dr. George Z. F. Bereday, Professor of Comparative Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027: A comparative study (with Professor Masui) of the mass educational systems of Japan and the United States, based on data collected in a Ford-funded project in 1964, 1966, 1967, and 1968, and to examine the results for applicability to the educational systems of developing countries.

Dr. Robert T. Bobilin, Associate Professor of Religion, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822: The role of religion as an agent of social change: the case of Japan.

Dr. Jyotirindra DasGupta, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720: Analysis of data collected in the field on (1) the role of language academies and the associations in the language planning process in India; (2) the social and political implications of the use of regional languages as the medium of higher education in India.

Dr. Joshua A. Fishman, Research Professor of Social Sciences, Ferkauf Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Yeshiva University, 55 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10003: To review and compare the processes of political integration in several Asian countries which have a language problem and to explain the inter-relationships between different kinds of language movements and different kinds of national integration movements.

Mr. Tsuneari Fukuda, author and critic and Chairman, Board of Trustees, Institute of Dramatic Arts, 5-Azabu-Tansu-machi, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan: A re-evaluation of the processes of modernization of Japan with special emphasis on its spiritual and psychological aspects.

Dr. Jean Grossholtz, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Massachusetts 01075: A comparative study of the political cultures of Malaysia and the Philippines with a view to testing the hypothesis that democracy rests upon a social bargaining process and not simply on a set of ideals, legal norms, economic achievements, and institutions developed in the West.

Dr. Siri Gunasinghe, Lecturer, Department of Sanskrit, University of Ceylon, Peradeniya, Ceylon: A study of interdependence and mutual influence among the cultures of South and Southeast Asia as seen especially in their Buddhist art traditions; and their implications to modern life and thought.

Dr. Philip E. Jacob, Professor of Political Science and Director, International Studies of Values in Politics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104: A study of the pattern of values held by leaders who are effective in mobilizing in the communities for development action.

Dr. Daniel W. Y. Kwok, Professor of History, University of Hawaii, Honolulu,

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Hawaii 96822: Studies on the Chinese mind with special reference to how intellectuals responded to stimuli from the outside world and to social changes within the country.

Dr. Peter H. Lee, Associate Professor of Korean, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822: A study of mutual influences of the cultures of Northeast Asia through an analysis of the traditional literature of the region, especially the heroic poetry, and their implications to modern life and thought.

Dr. Thomas Poffenberger, Consultant in Social Psychology, The Ford Foundation, 32 Ferozshah Road, New Delhi 1, India: The development of a better understanding of the dynamics of Indian personality through analysis of data collected in an Indian village on child-rearing practices, family interaction, attitudes toward education and change.

Dr. Surya P. Sharma, Associate Professor, Law School, Banaras Hindu University, Vanarasi 5, India: International law and peaceful co-existence, with special emphasis on the role of developing nations.

Mr. Soekmono, Director of Archaeology, Direktorat Purbakala, Djalan Kimia 12, Djakarta III/19, Indonesia: Implications to modern life and thought in Southeast Asia through a study of the art, religion, the city, and its government of early Indonesia.

Dr. Hengtse Tu, Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, Tunghai University, Taichung, Taiwan, Republic of China: The Chinese and Western concepts of international law, with special reference to the status of Tibet.

Dr. J. Milton Yinger, Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio 44074: The application of field theory to inter-religious, inter-racial, and inter-ethnic relations, with special reference to cross-cultural materials.

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It is arguable whether there is more violence in human affairs today than, relative to population, in past times. It is scarcely arguable, though, that we now have the capacity for organized violence on a scale undreamt of in the past. At the same time, one finds today a profound concern about violence and an intense interest in nonviolence, both as a technique and as a positive theory of human action. This *qualitative* concern, at the least, reduces a sense of despair among many of us to one of fear mixed with hope.

But what can philosophers and the philosophically concerned contribute to this great issue? The philosophers' contribution, we believe, is a modest but exceedingly important one. It consists in clarifying precisely what the issue is, in explicating the concepts that are relevant for analyzing the problem, in drawing the distinctions that are necessary to know what one is in fact talking about, in articulating the pertinent historical realities and illusions, in proffering arguments for and solutions to possible courses of action.

And it seems to us that a professional journal devoted to comparative philosophy is a most appropriate place for such a philosophical contribution to be presented, as so much of Western thinking on violence and nonviolence finds its reference, if not its starting point, in the East—viz., in the thought and work of Gandhi. Dr. Martin Luther King explicitly acknowledged his indebtedness to Gandhi, and to a considerable degree the pacific dimensions of the "world student rebellion" and "peace movement" are directly in debt to Gandhi for their techniques and moral justification.

Many scholars and thinkers who have studied Gandhi's thought, life, and work closely, however, have come to the conclusion that many of Gandhi's central ideas on nonviolence were drawn from Western sources. The ideas, to be sure, reached their fruition on Indian soil, were established in relation to the Indian tradition; and were practiced there, with partial success, on a momentous scale. With Gandhi, who is our starting point, we have an amazing double historical movement West to East and East to West.

Professor A. L. Herman's article, "*Satyagraha*: A New Indian Word For Some Old Ways of Western Thinking," gives us the sources and meaning of Gandhian nonviolence. Professor Herman finds in Thoreau and Tolstoy the formative influences on Gandhi and argues "that Gandhi's philosophy of *satyagraha* can be entirely reconstructed from Western sources."

Many philosophers, as indeed most intellectuals from all disciplines, favor a creative nonviolence in settling disputes. But there are an influential number of thinkers and "activists" who are somewhat impatient with nonviolence as a technique and who feel that it is simply unable to deal realistically with the vast problems of racial, social, and economic oppression. It is also strongly felt by many who would otherwise affirm the rightness of nonviolence that in a number of instances revolutionary violence is justified as the only practical means open to peoples to eradicate oppression. Father Peter J. Riga argues

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for this position. In "Violence: A Christian Perspective," Father Riga sees violence as destructive of the values of human personhood but as nevertheless justifiably employed as a last resort for meaningful social change. He argues that this doctrine is reconcilable with traditional Catholic teaching.

It is often thought that India is the land of nonviolence *par excellence*. Nonviolence (*ahiṁsā*) is a cardinal virtue in Jainism, an important one in Buddhism, a highly acceptable one in Hinduism. Gandhi thought that the *Bhagavad Gītā* extolled it and claimed the *Gītā* as both a source of his ideas and the major link between his ideas and the classical Indian tradition. Others find that the *Gītā* is quite indifferent to *ahiṁsā*. Professor K. N. Upadhyaya explains just what the position of the *Gītā* is on war and peace, taking exception to Gandhi and to many Western scholars who read the text in a very different way.

Several definitions of violence and nonviolence are given by the above authors in the context of their respective contributions. Professor John E. Smith offers us a straightforward analysis of these concepts in his paper "The Inescapable Ambiguity of Nonviolence." For Professor Smith, violence, when "constructive," always involves immediate action which constrains and denies the rights of another person; nonviolent action consists both in an appeal to a moral principle and in the exercise of a means to achieve a given end. It is ambiguous precisely because it stands as an appeal to a principle and as an expression of the principle—with the expression intended as the most effective means of achieving a desired end. The question is often raised, though, whether nonviolent action is the most effective means to achieve desired ends, and Professor H. J. N. Horsburgh argues that indeed it is when, as with Gandhi, it is properly understood as involving constructive work. In his paper, "The Distinctiveness of Satyagraha," Professor Horsburgh calls for a certain "flexibility" in the application of nonviolent action and maintains that "the most fundamental distinctive feature of Gandhian nonviolence is the emphasis which it places on certain means or methods of action, means that are seen as the *satyagrahi's* primary commitment, and also as the source, in combination with the existing situation, of both his long—and short—term objectives."

But how can one realize an effective program of nonviolence in an age of super-power technological warfare? Mr. Adam Roberts, in his "Civilian Defense and the Inhibition of Violence," argues for a program, on a mass scale, of "a defense policy based on the use of nonviolent resistance" and maintains that there are ample historical precedents for such a program.

The Editor is pleased to present these contributions to the theme of Violence and Nonviolence East and West and welcomes correspondence from readers who wish to respond to any of the articles.

ELIOT DEUTSCH

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A. L. Herman, Satyagraha: A new Indian word for some old ways of Western thinking

I. INTRODUCTION

I want to attempt something extremely simple in this very brief paper on Gandhi's philosophy. I want to demonstrate that the method, doctrine, or technique known as *satyagraha* can be traced to two essential sources; and that to the extent that Gandhi emerges as an innovator and political genius, he does so only insofar as he was an innovator in synthesizing these two already available philosophical movements, and in putting this synthesized philosophy of *satyagraha* into action where and when it was most needed. Gandhi's philosophic abilities, and I think he would be the first to agree, were quite average and ordinary. He was not a Śaṁkara or a Radhakrishnan. His philosophical prowess was practically non-existent when it came to providing consistent and even sagacious theoretical foundations for his beliefs and actions. The revolution he started was not philosophical, but political;[1] and that political revolution was justified or grounded in the philosophy of the day, not in an ancient tradition of Hindu *smṛti* and *śruti*.

Mohandas Gandhi was, after all, a British subject, raised with all the aspirations that an upper middle class family of British India could instill, whose traditions were pinned to and with the British Way and the Western Way in everything except religion.[2] He broke tradition, caste, and even that religion by taking the advice of a friend who urged him to go to England to study law, where he passed his British bar examinations and was enrolled in the English High Court. The two years he spent in London capped off a long history of Westernization for Gandhi, and while he was to spend the rest of his life fighting against it, he remained British to the core even in the fight (e.g., he exhibited the typical British attitudes of fair play to the adversary, Eton playing-field rules, good sportsmanship, compromise, discussion, and no

A. L. Herman is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Wisconsin State University, Stevens Point (on leave), and NDFL Fellow, Center for South Asian Language and Area Studies (1968-70), University of Minnesota.

[1] And even this may have had quite ordinary if not unsuccessful results. Cf. R. C. Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India* (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1963), III, xviii-xix: ". . . Gandhi was lacking in both political wisdom and political strategy—as we commonly understand these terms—and far from being infallible, committed serious blunders, one after another, in pursuit of some utopian ideals and methods which had no basis in reality."

Gandhi's failures in India are subsequently detailed by Professor Majumdar: Gandhi failed to inculcate nonviolence in the people; he failed to unify the Moslems and the Hindus; he failed to prevent political as well as geographical partition; he failed to get the Indians to adopt *Charka* and *Khaddar*; and he failed to secure equality for the Harijans.

[2] Gandhi is Western enough even to be psychoanalyzed. The wedding of psychoanalysis and history has produced some fascinating results, especially at the hands of Erik H. Erikson. Cf. "Gandhi's Autobiography: The Leader as a Child" (*The American Scholar*, Autumn, 1966), and "On the Nature of Psycho-Historical Evidence: In Search of Gandhi" (*Daedalus*, Summer, 1968).

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hard feelings). Gandhi, like George Washington, dreamed only late of leaving the empire, and was proud of being a subject of both Her and His Majesty. He read books and thought thoughts that all good English barristers steeped in Anglo-Saxon ways think and read. Later, for humanitarian, nationalist, and personal reasons, he turned away from this background, seemingly ashamed, longing to forget, concentrating solely on things Indian. The running away became fanatical, absurd, irrational, as if to underscore how close the Western embrace had been.

The chief sources for Gandhi's philosophy, *satyagraha*, as I shall try to show in parts III and IV of this paper, are Henry David Thoreau's *Civil Disobedience*, a work read and practically memorized by Gandhi in South Africa in 1907, and a book by Leo Tolstoi, *The Kingdom of God is Within You*, which Gandhi read in South Africa around 1894. I will try to show that the chief elements of the philosophy of *satyagraha* as it developed in South Africa between December 28, 1907 and July 18, 1908 can be traced to these sources.

In claiming that *satyagraha* is Western in origin I do not wish to imply that Gandhi was not influenced temperamentally by his own traditions, Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism, in developing that doctrine. Who can escape his past?[3] What I am saying is that Gandhi was not philosophically influenced

[3] Gandhi was raised in Gujarat, a northwestern province of India, north of Bombay. Gujarat has been for centuries the religious stronghold of the Jains and the Buddhists. Both sects, while not orthodox Hindu, have had enormous influence on Hinduism, and in particular with respect to the doctrine of *ahiṁsā*, nonviolence. Gandhi's temperamental nonviolence can certainly be traced to this religious background. Many commentators, however, would widen the circle of what I would call philosophical influences as opposed to temperamental influences. Dhirendra Mohan Datta, for example, writes: "He was influenced mainly by the Sermon on the Mount as interpreted by Tolstoi, the Friends, and Henry David Thoreau; the teachings of the Buddha and the Jainas; the philosophy of the *Gita*; and the ideas of Ruskin." ("Indian Political, Legal, and Economic Thought," in *The Indian Mind: Essentials of Indian Philosophy and Culture*, ed. Charles A. Moore [Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967], p. 285.)

My quarrel is thus with those writers who specifically argue that *satyagraha* is the result of Indian as well as Western philosophical influences. The following works concur in attributing *satyagraha* to this dual influence: Geoffrey Ashe, *Gandhi* (New York: Stein & Day, 1968); Joan V. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* (Princeton University Press, 1958); Dhirendra Mohan Datta, "Indian Political, Legal, and Economic Thought," *op. cit.*; G. N. Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi* (Bombay: The Popular Book Depot, 1946); R. R. Diwakar, *Gandhiji's Life, Thought and Philosophy* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1963); Louis Fischer, *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950); Haridas T. Muzumdar, *Mahatma Gandhi: Peaceful Revolutionary* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952).

Also, B. R. Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi, A Biography* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958); H. S. L. Polak, H. N. Brailsford, and Lord Pethick-Lawrence, *Mahatma Gandhi* (London: Odhams Press Limited, 1949); Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi: The Early Phase*, Vol. I (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1965); C. Rajagopalachari, *Gandhiji's Teachings and Philosophy* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1963). At least two other authors would appear to argue that *satyagraha* is indigenous to Indian thought

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by those Indian traditions: there is nothing in the ancient texts to which he could turn in order to find the essential elements of *satyagraha.* The *Arthaśāstra,* the *Manusmṛti,* the *Upaniṣads, Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata, Dhammapada,* and all the political treatises are devoid of reference to the kind of nonviolent noncooperation that became known as *satyagraha.*[4] From the *Mahābhārata,* the *Bhagavad Gītā* can be added specifically to this list. Gandhi saw the *Gītā* as a pacifist treatise, enjoining nonviolence (*ahiṁsā*) toward all creatures. One can read *ahiṁsā* into the *Gītā* but, except on one or two very minor occasions, one cannot, I believe, read *ahiṁsā* out of the *Gītā.*[5] And if one cannot wring *ahiṁsā* out of the *Gītā,* nor find nonviolent noncooperation in the Hindu-Buddhist-Jain tradition *per se,* then it must be the case that that is not where they are, i.e., that is not where Gandhi got them.

The fact that *ahiṁsā* and nonviolent noncooperation are present in the works of Tolstoi and Thoreau, respectively, and that Gandhi read and avidly devoured the works of both these writers, at a time and place most appropriate to their contents, must leave us with the following conclusion which remains to be demonstrated: *satyagraha* is a new Indian word for some old ways of Western thinking; in particular, *satyagraha* combines the American humanism and Yankee pragmatism of Henry David Thoreau with the Christian pacifism and Russian anarchism of Leo Tolstoi.[6]

alone and is without any Western proclivities: Nancy Wilson Ross, *Three Ways of Asian Wisdom, Hinduism, Buddhism, Zen, And Their Significance for the West* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966); Vincent Sheean, *Lead Kindly Light* (New York: Random House, 1949).

[4] Cf. Dhirendra Mohan Datta, *op. cit.,* p. 281, where Datta agrees that no "instances of a positive moral check such as Gandhi's methods of *Satyagraha*" can be found in the ancient treatises.

Swami Nikhilananda, in a paper "The Realistic Aspect of Indian Spirituality" in the same anthology, concurs: "The method of non-violence and non-resistance to evil prescribed by Gandhi to win India's political freedom is not in accordance with the teachings of the Hindu scriptures such as the *Rāmāyana,* the *Mahābhārata,* the *Bhagavad-gītā,* the *Candi,* and the *Code of Manu*" (*op. cit.,* p. 225). And Nikhilananda adds, "Gandhi's advocacy of non-violence was his personal religious creed, not accepted by many even among his intimate followers" (*Ibid.,* p. 225).

I hope to show that this personal creed, while having heterodox and temperamental foundations in Jainism and Buddhism, is traceable to the philosophic influence of Henry David Thoreau and Leo Tolstoi.

[5] Gandhi made a translation of the *Bhagavad Gītā* from the Sanskrit into his native language, Gujarati. He attempted to explain his position in the introduction, *Anâsaktiyoga,* to the text, and tried to show through an ingenious allegorical interpretation of the story in the *Gītā* that it was really and ultimately a pacifist document, filled with the doctrine of *ahiṁsā.* Cf. *Hindu Dharma* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1950), pp. 155, 156, 180; and *The Gita According to Gandhi* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1946), pp. 127-129; 132-133.

[6] Gandhi acknowledges his debt to three Western writers (Thoreau, Tolstoi, and John Ruskin) in nearly all of his writings. (But in the *Autobiography* and in *Satyagraha in South Africa* Thoreau is, very curiously, not mentioned at all). Here is a typical passage from Gandhi which occurs in the journal *Harijan* for August 9, 1942, but could equally

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II. SATYAGRAHA: FOUR STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT[7]

The history of the development of the concept of *satyagraha* is to be found in the history of the Transvaal Indian community in South Africa from De-

well be from *Indian Opinion* or *Young India.* It is from a letter to some American friends: "Moreover, you have given me a teacher in Thoreau, who furnished me through his essay on the 'Duty of Civil Disobedience' scientific confirmation of what I was doing in South Africa. Great Britain gave me Ruskin, whose 'Unto This Last' transformed me overnight from a lawyer and city dweller into a rustic . . . living on a farm . . . and Russia gave me in Tolstoi a teacher who furnished a reasoned basis for my non-violence" (*Non-Violence in Peace and War* [Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1948], I, 413). Incidentally, the index to this volume makes no reference to Thoreau.

Two comments: First, Thoreau's absence from the two works cited (*Autobiography* and *Satyagraha in South Africa*) seems to be more than just a simple oversight. In his activities after 1924, the year *Satyagraha in South Africa* was finished, Gandhi seems to have deliberately played down the role of Henry David Thoreau's philosophy of civil disobedience in his South African *satyagraha* campaign. In a letter to Mr. P. Kadanda Rao of the Servants of India Society dated September 10, 1935, Gandhi wrote: "The statement that I had derived my idea of Civil Disobedience from the writings of Thoreau is wrong. The resistance to authority in South Africa was well advanced before I got the essay of Thoreau on Civil Disobedience." (Quoted in Louis Fischer, *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi,* p. 82.)

I believe that both of these assertions are false, depending, of course, on what "well advanced" means. Gandhi first mentions Thoreau's work in *Indian Opinion* on September 7, 1907, where he quotes extensively from it for the first but not the last time. On November 11, 1907, two months later, the first Indian was arrested in the Transvaal for civil disobedience; in December, three months later, Gandhi was arrested for the first time in his life for civil disobedience; in December the contest to invent a Gujarati or Sanskrit name for "civil disobedience" begins; and in January, 1908, at least five months after Gandhi began reading and quoting Thoreau, the name *"satyagraha"* is invented and used for the first time. It seems to me the whole affair was just getting started when Gandhi first read *Civil Disobedience.*

Second, having just finished reading John Ruskin's *Unto This Last,* a treatise on political economy critically following the 18th and 19th century British economists Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and J. S. Mill, I can say that it is a tedious, dull, prosaic study of human labor and human economy which I think Gandhi has, to say the least, exaggerated in describing. What probably turned Gandhi from a city-dweller into a rustic was not John Ruskin's anguished prose, but Leo Tolstoi's plea for a return to the land and the virtues of hard, manual labor (all of which Gandhi extols in his *Charka* days and earlier) in his book *What to do?* which Gandhi read in 1894 or 1895 in Durban, South Africa. Louis Fischer states, after quoting Gandhi's interpretation of Ruskin: "But Ruskin did not say, as Gandhi did, that the *work* of all 'has the same value.' On the contrary Ruskin stresses, more than anything else, 'the impossibility of Equality' between men" (*op. cit.,* p. 68).

With regard to another interpretation (misinterpretation) of Ruskin by Gandhi, Fischer says: "But these are Gandhi's words: the teaching ("that the life of labor . . . is the life worth living"), though not alien to Ruskin is scarcely to be found in the four essays [by Ruskin]" (*ibid.*). Then Fischer quotes from Gandhi: "It was a habit with me," he once wrote, "to forget what I did not like and to carry out in practice whatever I liked" (*ibid.,* p. 69). John Ruskin never held a shovel in his life, as anyone can see who has been caught in the pages of *Unto This Last.*

[7] The sources for the general history of the struggle are *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1961, 1962, 1964), Vol. V (1905-1906), Vol. VI (1906-1907), Vol. VII (June-December, 1907) and Vol. VIII (January-August,

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cember 28, 1907 until sometime near July 18, 1908. I believe we can distinguish four phases in the evolution of the concept during this short period, for *satyagraha* did not fall fully ripened from any veldt bush or tree.[8] During this seven-month period Gandhi and his *satyagrahis* were reflecting on their victory of sorts over the South African government. That "victory" came about as the result of an act of civil disobedience to the government, and in reflecting on it, the Indians desired to give it a name. It is with their ruminations and considerations about a proper name for what they had done, for their instrument of "victory," that we shall be concerned here.

Phase I. On December 28, 1907 Gandhi initiated a contest in the Indian journal, *Indian Opinion,* to find a name to describe the recent passive resistance campaign against the government. Gandhi makes it quite clear that patriotic reasons alone urge him to find a Sanskrit or Gujarati word for that activity. He gives no inkling whatsoever that something new and different, beyond ordinary passive resistance, had been going on. He is looking for an Indian synonym, as he admits, for English words:

> To respect our own language, speak it well and use in it as few foreign words as possible—this is also a part of patriotism. We have been using some English terms just as they are, since we cannot find given Gujarati equivalents for them [e.g., "Passive Resistance," "Passive Resister," and "Civil Disobedience"].[9]

Then on or before January 10, 1908 Gandhi notes the results of the contest (in which there was a prize of £10), reminding the readers that "the editor had invited a Gujarati equivalent" for "passive resistance." He mentions the word "*sadagraha,*" suggested by a contestant, which Gandhi then changes to "*satyagraha.*"[10] At this stage, then, Gandhi noted no significant difference

1908). These volumes make use of news stories, interviews with Gandhi, articles from the Indian weekly *Indian Opinion*—a fascinating source in itself for the period—and Gandhi's other writings as they appeared during this time.

[8] The specific sources here are *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* (hereafter *Works*), Vols. VII and VIII. Less reliable but useful have been Gandhi's later writings on the struggle: *Satyagraha in South Africa* (Madras: Ganesan, 1928), a recounting of the events largely written in prison in 1924, helpful but marred by Gandhi's lack of first-hand documents; *An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1940), written when Gandhi was in prison and out from 1924 to 1925. Erik Erikson, writing in *Daedalus* in 1968 (*op. cit.,* p. 700), cautions against using the *Autobiography* for historical (or psychoanalytical) purposes, and comments: ". . . the autobiography often impresses the reader as monotonous and moralistic to the point of priggishness. . . ." It was written for publication serially in *Young India*; and short weekly installments, each one with a moral truth to expound, do get a bit tedious.

[9] *Works,* VII, 455.

[10] One prize was won by Maganlal Gandhi (Gandhi's cousin) who refused the money (*Works,* VIII, 131, n.5). "*Sadagraha*" means "insistance on or firmness in truth," while "*satyagraha*" can be rendered "to seize or grasp truth" (from the Sanskrit √*grah* or Vedic √*grabh* which mean "to grasp"), and "*sat,*" the Sanskrit word (from √*as,* "to

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between "passive resistance" and *"satyagraha"* and indeed throughout the next two years he uses the words interchangeably.[11] He defines the latter in terms that would have been quite acceptable to an old civil resister like Henry David Thoreau. For *satyagraha* during this early phase is simply "determined opposition to anything unjust" and "firmness in a good cause." The Transvaal Indians, including Gandhi, had simply disobeyed an unjust law, remained firm in their oath to stick together in their disobedience, and as a result they had triumphed. That was civil disobedience, that was *satyagraha.*

There are some strange limitations placed on the use of civil resistance during this formative phase, however, and Gandhi is careful to note these. The exceptions are rather curious:

> . . . satyagraha . . . or passive resistance . . . can be effective only in situations where we are required to act positively. For instance, if the Government does not allow us to acquire land, satyagraha will be of no avail. If, however, it forbids us from walking along a certain footpath, or asks us to shift to locations, or seeks to prevent us from carrying on trade, we can resort to satyagraha.

The mysterious distinction between the proper and improper use of *satyagraha* is cleared up when Gandhi then states: "That is, if we are required to do anything which violates our religion or insults our manhood [the phrase is nearly Thoreau's], we can administer the invaluable physic of satyagraha."[12] Phase I in the development of *satyagraha,* then, consists in the affirmation of

be") for "being" or "existing," which is related to Sanskrit *"satya,"* "truth" or "righteousness." At the same time, *"satyāgraha"* means "firmness or forcefulness in or of truth," from the two words *"satya"* and *"agraha,"* the latter meaning "firmness" or "forcefulness." Gandhi prefers *"satyāgraha"* (though he never renders it that way, but always *"satyagraha"*), and defines it as "firmness in truth," bringing us back, oddly enough, to Maganlal Gandhi's word *"sadagraha,"* which does indeed mean "firmness in truth."

[11] In retrospect, Gandhi conveniently forgets this identity between "passive resistance" and *"satyagraha"* and attributes to the two words, much later, differences they just did not have in 1907 and 1909. Thus in *Satyagraha in South Africa* he says: "We are only concerned to note the distinction between passive resistance and Satyagraha, and we have seen that there is a great and fundamental difference between the two" (p. 113). He assumes that difference existed from the beginning. Later he concludes, forgetting the patriotic contest: "In a word, we had to invent a new term clearly to denote the movement of the Indians in the Transvaal and to prevent its being confused with passive resistance generally so called" (p. 115).

[12] *Works,* VIII, 61. Later Gandhi was to remove such restrictions from the list of results achievable by *satyagraha.* In fact, Gandhi came as time passed to make utterly fantastic claims for the doctrine. In 1947, for example, he stated: "This I do say, fearlessly and firmly, that every worthy object can be achieved by the use of Satyagraha. It is the highest and infallible means, the greatest force" (M. K. Gandhi, *Non-Violence in Peace and War* [Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1949], II, 275). (At that stage Gandhi had taken to using upper case *S* for *"satyagraha."* Volume I of the above work, first published in 1942, does not employ such alphabetical honorifics.) And a year earlier he had said: "Satyagraha is a law of universal application. Beginning with the family its use can be extended to every other circle" (*ibid.,* p. 61).

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the freedom of religion or, as Thoreau would phrase it, freedom of conscience, from infringement by unjust laws, and the right to disobey or resist such laws when they do violate religion, conscience, or human dignity.

Phase II. In the issue of *Indian Opinion* dated February 22, 1908 Gandhi enlarges upon the doctrine of *satyagraha* by taking certain Transvaal Indians to task for their failure, as he arcanely puts it, "to comprehend the secret of satyagraha." The essence of this secret lies in getting rid of fear on the part of the *satyagrahi*: "But our satyagraha prompts us to become free and feel independent. . . . A satyagrahi enjoys a degree of freedom not possible for others, for he becomes a truly fearless person. Once his mind is rid of fear, he will never agree to be another's slave." Then Gandhi, in effect, couples this description of the *satyagrahi's* inner attitude with the practical application of that attitude, the civil disobedience mentioned in Phase I: "Such satyagraha can be, ought to be, practised not only against a Government but against a society as well."[13]

Coupled with this fearlessness is a doctrine of love that casts out the fear and that owes much to the influence of Tolstoi and his Christian doctrines. Gandhi throughout this second phase stresses repeatedly that *satyagraha* is "really an attitude of mind" and that "Passive resistance means resistance of evil with inner force instead of physical force. . . ."[14]

But at the same time civil disobedience, the element of Phase I *satyagraha,* remains an important ingredient in the struggle, and as if to underscore this point Gandhi mentions four *satyagrahis* in history who were inwardly fearless in their resistance to external "wicked" forces. The group is an odd collection, but we must remember the concept is evolving and at the time they all seemed to fit the mold of the *satyagrahi.* Thus Gandhi mentions Thoreau, who "ranged himself against his people," Luther, who "defied his people singlehanded," and Galileo, who "opposed society," and, finally, Gandhi conjures up for us the figure of Columbus "facing his sailors." Just where conscience, manhood, and religious principle fit in with Galileo and Columbus may be a moot issue; and whether love played any role at all in the lives of those two gentlemen and the two remaining is debatable, but that they were all fearless resisters I suspect no one can argue.

Courage is combined with love and fearlessness in the May 23, 1908 issue of *Indian Opinion* as a further element in *satyagraha.* This courage is made possible by a strict adherence to truth: "A satyagrahi will adhere to truth to the last. If we want to be satyagrahis we must have the courage to range ourselves [as Thoreau did previously] against the Government or our own community, and courage consists in being fearless."[15]

[13] *Works,* VIII, 91.
[14] *Ibid.,* p. 131.
[15] *Ibid.,* p. 252.

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The concepts of truth, fearlessness, courage, love, and nonviolence all work themselves together during this second phase. The words are all inner-state predicates, as opposed to civil disobedience, which is an outer-state predicate. Phase II unites these two sets of predicates and attributes them to *satyagraha.*

Phase III. On April 18, 1908 another prize of £10 was awarded by *Indian Opinion* to M. S. Maurice for an essay on the ethics of passive resistance. It contains extensive quotes from Henry Thoreau and repeats more or less what we have already seen in Phases I and II. But there is a new element here, and it is interesting insofar as this Phase III overlaps with Phase II and points up what some of the followers of the *satyagraha* movement must have been thinking regarding the direction of development of *satyagraha*; this new element probably reflects the bent of Gandhi's own thinking during this period. M. S. Maurice mentions examples of his own of three *satyagrahis* in history: Jesus of Nazareth, St. Stephen, the first Christian martyr, and Henry Thoreau, " a martyr to his principles." The first two are significant because, when compared to Gandhi's own list in Phase II, *religious* martyrs are here outstanding. Thoreau, Galileo, Luther, and Columbus were certainly not martyrs, and Gandhi never hints that there is anything religious or supernatural about their "*satyagraha.*" Mr. Maurice's prize essay sets the mood for Phase III when he says of his martyrs: "Thus passive resistance obtained Divine sanction, and men had recourse to it as the only effective weapon against tyranny and injustice and oppression."[16]

God and religion now find their way outspokenly into *satyagraha,* and on June 27, 1908 we find Gandhi saying: "The sword of satyagraha is far superior to the steel sword. Truth and justice provide its point; divine help is the hilt that adorns it."[17] On September 9, 1908, in words startlingly reminiscent of Mr. Maurice, Gandhi says, again: "This campaign [with the Krugersdorf Indians] is based on spiritual force. Hence it has a divine sanction. We know that intellectual force is superior to physical force, and spiritual force superior to intellectual force. That is the highest force."[18]

That is the precise difference, too, between the intellectual force of Phase II and the spiritual force being outlined here in Phase III. The Divine element in all of the *satyagrahi's* undertakings will remain a firm part of the later, and I stress "later," development of *satyagraha.*[19] This earlier doctrine, we shall see, is directly traceable to Leo Tolstoi.

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 493.
[17] *Ibid.,* p. 493.
[18] *Works,* IX, 14-15.
[19] On June 5, 1909, Gandhi says:, "I see that satyagraha is assured of divine help, and that in testing the satyagrahi the Creator imposes on him at every step only as much burden as he can bear" (*Works,* IX, 240). This is all part of the evolution of Phase III *satyagraha,* which leads from talk about spiritual force in Phase III proper, to talk

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Phase IV. The last of the necessary conditions for *satyagraha* appears in *Indian Opinion* for July 18, 1908. It was subsequently to develop into the most controversial concept yet propounded by the future Mahatma. Essentially it amounted to the belief that really successful *satyagraha* always led to a change of heart or a conversion in one's opponent. It is also a doctrine traceable to Leo Tolstoi and the Christians. Gandhi states the doctrine, not very clearly, not very sharply, but with the outline of the later theory nonetheless there, when he says on July 18: "The sword of satyagraha is not to be used for cutting dung cakes which is what the domiciliary rights of a handful of Transvaal Indians really are, but to pierce the violent rock-like hatred in the hearts of the whites."[20]

Once having pierced their hearts with love the whites will change, for their hearts, like Gandhi's, really contain goodness and truth. Gandhi believed this and all his life held firmly to the doctrine that man is basically, inwardly good. In this he was like Tolstoi, and like Tolstoi and Jesus of Nazareth, he believed that doing good to your enemies, and loving them that persecute you, were the ways to miraculously and divinely pierce that hard crust and convert even the most intemperate of the obdurately wicked. Examples of this attempt of the *satyagrahi* to change the minds and hearts of his opponent are numerous in Gandhi's later writing and lecturing. In 1938 Gandhi suggests this method of converting the opponent to the Jews of Germany and Israel: "They should seek to convert the Arab heart. The same God rules the Arab heart who rules the Jewish heart."[21] And, again, Gandhi says: "The idea behind it is not to

about "divine help," as here, to talk about God planning and directing the entire campaign.

Thus in *Satyagraha in South Africa* Gandhi speaks comfortably to this point in his 1924 preface: "In a righteous [*satyagraha*] struggle, God Himself plans campaigns and conducts battles. . . . God helps when one feels one's self humbler than the very dust under one's feet. Only to the weak and the helpless is divine succor vouchsafed" (p. xiv).

This has indeed become a familiar notion by 1946, where in *Non-Violence in Peace and War* Gandhi states: "The root of Satyagraha is in prayer [Phase II]. A Satyagrahi relies upon God for protection against the tyranny of brute force" [Phase III]. (II, 62.) But this feeling that God directly intervenes in all the *satyagrahi's* activities is a later development in *satyagraha,* and directly traceable, I believe, to Gandhi's interpretation of the *Bhagavad Gītā*.

[20] *Works,* VIII, 366-367.

[21] *Non-Violence in Peace and War,* I, 163. Pittabhi Sitaramayya, in *Gandhi and Gandhism,* says of this phase of *satyagraha*: "It involves self-chosen suffering and humiliation for the resisters. If it is effective, it is so by working on the conscience of those against whom it is being used, sapping their confidence in the exclusive rightness of their case, making their physical strength impotent, and weakening their resolution by insinuating a sense of guilt for the sufferings they have a part in causing" (p. 111; quoted in R. C. Majumdar, *op. cit.,* p. 8).

Commenting also on this nonviolent jiujitsu, R. C. Majumdar says: "The aim of Satyagraha is the conversion of the opponent to one's own view by self-suffering, and not by violence" (*ibid.,* p. 8). Success for such a method would mean that in India, for

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destroy or harass the opponent, but to convert him or win him over by sympathy, patience, and self-suffering."[22]

In conclusion, let me say that the later developments in *satyagraha* are nothing more nor less than elaborations and fulfillments of the ideas developed in these four phases. To this extent, then, *satyagraha* is a doctrine of civil disobedience (Phase I), employing love, nonviolence, fearlessness, and courage (Phase II), supported by Divine aid (Phase III) resulting in the conversion or change of heart of one's oppressors (Phase IV). Phase I and Phase II are directly traceable to the philosophical influence on Gandhi of Henry David Thoreau, and Phase II, Phase III, and Phase IV are directly traceable to the philosophical influence on Gandhi of Leo Tolstoi, and Christianity as interpreted by Tolstoi. In the sections which follow I hope to show the specific form that these influences took.

III. HENRY DAVID THOREAU

One day in the summer of 1846, as he was on his way to the cobbler in the village of Concord, Massachusetts, Henry David Thoreau was arrested and jailed for having refused to pay his poll taxes.[23] He refused to pay these taxes, he said, to a government that supported human slavery and carried out an unjust war with Mexico. Thoreau was not the first to protest in this way. Two years before, Amos Bronson Alcott (1799-1888), the father of the novelist Louisa May Alcott (1832-1888) and a friend of Thoreau's, went to Concord jail for like reasons. Protesting and going to prison are in the Western tradition.[24]

example, "the British had given up their hold on India in a mood of repentance or penitence for their sinful acts in India" (*ibid.*, p. xxiii).

[22] R. R. Diwakar in *Satyagraha* (Illinois, 1948), quoting Gandhi. From R. C. Majumdar, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[23] Both of Thoreau's biographers, Henry S. Canby and Joseph Wood Krutch, dispute the date Thoreau gives for his arrest. Thoreau says in Walden that it was late in the summer of his first year at Walden Pond; that would put the time in 1845. But the journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Bronson Alcott which allude to the incident would place the jailing in July of 1846. Cf. Canby, *Thoreau* (1939), pp. 233-234; Krutch, *Henry David Thoreau* (1948), pp. 132-133. Gandhi first read *Walden* in Johannesburg in 1906 (R. R. Diwakar, *Gandhiji's Life, Thought and Philosophy*, p. 47).

[24] Dwight Macdonald speaks to this grand tradition in a remarkable volume, *The Root is Man* (Alhambra, California: The Cunningham Press, 1953): "It is not the law breaker we must fear today so much as he who obeys the law. The Germans have long been noted for their deep respect for law and order. This foible, which one could smile at as an amiable weakness in the past, has assumed a sinister aspect under the Nazis. One of the most hopeful auguries for the future of this country, with the Permanent War Economy taking shape, is that we Americans have a long and honorable tradition of lawlessness and disrespect for authority" (p. 10).

C. P. Snow, in an article titled "Either-or," for the *Progressive* of February, 1961, touches a like strain: "When you think of the long and gloomy history of man, you

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Thoreau wrote a pamphlet about his reasons for going to jail (he spent only one day there before someone, possibly his aunts, bailed him out), and it was published in Elizabeth P. Peabody's *Aesthetic Papers* in 1849 under the title "Resistance to Civil Government." It was later retitled and printed as "Civil Disobedience," the name it carries today. Like Gandhi, Thoreau was not a trained philosopher, nor was he a disciplined essayist. He wrote about what he liked and did not like with passion and restraint, with vigor and quiescence, as the mood struck him rather than as the form of the work demanded. What emerges consequently is a *potpourri* of themes, carelessly interwoven and artlessly connected. But the message he is advancing comes through nonetheless clearly. Despite all the detours and asides and random literary gallopings, he still manages to make of this essay one of the most profound literary and philosophical documents in American history.

The work is seemingly anarchistic: "That government is best which governs not at all." "I quietly declare war with the state." "I am not responsible for the successful working of the machinery of society. I am not the son of the engineer."[25] And yet, inconsistently, he repeatedly calls not for no-government but for a better government; a government of conscience and not of legislators; a government not of masses of faceless automatons but of thoughtful minorities who decide issues by right and justice and not by law:

> Must the citizen even for a moment or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the legislator? I think we should be men first and subjects afterward. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right.[26]
>
> The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies.[27]
>
> A wise man will not leave the right to the mercy of chance, nor wish it to prevail through the power of the majority. There is but little virtue in the action of masses of men.[28]

The remedy for injustice lies in two directions, and here one can appreciate the dilemma of the reformer, whether he be a Gandhi, a Tolstoi, or a Thoreau. First, one can use the existing and legitimate machinery of painstaking, orderly, lawful change already provided by the State. Thoreau rejects this

will find more hideous crimes have been committed in the name of obedience than have ever been committed in the name of rebellion" (p. 24).

Thoreau, and Gandhi after him, are in a long and grand tradition, a tradition certainly not confined to America or England; Socrates' defiance of the orders of the "Thirty" in the affair of Leon (*Apology* 32c-d) or perhaps earlier Homer's recounting of Achilles' refusal to Agamemnon are in the Western tradition of rebellion.

[25] "Resistance to Civil Government (Civil Disobedience)" in *Henry David Thoreau*, ed. Bartholow V. Crawford (New York: American Book Company, 1934), pp. 245; 260; 263.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 246.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 247.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 251.

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way and tells us why: "As for adopting the ways which the state has provided for remedying the evil, I know not of such ways. They take too much time, and a man's life will be gone."[29] Because there is not world enough and time to wait upon the lumbering, slumbering masses to take up the cause of right, Thoreau turns to the second way of remedying evils in the State: civil disobedience. He cries: ". . . but if it [the government] is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another then, I say, break the law."[30] And again: "All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to and to resist the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable."[31]

That the consequence of such refusal is imprisonment obviously was not lost on Gandhi. Thoreau's justification for the consequences of civil disobedience is moving, quotable, and timely: "How does it become a man to behave toward this American government today? I answer that he cannot without disgrace be associated with it. I cannot for an instant recognize the political organization as *my* government which is the slave's government also."[32]

What does one do then? What can one man accomplish? One dissolves the partnership, one resists, one disobeys the law: "I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, if ten men whom I could name,—if ten *honest* men only,—aye, if *one* HONEST man . . . *ceasing to hold slaves,* were actually to withdraw from this copartnership and be locked up in the county jail therefor, it would be the abolition of slavery in America."[33] The dream Thoreau held regarding the effects of civil disobedience was as magnanimous as Gandhi's for *satyagraha.* But the result of such resistance to the law is jail, and once again Thoreau's voice takes on the reformer's ring when he cries: "Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison. [prison] . . . is the only house in a slave-state in which a free man can abide with honor."[34]

Thoreau's program of civil disobedience leading to jail, like Gandhi's later, served a double purpose. To begin with, it assuaged the conscience of the disobedient by allowing them to protest and be jailed, thereby freeing or cleansing them from participation in the injustice. Second, as Gandhi certainly noted, it had an effect on public opinion. Protest of a flamboyant sort draws attention from the general public, which has the power that the minority by definition does not have, the power to change the unjust law or practice by legal

[29] *Ibid.,* p. 254.
[30] *Ibid.,* p. 254.
[31] *Ibid.,* p. 248.
[32] *Ibid.,* p. 248.
[33] *Ibid.,* p. 255.
[34] *Ibid.,* p. 256. Gandhi in 1909 had this in mind when he said, "Thus, Thoreau's statement that in a tyrannical state those who do not wish to submit to its tyranny have their place in gaol is proved true" (*Works,* IX, 183).

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and democratic means. It is this double purpose of civil disobedience, I believe, which was not lost on Gandhi when with conscience-stricken Yankee shrewdness Thoreau said of those men abiding in jail: "If any think that their influence would be lost there, and their voices no longer afflict the ear of the state, that they would not be as an enemy within its walls, they do not know by how much truth is stronger than error, nor how much more eloquently and effectively he can combat injustice who has experienced a little in his own person."[35]

Thoreau championed the cause of justice and conscience by courageously and nonviolently disobeying the laws of the State; we called this Phase II of *satyagraha.* And he chose prison through civil disobedience as the only place for a righteous man in an unrighteous land; we called this Phase I of *satyagraha.*

As far as Phases I and II are concerned, Gandhi's attention to Thoreau is lengthy. Gandhi spoke for the first time about Thoreau in the September 7, 1907 issue of *Indian Opinion,* the Indian weekly newspaper of South Africa published by Gandhi in English and Gujarati. This is the first indication we have that Thoreau's doctrines are playing a part in the *satyagraha* movement. That first article is entitled "On the Duty of Civil Disobedience," and in it Gandhi calls attention to Thoreau and rightly attributes to him the doctrine that "there is no obligation imposed upon us by our conscience to give blind submission to any law, no matter what force or majority backs it."[36] In a subsequent article for the same September 7 issue titled "Duty of Disobeying Laws," Gandhi again refers to Thoreau as "a man who practiced what he preached," who went to prison and went on from there to write of his imprisonment with momentous consequences. Gandhi states: "Historians say that the chief cause of the abolition of slavery in America was Thoreau's imprisonment and the publication by him of the above-mentioned book after his release. Both his example and writings are at present exactly applicable to the Indians in the Transvaal."[37] Whether Gandhi believed this rather immoderate exaggeration or not, Thoreau was enlisted as early as September 1907 in the *satyagraha* movement. On October 5, 1907, buoyed up by Thoreauian optimism, Gandhi says archly in that same journal, *Indian Opinion*: "There is a deep-rooted superstition that a law cannot be disobeyed. It would be no small step forward for the community if this superstition were rooted out." And then he adds: "When we shall have resisted the law to the last, we shall be regarded as so many Thoreaus in miniature. By this time the readers

[35] *Ibid.,* p. 256.
[36] *Works,* VII, 211.
[37] *Ibid.,* p. 217. As we have seen above, n. 6, it was a habit with Gandhi "to forget what I did not like." This failing apparently extends to twisting the facts a bit as with Thoreau now and Ruskin later.

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of the *Opinion* must be aware of who Thoreau was."[38] His readers ought to have known, for in the September 7 issue and in the issue of September 14, 1907 Gandhi quoted whole pages from Thoreau and, in addition, gave in his own words a lengthy summary of "Civil Disobedience"; both selections were then later brought together and sold as a booklet, in case any Indians remained in South Africa who had not heard of Henry David Thoreau.

Thoreau seems at this time to have taken on the dimensions of a martyr and a saint for Gandhi. The latter writes lovingly and with respect for the American philosopher, making of Thoreau the kind of man that he, Gandhi, was becoming. He says of Thoreau in late October of 1907:

> David Thoreau was a great writer, philosopher, poet and withal a most practical man [this latter was never lost on Gandhi], that is, he taught nothing he was not prepared to practise himself. He was one of the greatest and most moral men America has produced. . . . He went to jail for the sake of his principles and suffering humanity. His essay has, therefore, been sanctified by suffering. Moreover, it is written for all time. Its incisive logic is unanswerable.[39]

However exaggerated these epithets may be, it is not an exaggeration to say that Gandhi was profoundly moved by Thoreau and his accomplishments, and that Thoreau gave to the Indian community in South Africa in 1907 what we have called Phase I and Phase II *satyagraha,* a method and an attitude respectively for coping with injustices. Further, Thoreau gave to the suffering efforts of that community a legitimacy and a meaning they had not previously held. This legitimacy and meaning extended finally beyond the insularity of that community and of that subcontinent, to the international level where the whole movement took on historical significance. Thoreau sanctified going to jail as a means of protesting injustices committed by the State. He showed Gandhi and the *satyagrahis* the way to give voice to their conscience in the face of evil, and at the same time he showed them how public opinion could be marshaled and used in the defense of individual conscience. Thoreau made imprisonment a necessary and respectable part of *satyagraha.*

IV. LEO TOLSTOI

Leo Tolstoi espoused a rare and radical kind of Christianity.[40] As with Thoreau's philosophy, there is an anarchistic refrain rumbling through Tolstoi's

[38] *Ibid.,* p. 267.

[39] *Ibid.,* pp. 304-305. It is all the more surprising, considering this outflow of adulation and praise in 1907, that Gandhi could so completely forget his hero in *Satyagraha in South Africa* in 1924 and in *An Autobiography* in 1927.

[40] Leo Tolstoi (1828-1910) was born and raised in the wealth and splendor of the 19th century Russian aristocracy. The Count (an inherited title) achieved early literary fame with his masterpieces *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina.* But a crisis occurred in his life when he was 57 and after a deadly struggle with psychological depression and suicide

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religion, but where Thoreau is at war with the State in order to improve its citizens and lead them to government by conscience, Tolstoi is at war with the State in order to abolish it. For this abolition he chooses nonviolent means that are intricately bound up with his religious beliefs. The *locus classicus* for this doctrine of anarchist Christian pacifism is Tolstoi's masterful essay, *The Kingdom of God is Within You,* first published in 1893. Essentially the argument of the work is as follows:

1. Jesus Christ commands us explicitly not to kill, cause suffering or go to war; therefore, Christ commands us not to support or promote the State with taxes or with our persons, for the State is responsible for killing people and causing suffering and war.
2. Christianity in its purest form, consequently, must be anti-State, because the State is the cause of killing and suffering and war. What remains for us to follow is the doctrine of love—all men would be happy and fulfilled and live at peace if they but followed and practised this simple Christian principle.[41]
3. The Church is a tool of the State, an instrument of the State, in supporting and promoting the evil ventures of the State. Therefore the Church is also evil.[42]

Let us take Parts 1 and 2 (Part 3 on the Church does not concern us, interesting as it is) of Tolstoi's argument and illustrate them with his own text from *The Kingdom of God is Within You,* for it is these parts that were of concern to Gandhi. The personal dilemma that struck Tolstoi was essentially this: If the State commands me to make war and pay my taxes to support that war, and if the law of Christ commands me not to make war in partnership with the State and not to support killing and murder, then what

he renounced his title, wealth, and properties, and adopted the life and ways of a simple peasant. He gave up shoes and went barefoot, he wore peasant clothes and dressed in a plain muzhik smock and trousers, and in 1891 he moved out of his estate mansion to live, like Thoreau earlier and Gandhi later, in a simple rude hut. He gave up smoking, drinking, hunting, and eating meat. He became interested in village education, vegetarianism, and famine relief, and began writing about pacifism, Christianity, the Church, governments, and theology. He refused the Nobel Prize when it was offered to him (because he did not accept money), and became the idol of Gandhi's eye. (They did carry on a brief correspondence.)

[41] For Tolstoi the true Christian is defined as follows: "A Christian enters into no dispute with his neighbor, he neither attacks nor uses violence; on the contrary, he suffers himself without resistance, and by his very attitude toward evil not only sets himself free, but helps to free the world at large from all outward authority" (*ibid.*, p. 96). Gandhi could have written every word of this statement, exchanging "Christian" for "*satyagrahi,*" and, as we shall see, he very nearly does.

[42] Tolstoi fought an unending battle with the Church, writing, for example, in *The Kingdom of God is Within You* in tones reminiscent of Ludwig Feuerbach and Fyodor Dostoevsky: "The history of the Church is the history of cruelties and horror. . . . Every Church excludes the doctrines of Christ." (Quoted in Louis Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 96.)

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should I do? If I obey the State but not God, what kind of Christian am I? If I obey Christ but not the State, what kind of citizen am I? Who comes first, God or the State? Thoreau asked this question in a similar way: What comes first, the State or my conscience? Both Tolstoi and Thoreau sided against the State. Tolstoi says, "A man has only to understand his life as Christianity teaches him to understand it—that is, he need only understand that his life does not belong to himself or his family or this State but to Him. . . ."[43] The law that guides man is not the law of the State but ". . . the law of God, and that law will dominate him and supplant all other laws, and by its supreme dominion will in his eyes deprive all human laws of their right to command or restrict him."[44] In his contention that "A Christian is free from every human authority . . ." we have an illustration of Christian anarchism in which each man is not merely a law unto himself—that would be political anarchism—but is subject to Christ's law and not to human law. This philosophy of Christian anarchism rests on the second of the summary arguments mentioned briefly above. That is to say, the philosophy of Christian anarchism rests upon the religion of love that Tolstoi writes about in so many of his essays.[45] This religion of love depends upon an attitude of mind that we have previously likened to Phase II of *satyagraha,* without which disciplined and moral action (Phase I *satyagraha* or civil disobedience) is impossible.

About this attitude, Tolstoi says,"The ideal [of the Sermon on the Mount] is to have no ill-will towards anyone, not to provoke ill-will, but to love all men. . . . The ideal is not to be concerned for the future, and to live in the present. . . . The ideal is never for any purpose to employ violence . . . not to return evil for evil, but to endure wrongs."[46] This Christian ideal extends beyond one's friends to include all men—tax gatherers, slave holders, even British sergeants of police and South African racists: "The ideal is to love our enemies and those that hate us . . . do no evil to our enemies, to speak well of them, and not to make distinctions between them and our compatriots."[47]

The passages are nearly direct quotations from the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 5. The purpose behind loving your enemies is to change their hearts, to convert them, turn them around. All men have the light of Christ,

[43] *The Kingdom of God is Within You,* trans. Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 251.
[44] *Ibid.,* p. 251.
[45] See, for example, tracts, pamphlets, and books with the following self-explanatory titles: *Christianity and Patriotism; Patriotism and Government; Thou Shalt Kill No One; Love One Another; Why Christian People in General and the Russian People Especially Fall into Distress; The Teachings of Christ for Children; Capital Punishment and Christianity; Religious Tolerance; Self Perfection,* and so on.
[46] *The Kingdom of God is Within You,* p. 121.
[47] *Ibid.,* pp. 121-122.

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that spark of God in them, the Kingdom of God that Tolstoi's book takes its title from; loving your enemies recalls them to their essential Divine Brotherhood with all men. One of the primary charactertistics of Phase IV *satyagraha* involved just that: suffering in jail or dying there, in order to change the hearts of the oppressors and tormentors, and Gandhi believed that *satyagraha* would succeed, could be said to have succeeded, only when it produced a change of heart, a conversion, a *metanoia* in the so-called enemy. This doctrine, Phase IV *satyagraha,* is basically Christian, and it is found in The Sermon on the Mount. It comes to Gandhi, along with the Christian pacifism and the Christian anarchism, from Tolstoi. There is nothing resembling Phase IV *satyagraha,* as mentioned previously (*supra,* n. 4), in the Hindu texts. Here is Tolstoi again: "A Christian will not quarrel with anyone or attack anyone or use violence against anyone. On the contrary he will endure violence." And for what purpose, to what end? What will it give us? "And by that very attitude towards violence he not only frees himself from all external power, but the world also."[48]

The Christian as Tolstoi sees him behaves in a way that is totally contrary to normal, ordinary, and acceptable practice. The *satyagrahi* as Gandhi developed him behaves in a precisely similar way, and Tolstoi could have been describing a *satyagrahi* when he wrote the above passages. The Christian and the *satyagrahi* are out to make a revolution, but a revolution in the hearts and minds of men. They refuse to pay taxes, and refuse conscription along with oaths of allegiance; they refuse jury duty, police duties; they refuse government honors and emoluments, but with love, patience, and endurance, in the hopes of converting the government and its officers. And this makes them especially difficult to handle:

> If these men were revolutionaries, advocating and practising violence and murder, it would be easy to resist them: some of them could be bought over, some duped, and some terrorized. . . . But what is to be done with men who neither advocate revolution nor preach any peculiar religious dogmas, but simply because they do not wish to harm any man, refuse to take oaths, pay taxes or serve in the army, obligations on which the whole fabric of the State rests?[49]

Tolstoi adds, "To kill these people or keep them in perpetual confinement is also impossible," and it is impossible because the affair is bound to arouse interest and sympathy from the public.[50] Thus, like Thoreau, Tolstoi believes that people's humanity and concern will be aroused by one man's act of defiance to the State:

> It is the same with the manifestation of Christian public opinion in regard to violence and all that is based on it. If this public opinion already influences

[48] *Ibid.,* p. 254.
[49] *Ibid.,* p. 278.
[50] *Ibid.,* p. 279.

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some sensitive people and causes them each in his own sphere to renounce the advantages that violence affords, then it will continue to act on others and will go on doing so until it transforms all the activity of men, and brings it into accord with the Christian consciousness. . . .[51]

Gandhi, Thoreau, and Tolstoi were all intent on this kind of transformation of the public consciousness. But while both Gandhi and Thoreau would agree with the substance of Tolstoi's thesis, there is nonetheless a difference of opinion on fine points. Tolstoi's Christian is out first and foremost to change himself (Phase II *satyagraha*); the conversion through pacific Christianity is a personal revolution. The change of public opinion, the altering of your opponent's position, is certainly found in Tolstoi (Phase IV *satyagraha*), but it is an afterthought. Tolstoi is an absolute Christian anarchist. He is not concerned one whit about changing the laws of the State, or making the laws just. He can say along with Thoreau that he is at war with the State, but, where Thoreau goes on from there to seek to improve the State, or at least to make State laws subject to the consciences of men within the State system, Tolstoi cuts at the very foundations of the State. One form of this cutting is the refusal to support the tax system. Henry Thoreau did pay some of his taxes and would, indeed, pay all of his taxes if the State would get rid of slavery and quit its support of war (in 1849 he finally paid his $1.50 poll tax). Tolstoi shows no signs of coming to terms with the State. Czarist Russia spewed forth its Kropotkins and its Bakunins, anarchists to the teeth. America could only spawn its gentle agitators like Emerson and Alcott; and South Africa in 1906 was more like America in 1850 than Czarist Russia in 1880. Hence Gandhi, like Thoreau, desired to change the laws and not abolish the State. He could incorporate Tolstoi's afterthought regarding public opinion, borrow the doctrine of internal, personal *metanoia* from Tolstoi's Christian philosophy, and come out with the *satyagrahi,* the man who changed himself first, and then went on with Thoreau's philosophy to court jail in order to change public opinion and thereby the law. Thus we can conclude here that both Phase II and Phase IV *satyagraha* can be found in Tolstoi, and that Gandhi had both the opportunity and the need to read and remember him.[52]

[51] *Ibid.,* p. 324. Cf. Joseph Wood Krutch, *Henry David Thoreau* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948): "Tolstoi and Gandhi . . . shared [Thoreau's] conviction that not only was there something wrong with the world, but also that this something wrong was to be traced back to what was wrong in the souls of men who make it" (pp. 253-254).

[52] Thus in his *Autobiography* Gandhi says, "Tolstoi's *The Kingdom of God is Within You* overwhelmed me. It left an abiding impression on me." Gandhi read it during his first period in South Africa (1893-1896), and it became one of his favorites, like the *Gītā,* which he continually reread. He continues: "Before the independent thinking, profound morality, and the truthfulness of this book, all the books of Mr. Coates [a Christian friend who deluged him with tracts] seemed to pale into insignificance" (*An Autobiography,* p. 172).

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Further, if, as Tolstoi believed, Christ commands men to live in truth and in peace, to fulfill His law by struggling to sustain the dignity of life in oneself and others, and to do this through physical labor and self-renunciation, then that life of work takes on Divine sanction. For one works with spiritual force and not merely intellectual force, courage, and selflessness (Phase II *satyagraha*), when one is zealously carrying out Divine commands. In *The Kingdom of God is Within You* Tolstoi asks: "Are you doing what He demands of you who sent you into the world and to whom you will soon return? Are you doing what He wills?"[53] And what He demands is very carefully detailed in the Sermon on the Mount and elsewhere: "The essence of Christianity is the fulfillment of the will of God."[54] Therefore, when one does engage in activities that are connected to "My Father's business" one is necessarily given Divine sanction like Mr. Maurice's martyrs; one works with spiritual force like Gandhi's *satyagrahis*.

To this extent then Phases II, III, and IV are all bound together in the anarchist Christian pacifism of Leo Tolstoi. When one changes oneself through truth, honesty, and love (Phase II *satyagraha*) and becomes a Divine instrument by virtue of doing what God commands, then one acts with spiritual force (Phase III *satyagraha*), and those on whom one acts change consequently, the God or Light in them responding to the God or Light in you (Phase IV *satyagraha*). Of course, Phase I *satyagraha,* civil disobedience, is also in Tolstoi directly and by implication. He was too good an anarchist not to have mentioned the techniques of telling the State, and its tool, the Church, "no." I have not mentioned that phase here, since Thoreau seems to expound the doctrine more directly to Gandhi. But one could not be, as a moment's reflection should show, the kind of person Tolstoi calls a "Christian" and not be at the same time a civil resister, a *satyagrahi* in all four senses of that word. Therefore, to practice anarchistic Christian pacifism, to be a Christian, and to practice the four phases of *satyagraha,* to be a *satyagrahi,* must, in the end, come to the same thing.

V. CONCLUSION

What I have tried to demonstrate in this brief paper is that Gandhi's philosophy of *satyagraha* can be entirely reconstructed from Western sources.

Some years before, during his stay in England, Gandhi had also read the New Testament. He says, reminiscing about that period from 1888-1890: "But the New Testament . . . especially the Sermon on the Mount went straight to my heart. . . . The verses, 'But I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also . . . delighted me beyond measure . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 92).

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 436.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 451.

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I have also tried to show that Gandhi had the need, a rather urgent need, and also the opportunity to do this reconstruction. I have attempted to analyze *satyagraha* into four phases. Each phase can be correlated with an historical period in the evolution of the concept as it grew and changed from Phase I, simple civil disobedience to unjust laws, to Phase II, the inner attitude of love, courage, and nonviolence cultivated by the *satyagrahis* and necessary to Phase I; to Phase III, which was the period which saw the introduction of the belief that *satyagraha* was a spiritual and holy undertaking as well as an intellectual one; to Phase IV, which stressed the conversion and change in and of one's opponent as a necessary part of *satyagraha.*

I have attempted to show that each of these phases in the development of *satyagraha* can be traced directly to Henry David Thoreau (Phases I and II), and Leo Tolstoi's Christianity (Phases II, III, and IV), and I have concluded that *satyagraha* is, as a consequence, an Indian name for some old Western ways of thinking.

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I

The general definition of violence has been wrongly restricted to describe illicit and illegal application of physical force. In the common estimation of men, violence is associated with "riots in the streets," muggings, rape, murder, and other such forms of injury. These are certainly forms of violence but they are the symptomatic forms of violence which express deeper causes, covert and overt. We simply cannot identify physical force with violence, for force can be defined as that measure of rational power to accomplish a reasonable end. This is evident in the case of the police. Policemen do not use violence against the criminal, but measured power (investigation, accusation, apprehension which *may* involve physical force) to accomplish a rational end (observation of a law or laws). The physical force used to restrain a baby, for instance, from falling off the stairs—because the use of reason has not attained its exercising power in this person—is force but not violence. So too with regard to criminals in prison (protection of society) as well as mental patients in hospitals. We use much force in the exercise of the various passions without necessarily committing violence. The shade of difference between violence and force can be subtle, but it can be easily understood by all. The sexual passion uses much force in its exercise, but when done as an act of love, no one would call this violence. When, however, it is imposed on someone who is unwilling, or more serious, on one whom one does not love, then instinctual passion has replaced human sexuality and we have violence. What is force and instinct in an animal becomes vice and violence in a man precisely because, as we shall see, the human person has the freedom of intelligence and understanding.

Perhaps this distinction between force and violence becomes much more tenuous in institutional forms of the use of force such as war. Although the individual soldier can kill another soldier of the enemy nation, this is considered not murder, but self-defense against unjust aggression. Thus even in such a case, we have a rational application of force for rational ends (resisting so-called aggression, protection of one's national society). This was what the whole theology of the "just war" was all about; that is, it was an attempt by the medieval theologians to limit the violence of war (by the so-called four conditions of the just war: just cause, correct authority, proportionality, and civilian non-combatant immunity) by bringing it into tolerable limits of rational ends. Yet, this use of force today has its own problematic with guerilla warfare, nuclear energy, institutional, international, economic, and social violence by the major powers—each contributing to the very complicated problem of the difference between violence and force. Application, for instance, of full-scale nuclear exchange could not be conceived as force since no rational end

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could be served by total annihilation. This is violence pure and simple and, therefore, clearly immoral. But what of the lesser range of the use of force, the sometimes "illegal" use of force such as guerilla warfare against a regime which is patently oppressive of basic human and civil rights? The moral use of force would have to be nuanced and therefore each specific situation must be examined very carefully in the light of a further understanding of what constitutes the nature of violence.

In the final analysis, violence comes to be when the basic human rights of the human person are violated. With such a definition, it is perhaps easier to define violence in terms of the function of the human person rather than in terms of the rational use of force for rational ends. In order to understand this concept of violence, we must understand the concept of the rights of the human person. The person is subject of rights because he is a moral person; that is, he is a being with intelligence and freedom. He is thus capable of and responsible for the realization of his human and moral destiny. In man's personal being lies the source of his rights and he is the bearer of these rights. They are universal because they belong to every single human being. Since these rights are not arbitrarily given or taken away, they pertain to what man is and to his fulfillment as a human person. They cannot, therefore, be granted nor denied by the edict of the state or by a "social contract." They are inviolable and inalienable because each human person has a destiny which no one else can fulfill or take from him. He is unique in his personal destiny and so only he has the obligation and the right to fulfill this destiny which is proper to him alone. If each man must fulfill his destiny (without which he would cease to be human) he must have the means, insured by his fundamental human rights, to do so. Therefore, it is only the human person who is subject of rights by the principle of who and what he is, directing himself in freedom to his proper fulfillment and destiny.

In such a perspective, the law exists to promote, safeguard, and sometimes to limit these rights for the good of all. These rights cannot be granted or taken away from any man without attacking and doing violence at the very core of who and what man is. Even those who are not conscious of their rights, such as children, idiots, and the mentally ill, are subjects of rights, and these persons cannot be eliminated when they are no longer "useful" to the state or the social or economic community. These rights are both specific and continuously being elaborated, the more we know of man.

Man, for instance, is not simply a soul imprisoned in a body; man is his body and is thus an incarnate spirit, an incarnate interiority, and his body is an essential principle of his being-in-the-world. Only through his body can man develop, do good, make his contribution to society. Therefore, life is a precious gift and man has a right to life and must respect this right. At times,

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he may even assert his right to life against others who would unjustly attempt to take it from him, that is, in self-defense.

So too with regard to private property. The human person needs material goods for his sustenance and security. Men are incarnate spirits and this implies a clear relationship to his material needs. In order to perfect his person, he must make use of them; and if he must, he has a right to do so. This brings us to a very fine but important distinction: a man has a right to private property but this right in turn is subordinate to a more basic right, the right of use of material goods. The right to property is secondary and derived, and it exists so that an order might be established in which the right of usage is assured. The right of property is then a means to an end, and it is therefore subordinate to the right of usage that belongs to all men by virtue of the fact that they are incarnate beings; because every means is necessarily relative, the doctrine of the absolute right of private property is a grave human and social aberration. Private property must promote the right of usage. Thus, large landholdings in the hands of a few Latin Americans represent a grave human disorder because the right of usage is denied to the many. The lack of a genuine land reform is a basic violence in the midst of these societies.

Here we are at the touchstone of what it means to be a person, and in terms of that, what it means to be violent. Violence at its root definition is any violation of the basic human rights of the person. These violations can be social, economic, moral, and political. This latter category is really not related to man's intrinsic rights (he has these by the very fact that he is a person) but to his extrinsic relationship with his fellows insofar as they are morally obligated to respect, protect, and promote these rights in community. This function formally belongs to the political order, which is artificially set up to perform exactly such a function. The political community (or "The State") is therefore not at the *source* of these basic human rights, but can only protect, promote, and delineate these rights in a context of community (Constitution, Bill of Rights, declarations of independence, etc.). It is clear how all forms of totalitarianism (of the left, right, or middle) are violent for the human person, even if he has enough to eat and drink.

There is a hierarchy of temporal and moral importance among these human rights. Thus, while it is true that without food and shelter I shall starve and freeze (therefore, this right is temporarily primary), it is more important to me as a human being to have my right of communication and free speech guaranteed (morally superior to the right of economic dignity). In reality, these rights form a complex whole which cannot be separated—at least gradually—without doing fundamental violence to man. Man as an incarnate spirit is the subject and repository of human rights, and to deprive him of these is to do violence to his very person.

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If, for example, the government imposes arbitrary censorship on me as a citizen, I have been violated at the core of my being. As a person, my search for truth is such that I live in illusion and falsehood without it; as incarnate spirit, this communication of truth comes to me by exchange of views in print, on the mass media, etc. For government to deprive me of these media is to impede my search for truth, which is intolerable to me as a thinking, rational spirit. It is to do violence to me in a most profound way.

This violence on men can be exercised in both a covert and an overt fashion; it can be both social and individual violence.

What is commonly called "disorder in the streets" refers to the unjustified physical attack of one person upon another for any number of reasons: robbery, rape, rage, etc. Such violence is the most evident since it is the most visible form of coercion. Covert individual violence can be exercised as a threat, such as blackmail, from personal information about a particular person (homosexuality, former prison record, past indiscretions, etc.). This violence infringes on his right to bodily and psychological integrity, his right to confidence and secrecy, and on his interiority as a person.

The situation takes on a different perspective when individuals in riots participate in mass violence against persons and property. These actions, though indeed the acts of individuals, are a manifestation of rage against the prevailing and oppressive social, economic, and political order which has already done massive violence to their fundamental rights as persons. This is usually but not always triggered by racial causes. The Irish rebellion in New York in 1862 was directed against the inequity of a draft system as well as against an economic system which kept them poor, yet demanded that the poor fight to preserve these economic and social inequities.

Institutional violence can also be overt or covert. War is perhaps the clearest form of overt institutional violence of one group (or nation) against another. The distinction between murder and patriotism is that in the latter case, the soldier kills the enemy because he is commanded to do so by his institutional government (in civil war this distinction becomes more complicated, since the government itself is divided). The limits of such violence have never really been defined and, in reality, the limit has usually been set by the less scrupulous party, whose policy is then imitated by the other belligerent (e.g., unrestricted bombing by both the Germans and the Allies during World War II). The international agreements of the Hague, Geneva, and Nuremburg have been sometimes honored, sometimes not (Vietnam). The Nuremburg Trials were interesting in this respect since their basis was not so much written international law as unwritten laws of "nature" or of conscience known to all men, the disregard of which must be held accountable under international law. In such cases, the individual soldier is not excused

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from perpetrating violence on the innocent even if he is commanded to do so by his institutional government.

Covert institutional violence is also very common. A whole social, economic, and political order, built to protect the few rich while leaving the vast majority of citizens in the midst of want, misery, and depravation, is radical institutional violence even if the government does not fire a shot. It is this form of violence which ultimately leads to insurrection or the violence of the *enlevé en masse,* which in its turn is met with repression by those who control and confirm the status quo. A social or economic order which does not guarantee the basic rights of freedom from want and misery for all of its citizens is an oppressive and totalitarian exercise of institutional violence. In their own turn, the supporters of the status quo (in order to justify their actions) usually poison the waters of understanding by accusing the other party of "communism" so that, the well of understanding being poisoned, all opposition to the established disorder is effectively terminated.

Covert institutional violence can be exercised in many other ways as well. Since government controls many of the mass media as well as information concerning international affairs, it is not hard for it to manage the news to fit its own views of domestic and international situations. This form of institutional violence can also be effectively exercised by powerful and well-financed interest groups. Their control (particularly of commercial interests) is vast in the mass media, even determining future cultural patterns of the society itself. This is blatantly exercised in the Soviet Union, but it is also subtly at work in what has become known as the consumer society in the United States. Values indoctrinated are those of a purely commercial and materialistic nature. This corrupts the society as much as blatantly managed cultural patterns.

There is also the violence of illusion and self-deception. This is particularly true of United States foreign policy, which has confused political ends with ideological ends. The illusion that Americans can accomplish any goal they wish, because they have the material resources and the technological ability, can lead to the frustration and rage of a whole country. Thus we are not "winning" in Vietnam, not because our goals have been wrong in being there in the first place, but because there is a "conspiracy" somewhere along the line, or someone (or some group) is subverting the war effort. The solution is therefore easy: we must have the "will to win" by using even more destructive material and more manpower "to do the job." The illusory vision of omnipotent military power is the very violence done to the human condition.

There are other forms of violence which lie dormant in the heart of society and tear at its very fabric. There is the violence of misunderstanding of the young and the older generations. An almost complete distrust of the old is evidenced in the hippie subculture of the young, in their songs and dress as

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well as in their views of the social and political order. The student's revolt is only symptomatic of this sort of violent confrontation between the age groups.

There is, of course, the violence of racial hatred so alive in the world at large. Whole groups of people are characterized and rejected because of the accidents of skin color or facial appearance. The report of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders (1968) has amply documented how deeply embedded is this cancer in the entrails of American society. The polarization of black and white shows no sign of abating, and unless it does, there seems to be no hope for civil peace in America. The roots of violence here are so deep precisely because racism attacks the very notion of the human person and his rights in a society. Such violence turns whole groups of men into "things" which can then be eliminated when they threaten the established structure of society. The history of this is quite clear in the not so distant past when genocide was practiced on the American Indians: "a good Indian is a dead Indian."

There are certain more hidden forms of violence in human society today, such as the lack of reforms in prisons or even in the legal code itself. When we punish criminals instead of trying to rehabilitate them, we perpetrate violence on another human being in the name of "self righteousness."

There is the impersonality of urban mass which is at the heart of so much rage and violence as well as of the personal deterioration of human beings. The construction of a community can lead to human fulfillment or to the mental and spiritual deterioration of its inhabitants. The latter consequence is reflected in the violence of slums (Negro and minority rage), but it is also clear with regard to the terribly impersonal urban and suburban sprawl.

There is the violence of the mass media and commercial interests which, by a system of material indoctrination, brainwash people into being "consumers": men and women whose only (or principal) object in living is not becoming oneself in freedom and fulfillment, but to have more and more luxurious "things." This does violence to man at his very core since man has above all the right to understand who he is and where he is going.

Perhaps the greatest violence is practiced by those who do not care for anything except for themselves, who are not interested in the commonweal because it does not directly relate to themselves. These people do the supreme violence in not wanting to live as brothers in a human community. For while the essential virtue of the city of man is justice, without the virtue of compassion and love, characteristic of the City of God, we have only the Hobbesian "war of all against all." The ultimate consequence of this is not peace, but contention and mistrust. It is perhaps ironic but radically true that the only way man has to channel his natural aggression is in friendship and love. Only in this way can violence be sublimated into a constructive orientation.

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II

The Christian is confronted with these situations, for he must choose. Not to choose is, in effect, to choose. This national and international violence is such that he cannot stay idly by and say nothing. Even by his silence, he speaks.

Let us take the example of the foreign policy of the United States. Its whole philosophical basis is founded on keeping the majority of mankind poor while the few rich nations (above all the United States) can retain their privileged position of wealth and power all over the world. We thus have massive violence on an international scale. The rich seldom give up power (economic and military) without a violent revolution, and since such revolutions will mean a deterioration of the unique economic and military power of the United States all "subversions," "wars of national liberation," must be opposed all over the (poor) world. The real revolution alive in the world today is not "Communism vs. Free World" or "freedom vs. slavery"; this is just so much political and moral rubbish to alleviate the consciences (most "Christians") of the few rich (about 18 percent) of the world who possess the great majority of the world's wealth (about 80 percent). These rich nations know that if they were to give up their privileged positions (e.g., international trade, stabilization of prime products from the poor, monopolistic interests financed by American dollars with the cooperation of corrupt local oligarchies) then they would have to share wealth with the mass of humanity. This would run contrary to the present policies of the rich nations, above all those of the United States. That is what seventeen Catholic bishops from the underdeveloped "third" world were talking about in their letter on revolution in the poor countries: "The people of the third world form the proletariat of today's humanity, exploited by the great nations and menaced in their very existence by those who alone claim the right (because they are stronger) to be the judge and policemen of the people who are poorer."[1]

These Catholic bishops make the explicit point that the Church should endeavor to end all of its ties to that system which is above all "the international imperialism of money." In the face of this attitude of the rich and powerful nations, the poor must take matters into their own hands, even if it is by violent revolution against this international system of capitalism and money which keeps them poor. "It is time that the poor people (of the world), sustained and led by their legitimate governments, efficaciously deferred their right to life." In order to accomplish this these bishops forthrightly claim that

The Church does not condemn every revolution;
The Church wishes those revolutions which lead to justice;

[1] Text reproduced in *Informations Catholiques Internationales* (Feb. 1, 1968), n. 318, pp. 11-13.

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The Church knows that, often, it is the rich and not the poor who are responsible for class warfare.

The bishops quite bluntly state the true cause of revolution all over the world. Communism does not and cannot create these conditions; it can only make use of them for its own goals as a definite even if brutal solution to this tragic problem. The Americans, however, are looked upon *universally* as the enemy of the poor as they have the proof at hand: the Americans are willing to spend fifty billion dollars a year to destroy this revolution of the poor and, although they mouth all the right words about poverty in the world, they really don't believe what they say, since they allocate a miserable two billion dollars for the poor of the world—and this mostly in loans! The poor must realize on what side the Americans will fight in a true revolution of rich and poor, and that is why these same bishops bluntly told their flock:

> The poor . . . know by experience that they must count only on themselves and on their own forces rather than on aid from the rich. . . . It would be an illusion to passively expect a free conversion of all those whom our father Abraham told us about: "They will not listen even if one from the dead speaks to them" (Luke 15:31). It is first of all the job of the poor . . . to accomplish their own promotion themselves.[2]

The bishops might well have added that their poor people may readily expect green berets, napalm, and other "military advisors" lined up against them and with the established oligarchies. This is true of practically any country in Latin America.

The bishops are saying nothing more than that rather revolutionary encyclical of Pope Paul VI, *On the Development of Peoples*. The principle of redistribution of wealth, says the Pope, ought to be such that it guarantees to each individual nation *as a right* from the world community sufficient resources to permit its citizens to live a decent human economic and social existence; in its turn, the recipient nation would contribute according to its own means and resources. The terms of exchange would be submitted to objective and strict terms of social justice in conformity with the well-known adage of social justice: to each according to his needs, and from each according to his abilities. This principle of moderate socialism runs throughout the encyclical (paragraphs 1, 6, 15, 17, 20, 22, 26, 28, 34, 39, 47, 65, 79). This, of course, is diametrically opposed to the atomistic and capitalistic system which presently rules and does violence to the international commercial system (para. 26). The distress in the present economic and social sphere on an international plane is not dependent on any particular individual or group of individuals, but on a whole system of capital which runs its own course with its own laws, and which can be cured only at the root cause, by personalizing

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

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that which has been brutally and inhumanly depersonalized in this system. The distress proceeds from a profoundly dislocated social and economic structure on the international scene and, as such, has an inhuman effect on the human person, particularly on the poor, since it reduces men and nations to a means for economic gain. Because capitalism is based squarely on the profit motif, it cannot be made into any kind of principle for the relief of the world's poor. On the contrary, it is directly inimical to them above all. We shall have to find more equitable and efficacious means to promote this international social justice *founded directly on the principle of the solidarity of the human family and on no other* (cf. paras. 3, 5, 44, 48).

The Pope is speaking not of a question of "foreign aid" or "charity" (even if they are needed as a stopgap for the present) but of a matter of strict social justice. Otherwise, it will become simply impossible to stop, let alone alleviate, the slide of the poor nations into further degradation. This calls for an international taxation on actual income to be re-distributed internationally according to actual need (para. 47). This would not be very difficult, since we already have such machinery set up in the United Nations, and a progressive income tax would meet the international emergency in a just and satisfying way. The obstacle here, once again, is national sovereignty and egoism, which will be most difficult to overcome at the present time (paras. 61-62).

The Pope deals realistically with the situation as it is. He openly discusses the possibility of revolution (paras. 29-31). For the first time in a pontifical document, the possibility of violent revolution is faced and—under certain conditions—accepted. Pope John, too, had seen this possibility (*Pacem,* para. 162). There the Pope spoke in favor of gradualism, since otherwise revolution can lead to more evil than existed in the first place. But what is to be done in those cases where the ruling oligarchies refuse to move at all? Too often in the past, the United States has placed weak countries in a dilemma where they must either stand still with the United States supporting their selfish rulers, or start moving with the Communists. This dilemma, says *Progressio,* cannot be eliminated unless there is "bold transformation, innovations that go deep. Urgent reforms should be undertaken without delay" (para. 32). Yet what is to be done if even this modicum cannot be accomplished? The Pope gives a startling answer, even if he gives it indirectly; in such cases, revolution of a violent nature can be justified. "We know, however, that a revolutionary uprising—*save where there is manifest long-standing tyranny which would do great damage to fundamental personal rights and dangerous harm to the common good of the country*—produces new injustices . . ." (para. 31). The radical suggestions of the Pope—massive technical and economic aid from the rich countries, concentrated social direction from the governments of the developing countries, agrarian reform, a strong arm on exploiting capitalists in the developing countries—are the only solutions to the impending danger to

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world peace. Otherwise there will be revolution all over the globe, which in turn can lead to world war itself. Vietnam is only the beginning of this long and bitter revolutionary struggle between the rich and the poor. The choice belongs *both* to the rich countries and to the developing countries themselves. There simply is no third option.

Among the many examples one could cite concerning the plight of the poor in the third world, and revolutionary activity and violence as the inevitable choice of these people, is that of Guatemala, where there is an intolerable situation. The fact is that the U. S. Army and the C.I.A. are supporting the status quo with military aid to and support of the Guatemalan government. This power will be successful only through the rape and murder of all of the people. Judging from Vietnam, such genocidal thoughts are not beyond the thought and action capacity of the U. S. government in supporting the status quo of the rich against the poor. We have in Guatemala a perfect pre-Vietnam: a situation in which the United States is, with its military might, supporting the two percent of the people who own eighty percent of the land and goods of the country. The rest of the people are living in sub-poverty conditions that that are beyond description. We have here all the ingredients of another disaster arising from the same basic causes: poverty, destitution, and exploitation. The people in Guatemala who desire strong social, economic, and political reform, land reform, and literacy programs are threatened and killed by the military, who are at the service of the rich and of the Americans. The rich are strong because they are backed by U. S. military strength. We refer to Guatemala as part of the "free world." The people living there are not free. They are slaves. They are hungry. They are sick. They cannot move. The average man in Guatemala is a destitute slave whose only hope is violent revolution. And, if this is their only hope, it is just, moral, and pleasing to God. If God cannot get justice from His friends, the Christians, He will get it from His enemies, the Communists. As with the Babylonians of old who are the instruments of God's justice to and for the chosen people, so too throughout the poor third world, where Christians have utterly failed the cause of justice. Without justice, there can never be peace, no matter how many bombs are dropped or troops sent to quell the revolution of the poor.

It is commonly asserted that "violence will not work" and that therefore all grievances must be settled by the ballot. Reform must come through the legislative process and relief sought through peaceful litigation in the courts. The pulpit must be used to "convert the heart of man" and, in a democracy, violence by the oppressed minority (read: black) only leads to future repression and "hardening" on the part of the larger community (read: white).

It is time we ceased mouthing these irrelevant clichés repeated in the junior high school civics class for the consolation, both domestically and internationally, of the affluent middle class white. We must develop a theology

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of revolution where peaceful progress (*real* progress) is to be preferred to violence, but where violence cannot be excluded *a priori* in social change. One need not be a pessimist to note that there seems no other way when we see, according to the statement of the President's Commission on Riots (Feb. 17, 1968), that no progress has been made even in those cities torn by riots in the summer of 1967 (Detroit, Newark, Buffalo). The only change is a larger, better-equipped police force to quell the revolution of the poor and to protect the status quo of the affluent middle class, black and white. It is the same revolution against poverty and human degradation in both Newark and Saigon.

It is here that the voices of black power have found a resonant chord in the hearts of so many Negroes, since they know, with H. Rap Brown, that violence of the rich against the poor at home and abroad is as American as apple pie. Violence has succeeded many times in American history.

The Republic was built upon a violent revolution. It was kept together by one of the bloodiest conflicts of our history, and was expanded by the massacre and genocide of the Indian nations. When it was strong enough, it bullied another colonial power in the Spanish-American War, and it seeks to overcome a whole people today by massive firepower even if, again, it is to mean genocide (Vietnam).

H. Rap Brown is quite correct: the United States must come around (read: the biblical conversion) or face increasing and more devastating violence. Pope John XXIII was also correct: men today will no longer submit to a fate where "some classes of men accept an inferior position, while others demand for themselves a superior position, on account of economic and social conditions or of assigned rank within the political community."[3]

[3] Encyclical letter *Pacem in Terris*, para. 43, as reproduced and commented in P. Riga, *Peace on Earth* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1963), p. 208.

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In recent years the topic of the relation between violent and nonviolent action has become increasingly important. The social and political transformations taking place the world over force us to concentrate special attention on the devices by which change and reform are brought about. We are more aware now than we once were of the fundamental contrast between those political and social systems which include within their structure resources for self-criticism and reform, and those which do not. The bearing of this distinction on the manner in which change can be effected is obvious: where no internal resources for righting wrongs and injustices exist or where criticism of the existing order is rejected, and often with force, it is clear that forms of violent action will be the *only* recourse for the disinherited, the minority groups with grievances, and the politically dissident. In a system that has been able to maintain effective channels for criticism and reform, violence, if it makes its appearance at all, must be a means of last resort. And yet in a system like that in America, where it has been supposed that at least some means for criticism and reform have been provided for within the system itself, there has been much violence in recent years, and not a small amount of nihilism aimed at tearing down institutions without much thought for their reconstruction in accordance with new ideals and goals. To complicate the situation further, there have recently appeared on the American scene new and subtle forms of direct action for attaining objectives, but forms that have come to be described as *nonviolent* in character. If we are to understand this new phenomenon, it will be necessary to grasp the nature of nonviolent action, to understand it as action and yet to see that it differs in important respects from those forms of action we are accustomed to describe as violent. There are subtle ethical, philosophical, and religious issues involved, issues that have not always been understood and faced by the violent, the nonviolent, and whatever other parties to change there may be.

Let us first attempt to see what sort of intelligible boundary can be drawn between violent and nonviolent action. Violent action is, to begin with, immediate physical action—occupying buildings, taking hostages, beating opponents, burning property—which always involves a constraint on the person, and ultimately the rights, of another. Often, such action, though in its immediacy it involves destruction, physical harm, and injury, is meant to have a constructive purpose—to *force* the opponent to acknowledge a right or to eliminate an injustice—and thus it appears as having an ideal element in itself. It is this element that distinguishes violence with a purpose from what might be called sheer nihilism, where the constructive intent is absent or so completely submerged that the action itself is not in any sense informed by it. The Marxist or other revolutionary who seeks to destroy an institution solely on

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the ground that it represents the capitalist establishment is, despite his *ultimate* ideal, nihilistic to the extent that his violence is unaccompanied by any sense of responsibility for reconstruction.

Violent action takes many forms. It may be intended as an instrument of *retaliation* for injustice, real or alleged, and thus serve as a form of punishment against the offending party. Here violence means the assumption on the part of private individuals or groups of the power of the state to punish the law breaker. Or, again, displays of violence may be particularly forcible *expressions* of anger, frustration, and outrage. As such, violence would be a form of retributive justice in intent, but in the actual event it is an outward venting of inner passions. There can be little doubt that this motive was important in prompting the riots in America that followed upon the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. Yet another form in which violence clothes itself is that of the *demonstration* where the means of physical force are displayed, even if they are not actually used, for the purpose of intimidating the enemy and building a measure of self-confidence in the violent.

It is important to notice that the use of violence does not depend on making an appeal to principle in the minds of those against whom it is directed. In violent action there is forcing, subduing, attacking, and injuring, and while such action may, as we have seen, stand related to the achievement of some more ultimate goal, it is not as such based on a moral principle which the violent expect their antagonists to recognize or acknowledge. When it comes to the violent justifying their violence, the usual excuse is that of *necessity,* or the claim that other channels of effecting change are ineffectual or operate at too slow a pace. A more immediate means is required. Those who use violence may argue that it is justified because of its effectiveness, and that it is superior to any other way of proceeding, but beyond this appeal there is no appeal to principle which the *opponent* is asked to acknowledge. In using violence, particularly in relation to other persons, I am effectively treating them as objects or things to be manipulated in the world; I am not appealing to their own standards of conduct or asking them to discipline themselves in accordance with a principle. Instead I am attempting to force them directly to act in a certain way. I am imposing my will in contact; I am not proposing a principle or course of action for consideration. Hence violent action, whatever goals or ends it may ultimately imply, is not a moral or educating process, even though much can be learned from being involved in it.

Nonviolence, though obviously a form of *action,* is an ambiguous form of activity from the outset. Nonviolence, that is to say, is more than a display of ideas and more than a dialectical process. In taking nonviolent action, one is doing more than preaching to the enemy, and one is doing something more than attempting to present a rational case which he is supposed to consider (although this aim may be, and usually is, part of what is involved in non-

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violent technique). The point is that some overt action is always involved—a sit-down, a sit-in, various forms of non-cooperation or refusal to follow regulations or established procedures—so that nonviolence does not mean merely inactivity. It is a peculiar form of activity embracing a subtle purpose. The ambiguity of nonviolence consists in its appearing *both* as an appeal to moral principle *and* as a practical device which is effective and therefore the *best means* to achieve the goal. On the one hand, nonviolence is a signal intending to goad the one against whom it is used to some self-awareness and to the acknowledgment of some moral principle. On the other hand, nonviolence not only appeals to principle but is often justified on the grounds that it is an *expression* of principle, the principle that love or compassion is the proper attitude to be adopted and the proper way to treat other people in all circumstances.[1] But as an expression of such principle, nonviolence is not intended *merely* as an expression of principle; it is intended as well to be an *effective* (*the* effective) means of achieving a desired result. And this is precisely where the ambiguity comes in. Nonviolence is *both* a principle and a *means* for achieving a practical result. Those who practice nonviolence are forced to oscillate between these two poles. On the one hand, nonviolence as a form of response is adopted because it is dictated by a principle, the principle that violence is always to be avoided because in itself it is "wrong" and perpetuates the very divisiveness we are trying to overcome. On the other hand, nonviolence is not chosen for this reason alone. It is chosen because, as a matter of actual fact derived from past experience, this method has been shown to be more *effective* than violence in accomplishing certain objectives. Nonviolence, therefore, may be said to have a pragmatic justification as well as justification rooted initially in moral principle.

The practical side of nonviolence can be seen in three particulars:

1. It avoids, or attempts to avoid, the burden of guilt that accompanies the use of violence, and in that sense might be said to be a "better" instrument of change.

2. It could be claimed that the one who practices nonviolence more effectively forces his opponents to respond and hence that on purely practical grounds nonviolence is superior to the use of violence.

3. Nonviolence takes a measure of suffering unto itself by trying not to injure the body of the other, but rather to induce him to confront himself and to make his own full response to the demand placed upon him. In this sense nonviolence is a form of "moral confrontation" and, as a goad, it is a form of "moral coercion."

[1] The problem of Christian pacifism has always been that of showing how *love* as a *principle* can also be a *means*.

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The sense in which nonviolence is an appeal to "moral principle" is that this form of response is said to be "right" because the universe is so constructed that when the *right* is done it succeeds *in the end,* whether it appears to be succeeding in the "short run" or not. Many forms of pacifism have been justified on the ground that the form of activity one adopts is the *right* one and that it must be adopted whether it "works" or not.

The ambiguity we have noted in nonviolence leads to an ambivalence in attitude and in action. The advocate of nonviolence is torn between the conviction that nonviolence is "right" *come what may* and the thesis that it is *in fact* the most effective instrument for achieving some desired results. The advocate of nonviolence must take this ambiguity and ambivalence on himself and not attempt to resolve it with some simple solution that makes an inescapable problem soluble by appeal to understanding alone. The main reason for this conclusion is that the moral situation is in itself ambiguous. On the one hand, an appeal to principle is always necessary if human action is not to be brutalized and not to fall completely under the sway of cynicism. On the other hand, one has to recognize that conflicts cannot be resolved merely by appeal to principles and to ideals which require the acceptance and the acknowledgment of another. Some instrument of power is required. Indeed, the exercise of power of a non-intellectual sort can never be entirely eliminated from any conflict situation. In a perfected kingdom of ends one might expect that all the members would be motivated by reason alone, but the obvious and bitter fact is that we do not live in such a kingdom; the political man and the political reality we know both exhibit a large gulf between political belief and political action. The nonviolence position will be stronger to the extent to which its adherents are aware of the double-barreled character of their solution. On the one hand, they must not become utopian in their thinking and suppose that the situation is already arranged in such a way that their nonviolence will triumph merely because it is the "right" way to conduct oneself in the world; on the other hand, they must not become too realistic and espouse nonviolence merely because it appears to be the most effective instrument. For nonviolence always has a moral superiority as a means which violence lacks, and it retains this superiority even when it fails to achieve the political or social goal to which it was directed.

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With the world precariously poised between war and peace, the question is often raised in India whether the *Bhagavad Gītā* advocates war or peace. Posed in such a form, however, the question tends to create some misleading impressions, namely that the *Gītā* is primarily interested in teaching either war or peace and that a teaching of war and of peace must be incompatible. None of these suppositions turn out to be true in the light of what the *Gītā* primarily stands for. The central message of the *Gītā* is something more fundamental, something having a universal range, in the total perspective of which the question of war and peace is just one problem among many others. Moreover, as envisaged by the *Gītā,* war is not incompatible with a life of peace and righteousness.

It should be made clear at the very outset that the "peace" spoken of here as an alternative to war is not to be confused with that which is frequently referred to in the *Gītā* as the ultimate end of life.[1] There can be hardly any doubt or controversy about the fact that peace (*śānti*), in this sense, is almost universally recognized by the different religio-philosophical systems of India to be the supreme end of life, with different means suggested to attain it. So the problem posed here is not in relation to the supreme end but only with reference to the means adopted to achieve it. In other words, the problem is whether the *Gītā* enjoins violent or nonviolent means.

There are, indeed, some factors which naturally give rise to the impression that the primary teaching of the *Gītā* consists in prescribing either war or peace, violent or nonviolent means. Evidently, the *Gītā* is taught on the war-front at the crucial time when Arjuna, just before the commencement of the war, is terribly upset with the problem whether to fight or not to fight. In the course of the exhortation, he is explicitly and repeatedly told: "get up, O Arjuna, with a resolve to fight," "get ready for the battle," "fight, O Arjuna," "remember me at all times and fight," "fight dispassionately," etc. But, on the other hand, virtues like nonviolence (*ahiṁsā*), non-anger (*akrodhaḥ*), peace (*śāntiḥ*), forgiveness (*kṣamā*), amity (*adrohaḥ*) and compassion to beings (*dayā bhūteṣu*) are enumerated as essential possessions of a righteous man (XVI. 2, 3). Being free from enmity to all creatures (XI. 53) and doing good to all beings (V. 25; XII. 4) are considered the *sine qua non* of attaining the highest goal. In view of these facts, some people, stressing one or the other side, are led to think that the *Gītā* stands primarily for either war or peace.

Even some eminent scholars and admirers of the *Gītā* seem to be deluded by this paradoxical situation and try to resolve the difficulty by suggesting that war is not intended here to be taken literally but only allegorically. For

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[1] *Gītā* II. 70, 71; IV. 39; XVIII. 62; *Śāntiṁ nirvāṇaparamām* (VI. 15).

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example, Gandhi, the well-known champion of nonviolence and a noted admirer and devoted follower of the *Gītā,* comments as follows: "I felt that it [the *Gītā*] was not a historical work but that under the guise of physical warfare it described the duel that perpetually went on in the hearts of mankind, and that physical warfare was brought in merely to make the description of the internal duel more alluring."[2]

S. Radhakrishnan, attempting a further amplification of the same view, observes: "The life of the soul is symbolised by the battlefield of Kurukṣetra, and the Kauravas are the enemies who impede the progress of the soul. Arjuna attempts to recapture the kingdom of man by resisting the temptations and controlling the passions."[3] According to him "the chariot stands for the psychophysical vehicle. The steeds are the senses, the reins their controls, but the charioteer, the guide is the spirit or real self, ātman. Kṛṣṇa, the charioteer, is the Spirit in us."[4]

Such attempts at allegorical explanation may be quite ingenious, but they are not convincing since it is almost impossible to provide similar explanations for all the different warriors of the two parties mentioned by name, for the elaborate paraphernalia of war referred to in a realistic manner, and for the entire sequence of events described in the course of the narrative. In fact, if the allegorical or metaphorical interpretation is accepted, the *Gītā* will lose all its relevance to the context of the *Mahābhārata* in which it is fitted, and which it itself presupposes and relates throughout the text.

Another effort to extricate the *Gītā* from the aforesaid difficulty is made by Nataraja Guru who, though accepting the fact of actual war, makes the plea that the background of war should not be taken to impair "the wisdom teaching" of the *Gītā*. He urges "that in the study of the *Gītā* the blemish of the canvas should not be attributed to the picture in the mind of the painter. The canvas here was the historical setting of the *Mahābhārata* as described in the epic poem, and the painting was the wisdom teaching that Vyāsa wanted to transmit to future generations through this medium."[5] This observation of Nataraja Guru amounts to saying that Vyāsa, the author of "wisdom teaching" (the *Gītā* is perhaps regarded by him mainly as a gospel of knowledge and renunciation to be practiced adequately by saints and yogins) has not displayed his wisdom in selecting the appropriate background for this teaching. We are, however, inclined to think that its author was really anxious to bring out as prominently as possible his commendation for the relentless discharge of one's duty (*svadharma*) at all costs and in all situa-

[2] M. K. Gandhi, *Gītā: The Mother,* ed. Jag Parvesh Chander (4th ed.; Lahore: Indian Publishing Works, 1946-47), p. 14.
[3] *Indian Philosophy* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958), I, 520.
[4] *The Bhagavadgītā* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960), p. 85.
[5] *The Bhagavadgītā* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960), p. ix.

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tions, and that the background for this teaching was well-chosen, since by weaving it with the central theme of the Epic—the war itself—the author secures for it the desired prominence. We are, therefore, inclined to treat the description of war in the *Gītā* in its literal and not allegorical sense.

Should we then say that the *Gītā* preaches war and violence without compunction and shows no respect or regard for life? Scholars such as Professor Karl H. Potter and Professor K. N. Jayatilleke, who take the *Gītā* teaching of war in its literal sense, seem to support this position. In an open disregard to the explicit statements of Arjuna, uttered with utmost pity or compassion (*kṛpayā parayā'viṣṭo*; I. 28; II. 1), that he would not incur the sin of killing even for the sake of the kingdom of the three worlds (I. 35-36, 45), would prefer begging to killing (II. 5), would not inflict injury with his arrows on worthy people (II. 4), and would prefer to be killed rather than to live to enjoy the pleasures tainted with blood (I. 35), Professor Potter notices a "singular lack of pity"[6] on the part of Arjuna and observes that

> he (Arjuna) worries about everything else but the pain he may inflict upon those he wounds or kills. It is therefore not appropriate for Krishna to give him an extended answer intended to alleviate worries about the pain he might produce. For other people, it is extremely important to do so; it is the pain one causes others that most worries a Christian, or indeed a Buddhist or a Jain, when he considers what to do in Arjuna's case.[7]

Thus, according to him there is "the feeling that this is a callous philosophy."[8] Professor Jayatilleke also thinks that the *Gītā,* in contradistinction to Buddhism, exhorts "to fight at any cost in a war in which the state is engaged."[9] Such an interpretation of the *Gītā* prescribing reckless war in an unreserved manner seems to be another extreme view held by scholars. The true significance of the *Gītā* teaching, however, as I understand it, is something deeper, and the problem deserves a more careful consideration.

The despondency of Arjuna is looked upon by Kṛṣṇa not merely as the accidental passing mood of a disheartened man, but as a deep-rooted and widespread belief of people, symptomatic of the age, that the true goal of life can be realized only by shaking off the burden of active worldly life. This doctrine of renunciation (*nivṛtti*) was so dominant in India that renouncing worldly life was considered the very first step to pursue a higher life. The *Gītā* takes up the challenge of the age and puts forward a predominantly activistic philosophy while preserving at the same time the essence of renunciation. Thus, it attempts to solve the very fundamental issue of the norm of

[6] *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 20.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[9] "Some Aspects of Gītā and Buddhist Ethics," *University of Ceylon Review,* XIII, nos. 2 & 3 (1955), 146.

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human conduct and offers a general guiding principle which is equally applicable to all particular problems of life, including the one of war and peace with which Arjuna was confronted.

The keynote of this principle is activism (*pravṛtti*)[10] which seeks to incorporate in itself the essence of renunciation (*nivṛtti*). Thus, renunciation is no longer a renunciation of action but a "renunciation *in* action," as Professor Hiriyanna calls it.[11] It is this "renunciation in action," or disinterested discharge of one's duty, which is reinforced by the *Gītā* from its different standpoints of knowledge (*jñāna*), devotion (*bhakti*), and action (*karma*) regardless of the fruit, and which is said to lead ultimately to the highest goal.

From the standpoint of knowledge, Arjuna is reminded of the imperishable and immortal nature of the Self and is exhorted to remain firm and unperturbed in the discharge of his duty (II. 13-30). The knower of the truth is said to rise above the vicissitudes of life and is no longer to be moved by the rise or fall (birth or death) of perishable things, no longer to be swayed by emotional weaknesses, desires, and passions. Thus, by pointing out the inevitability of the destruction of the physical body, on the one hand, and the impossibility of the destruction of the eternal self, on the other, Arjuna is asked to perform his duties with equanimity (*samatva*) or detachment (*saṁnyāsa*). It is said: "The wise man, O Arjuna, who remains equal in pain and pleasure (*samaduḥkhasukham*) and who is not troubled by these (pairs of opposites), he, indeed, is fit for attaining immortality" (II. 15).

By means of devotion also the same teaching is imparted. Devotion consists not in escaping from worldly duties but in dedicating all activities to God. It does not require abandonment of work but only the abandonment of selfish desires. This is the crux of the teaching of complete surrender to God. Accordingly, Arjuna is told: "Dedicating all actions to Me by your spiritualised mind and being free from desire and egotism, fight without the fever (of emotion)" (III. 30). "With your mind and intellect given to Me, you will undoubtedly come to Me" (VIII. 7). Work is worship, the best homage to God. "Man attains perfection by worshipping Him through his own duty" (XVIII. 46). Thus, the true import of devotion is taught as follows: "Doing continually all actions whatsoever, resigning unto Me, one reaches by My grace the eternal and imperishable goal" (XVIII. 56).

The same is reiterated through the teaching of *karmayoga*. Yoga in this context is defined as "equanimity" (*samatvaṃ*; II. 48) or skillfulness in action" (*karmasu kauśālam*; II. 50). Action performed in the state of absolute equanimity or with utter detachment to the fruit is considered "skillful," since in so doing a man goes unsullied even while engaged in action. Action, thus, is veritably converted into inaction. It is clearly stated: "Having aban-

[10] Cf. *Pravṛttilakṣaṇaś caiva dharmo nārāyaṇātmakaḥ. Mahābhārata* (*Śānti*, 347), 80-81.
[11] *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958), p. 121.

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doned attachment to the fruit of action, ever content and free from dependence, one, even though engaged in action, does nothing at all" (IV. 20). "He is not contaminated even though he works" (V. 7). So the famous teaching of *karmayoga* runs as follows: "Action alone is thy concern and never its fruits" (II. 47), and it is added: "Man attains to the highest by performing action without attachment" (III. 19).

Thus the precept of distinterested performance of one's own duty (*svadharma*) is offered by the *Gītā* as the central guiding principle which is woven in the very fibers of all the paths advocated by it. From this general principle it automatically follows that the royal prince, Arjuna, should stick unflinchingly to his pious duty of fighting against the evildoers.

There is, however, one very important point regarding this precept of "duty for duty's sake" which must not be lost sight of, namely that the duty to be performed must be in keeping with the codes of morality as embodied in the scripture. A man cannot take recourse to a profession which is mean and forbidden and vindicate it by saying that it is his duty. The *Gītā* clearly says: "Therefore let the scripture be your authority for determining what should be done and what should not be done" (XVI. 24). It is also added: "He who discards the scriptural law and acts according to the promptings of his desire does not attain either perfection, or happiness or the supreme goal" (XVI. 23).

From these considerations it is clear that the war is prescribed by the *Gītā* for Arjuna only because it happens to be one of the sacred duties of a *kṣatriya* in a special circumstance.[12] In keeping with its ideal of duty for duty's sake, the *Gītā* quite naturally upholds the view that a warrior following his royal duty (*rājadharma*) and a contemplative sage following the duty of a recluse (*yatidharma*) reach the same goal (*niḥśreyasakarāv ubhau;* V. 2). The same is explicitly declared by the *Mahābhārata*: "O thou best of men, there are only these two who pierce the constellation of the sun [reach the sphere of Brahman] : the one is the recluse who is endowed with yoga and the other is the warrior who falls fighting in the battle field."[13] Thus anyone, whether he be a recluse or a warrior, if he falls from his enjoined sacred duty, would incur sin (II. 33). One must, therefore, unflinchingly stick to one's righteously enjoined duty and one should be ready to sacrifice even one's life in its fulfillment (III. 35). This is the central teaching of the *Gītā*.

Moreover, in connection with the duty of fighting, it is important to note that (1) the war which Arjuna is exhorted to plunge into is not a reckless aggression but a righteous war (*dharmya yuddha,* II. 31; *dharmya saṅgrāma,*

[12] Of the various duties of a *kṣatriya,* as enumerated by the *Gītā* (XVIII. 43), one is "not to run away from the battle" (*yuddhe cā'py apalāyanam*).

[13] *dvāv imau puruṣavyāghra sūryamaṇḍala bhedinau, parivrāṭ yogayuktaś ca raṇe cā bhimukho hataḥ, Mahābhārata, Udyoga* 32. 65.

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II. 33) aimed at fighting against evildoers (*ātatāyinaḥ*; I. 36); (2) that it is to be fought not with the fury of anger and passion or with the feeling of vengeance, hatred, or greed, but with a pure sense of duty and with utter detachment, and (3) that war is to be looked upon more as an exception than the rule.

One cannot correctly understand and appreciate the position of the *Gītā* in relation to war unless one has a due awareness of the concept of "righteous war," since it is only the righteous war (*dharmya yuddha* or *dharmya saṅgrāma*) and not just any war that is sanctioned by the *Gītā*.[14] In fact, righteousness (*dharma*) is the focal point of the *Gītā*, even of the *Mahābhārata* itself, of which the *Gītā* is only a part. All worldly activities are to be performed in keeping with this righteousness. In one of its concluding verses the *Mahābhārata* fervently appeals to one to follow the righteous mode of living in these words: "With uplifted hand I proclaim and no one pays heed to me. Even wealth and enjoyment are to be procured by means of righteousness. Why not uphold that righteousness."[15] The *Gītā* itself begins by mentioning the battlefield as *dharmakṣetra* (the field of righteousness). The despondency of Arjuna is clearly on moral grounds. He is not afraid of anything but moral sins. He is ready to sacrifice even his life (I. 32, 35, 46) but not to commit moral sins. Repeatedly he exclaims: "Alas, what a great sin (*mahat pāpam*) are we resolved to commit" (I. 45); "why should we not have the wisdom to turn away from this sin (*pāpāt*)" (I. 39); "Only sin (*pāpam eva*) shall we incur by killing these evildoers" (I. 36). Thus, expressing his concern for the moral sin, he entreatingly says to Kṛṣṇa: "Being bewildered about righteousness (*dharmasaṃmūḍha-cetāḥ*), I ask Thee. Tell me for certain wherein lies the good (*śreyaḥ*)." Kṛṣṇa naturally instructs him about his righteous duty and points out how he will be saved from sins and attain the supreme good (*śreyaḥ param avāpsyatha*; III. 11). He clearly says: "He who works having given up attachment . . . is not touched by sin" (*lipyate na sa pāpena*; V. 10); "You shall not thus incur sin" (*naiʼvaṃ pāpam avapsyasi*; II. 38); "you shall cross over all sins by the boat of wisdom alone" (IV. 36). But on the other hand, "if you do not fight this *righteous* war (*dharmyaṃ saṅgrāmam*), then having fallen from your duty and glory, you shall incur sin (*pāpam avāpsyasi*)" (II. 33). It is explicitly declared that when there is a decline of righteousness the supreme divinity reincarnates himself to establish righteousness (IV. 8).

But what type of wâr is to be called a righteous war? Śaṁkara, in his com-

[14] While reminding Arjuna of his *svadharma*, Kṛṣṇa refers only to the righteous war: *dharmyād dhi yuddhāc chreyo' nyat kṣatriyasya na vidyate* (II. 31. 31); *atha cet tvam imaṃ dharmyaṃ saṅgrāmaṃ na kariṣyasi* (II. 33).

[15] *ūrdhvabāhur viraumy eṣaḥ na ca kaścicchṛṇoti mām, dharmād arthaś ca kāmaś ca sa dharmaḥ kiṃ na sevyate.*

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mentary on the *Gītā*, sheds but little light and passes on with the remark that it is a war fought in defense of people (*prajārakṣaṇārtham*).[16] Rāmānuja takes it in the sense of a war which is in keeping with justice (*nyāyataḥ pravṛttāt yuddhāt*).[17] Though the *Gītā* does not elaborate this concept of righteous war, it does contain a clue whereby its view may be ascertained with reasonable plausibility. We have stated that Arjuna was despondent out of his sheer regard for righteousness, and he takes the stand that the killing even of evildoers (*ātatāyinaḥ*) is sinful. Kṛṣṇa dissuades him from this thought and reminds him of the righteous duty of a *kṣatriya* to fight against such offenders. The word '*ātatāyi*' is a significant one. It is said: "One who sets fire, gives poison, attacks with weapon in hand, plunders the property, dispossesses of the territory as well as of women—these six are evil-doers (*ātatāyinaḥ*)" (*Vaśiṣṭhasmṛti* III. 16). With regard to such a heinous criminal, the *Manusmṛti* says: "Whether he be a teacher, an infant, an old man or a much learned brahmin, if he comes as a criminal (*ātatāyi*), one should kill him without any consideration. There is no sin in killing a criminal (*ātatāyi*)."[18] He is said to be killed by his own outrageous conduct. Now, in the light of the story of the *Mahābhārata* (which the *Gītā* presupposes), it is not difficult to see that the Kauravas, against whom Arjuna is asked to fight, had committed not one but all the six heinous crimes.[19] They had further thwarted all attempts made by Kṛṣṇa for a peaceful settlement of the dispute by refusing to accept the request of giving even five villages, the bare minimum for the five Pāṇḍavas. They have, therefore, rightly been called criminals (*ātatāyinaḥ*) by the *Gītā*. But even then Arjuna feels that he would be committing sin by killing these criminals. It is against this attitude of Arjuna that Kṛṣṇa imparts the teaching of righteous war and explicitly proclaims: "There is no good higher than *righteous war* for a Kṣatriya" (II. 31). The attitude of the *Gītā* in this respect is amply illustrated from the ideal set by Kṛṣṇa (the incarnate God) Himself who is said to "assume birth for the protection of the righteous ones, the destruction of the evil-doers and the establishment of righteousness" (IV. 8). It is in the light of this very ideal that war is considered compatible with the life of righteousness, virtue, or peace.

The second important consideration of the *Gītā* in relation to this duty of fighting is that, like all other duties, it also has to be performed with a detached and dispassionate mind. It is only on this condition that Arjuna is said to remain uncontaminated by the sin of killing, since in so performing an act,

[16] Śaṁkara on *Gītā* II. 31.
[17] Rāmānuja on *Gītā* II. 31.
[18] *Manusmṛti* VIII. 350-351.
[19] We are told by the epic narrative that the Kauravas had set fire to the house of the Pāṇḍavas, given poison to Bhīma, deprived them of their property and kingdom, insulted their wife in open royal court, and were ultimately planning to launch an armed attack on them.

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he would be veritably converting action into inaction. Thus Kṛṣṇa says: "Treat alike pleasure and pain, gain and loss, victory and defeat and then get ready for the battle. Thus you shall not incur sin" (II. 38). "He who is not self-conceited, whose mind is not attached, even though he slays these worlds, he neither slays nor is he bound" (XVIII. 17). Thus, according to the *Gītā,* the fighter has to exhibit the most difficult feat of indulging in outward fighting and remaining inwardly at peace at the same time. This is the core of the teaching of "renunciation in action."

It may not, however, be quite possible for a beginner to reach this ideal of absolute detachment. Should he, then, not stick to his righteous duty and try to defend himself against heinous criminals? The *Gītā,* in such a situation, seems to moderate its strict standard and adds: "Even a little of this *dharma* [discipline of detachment] saves one from great fear" (II. 40). Nevertheless, one is enjoined to make constant efforts to attain the ideal of perfect detachment (VI. 35, 36).

Lastly it may be noted that war or violence as sanctioned by the *Gītā* is not a normal code of conduct. As indicated above, it is to be used only in an exceptional situation when one has to deal with incorrigible criminals, and where all peaceful means are found unavailing. Barring this exception, the *Gītā* stands for peace or nonviolence as much as does any other religio-philosophical text of the world, and delivers the message of love and compassion with perfect purity of purpose. Its teaching about war, thus, can neither be ignored as an exercise in allegory nor looked upon as an exhortation for reckless war.

What is important to note here is that the *Gītā* considers it morally right to take recourse to arms against incorrigible criminals for the sake of self-defense and protection of the righteous people. One has, however, to see that this measure is adopted as a last resort, and the fight is fought with a sense of pious duty and utter equanimity. Now, no one can deny that to protect oneself and other innocent people is a noble end. It is also agreed that one should try one's best to adopt all possible peaceful means to achieve this end. But in case all possible peaceful means are found unavailing, and one is facing disaster at the hands of incorrigible criminals, the question arises whether or not in such an exceptional situation, one is morally justified in taking recourse to violence.

It is not difficult to see that the absolute abandonment of violence in every shape and form is an impracticability. The remark of the *Bhāgavat* that "the life lives on life" (*jīvo jīvasya jīvanam*)[20] is not without truth. Even the avowed champions of nonviolence, like the Buddha in the ancient past and

[20] *Srimad Bhagwatam,* Vol. III, ed. A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami (Vrindaban: The League of Devotees, 1965), I. 13, 47; cf. *Manusmṛti* V. 28.

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Gandhi in recent times, have to acknowledge directly or indirectly the limitations of nonviolence.

That absolute adherence to nonviolence and other virtues in a household society—comprised of average people leading a normal day-to-day life—is nearly an impossibility is acknowledged by the Buddha. While exhorting people to renounce worldly life, he is frequently found to remark: "A holy life in all its purity and perfection is not easy to practise while leading the life of a householder."[21] Should every householder then renounce the world and be a recluse? Obviously it is not possible to convert the whole world into a society of monks, for, as the *Gītā* rightly points out, monks have to depend for their subsistence on householders (III. 8). Thus, the strict observance of nonviolence is not possible in the larger society of active householders. It is interesting to note that the Buddha, after attaining his enlightenment, is found to ponder the question, "whether it is possible to reign with *dhamma,* without killing or causing to kill, without conquering or causing to conquer, without grieving or causing to grieve."[22] On being told by Māra that it is possible, and on being prompted by him to take up the life of a king, the Buddha rebukes him and declines to accept it.

Gandhi also had to approve violence in exceptional situations. It is well-known that he advised the shooting of a miserably ailing cow. On another occasion, when some people reported to him that they, owing to his instruction of nonviolence, did not retaliate against the ravaging soldiers who were plundering their properties and misbehaving with their womenfolk, Gandhi rebuked them for misunderstanding his teaching. In such situations he recommends violence in preference to cowardice. He clearly asserts: "Better far than cowardice is killing and being killed in battle."[23]

It is no doubt true that nonviolent means are ordinarily the most efficacious in bringing about change of heart and effecting enduring peace. But the big question remains: Is it possible to change the heart of every individual, including the most reckless and unscrupulous criminals? And even if it is possible, is it also possible to effect this change before harm is done to innocent people? Had all this been possible, we could then consistently argue that the entire legal code of punishment is morally reprehensible. Nay, we could even

[21] *nayidaṃ sukaraṃ agāraṃ ajjhāvasatā ekāntaparipuṇṇaṃ ekāntaparisuddhaṃ saṅkhalikhitam brahmacariyaṃ carituṃ. Digha Nikāya,* ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, 3 vols. (London: Pali Text Society, 1890-1911), I, 63; *Majjhima Nikāya,* ed. V. Trenkner and R. Chalmers, 3 vols. (London: Pali Text Society, 1948-51), I, 179, 240, 267; II, 56.

[22] *sakkā nu kho rajjaṃ kāretuṃ ahanaṃ aghātayaṃ ajinaṃ ajāpayaṃ asocaṃ asocāpayaṃ dhammenā, ti? Saṃyutta Nikāya,* ed. L. Fleer, 6 vols. (London: Pali Text Society, 1884-1904), I, 116.

[23] M. K. Gandhi, *Gītā: My Mother,* ed. Anand T. Hingorani (Bombay: Pearl Publications Private Ltd., 1965), p. 66.

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have found fault with the justice of the Almighty or with the law of *karma*, which ordains that sinful men suffer for their sins. Thus, whether we consider the problem in social, theological, or ethical terms it is clear that there is ample justification for inflicting punishment on criminals, and there is a limit beyond which nonviolence and forgiveness should not be practiced.

It is precisely in the light of these considerations that the ancient scriptures recommend the avoidance of extremes even in relation to the observance of cardinal virtues[24] and refer to situations when exceptions have to be made. We have already noticed the exceptions made in relation to nonviolence. Similar exceptional situations may be envisaged in relation to the observance of other virtues like truth, etc. For example, when you have seen some innocent people running away and hiding themselves in a thick forest in order to escape plunderers and murderers following them, and you subsequently are approached by the latter who inquire about those people, should you or should you not tell them the truth? The *Mahābhārata* first advises to avoid telling a lie but permits it if no other course is left to save the lives of innocent people. Its advice is as follows: "Do not speak unless you are asked, and even if asked unjustly, you should not speak. The wise man, though knowing the truth, should (alternately) behave like a dumb or ignorant man."[25] But if there is no escape from speaking, the *Mahābhārata* adds, one may tell a lie. It says: "If you can escape without speaking, then you should not speak in any way. But if speaking is necessary or your not speaking is likely to arouse suspicion, then it has been considered better to tell a lie rather than to tell the truth."[26] Thus, it has been shown that deviating from acknowledged virtues like nonviolence, forgiveness, truth, etc., in exceptional situations is not morally unwarranted or unjustified.

An objection, however, may be raised that such exceptional provisions are likely to be misused by common people. They may regard even an ordinary situation to be an exceptional one and try to justify their obvious acts of violence. To avoid such pitfalls, the *Gītā* suggests certain measures which must be clearly borne in mind. It points out that the pure discriminative intellect (*vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ*) of men is uniformly of one nature (II. 41) and that those who have developed this state of intellect cannot fail to discern whether a situation does or does not warrant a deviation from the acknowledged virtue. The diversity of opinion is expressed and controversy raised in

[24] *na śreyaḥ satataṃ tejo na nityaṃ śreyasī kṣamā, Tasmān nityaṃ kṣamā tāta paṇḍitair apavāditā. The Mahābhārata*, ed. Visnu S. Sukthankar and others, 19 vols. (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1933-1959), *Āraṇyaka Parva*, 29. 6, 8.
[25] *nāpṛṣṭaḥ kasyacid brūyān na cānyāyena pṛcchataḥ, jñānavān api medhāvī jaḍavallokam ācaret. Ibid., Śānti Parva* 276. 34.
[26] *akūjanena cen mokṣo nātra kūjet kathaṃcana, Avaśyaṃ kūjitavyaṃ vā saṅkeran vā pyakūjanāt; Śreyas tatrānṛtaṃ vaktuṃ satyād iti vicāritaṃ. Ibid., Śānti Parva* 110. 14, 15.

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a given situation only when ordinary people judge the issue with agitated or passioned intellect (*vāsanātmikā buddhiḥ*), which the *Gītā* characterizes as indiscriminative intellect (*avyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ*). Such people, according to the *Gītā* (XVI. 24), are to be guided by the authority of the scriptures (which are supposed to embody the rules laid down by people of discriminative intellect). It is only the people of discriminative intellect who are said to be competent to assess a situation directly and decide the right course of action in a given situation. Lest everybody claim to be a man of discriminative intellect, the *Gītā* lays down some important tests, such as the ability to remain unmoved amidst pleasure and pain and amidst other pairs of opposites, etc. (II. 54-72), whereby it is easy to determine whether or not one is a man of discriminative intellect. It is important to remember that Arjuna is asked to qualify himself through these tests while he is being exhorted to get ready for the battle (II. 38).

All this clearly shows that the *Gītā,* in sanctioning the righteous war, fought with equanimity and in an exceptional situation, is guided by a careful consideration of the problems of an average society.

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Different purposes demand different degrees of care in the elaboration of the distinction between violence and nonviolence. For my present purposes it suffices to make the distinction turn simply on one's willingness to resort to physical force in certain extreme circumstances, for example, when a conflict develops either within one's own community or between one's community and some other, and it is impossible to reach a settlement by the use of constitutional or diplomatic procedures, that is, either by negotiation or by reference to some authority whose decision will be accepted as final by the parties to the dispute. Believers in violence are those who are prepared to resort to physical force in such circumstances; believers in nonviolence are those who, while proposing to resist the imposition of a settlement by their opponents, are determined to confine their resistance to the techniques of noncooperation and civil disobedience, completely eschewing the use of physical coercion.

It is obvious that Gandhi falls on the nonviolent side of this divide. But there are other important divides which would separate him from most believers in nonviolence, divides that would place the majority of those who reject violence on the same side as those who accept it. What I want to do in this short article is to draw attention to one or two of the distinctive features of *satyagraha,* and to try to show how they further Gandhi's attempts to turn all occasions—even those of bitterest conflict—to creative rather than destructive account. In my view this attempt points the way toward success. Hence, this program is really a small part of a larger one that cannot be undertaken here, the attempt to show that *satyagraha*—unlike other forms of nonviolence —is able to meet the problems which violence unsuccessfully tries to solve.

Underlying the other differences between Gandhian and non-Gandhian systems of nonviolence is a disagreement about the relations of ends and means. This is a big subject which cannot receive full treatment here.[1] I am hoping that this will matter rather less than might be expected since the main practical differences of emphasis can be sufficiently indicated without exploring their ethical foundations in any detail.

Those who see nonviolent methods of social action as a system of techniques that are always or often more effective than the techniques of violence share the prevailing view of the proper relations of ends and means. The main tenets of this view would seem to be the following: that the selection of ends should precede the selection of means; and that the selection of means should be governed wholly or mainly by effectiveness as judged in terms of the ends which have been previously selected. I say "wholly or mainly" because there is some difference of opinion about whether effectiveness is the

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[1] I have tried to deal with it at length in Chapter 2 of my book, *Non-Violence and Aggression* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

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only moral issue that arises in connection with the selection of means. For some, the end justifies the means; for others, effectiveness seems to be the only reason for proposing to use a given method, but each such proposal has to undergo a process of moral vetting, some methods being ruled out altogether as morally unacceptable and others being used only reluctantly when alternative methods have been judged to have failed. Gandhi's view is quite different. The difference is also of fundamental importance since it arises out of his basic values of *satya* or truth and *ahiṁsā,* which is often translated as harmlessness or non-injury. The fundamental tenets of this view can be briefly characterized as being the reverse of the prevailing one. For, according to Gandhi, the selection of means precedes the selection of ends in the sense that one's original and basic commitment is to certain means or methods, and one's ends are seen as objectives which progressively emerge as one tries to bring one's life into conformity with this basic commitment.

A simple illustration of this process might be useful at this point. It is obvious that certain social institutions make for violence, for example, those which arbitrarily provide greater or lesser opportunities for human beings according as they belong to this or the other race or social class or religious communion. A Gandhian, living in a community where such arrangements prevail, is soon presented with the end of changing these violence-making social patterns. But this is only a beginning. Gradually, as he pursues this objective, he becomes aware of other violence-producing institutions within his community; and, bit by bit, as he faces the task of their extirpation, he comes to frame more and more positive proposals for the reordering of society, proposals which are intended not merely to sever the roots of violence but to build up a community that is imbued with a positive spirit of brotherhood.

It seems clear that this view has made little appeal to most of those who have used or advocated nonviolent methods of social action. This is shown, not only by what they have said or written, but still more clearly by their readiness to relinquish nonviolent methods when they have come to doubt their superior effectiveness. Thus, both in South Africa and in the United States, impatience and frustration have resulted in marked swings away from nonviolence and toward violence; and such swings presuppose a primary commitment to ends. Gandhi's own faith in nonviolence was of a different order. He believed in its effectiveness, in spite of deferred hope and much frustration. But his unwavering advocacy of nonviolence was due not merely to superior patience but to the fact that his commitment to *satyagraha* overrode every other commitment. It was this commitment which had gradually turned him against British imperialism; to cast it off and to cling instead to the ends to which it had led him would have been an evident absurdity.

The difference of view which I have been trying to indicate manifests itself in the clearest way at the practical level.

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Those whose primary commitment is to ends rigidly assume that their cause is just; they speak—in the manner of those for whom violence is the final arbiter—of this or that as being "not negotiable." The justice of their cause is not something to be established; it is taken as the fixed point in their struggle with their opponents. It is true, of course, that they may feel bound to alter their demands in some degree in response to the developing situation, either because of changes in their expectations with regard to what is feasible or because of further information on the price to be paid for getting what they want. But these changes are seldom seen as closer approximations to equity, and their opponents are hardly ever credited with a positive role in the attainment of justice.

The Gandhian attitude to conflict is very different. The *satyagrahi* holds fast to his demands while he believes them to be just. But their justice is not taken for granted or held to have been established. He remains open to persuasion from his opponent, and can even be said to appeal to him to confirm the moral acceptability of what the *satyagrahi* demands. Thus, the struggle between the Gandhian believer in nonviolence and his opponents proceeds at two levels: that on which the *satyagrahi* tries to persuade his opponents of the justice of the ends which he has adopted, and that on which he tries to induce his opponents to enter into a fundamentally cooperative relationship with himself, a relationship through which the truth about relevant human needs is to be uncovered and a just settlement agreed between them. Hence, although he presents a rigid surface to his opponents, refusing to make concessions that he believes to be opposed to justice, his attitude is fundamentally flexible since he is inviting them to cooperate with him in the discovery and implementation of a just settlement of differences. He does not see his opponents simply as an obstacle in the path of justice—something to be thrust aside or surmounted in the best way possible; he credits them with the capacity to make a positive contribution to the ending of conflict by drawing attention to relevant matters of which he is partially or wholly unaware. The surface rigidity and the underlying flexibility are two aspects of the same unremitting search for truth since one's apparent efforts to join with one's opponents in a closer study of the conflict situation would be at once exposed as mere pretence if one were prepared to surrender anything which one still regarded as an essential requirement of justice.

It follows that the *satyagrahi* should not use the language of victory and defeat when classifying the struggles in which he has been engaged. There are several reasons why such language would be inappropriate: the attainment of his provisional objectives is only sought while they are held to be just; if such objectives are attained, not through a cooperative pursuit of truth but as a result of coercion, there has been a failure to make progress at the second and more fundamental level on which the struggle is being con-

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ducted, and doubts must be cast on the moral acceptability of his objectives; and progress on the second level is viewed as a notable advance even if his provisional objectives remain partially or wholly unrealized. No such reasons are operative in the case of non-Gandhian believers in nonviolence. For them, the terms 'victory' and 'defeat' can be used as appropriately as they are of wars and other outbreaks of violence.

A further difference between the *satyagrahi* and other believers in nonviolence is that the latter, as might be expected of those who think in terms of victories and defeats, tend to assume that once a full-scale struggle has begun, one's efforts to attain one's disputed ends are entitled to monopolize one's attentions and to command all one's resources. This is quite at odds with Gandhi's teaching. He insisted that the struggle to resist injustice and to convert one's opponents is not enough; one must also engage in some form (or forms) of constructive work.

The reason Gandhi gives for his insistence on constructive work is that resistance, even by nonviolent means, is morally unjustifiable unless one is also simultaneously trying to make constructive use of the situation. It is probable that his main reason for taking this view was total disbelief in the constructive intentions of those whose efforts can ever be confined to resisting the policies and intentions of others. Gandhi believed that the foundation values of *satyagraha* should be able to find expression, not only in nonviolent resistance itself, but also in more positive activities. Other practical moral reasons why he emphasized constructive work almost certainly included the following: the need to maintain a real awareness of one's fundamental concerns and the wider contexts of one's actions, and the importance of providing one's opponents with some kind of earnest of one's will to reach an amicable and just settlement. Both these purposes are furthered by constructive work. It acts as a brake on the tendency of conflict to lead to a severe constriction of interest and a sad loss of sense of proportion. Resisters who find time and energy to carry on with schemes of self-reliant reform when they are involved in serious—perhaps even life and death—struggles are likely to elicit an increasingly favorable and positive response from their opponents.

The insistence upon constructive work is the feature of *satyagraha* I most wish to emphasize in what remains of this article. This is partly because constructive work is the most neglected feature of Gandhian nonviolence, and this neglect has had many serious consequences; and partly because due emphasis upon it rules out many of the commoner misinterpretations of Gandhi's teaching.

There seems to be no doubt of the neglect of constructive work even among those who have seen Gandhi as offering more than a distinctive set of social techniques. For example, it is clear from *Stride Toward Freedom* that Martin Luther King regarded himself as a follower of Gandhi. Yet it is equally

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clear from the same book that constructive work had no place in the campaign he led in Montgomery.

It is also indisputable that this neglect has done much to undermine the effectiveness of nonviolence, and hence, that it has been at least partly responsible for the progressive disenchantment of those who once saw nonviolent resistance as the method by which racial inequality would be overcome. Gandhi was a man with a genius for preserving the moral significance of the struggles in which he took part. He had the keenest eye for methods of maintaining integrity, discipline, and enthusiasm. Therefore, it is much to be regretted that this main feature of his method should be so widely ignored, for there can be no question that it is of the greatest practical importance. It is true, of course, that the Montgomery bus boycott was an effective exercise in the use of nonviolence. But it was a very limited campaign both in the sense that it had highly specific and narrow objectives and in the sense that it was confined to a small area of the United States.

Mass campaigns of the kind that Gandhi sometimes led raise far more serious problems, especially that of widening and deepening mass impatience. Such impatience deserves to be seen as the greatest single difficulty facing believers in nonviolence. There are several reasons why this should be so. Although violence often gives rise to stalemate situations of the kind that normally form a protracted phase in campaigns involving noncooperation, it can be made to yield an abundance of morale-raising physical activity—something that is far less plentiful in nonviolent campaigning unless it includes a strenuous program of constructive work. From a strictly practical point of view, then, the vast importance of such programs resides in the facts that they offer resisters something to do, and that the work they offer is necessarily hope-raising because it adds a constructive dimension to a situation that may seem to be primarily one of deadlock. Modern warfare is so all-embracing in its demands that it spreads progressive paralysis through even the wealthiest community, calling a more and more complete halt to non-military efforts of every kind. Hence, the larger a war, and the longer it lasts, the more it tends to force belligerents to evaluate progress in purely military terms. This has an abundance of evil consequences, especially the following: it gradually loosens one's hold on one's ultimate objectives; and any appearance of military stalemate takes a severe toll of morale. The problem in nonviolent campaigning is much more that of how to hold mass impatience in check for a period sufficient to allow such methods as that of noncooperation to work out their often slow effects. A constructive program is the main answer to this problem, largely because it provides work and progress. Thus, it makes full use of one of the main potential advantages of nonviolent resistance: the fact that it demands a relatively small proportion of a community's time and resources.

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As suggested earlier, it also does much to prevent or correct common misconceptions of Gandhi's teaching. To begin with, constructive work draws attention to the Gandhian accent on continuity. The true *satyagrahi* does not become active in times of crisis and then lapse into silence and passivity in times of relative peace and stability: he is a perpetual reformer both of himself and of the community to which he belongs. For him, the struggle that results from nonviolent resistance is only a phase in a lifetime's pursuit of truth—the questing way of life that gave Gandhi a title for his autobiography.[2] This accent on continuity, and the concept of *satya* which underlies it, leads on inevitably to a consideration of the other distinctive features of *satyagraha,* such as its conception of the relations of ends and means. Thus, if one gives due attention to constructive work as an absolutely essential feature of Gandhian nonviolence, one is no longer in any danger of seeing Gandhi as simply a technical innovator who invites us to abandon goal-promoting methods of one kind and to substitute those of another. This is the commonest and most serious misinterpretation of Gandhi's work.

Ironically enough, it is probably the Western tendency—caught from the practice of violence—to think in a discontinuous way about the less restricted forms of social or international conflict that has led believers in nonviolence to undervalue constructive work. Wars and large-scale outbreaks of violence seem to cut across policies of social reconstruction, mainly because they cause such upheaval and devastation that the schemes for reform or progress which are under consideration immediately before they begin usually seem hopelessly irrelevant by the time that they are over. Wars are like accidents in which individuals are blinded or crippled: they create life-situations that differ in really fundamental ways from those that existed before they occurred. Long ago this should have led men to question the effectiveness of violence as a means of attaining communal ends. Instead, it has encouraged a tolerance of the discontinuities that must be accepted if large-scale violence is to be credited with any rationality. In turn, this acceptance has given a somewhat artificial look to constructive work. For, unless such programs are viewed as parts of expanding patterns of reform, springing from the basic values of *satyagraha* —schemes of work to be persisted in whether times are good or bad, peaceful or disorderly—they must seem to be something conspicuously superfluous, tacked on as cumbersome extras to the main business of non-violent resistance.

For Gandhi, of course, there was nothing artificial, nothing of the optional extra, about constructive work, even though some of his own accounts of limited campaigns may convey an erroneous impression to the contrary. (This impression arises because every program has its priorities, and this can lead to a look of artificiality if it is not made sufficiently clear why one is concentrating on any given selection of objectives from one's total program. Gandhi

[2] *The Story of My Experiments with Truth.* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Press, 1945).

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sometimes erred in this regard). His fundamental view is clearly stated at the beginning of *Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place,* where he insists that "the constructive programme is the truthful and non-violent way of winning Poorna Swaraj. Its wholesale fulfillment *is* complete independence." In other words, constructive work is not something tacked on arbitrarily to resistance; taken as a whole it spells out the program of reform which (subject to further insight) one intends to implement. Taken in context, this passage also makes clear that political independence was a small part of the goal of *swaraj,* which, for Gandhi, had become that of a many-sided liberation embracing such varied aspects of life as reform of the caste system, sanitation, education, communal unity, and economic and sexual equality.

The same passage also draws attention to two further invaluable features of constructive work: its power simultaneously to preserve one's sense of direction and one's sense of proportion. I have already alluded to both of these, but they deserve a little more attention.

It is a notorious feature of violence—which is still far from being sufficiently notorious—that it progressively blinds us to what we are trying to do. As we have seen, this is partly because it transforms the situation in which we are placed, thereby rendering our objectives more or less irrelevant. But it is also partly due to the fact that it monopolizes our attention, forcing us to desist progressively from anything that cannot be related to the pursuit of victory. Nonviolent resistance, when properly combined with constructive work, is quite different. It actively supports and confirms our eventual aims, keeping us in what religious writers sometimes call a state of recollection. Our attention is neither distracted from our goals, nor are these goals themselves subject to the same mortality, since, although they may be amended in some degree in response to what we learn from our opponents and changes in the situation, the scale of destruction consequent upon the struggle is most unlikely to be such as to make them unattainable or irrelevant.

Furthermore, we are forced to remember what violence encourages us to forget, namely, that the power of our opponents is limited. Modern weapons, freely used, can reduce all our schemes to dust and ashes. This is true however one resists. But one's opponents must be far less tempted, if tempted at all, to use the most destructive of their weapons if one renounces violence. And meanwhile, while life remains, no imaginable tyranny can call a complete halt to what one feels bound to set out to do under the influence of the basic values of Gandhism. In brief, although political independence is of great importance, it is neither everything in itself nor is it a presupposition of everything other than itself. There is much that can be undertaken even after it has been lost or while it has yet to be attained. Thus, in placing the greatest stress on constructive work, Gandhi is trying to displace the mistaken belief that political freedom must be realized before any other sort of freedom can be

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exercised. He is raising the questions: What do you want this independence for? And is it not the case that much that you want remains possible even when independence is still denied to you? The effect of such questions is to restore one's sense of proportion.

In my view, all this has immediate applicability to the situation of the American Negro and the Russian-dominated Czech. He lies under a yoke, but the yoke does not reduce him to complete helplessness. His struggle need not be restricted to the removal of the yoke. Much that he wants to do with the freedom he is seeking can be done, here and now, while he is still struggling to win that freedom.[3]

Much violence is due to the all but universal human tendency to credit enemies with illusory powers as well as devilish intentions, thereby allowing oneself to be driven to destructive extremes instead of fastening on to the creative possibilities of one's situation.[4]

I think it is clear from what has been said that Gandhi's conception of the *satyagrahi* is really that of a continuously creative participant in human affairs (including politics), and that all the distinctive features of *satyagraha* witness to Gandhi's belief that a creative response is possible in any situation, regardless of other people's enmity or opposition. It is on the second of these claims that I wish to focus further attention in the remainder of this paper. I shall do this by returning to the distinctive characteristics of *satyagraha* mentioned earlier.

But first, what do I mean by the phrase 'creative response'? As I understand it, the meaning of this phrase includes much that Gandhi understood by the term *satya*. I would say that one has intervened creatively in any situation if one clarifies human need, or if one shows how it may be met more adequately, or if one makes some positive contribution to actually meeting it.

As we have seen, the most fundamental distinctive feature of Gandhian nonviolence is the emphasis which it places on certain means or methods of action, means that are seen as the *satyagrahi's* primary commitment, and also as the source, in combination with the existing situation, of both his long- and short-term objectives. In the present context several things need to be stressed in connection with this feature of Gandhi's teaching.

Insofar as the *satyagrahi's* opponents understand that teaching, this doctrine of the primacy of means, and of the way in which they give rise to ends, is the best guarantee of the *satyagrahi's* openness of mind and of the genuineness of his belief that any opponent must be recognized to have a potentially

[3] Present admiration for the Czech people surely owes a great deal to the fact that it seems to recognize that it is far from helpless.

[4] This is easy to say, of course, when one belongs neither to a persecuted minority nor to a subject people. But to be silenced by the embarrassment one is bound to feel when commenting on the behavior of those who have faced much severer tests than oneself is often a poor service to these unfortunates themselves as well as to the truth.

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creative role in situations of conflict. So it is not only the *satyagrahi* himself who is seen as capable of creative intervention; as much is always conceded to, and even demanded of, his opponents. Indeed, it is part of his self-imposed task to open the way to such a role for his opponents, even in those cases where they may have chosen a purely or predominantly destructive role for themselves.

But their capacity to fill this creative role is dependent upon a fundamental change in the relations of the parties to the conflict, the change that will make cooperation rather than conflict the basic mode in their relations. Such a change is bound to occur if the parties to the conflict come to view one another with mutual good will. It is a fundamental tenet of Gandhi's philosophy of action that this is most likely to be achieved if the nonviolent resister holds fast to the basic values of *satyagraha*; that is, to *satya* and *ahiṁsā*. Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that a *satyagraha* campaign is a concentrated endeavor to release the creative powers of both sides.

But such a campaign may fail. The moral appeal which lies at the heart of the resistance that is offered to the *satyagrahi's* opponents may be rejected. Even then, however, the *satyagrahi's* creative intervention in the existing situation is not at an end. For his resistance is accompanied by work on a constructive program that will be persisted with throughout the campaign. The *satyagrahi's* opponents may be able to prevent part of this campaign from being implemented[5] although, as a general rule, they will have little if any reason to interfere with constructive work. But they can only altogether frustrate such programs by resorting to genocide.

Here one should remind oneself of Gandhi's insistence on self-reliance. The *satyagrahi* should be ready to cooperate with others, but he should resolutely refuse to become dependent upon them. In a large degree this is even true of his relations with his fellow resisters. "Each man, his own army" is the formula of last and bitterest resistance. It has application not only to guerilla warfare but also, in certain circumstances, to nonviolent resistance. The same desperate resolution must accompany constructive work. And insofar as it exists it guarantees that the *satyagrahi* will never be reduced to impotence. For complete frustration is always due to some failure of one's own: of morale, as when opponents are credited with powers they do not possess; of imagination, as when one's constructive energies are so narrowly focused that they can be indefinitely blocked by others; of good will, as when opponents are turned into enemies and one's task is seen as that of destroying them instead of trying to develop more fruitful relations with them.

Faced with Gandhi's successes in India, the British are apt to say that he was lucky in having the opponents he did—not Germans, not Japanese, not

[5] Indian case histories are silent on this issue, mainly for the reason that constructive programs do not seem to have included activities involving civil disobedience.

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Russians. But faced with the remarkable degree of friendship which exists between Britain and India, it would be much truer to say that both sides were lucky in having their quarrel mediated by *satyagraha.* For, as Gandhi once said, "it blesses him who uses it, and him against whom it is used." Of what other instrument of resistance can as much be claimed?

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Adam Roberts—Civilian defense and the inhibition of violence[1]

The link between violence and national defense is so close that it is often thought to be indissoluble. This is natural and even proper, for when nations have been faced with such challenges as invasion or insurgency, their means of resistance have almost always been military. In such crises people have seen the use of armed force as the most effective way of materially affecting the situation, and of making an absolute and uncompromising stand against the opponent.

Is any alternative means of defense possible? The concept of civilian defense—a defense policy based on the use of nonviolent methods of resistance—is one attempt to devise a substitute which might overcome at least some of the crippling disadvantages of military defense. It is not my purpose here to discuss the evils of war or the escalatory and self-defeating character of military action and military defense preparations. Nor is it my purpose to give any over-all outline of a possible civilian defense policy, or of the various strategies that might be employed in civilian defense. Rather, I shall attempt to focus attention on two crucial questions underlying the whole subject of civilian defense and the control of military power. First, the question whether nonviolent action may tend to inhibit the opponent's use of violence will be examined; second, the difficult question whether the defense of a nation could be based entirely on nonviolent methods of struggle, or would involve the use of certain forms of violence at certain points, will be raised.

THE CONCEPT OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE

The attempt to defend a country by means of resistance which do not involve the use of violence seems to many as unrealistic as making an omelette without eggs or a cake without flour. Yet there is a very considerable body of historical experience in the use of noncooperation and nonviolent resistance which, if it does no more, at least indicates that a more prepared and systematic use of such methods deserves examination. The idea of civilian defense is essentially an attempt to outline how such methods might be used against particular threats, and how those methods might be planned and organized on a national scale.

The term "civilian defense" itself has only been used at all widely since

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[1] This is a revised version of a paper, originally entitled "Different Strategic Ideas in Civilian Defense," which was presented by the author at the conference on nonmilitary forms of struggle at Sigtuna, Sweden, April 26-28, 1968. This paper therefore was completed before the developments in Czechoslovakia following the invasion by five Warsaw Pact armies on August 20-21, 1968; these developments are so important that they deserve separate treatment and I have not revised this paper in the light of them. © Adam Roberts 1969.

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1964. Those of us who introduced this term at that time felt that there was a need for a more positive and descriptive term to refer to a policy based on civilian resistance and noncooperation than any of the terms previously used—such as "unarmed defense," "nonmilitary defense," and "nonviolent defense." "Civilian defense" was the solution we found to the problem, since the word "civilian" conveys the sense of participation by the population as a whole, and it also suggests the nonmilitary character of the policy. There are two disadvantages to the use of this term. First, it is easily (particularly in the United States) confused with "civil defense" protection measures; second, the word "civilian" is not always easily translated into other languages. Despite these disadvantages, the term "civilian defense" remains the most satisfactory because it is so much more positive than any of the alternatives yet suggested.[2]

Although the term "civilian defense" is relatively new, the concept of a defense policy based on civilian resistance and noncooperation is grounded in a great deal of historical experience. This paper is in part a plea that proposals for civilian defense should in large measure be based on detailed and painstaking studies of the past use of nonviolent resistance.

There are three reasons why historical studies are of particular importance in developing the concept of civilian defense. The first reason is that only by an examination of the many historical cases in which nonviolent action has been used can the idea of civilian defense be made to appear realistic and brought within the psychological grasp of people new to the idea. The second reason is that history provides a constant reminder of the great variety of situations that can arise; it may thus point to problems which would not occur to us by a process of abstract reasoning, and compel us to be flexible and open-minded in our search for a civilian defense "strategy." The third reason for emphasis on historical studies is that they can teach us something about the mechanisms by which nonviolent action operates. To give an example,

[2] Johan Galtung has in a recent paper, "The Strategy of Nonmilitary Defense: Some Proposals and Problems" (Oslo: Peace Research Institute, 1968, n.1), expressed a slight preference for the term "nonmilitary defense" rather than "civilian defense." But the term "nonmilitary defense" is sometimes itself used to refer to civil defense protection measures, as by Herman Kahn in his 1957 RAND Corporation research memorandum on nonmilitary defense capabilities. The same term has also been used in America to refer to defense against chemical and biological warfare. For an example, see the letter by John Barden in the February 1961 *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, reprinted in Robin Clarke, *We All Fall Down: The Prospect of Biological and Chemical Warfare* (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1968), pp. 21-24.

Galtung suggests that the term "nonmilitary defense" is useful because it highlights the close parallel with military defense. In my view the relative merits of the terms "civilian defense" and "nonmilitary defense" are fairly finely balanced, and perhaps it does no harm to have two terms for describing this possible defense policy. At all events I agree with Galtung when he states: "On the other hand, non-military defense is a negative term and the search for a better term should be continued."

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one of the effects of nonviolent action is that it sometimes, and perhaps only to a limited degree, inhibits the opponent from using violence. This effect is much more convincingly demonstrated by historical case material than by purely theoretical work. To demonstrate such a mechanism only in a theoretical fashion would seem like wishful thinking.

Emphasis on historical studies can of course take many forms. It is not confined to the mere recounting of allegedly successful and purportedly relevant incidents, such as was done by Anna Ruth Fry in her booklet *Victories Without Violence*.[3] There is a need to look at failures as well as successes, to examine cases in the light of local and particular conditions, and to use historical material in a systematic way as an empirical basis for developing ideas and theories about the conditions for, and most effective types of, nonviolent resistance.

There are of course other means of investigating the idea of civilian defense. It can be done by dreaming, playing games, or writing novels or scenarios. Certainly at some stage in the formulation of any policy there can be a need for imagination and for theoretically guided proposals. But theory needs to be based, to a greater or lesser extent, on the study of empirical fact.[4]

THE USE OF CIVILIAN RESISTANCE

In numerous historical cases it has been shown that the link between violence and national defense may not be as indissoluble as is commonly believed. In this century there have been several occasions on which whole nations, when faced with a grave military threat, have defended themselves by primarily or entirely nonmilitary means. In Germany in March 1920, Dr. Wolfgang Kapp was placed in power as a result of a militarily successful *putsch* in Berlin. But civil servants refused to obey his illegal regime and the workers staged a general strike. In the face of this unplanned but nevertheless effective "nonviolent war," Kapp fled from Germany. Other cases of the use of nonviolent action on a mass scale against an armed opponent include the major part of the resistance in the Ruhr in 1923 against French occupation, some aspects of the resistance in various German-occupied countries in Europe in World War II, and the resistance in Algeria and France in April

[3] First published in 1939 by the Peace Book Club, London. Reprinted by Dennis Dobson, London, 1957, 88 pp.

[4] In one or two unpublished Scandinavian studies of civilian defense a theoretical approach has been so overemphasized as to exclude almost entirely an investigation of actual empirical material; these studies have also tended to rely on mathematical and algebraic formulations which, quite apart from the difficulties of comprehending them, are methodologically very questionable, attempting as they do to reduce complex and varied political problems to the language of mathematical exactness and scientific certainty.

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1961 against the units of the French Army which had seized control in Algiers.[5]

In cases such as these, nonviolent resistance was not used because "nonviolence" was considered ethically superior to "violence," but because a population suddenly found itself faced with a military threat and was deprived of its usual military methods of meeting such a threat, either because its armed forces had been defeated or disarmed, or because they were disloyal. Nonviolent resistance was a last resort, unplanned and unprepared. Yet in all of these cases it showed distinct potentialities which suggest that it merits closer examination.

In very many cases of politically and socially significant use of nonviolent action, the decision to resist by means of massive noncooperation was so little determined by explicit ethical principles that one may even question whether "nonviolent resistance" is the best term to describe the technique of struggle used. Rightly or wrongly, the term "nonviolent resistance" tends to imply action by small and deeply motivated groups. The term "civilian resistance" would seem more applicable to the cases mentioned above, for it suggests not only a nonmilitary character, but also an element of mass participation which the term "nonviolent resistance," with its doctrinal overtones, tends to lack.[6]

Any attempt to use this phenomenon of civilian resistance as the basis for a defense policy is founded, at least in part, on a belief that in the long run, and in some rather complex ways, the use of nonviolent methods tends to inhibit the use of violence by the opponent, or else to reduce the value and effect of the violence he does employ. This mechanism of inhibition has been referred to in much writing on civilian defense without ever being discussed very fully. As this mechanism is one of the key bases of civilian defense strategy, it deserves at least a general outline.

FOUR APPROACHES AGAINST VIOLENCE

Sir Basil Liddell Hart has written that the purpose of strategy "is to diminish the possibility of resistance."[7] Strategy is not merely a matter of

[5] For an account and analysis of the effect of noncooperation in combating the 1920 Kapp *putsch* and the 1961 Generals' Revolt, see my "Resisting Military Coups," *New Society* (weekly), London, June 1, 1967.

[6] The term "civilian resistance" has sometimes been used to describe popular but largely violent forms of resistance. See, for example, Arthur Waskow, *The Limits of Defense* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 94–97. This is perhaps a somewhat misleading use of the word "civilian," and is hardly necessary in view of the existence of numerous other terms (for example, "popular resistance," "general resistance," etc.) to describe widespread popular resistance which includes the use of violent methods.

[7] B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1954), p. 337.

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fighting battles, but of undermining the opponent's power by a variety of means, which may include killing his men, wounding them, demoralizing them, starving them, capturing them, and inducing them to be inefficient or to desert. The means of undermining the opponent's power may also include overextending his resources, weakening his economy, and causing internal political divisions in his society. Nonviolent means of combat can at times achieve many of these objects, and they may also at times have a greater tendency than violent methods to inhibit the opponent's use of violence. Inhibiting the opponent may be a vital part of strategy.

The need for developing some form of inhibition mechanism has been pointed to by Dr. Konrad Lorenz. He has described the mechanism whereby many animal species avoid actual destruction of other members of their own species. Deer, for example, do not strike with their antlers when presented with the unprotected flank of their rivals. Lorenz states: "Among the higher vertebrates there are countless examples of such inhibitions against injuring fellow-members of the species, and they often play an essential part in situations where the anthropomorphizing observer would never suspect that aggression was present or that special mechanisms were necessary for its suppression."[8] Of humans, Lorenz states: "In human evolution, no inhibitory mechanisms preventing sudden manslaughter were necessary, because quick killing was impossible anyhow; the potential victim had plenty of opportunity to elicit the pity of the aggressor by submissive gestures and appeasing attitudes. No selection pressure arose in the pre-history of mankind to breed inhibitory mechanisms preventing the killing of conspecifics until, all of a sudden, the invention of artificial weapons upset the equilibrium of killing potential and social inhibitions."[9]

Drawing on the work of Lorenz and others in a study dealing more directly with war and peace among humans, Dr. Jerome D. Frank has concluded: "Certain human attitudes of prayer or suppliance may be analogous to those that inhibit aggression in animals, but their efficacy is at best uncertain, and they may fail altogether to inhibit an attacker from a different culture who does not recognize the signal. In fact, the most striking difference between humans and almost all animals is that . . . they lack adequate inhibitions against killing their own kind."[10]

Among the many techniques which may help in the complex process of inhibition, nonviolent action may have a significant place. The means by which it can inhibit violence, and operate in the face of violence, require some

[8] Konrad Lorenz, *On Aggression*, trans. Marjorie Latzke (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1966), pp. 98-99.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 207.
[10] Jerome D. Frank, *Sanity and Survival: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 44-45.

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description. No easy assumption should be made, however, that any individual technique is likely on its own to be wholly effective in the complex process of inhibition.

Nor should the inhibition of violence be seen as the sole aim of any civilian defense struggle. A struggle of any kind against an armed and determined opponent is always likely to result in his use of violence and repression. But, if it is assumed that there must be a struggle of some kind, nonviolent forms of resistance may in general tend to result in less use of violence by the opponent. They will still almost certainly provoke some violence, and there should be no assumption that civilian defense would enable people to escape bloodshed and suffering. If short-term inhibition of violence was all that was aimed at, acceptance of aggression, and accommodation with alien rule, might be a more satisfactory course; but such a course, apart from being unsatisfactory for other reasons, is scarcely likely to provide any long-term discouragement of aggression and violence. Indeed, by insuring that attackers get what they seek it could be construed as a direct encouragement to them.

It is commonly argued that methods of nonviolent action such as strikes, boycotts, and civil disobedience can be effective within the restrained framework of a liberal democracy, but can have no place in a struggle against a dictatorial opponent prepared to use violent means of repression. However, many nonviolent campaigns have in fact taken place under conditions of considerable repression and violence. Even in the Indian struggle for independence from British rule there were very large casualties; though, as Richard Gregg pointed out in his book *The Power of Nonviolence,* these were far fewer than would have been expected in a violent resistance struggle: "In the Indian struggle for independence, though I know of no accurate statistics, hundreds of thousands of Indians went to jail, probably not more than five hundred received permanent physical injuries, and probably not over eight thousand were killed immediately or died later from wounds. No British, I believe, were killed or wounded."[11]

Nonviolent action can operate effectively against violence in a number of distinct ways which deserve to be very briefly summarized. The listing of four basic ways which follows is preliminary in character and certainly incomplete. But it may provide some clues about the potentialities of a civilian defense

[11] Richard B. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence* (London: James Clarke Co., Ltd., 1960), p. 100. A note of caution about these figures is needed. Apart from the apparent vagueness of the figure 8,000, it should be noted that this figure is hard to evaluate because the Indian independence struggle was at various stages accompanied by rioting and terrorism, quite apart from the Hindu-Muslim riots at the time of independence. Contrary to Gregg's statement, such rioting and terrorism did on some occasions result in the death of British people. Inevitably there were reprisals against Indians by the British after such incidents.

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policy, and about the particular strategies which are likely to be effective in civilian defense.

First, the mere fact that nonviolent action *is* nonviolent can serve to inhibit the opponent's forces from using violence. For some people at some times it undeniably tends to be harder to fire against disciplined nonviolent opponents than against people who are threatening one's life and limb. It is worth briefly listing a few examples of nonviolent action inhibiting the opponent in this way.

On June 12, 1919 in Tsinan-fu, capital of the Chinese province of Shantung, nationalist students, striking against Japanese control, came up against Japanese soldiers who had been ordered by proclamation to arrest all students found on the streets at noon. As the Japanese mounted infantry advanced, "the lads knelt on the street, and with tears streaming down many a face they cried, 'This is a matter of conscience.' As they saw this scene, the soldiers refused to obey their superiors, and the students were safe."[12]

In Berlin in March 1920, during the Kapp *putsch,* which was resisted primarily by means of noncooperation, there was disobedience among the forces which Dr. Kapp had hoped to control. On the night of March 16-17 a Guards Engineer battalion in Berlin mutinied and declared for the legal government. On the following morning it was learned that the Berlin Security Police had ceased to support Kapp, and there was a report of a mutiny of Reichswehr soldiers.[13]

In India in April 1930 two platoons of the Garhwal regiment refused to fire on nonviolent resisters in Peshawar.[14]

In the East German uprising of June 1953, some Polish tanks were sent to Goerlitz to disperse workers taking part in the uprising, but the senior Polish officer stepped out of his tank, faced the Germans, and said: "I don't fire on German workers."[15] In the East German town of Jena, women sitting down in the street succeeded in stopping the advance of Russian tanks temporarily.[16]

[12] Paul Jones, "The Students' Revolt in China," *The Independent,* September 20, 1919. Quoted in Clarence Marsh Case, *Non-violent Coercion-A Study in Methods of Social Pressure* (New York: The Century Co., 1923), pp. 341-342.

[13] D. J. Goodspeed, *The Conspirators: A Study of the Coup d'État* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1962), p. 135.

[14] For fuller accounts of this important incident see Joan Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 137-138; Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography* (London: The Bodley Head, 1936), p. 214; and Krishnalal Shridharani, *War Without Violence: A Study of Gandhi's Method and Its Accomplishments* (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1939), pp. 53-57.

[15] Associated Press dispatch datelined Berlin, June 22, 1953; quoted in William Robert Miller, *Nonviolence: A Christian Interpretation* (New York: Association Press, 1964), p. 352.

[16] Stefan Brant, *The East German Rising,* trans. Charles Wheeler (London: Thames and Hudson, 1955), pp. 110-113.

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The nonviolent character of the uprising in its early stages—when it was marked more by strikes and demonstrations than by violent actions—appears to have puzzled the authorities; and after the uprising, according to West German sources, seventeen Russian officers were shot for having refused to obey orders.[17] In the week following the uprising, 150 members of the East German People's Police deserted to West Berlin.[18]

In the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, which like the East German uprising was relatively peaceful in its early stages, there were several cases of Russian troops refusing to fire on unarmed crowds.[19]

In the resistance against *apartheid* in South Africa, there were a few instances of nonviolent demonstrations inhibiting the use of violence. Certainly this did not always happen; but in his account of the police tendency to beat up women demonstrators during a campaign in 1959, Luthuli said: "At Ixopo, where there was some very efficient organization, the women met this threat with a tactic of their own. When the order to disperse was given, they fell down on their knees and began to pray! The police hung around helplessly."[20]

In the U. S. struggle for civil rights, there was a similar incident involving praying demonstrators in Birmingham, Alabama, on Sunday, May 5, 1963. When the police chief Bull Connor ordered firemen to turn on the hoses against demonstrators, the firemen failed to obey.[21]

The above examples certainly do no more than indicate that on some occasions nonviolent methods can inhibit an opponent's use of violence, even in dramatic situations of open confrontation in the streets. But merely being nonviolent certainly does not always produce this effect; and there is a need to examine further ways in which the use of nonviolent methods can be effective against violence.

It is here that a second approach against violence is particularly relevant. Nonviolent action, more easily than violent action, can be accompanied by various types of contact between the opposing sides. Such contact may be simply friendly fraternization; or it may involve political propaganda about the aims of the nonviolent resisters; or it may involve deliberate and carefully

[17] *Es geschah im Juni 1953: Fakten und Daten* (Bonn: Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1965), p. 42; quoted in Theodor Ebert, "Non-violent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" in Adam Roberts, ed., *The Strategy of Civilian Defence: Non-violent Resistance to Aggression* (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1967), p. 192. Published in the United States as *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1968).

[18] Associated Press dispatch, *New York Times*, June 24, 1953.

[19] *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary*, Supplement no. 18 to the Official Records of the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly (New York: United Nations, 1957), p. 82.

[20] Albert Luthuli, *Let My People Go: An Autobiography* (London: Collins Fontana Books, 1963), p. 175.

[21] Martin Luther King, *Why We Can't Wait* (New York: Signet Books, 1964), p. 101.

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calculated attempts to make the opponent realize the degree of human suffering which his actions are causing.[22]

The important consequences of contact between opposing parties have been demonstrated in many conflicts. During the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the Russians clearly felt that they could not trust the Russian troops already in Hungary; therefore, according to the UN report on events in Hungary, they brought in troops from outside who "were unaware of the aspirations, and sometimes even of the identity, of their enemies."[23]

Contacts can, obviously, be especially strong in struggles against indigenous opponents—as, for example, when resisting a military coup or a tyrannical regime. A particularly notable example occurred in South Vietnam in 1963 during the Buddhist revolt against the Diem regime. Douglas Pike has written that when Vietnamese army officers and men "discovered that they were standing guard on prisons containing their younger brothers and sisters, their sympathy even publicly veered to the Buddhist-student cause, and the fate of the Diem government was sealed."[24] The nonviolent defiance of the regime's opponents affected the officers. As Robert Shaplen has said: "The fact was that young officers throughout the military were becoming increasingly disillusioned with the regime, and this feeling was strengthened when they saw that people everywhere were still willing to flock to the pagodas, even in the face of gun muzzles."[25] The Buddhists capitalized on their close proximity to their opponents not merely by their attempts to maintain friendly contact (by keeping the struggle largely nonviolent), but also by the amplification of their own suffering. Their dramatic (and in my opinion highly questionable[26]) protest suicides were only the most extreme of a whole series of measures intended to show their opponents that they were suffering.

A third aspect of the use of nonviolent methods against violent opponents is that methods of resistance can be selected which are so far removed from the normal military context of military operations, and so decentralized in character, that the use of violence by the opponent is hopefully not even seriously considered. A crowd of demonstrators or a line of nonviolent obstructers can easily be shot or arrested by an occupying force. But some forms of concealed noncooperation (work-to-rules, inefficiency, loss of consignments,

[22] For a discussion of problems of fraternization and of "amplification of suffering inflicted by the enemy" see Galtung's 1968 paper "The Strategy of Non-military Defense" (*supra*, n. 2), pp. 21-26.

[23] *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary*, p. 129.

[24] Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 71.

[25] Robert Shaplen, *The Lost Revolution: Vietnam 1945-65* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1966), pp. 198-199.

[26] Protest suicide is a questionable form of action not only because it is so violent and irrevocable, but also because it so easily lends itself to use by unbalanced individuals in wholly inappropriate situations.

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etc.) can be far harder to deal with by military means. This is true also to some extent of some forms of open noncooperation, such as strikes.

A fourth aspect of the use of nonviolent methods against violence is that, even where the opponent's violence is not quickly inhibited, corroded by friendly contact, or made irrelevant by subtle forms of resistance, it can be made to rebound against him. Nonviolent action can isolate and discredit those who use violence. It can not only cause dissension in their own forces, but it can also bring about international pressure against the opponent. This appears to have been the Buddhists' aim in South Vietnam in 1963. They made little direct impression on Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu, but they did very largely isolate the Diem regime from its usual sources of support, both domestic and international. This was achieved precisely *because* Diem and Nhu had used so much violence against the Buddhists in their attempt to suppress the Buddhist revolt. This case serves as a reminder that in human affairs inhibition is an even more complex process than it is on other steps of the evolutionary ladder. The opponent's use of violence may be an essential step in his ultimate defeat.

The process of inhibiting, achieving contact with, and isolating an opponent's forces is generally slow, and a civilian defense struggle, like any form of defense against attack, is always likely to involve casualties and suffering. How many casualties and how much suffering of course depends on the particular conflict, but proposals for civilian defense should not be based on a false optimism which could only lead to disappointment. The vast slaughters of Jews and others by the Germans in World War II are a reminder of the brutalities of which man is capable—though the question needs to be raised as to whether these exterminations would have been possible if there had been more sustained noncooperation by the Jews, and if the killings had not taken place during the chaos and national hysteria of a world war.[27]

There is another dimension to the problem of facing the opponent's violence. The existence of nuclear weapons, which has undoubtedly stimulated interest in civilian defense, has also presented it with a series of difficult problems. How can nonviolent methods inhibit the use of nuclear missiles, operated as they are by people remote from the targets? Could not a nation with a civilian defense policy be subjected to nuclear blackmail? Walter Millis and James Real have discussed this possibility:

> Assuming a Soviet Union armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons and confronting a Western and neutralist world that had divested itself of such "power," what could the Soviet Union actually do with its armament? It could, of course, make demands and threats on pain of nuclear extermination. But if the demands were simply rejected, could the power of extermination help them at all? Would their military power not in fact be reduced to the

[27] For a discussion of the question of Jewish resistance in Europe see my review article, "Resistance and Rescue," *New Society*, London, April 11, 1968.

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position of the French military power in Europe after 1918, which in the absence of a German army had no target against which to direct its efforts and in the result lost all control over events in Central Europe?[28]

In certain respects a civilian defense policy is particularly well suited to inhibiting the use of air power, including nuclear weapons. This is not only because the nuclear bombing of a civilian defense country would be a particularly blatant crime, hard for any nation to justify to its own citizens or the world at large, but also because in civilian defense there are few concentrated targets of the type which, in military defense, can tempt an opponent to use his air power.

The problem of nullifying air power is not peculiar to civilian defense, and Liddell Hart has seen the growing use of guerrilla methods as being partly a response to the development of air power:

> We have moved into a new era of strategy that is very different to what was assumed by the advocates of air-atomic power—the 'revolutionaries' of the past era. The strategy now being developed by our opponents is inspired by the dual idea of evading and hamstringing superior air-power. Ironically, the further we have developed the "massive" effect of the bombing weapon, the more we have helped the progress of this new guerrilla-type strategy.[29]

Civilian defense has at least some of those characteristics of guerrilla warfare which make air power a blunted weapon. It could also sharply reduce, if not entirely eliminate, the risk of accidental or unintended nuclear war. While accidental wars can start in a wide variety of ways, their basic cause is generally mutual fear of surprise attack—a more or less unavoidable accompaniment of military, and especially nuclear, policies.

There can be no claim that a policy of civilian defense would be certain to inhibit the use of nuclear power by an opponent. But there is evidence that it might produce such a result, and prevent the process of escalation to ever higher levels of violence.[30] Civilian defense can thus be seen to have a deterrent, or dissuasive, function against nuclear attack as well as against other types of threat.

VIOLENT INSTINCTS AND STRATEGIES IN DEFENSE

The above discussion has perhaps somewhat oversimplified the problem of the inhibition of violence. In practice even a properly prepared policy of civilian defense might involve, or be accompanied by, the use of violence *by defenders,* and to this problem we now turn. The problem has two related aspects: the use of violence in defense as an emotional release, a means of

[28] Walter Millis and James Real, *The Abolition of War* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963), p. 101.

[29] B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1954), p. 15.

[30] I have discussed the danger of bombing of a civilian defense country at greater length in Roberts, ed., *The Strategy of Civilian Defence,* pp. 231-235.

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getting revenge or letting off aggressive instincts; and the use of violence as a serious strategy to accompany the use of nonviolent methods.

These aspects of civilian defense demand attention because in almost all nonviolent campaigns there has been some use of violence by those who support the overall aims of the campaign, if not its means of struggle and internal discipline. In a civilian defense struggle, involving a whole nation, there is obviously a very strong likelihood that many individuals will hold some kind of belief in, or give support to, violent methods. Any realistic planning for civilian defense must take account of this problem, which could be particularly acute in a long civilian defense struggle involving intense suffering and facing a population almost daily with the spectacle of arbitrary and wanton action by an opponent. In such a situation there will inevitably be violent feelings among the population of a country under attack. The problem is how to suppress, redirect, or employ those violent feelings.

Simply to regard violence as *ipso facto* immoral and harmful, and to apply this attitude to all spheres of human activity, is no solution. Jerome D. Frank has suggested that the rigorous adoption of nonviolence can in some circumstances eventually result in severe outbreaks of violence, owing to the frustration of violent impulses involved.[31] Konrad Lorenz has said that it is "hopeless" to try "to control aggression by putting a moral veto on it," and has stressed the importance of finding constructive outlets for aggressive and violent instincts.[32] The question as to how this should be done in civilian defense has hardly been tackled. Undoubtedly it can be important to nonviolent discipline to have widely respected leaders who are deeply committed to the ethic of nonviolence. But it may be equally important to have outlets for violent feelings. Paradoxically, certain forms of nonviolent action may themselves at times provide such outlets, but so may actions such as sabotage, rioting, or assassination. If the more violent of these actions is to be avoided, it might be desirable to have some kind of program of sabotage directed against property rather than persons. Directed violence might be much less of a threat to a civilian defense struggle, and be much less of an obstacle to the friendly approach to the opponent's personnel, than the mindless violence of rioting or individual terrorism.

Violence generally hampers a nonviolent struggle, weakens its effect, and distorts its image. But at times it may have its strategic uses. The *threat* of violence is often alluded to by nonviolent leaders, who have often stressed that if their demands are not met, the situation may get out of hand. Gandhi and Martin Luther King frequently hinted at such possibilities, and their hints

[31] In a paper originally presented at a conference on "Youth, non-violence and social change" at Howard University, Washington, D.C., and reprinted in *Peace News* (weekly), London, January 3, 1964.
[32] Lorenz, *On Aggression*, p. 239.

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were entirely proper. They did not approve of violence, for in both cases they were drawing attention to the possibility of a state of rioting and destructiveness which was not likely to benefit either side. Thus violence would have made little sense, and there was never any question of Gandhi or King launching it. But they recognized the potency of the threat of destructive violence.

Nonviolent campaigns can involve a more complex relationship to violence than the above-mentioned use of the threat of violence. They can at times be associated with the actual employment of violence or armed forces in a controlled manner. In the nonviolent movement for civil rights in the United States there has been very little principled opposition to the use of armed federal intervention in schools which refuse to desegregate, or in protection of particular nonviolent demonstrations which previous experience had shown to be in danger of brutal physical attack. (Examples are the Freedom Ride in May 1961, which on the section from Montgomery, Alabama, to Jackson, Mississippi, was escorted by twenty-two highway patrol cars, two battalions of national guardsmen, three U.S. Army reconnaissance planes, and two helicopters; and the march from Selma to Montgomery in 1965.)

Gandhi himself to a considerable extent based his advocacy of nonviolence in politics on pragmatic assessment. Thus, though he opposed all use of violence by the independence movement, he favored violence in certain hypothetical situations where people were threatened by deranged individuals. As he wrote: "Taking life may be a duty . . . Even man-slaughter may be necessary in certain cases. Suppose a man runs amuck and goes furiously about sword in hand, and killing anyone that comes in his way, and no one dares to capture him alive. Anyone who despatches this lunatic will earn the gratitude of the community and be regarded as a benevolent man."[33] This statement should not be taken as offering any basis for approval of the use of violence in *political* affairs, for here Gandhi believed that the opponent's power was most effectively undermined by nonviolent means, even where the opponent has been engaging in indiscriminate slaughter.

The whole concept of civilian defense is increasingly being recognized as an important subject of study and research. It is not too much to hope that this form of defense may be properly organized on a national scale and be used effectively in the fight for peace and freedom. But if the idea of civilian defense is to become reality, and if it is to succeed on the field of action, it will need to be based on a deep understanding of the complexity both of the problem of defense and of nonviolent action. The inhibition of violence and the control of military power is a great and difficult challenge, and our research into it needs to take account of the difficulties as well as the greatness of the challenge.

[33] *Young India* (weekly), November 4, 1926; reprinted in Nirmal Kumar Bose, *Selections from Gandhi* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1957), p. 156.

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The Awakening of Faith Attributed to Aśvaghosha. *Translated with Commentary by Yoshito S. Hakeda.* New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. xi + 128. $5.00.

The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna (Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun), reconstructed into Sanskrit as *Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra,* is attributed to one Aśvaghoṣa, whose biographical sketch is vague. At least scholars today are cognizant of the fact that he is not to be confused with the Sanskrit poet of the first or second century A.D., author of the *Buddhacārita, Saundarananda,* and *Śāriputra-prakaraṇa.* The text was first translated into Chinese with the assistance of an Indian, *Paramārtha,* in 550 A.D. Another complete translation was made by another Indian, Śikṣānanda, about 150 years later, the content of which seems to be quite similar to that of Paramārtha's version, thus giving rise to speculation that the former may have relied heavily on the latter.

Over the centuries the text has enjoyed unprecedented popularity and influence in China, Korea, and Japan, because of its compact presentation of the basic ideas of the Mahāyāna. More particularly, it has been accepted by such prominent schools as Fa-hsiang (Vijñānavāda), Hua-yen (Kegon or "Wreath Doctrine"), Ch'an (Zen), T'ien T'ai (Tendai or "Lotus Doctrine"), Chen-yen ("True Word Doctrine"), and Ching-t'u (Pure Land). Thus all or most of the principal developments of Far Eastern Buddhism have incorporated partially or totally the tenets of this text.

There have been some 170 commentaries on the text among which, as Professor Hakeda rightly indicates, the standard commentaries are by Hui-yuan (523-592), by the Korean monk Wŏnhyo (617-686), and by Fa-tsang (643-712). Among the three Fa-tsang's work has been acclaimed for a long time to be the most authoritative, and Hakeda has resorted to this work repeatedly in the interpretation of subtle passages.

In our times three English translations of the text have been made. The pioneering work is by D. T. Suzuki, *Aśvaghosha's Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna,* done in 1900 and based on the later Chinese work of Śikṣānanda. The second is by the Rev. Timothy Richard, *The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna Doctrine—the New Buddhism,* done in 1907 and based on the earlier work of Paramārtha. Richard's translation is so deeply tinged with Christian dogmas that it is utterly useless for all practical purposes. The third is by Bhikshu Wai-tao, *Awakening of Faith* included as a section in *A Buddhist Bible* (edited by Dwight Goddard), done in 1938 and based on Paramārtha's work. This translation suffers from being too free and liberal, perhaps due to Goddard's editing of the English.

Professor Hakeda has based his translation on the old text by Paramārtha. His intent "is to present as accurate as possible a translation of the text as it is interpreted in the light of the traditional commentaries, at the same time taking into consideration the results of modern critical scholarship on the text and the history of Buddhist thought in general. An effort has been made to translate the text so as to make it easily accessible to the general reader, but the demands of specialists,

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who will be comparing it with the original, have also been kept in mind. As a result, the translation is more liberal than literary" (p. 18). Where other translations have failed to do so, he has included paragraphs or lines of explanation in small type to aid the reader in following subtle points as well as the general line of development of the text itself. Footnotes are mainly reserved for the specialist who may wish to seek further up-to-date references or source materials. In these respects, this translation is far superior to any to date. It can profitably be used for undergraduates and would be extremely beneficial to mature students exposed to fundamental Buddhist thought and with some knowledge of the Chinese language.

The content of the text is described very aptly by Hakeda:

> The work is a comprehensive summary of the essentials of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the product of a mind extraordinarily apt at synthesis. It begins with an examination of the nature of the Absolute or enlightenment and of the phenomenal world or non-enlightenment, and discusses the relationships that exist between them; from there it passes on to the question of how man may transcend his finite state and participate in the life of the infinite while still remaining in the midst of the phenomenal order; it concludes with a discussion of particular practices and techniques that will aid the believer in the awakening and growth of his faith. (pp. 3-4)

Being a relatively late work in the Mahāyāna tradition, and therefore containing a logical, concise, crystallized account of Mahāyāna thought, the text is not easy reading even in translation. For example, in the third part of the text, the cardinal principle discussed is the mutually inclusive nature of the phenomenal (*saṃsāra*) and non-phenomenal (*tathatā*) realms of being. The enlightened mind (*citta*) has these two aspects but they are manifest differently for different aspirants. It is also called the "storehouse consciousness" (*ālaya-vijñāna*), like the ocean (enlightened realm) and waves caused by the wind (defilements). Both ocean and waves are inseparable but the waves can be made to stop with the cessation of the wind; likewise, the potential nature of the mind, which is suchness, or of the nirvāṇic nature (*śūnyatā*) can be realized with the cessation of the "winds of ignorance" (*avidyā*). Thereafter, the principal task of the text centers on the elaboration of how the subtle interchange between the realm of enlightenment and non-enlightenment is possible. The awakening of faith is indeed, in the final analysis, the awakening to an understanding of the profound Mahāyāna principles. The text is markedly eclectic, synthesizing doctrines culled from Prajñā philosophy, Śūnyavāda or Mādhyamika, Vijñānavāda, and Sukhāvatī (Pure Land thought).

I personally welcome this excellent translation in the repertoire of worthy Mahāyāna philosophical texts.

Kenneth K. Inada
University of Hawaii

Royce and Hocking: American Idealists (An Introduction to Their Philosophy with Selected Letters). *By Daniel S. Robinson.* Boston: The Christopher Publishing House, 1968. Pp. 175. $5.00.

Over the past twenty years Daniel Robinson has written many important articles on the work of his teachers, Josiah Royce and William Ernest Hocking. The pres-

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ent volume is principally a gathering of these articles with selected letters, in order, as Professor Robinson puts it, ". . . to provide a general introduction to their thought, to clarify its chief characteristics, and to induce readers to study seriously their chief works" (p. 9). The book is divided into three parts: first, "Essays on the Philosophy of Josiah Royce"; second, "Essays on the Philosophy of William Ernest Hocking"; and third, "Selected Letters."

Noteworthy in Part One are the chapters entitled "Royce On the Origin and Development of Philosophical Terminology"—a discussion of Royce's articles which appeared in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*—and "Royce's Contribution to Logic." These two excellent essays uncover for the reader rich areas in Royce's own writings.

Part Two contains several fine essays. Especially rewarding are "Hocking's Contribution to Metaphysical Idealism," "Hocking's Political Philosophy," and "Hocking's Experiment in Education." The last is Professor Robinson's review of Hocking's penetrating study of American involvement in postwar German education. The essay is followed by Professor Hocking's comments on his own book ". . . whose burden, simply stated, is that Germany's aberration was metaphysical; that the deep suffering of our age, its loss of bearings, is metaphysical; that our errors in education, our failure to convey 'democracy,' so far as we did fail was metaphysical; that the weakness of our jurisprudence, and the incompetence of our struggle for a world order, are at bottom metaphysical; and that the cure for all of this must be metaphysical, namely a revision of Descartes and Kant" (p. 116).

The letters in Part Three are as charming as they are informative. There is young Royce submitting his first article for publication in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* and appending the apology: "After all it may not be unwelcome to you to hear a word of the philosophic studies that a few at the Johns Hopkins University are engaged in; even though you may not find much worth in what I herewith send" (pp. 128-129); or Hocking's observation to Professor Robinson: ". . . you have put this matter just right, by defining idealism as a view of 'being,' a metaphysic, not an epistemological vestibule. When Reinhold Niebuhr or John Wild denounces idealism . . . they are not opposing the thesis that ideas are real, but the thesis that the real consists of (our) ideas pure and simple" (p. 159).

Of particular significance are four letters of Stephen Royce in which he discusses his father's association with Indian thought, and comments upon his later work in logic. He corrects the view that Josiah Royce's extensive acquaintance with Indian philosophy sprang from European sources, pointing out that Charles R. Lanman, the well-known Sanskrit scholar, was his father's personal friend and intellectual companion for many years. In carefully explaining this judgment, as well as others on logic and the Münsterberg affair, Stephen Royce makes his letters a rich source of biographical detail and commentary.

Since this is a collection of disparate essays and letters rather than an overview of the philosophies of Royce and Hocking, the reader will not find in these pages an exposition of American metaphysical idealism. But from the first chapter

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it is clear that Professor Robinson has chosen each topic, essay, and letter out of admiration, and the result is certainly a good introduction to Royce and Hocking.

TERRENCE HANEY
University of Hawaii

Tibetan Buddhism Without Mystification (The Buddhist Way From Original Tibetan Sources). *By Herbert V. Guenther.* Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966. Pp. 156. (Price not given.)

Mr. Guenther's valuable book is divided into two sections. The first is called "The Buddhist Way," and is an exposition of the main elements constituting Buddhism, with special reference to Tibetan schools. The second, "The Tibetan Sources," is made up of four works from the *dGe-lugs-pa* school of Tibetan Buddhism which are here translated, by the author, into English for the first time. Mr. Guenther has chosen to emphasize this particular school because, he says, "I wanted to bring out the specific merits of the *dGe-lugs-pa* writers: the clear distinction between the various philosophical trends that were developed by the four major schools of thought in India and continued in Tibet; the preeminent interest in epistemological problems; and their traditionalism" (p. vii). It should also be noted that the *dGe-lugs-pa* is the most influential school of Tibetan Buddhism, having both the Dalai and Panchen Lamas as members.

All four texts were written by the tutor of the Eighth Dalai Lama (1758-1805), Ye-shes rgyal-mtshan. The titles of these texts are as follows: "The Gold-Refinery bringing out the very essence of the Sutra and Tantra Paths"; "The Specific Guidance to the Profound Middle View or the direct Message of Blo-bzang"; "The Secret Manual revealing the Innermost Nature of Seeing Reality or the Source of all Attainments"; and "The Instruction In the Essence of the Vajrayāna Path or the Shortcut to the Palace of Unity."

Mr. Guenther remarks that the present Dalai Lama had complained to him that the philosophical and religious merits of Tibetan Buddhism have all too often been overlooked or distorted for the purpose of catering to the "mystery monger." Mr. Guenther has, in his commentary and translations, set himself the admirable task of correcting this imbalance.

Mr. Guenther also states that the Tantras, both in themselves and in relation to the Sūtras, have been generally misrepresented to Western students. The four texts cited above were chosen both for their informative value and their ability to clear up many of these misrepresented aspects. The author enumerates four specific characteristics of his translations. First, he stresses "the value of mystic experience"; second, he has "refrained from etymologizing"; third, he has also refrained "from rediscovering neo-Hegelian trends in Buddhism"; fourth, the last-mentioned procedure has resulted in "a revision of almost all key terms in Buddhist

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texts and the introduction of new renderings." The original Tibetan texts are appended at the end of the book.

In the first part of his book, Mr. Guenther has attempted to revitalize the concepts and symbolism of Buddhism by re-expressing many key ideas in an existentialist vein, while at the same time rejecting "Continental" existentialists, or at least some of them, for their concept of man. This procedure makes for interesting and stimulating interpretations and explanations of Buddhism, perhaps because Buddhism lends itself more naturally to being expressed in terms of modern "process" philosophy than does Christianity, which, when similarly treated, leaves one with the impression that something is being "put over" on one.

At any rate, Mr. Guenther has presented to us a work of first rate importance in the field of Tibetan studies, and English speaking students owe to him a debt of gratitude for his illuminating translations.

THOMAS RIGGINS
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Human Love (Existential and Mystical). *By Ralph Harper.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. 178. $5.50.

In *Human Love* there are 178 pages of text which contain 301 quotations. By a simple consideration of these figures it will be correctly deduced that the book is by and large an anthology of extracts about love.

It should be noted that Ralph Harper's book is, in effect, an anthology about love in purely Western cultures. All of his examples are drawn from Western sources alone. Not to have looked at the wealth of data, both historical and fictional, that is available to the researcher into love in Eastern cultures is a serious omission in a book whose title is *Human Love.*

Strictly speaking, the book is not a work of philosophy but a rather discursive work of literary criticism; in fact, by far the best and most interesting chapters are those in which Harper gives accounts of famous fictional or real love affairs. The best of these is his account of the love affair of Heloise and Abelard (chap. 6), which is probably the best account that I have read of this famous affair and contains a good criticism of Gilson's account.

Despite the above, Harper's avowed central thesis is an espousal of Buber's view that ". . . in each Thou we address the eternal Thou" by which (I take it) is meant that love of man is really somehow inseparable from love of God. Unfortunately, his arguments for this view, or should I call them persuasions, are not very strong. He says that the mystics' language when referring to God is like the language of human lovers referring to their human beloveds. This is hardly a strong argument for saying that human love and love of God are somehow inseparable; a man may use much the same language in addressing his car as in addressing his wife, but this does not mean that we must consider his attitude to his car and to his wife to be in some way inseparable. Harper's next "argument,"

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that the observable characteristics of a human lover are much the same as those of a mystic who is in love with God, is open to exactly the same sort of objection.

Throughout the whole of the book, the reader is subjected to a barrage of unargued-for, highly-debatable assertions: "Yet, in the end, the worthiness of the lover is determined as much by the energy and purity of his own love as by the energy and purity of the one he loves" (p. 15). If what Harper says in this extract is true, it means that Christ's love for the prostitute Mary Magdalen makes him less worthy than if he loved only persons of "energy and purity"!

"Love breeds love, whether human or divine" (p. 15). Does Harper mean that if X loves Y then Y will necessarily love X? If so he is wrong, for there are many cases of rejected love. Does he mean that if X loves Y then Y is more likely to fall in love with X, given the fulfillment of other factors, than if X did not love Y? If so, he is probably factually correct.

". . . But here I am concerned only with the single-minded obsession with the real that one finds in great lovers, whether of nature or of mankind" (p. 17). I would have thought that many great lovers are really in love with imagined objects. Or does the author mean to legislate arbitrarily that great lovers are those who, by definition, only love their beloveds because of the cold hard "reality" which constitutes them?

"Once loved, we do have an obligation to render thanks and to return that love, for love that does not give . . ." (p. 75). This seems contrary to fact. A person might find someone's love boring or depressing or corrupting or painful. In such cases, one (though grateful, perhaps) can hardly be expected to return the love.

I feel that it is not unfair to accuse Harper of *often* using persuasion or an unargued-for assertion when what is required is solid argument. Other examples of what I mean are the following: "A good love is surprised at being loved at all; and it is being loved that makes it good" (p. 29). "The root of all evils is the frustration of love" (p. 169). "Love reveals herself only to those who trust her as much as they desire her" (p. 172).

William E. Lyons
University of Calgary

Protestant Theologies in Modern Japan. *By Charles H. Germany.* Tokyo: IISR Press, 1965. Pp. xv + 239. $4.50.

As both its title and author's preface indicate, the principal aim of this book by Dr. Charles H. Germany is that of presenting the dominant theologies of modern Japan. The approach taken is basically a historical one for which the first chapter sets the stage by briefly describing the character of Protestant theology, from the time of its introduction into Japan in 1859 to the early 1900's, as one latent with liberal as well as non-liberal tendencies. Its development along liberal lines is revealed by reference to the thought of three major theologians, Danjō Ebina, Setsuji Ōtsuka, and Toyohiko Kagawa, and to the position of the Nihon Gakusei

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Kurisutokyō Undō (SCM), whose main spokesmen are Enkichi Kan and Shigeru Nakajima. Its development along non-liberal lines is depicted in terms of the theology of Tokutarō Takakura and the dialectical theology of Yoshitaka Kumano and Kan, who had changed his theological outlook. A description of Protestant thought during and after World War II completes the survey being given. The book concludes with the author's views on the challenges facing Japanese Protestant theologians of the future.

This basic outline is excellent for bringing into focus the dynamic interplay and development of theological ideas and patterns that occurred in Japan during this century. Unfortunately, however, Dr. Germany does not take advantage of this structure, and instead presents us with a mere collection of essays. In fact, such a major portion of the text is devoted to relating the life history of individuals that the reader who is intent upon learning about the theologies finds himself having to plow through pages of biographical and sociopolitical details.

It is also unfortunate that Dr. Germany does not focus his study upon a given set of doctrines. Parallel treatments of specific doctrines as held by various thinkers would give the reader a background to engage in a comparative study of his own.

Dr. Germany seems most vitally concerned with the social relevance of Protestant Christianity. This is evident in his evaluative remarks and in his numerous references to socio-political conditions and to the role of the churches. In the opening paragraph of the concluding chapter, he writes, ". . . one matter in particular emerges as a challenge which the future holds before the theological mind of the church—the challenge of the relevant, creative, and redeeming relation of theology and the church to Japanese society and culture" (p. 209). He is at his best when discussing this theme, a theme identified as a sub-theme in his preface (p. xii).

From a technical point of view one can cite several deficiencies that might well have been avoided. Among them are the following: inadequate identification of numerous individuals (no mention of personal names, either in the text or index, along with such common surnames as Kennedy, Miyazaki, and Takahashi); repeated identifications of others (for example, Professor Hidenobu Kuwada is cited as the president of Tokyo Union Theological Seminary at least four times); occasional omission of publication dates; incomplete listings of sources in the bibliography, which is otherwise extensive; innumerable typographical errors for which a special apology is enclosed.

This book could be vastly improved in a subsequent edition by careful editing and rewriting with greater focus placed upon its central theme. Such a rewriting should certainly include more about Kazō Kitamori, who is cited as "probably Japan's most creative and original theologian today" (pp. 204-205); only a few pages are devoted to the exposition of his thought. Dr. Germany has a wealth of information, and it is to be hoped that it might be shared with the world of scholarship in a more significant, systematic, and perceptive manner than it has been.

Beatrice T. Yamasaki
University of Hawaii

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The Sciences and the Humanities (Conflict and Reconciliation). *By W. I. Jones.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967. Pp. viii + 282. $2.25. Paper.

Although there have been in recent years a number of works dealing with the relations (or lack of them) between the sciences and the arts that have been geared to a popular audience, this book, however enticing its title, is not in the same category. The average reader, if not aware of much that is happening on the contemporary philosophical scene, is very likely to be put off by the rather complex conceptual apparatus which Professor Jones develops in order to deal with the central problems of this work. But if the development is sometimes taxing, it is nevertheless well-done, with many apt examples which make for stimulating, if not exactly casual, reading.

The central task of this book is to show that the sciences and the humanities are in many significant respects similar in their aims, methods, and results. Furthermore, Professor Jones argues that the view that there is an unbridgeable gap between the two areas of human activity rests in turn upon the (erroneous) belief in a sharp distinction between matters of fact and matters of value. For this reason, nearly one-half of this book is devoted to the development of a theory (similar to that of John Dewey) of the nature of thought and language which, if correct, results in the untenability of just such a sharp distinction. The main result now follows immediately: the apparently value-free statements of the physicist and the expressive utterances of the poet are alike in that they both contain some expressive and designative (roughly "factual") components, albeit in varying degrees. This fundamental similarity is then used to highlight other significant features common to the arts and sciences, but always with a careful eye kept upon important differences as well.

Professor Jones argues his case with care and wit. The result is an important book which is easy to recommend to the philosophically prepared student of the sciences and the arts.

John A. Winnie
University of Hawaii

Word Order in Sanskrit and Universal Grammar. *By J. F. Staal.* Foundations of Language, Supplementary Series, Volume 5. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1967. Pp. 98. $9.75.

In this book the author contrasts the views on word order in Sanskrit held by the early Sanskrit grammarians with those held by Western Sanskrit scholars. The results of this comparison are expressed in terms of modern linguistic theory. The particular framework adopted for this investigation is a simplified version of the

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scheme given in Noam Chomsky's *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).

The ancient Indian grammarians did not concern themselves with the order of words in a sentence (*ānupūrvya*), but rather with the grammatical relations of one word to another (*saṁbandha*). This was natural, since they were describing a highly inflected language which shows the relation of words by their grammatical terminations (like Latin and Greek), making a rigidly fixed order of words a relatively unimportant consideration. Sentences like *āhara pātram* and *pātram āhara,* which differ only in the arrangement of the words, were considered synonymous. The differences in such instances were regarded as due to emphasis or stylistic effect and without grammatical significance. In sum, then, the Indian grammarians considered Sanskrit word order to be free and paid little regard to the discussion of it in their analyses.

Western Sanskritists have generally proceeded on the assumption that word order in a Sanskrit sentence is not free, but that there is a traditional order of words (given on p. 51) that is usually adhered to, deviations from which can be explained in various ways. The author feels that the gap between the two is much narrower than at first appears to be the case, the difference being basically one of approach.

It is hard to evaluate this book. Its basic purpose is never quite clear, a feature which the reader may gather from the initial sentence of the Preface: "This monograph owes its existence to certain puzzles in universal grammar and the theory of language which led the author to an investigation of word order in Sanskrit and its possible analyses and descriptions." This is certainly not crystal clear, and not only is the over-all purpose of the book vague and elusive, but the language in which it is written is often nebulous and from the outset is impeded by an overabundance of the technical and symbolical trappings of modern linguistic terminology. Many paragraphs require several readings, starting out with reasonably clear and logical assertions but suddenly taking an unexpected turn which leaves one baffled by the author's intention.

In the Preface the author speaks of the great variance between Indian and Western grammarians, and yet we learn in his chapter of conclusions that the gap is not so great after all. In fact, it is difficult to see how the gap could ever have been so great as he intimates. For Vaman Shivaram Apte, from whose well-known book on Sanskrit composition he quotes in the beginning and who he admits reflects the tradition of the early Indian grammarians, surely does not take a position on word order in Sanskrit that differs essentially from that of any Western Sanskritist, viz., that since Sanskrit is an inflectional language, word order has no grammatical significance, but there is a logical sequence which Apte proceeds to enunciate in great detail. It is this word order that is generally inculcated by Western Sanskritists on their students.

The method of documentation, consisting of the interpolation in the text of an author's last name with the date of his publication, requires constant reference to the bibliography in the back for the full data. This seems an unnecessary inconvenience to the reader.

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On page 33, in the permutations of the sentence from Patañjali, as well as in the chart on page 34, the nominative singular of the stem *anaḍvah-* is wrongly given as *anaḍvāhaḥ*. The correct form is *anaḍvān* (for which vide Whitney, *Sanskrit Grammar*, § 404). On page 9, penultimate paragraph, read: *govindo 'paśyad rāmam* for *govinda*, etc.

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CONCEPTS OF SCIENCE (A Philosophical Analysis). By *Peter Achinstein*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. Pp. xiii + 266. $8.95.

AMERICAN SHORT SPEECHES (An Anthology). Selected and edited by *Bower Aly* and *Lucile Folse Aly*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968. Pp. xii + 140. $1.95. Paper.

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THE TARJUMĀN AL-QUR'ĀN. By *Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad*. Edited and rendered into English by *Syed Abdul Latif*. Vol. 2. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1968. Pp. xxiii + 508. $7.75.

EXPLANATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE. By *Robert Brown*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1963. Pp. viii + 198. $2.95. Paper.

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THE ENLIGHTENMENT (The Proper Study of Mankind). Selected, edited, and with an introduction by *Nicholas Capaldi*. New York: Capricorn Books, 1968. Pp. 316. $2.25. Paper.

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THINKING WITH THE YAJURVEDA. By *Gandabhai G. Desai*. New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., 1968. Pp. xxv + 184. $5.25.

MORAL SITUATIONS. By *N. Fotion*. Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1968. Pp. 128. $4.75.

A CHRISTIAN-COMMUNIST DIALOGUE. By *Roger Garaudy* and *Quentin Lauer*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1968. Pp. 190. $4.95.

MYSTICS AND SOCIETY (A Point of View). By *Sisirkumar Ghose*. Foreword by *Aldous Huxley*. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1968. Pp. xv + 116. (Price not given.)

THE GREAT THINKERS ON PLATO. Edited and selected by *Barry Gross*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1968. Pp. xxv + 323. $6.95.

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THE ORIGIN AND GOAL OF HISTORY. By *Karl Jaspers*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. xvi + 294. $1.95. Paper.

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THE SPIRIT OF THE CLASSICAL WORLD. Selected, edited, and with introduction by Wade C. Stephens. New York: Capricorn Books, 1967. Pp. 383. $2.25. Paper.

WORLD OF THE BUDDHA: A READER FROM THE THREE BASKETS TO MODERN ZEN. Edited with introduction and commentaries by *Lucien Stryk*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1968. Pp. lvi + 423. $6.95.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE. By *Unto Tähtinen*. Turku: Turun Yliopisto, 1968. Pp. 124. (Price not given.) Paper.

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THE ARYAN PATH (Bombay), XXXIX (4), April, 1968: *P. Nagaraja Rao,* The Indian Concept of *Artha* (Wealth).
XXXIX (7), July, 1968: *J. N. Chubb,* Indian Philosophy and Social Concern.

BULLETIN OF THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION INSTITUTE OF CULTURE (Calcutta), XIX (5), May, 1968: *Sisirkumar Ghose,* Poetry and Liberation.
XIX (6), June, 1968: *Bhabatosh Datta,* Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century Bengal.

THE DIVINE LIFE (Sivanandanagar), XXX (5), May, 1968: *Charles A. Moore,* The Spiritual Approach to East-West Understanding.

HARVARD JOURNAL OF ASIATIC STUDIES (Cambridge), 28, 1968: *Kenneth Ch'en,* Filial Piety in Chinese Buddhism.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (New York), XXIX (4), Oct.-Dec., 1968: *V. V. Ramana Murti,* Buber's Dialogue and Gandhi's *Satyagraha.*

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS IN JAPAN (Tokyo), V (1), April, 1967: *Nomura Koichi,* Mao Tse-tung's Thought and the Chinese Revolution.

THE MAHA BODHI (Calcutta), 76 (4), April, 1968: *Alexander Pyatigorsky,* Buddhology in the USSR. 76 (5-6), May-June, 1968: *L. M. Joshi,* The Mind and the Mere Mind in Buddhism.

THE MIDDLE WAY (London), XLIII (2), August, 1968: *Christmas Humphreys,* Studies in Buddhism and Psychology I. Answer to Jung. *Daisetz T. Suzuki,* Sudden and Gradual Enlightenment.

THE MUSLIM WORLD (Hartford), LVIII (1), January, 1968: *M. S. Seale,* The Ethics of Malāmatiya Sufism and the Sermon on the Mount.

PRABUDDHA BHARATA (Calcutta), LXXIII, July, 1968: *Donald H. Bishop,* Reflections on Hinduism and Contemporary India.

THE TSING HUA JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES (Taiwan), VII (1), August, 1968: *Irving Yu-Cheng Lo,* Style and Vision in Chinese Poetry: An Inquiry into its Apollonian and Dionysian Dimensions.

THE VEDANTA KESARI (Madras), LV (2), June, 1968: *K. Seshadri,* The Meaning of Metaphysics.

THE VISVABHARATI QUARTERLY (Santiniketan), 32 (1), 1966-67: *Kalyan Kumar Bagchi,* Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya: A Philosopher of Indian Renaissance. *Donald H. Bishop,* Three Metaphysical Views and Their Existential Implications.

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Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill inaugurated this year a cooperative program in East Asian Studies leading to the M.A. and Ph.D. in a number of disciplines.

Graduate students admitted to one institution are encouraged and sometimes required to enroll in courses and seminars in the other which are advantageous to their field of study. Members of the graduate faculty of one institution may and often do serve as examiners at the other. Contact between the faculty and graduate students involved and interested in the program is maintained by a Joint Duke-UNC East Asian Studies Colloquium. The colloquium is held from six to eight times during the academic year. Papers by eminent visiting scholars in the areas of China and Japan are presented.

Responsibility for the planning and development of cooperative work in East Asian studies is held by a Joint Duke-UNC Advisory Committee on East Asian Studies composed of faculty representatives of both institutions.

Inquiries about course work, programs of study, fellowships, and other matters should be addressed to the institution at which the student intends to matriculate. For Duke University, write to the Committee on Russian and East European Studies-East Asia, International Studies Center, Duke University, 2101 Campus Drive, Durham, N.C., 27706. For the University of North Carolina write to the Office of the Graduate School, South Building, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., 27514, or the respective department in which you are interested.

The Philosophical Forum, published by the Department of Philosophy of Boston University, became a quarterly beginning in September, 1968.

The Philosophical Forum is open to contributions of all types and schools: critical or constructive, systematic or fragmentary, speculative or scholarly, substantive or historical. In particular, the editors hope to give new voices an opportunity to be heard; to encourage the exchange of views among those of differing philosophical schools or method; to enrich philosophy by the publication of the disciplined self-reflection of practitioners in other fields of the humanities, the natural and social sciences, religious studies, education, literature, and the arts; and to stimulate a broader critical perspective in philosophy itself.

To embody further the spirit of its title, *The Forum* welcomes replies to all published contributions. Lengthy critical studies of important new books are regularly featured, as are original translations of significant untranslated works.

The Philosophical Forum was published as an annual from 1943 to 1966. During those years *The Forum* presented important papers by Peter A. Bertocci, Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Brand Blanshard, Milič Čapek, C. J. Ducasse, Abraham Edel, Charles Hartshorne, H. D. Lewis, Paul Arthur Schilpp, William H. Werkmeister, John Wild, and others, as well as translations of significant, previously untranslated works of Kant, Husserl, and Schopenhauer.

The 42nd Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress was held at Patna University, Patna, India on December 27-30, 1968. K. Satchidananda Murthy from Andhra University presided as General President over the Session.

The following members of the Congress were elected to preside over the respective sections: T. G. Kalghatgi (Karnatak), "History of Philosophy"; R. K. Tripathi (Benaras Hindu University), "Logic and Metaphysics"; C. Sharma (Jodhpur), "Ethics and Social Philosophy"; and Durga Nand Sinha (Allahabad), "Psychology."

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The speakers for the Symposia were as follows: H. M. Joshi (Gujrat); K. Sivaraman (Benaras Hindu University); N. G. Kulkarni (Bombay); N. K. Bose (New Delhi); Madhusudan Prasad (Patna); and J. De Marneff (Poona).

The Sreemant Pratap Seth Lecture for 1968 on Vedanta was delivered by G. R. Malkani, formerly Director of the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, E. Khandesh. The Buddha Jayanti Lecture for 1968, instituted by the Government of Ceylon, was delivered by R. C. Pandeya, Delhi University.

Index India, edited by N. N. Gidwani, a quarterly publication, is now being published by the Rajasthan University Library, Jaipur, India. The *Index* intends to list all significant English-language writings on India in about 1000 journals and newspapers from all over the world. The first issue for January-March, 1968 carries more than 10,000 entries. The annual subscription is $20.00.

An expanded program of South and Southeast Asian studies will be offered this summer by the University of Washington Department of Asian Languages and Literature, under the sponsorship of the University's Far Eastern and Russian NDEA Language and Area Center in cooperation with several other universities. The program will include courses not normally available during the academic year.

The language courses, offered on an intensive basis, will meet three hours daily, Monday through Friday, enabling students to complete 15 foreign-language credits in one quarter. Courses available include Hindi-Urdu, Hindi, Tamil, Singhalese, and Thai.

Courses in related areas include Indic Linguistics, History of Religion, Anthropology, Geography, History, Art History, and Music.

The University of Washington *Summer Quarter Bulletin* contains detailed information about admission requirements, registration procedures, and course offerings for the University's portion of the program. A copy is available upon request from the University's Office of Summer Quarter, Seattle, Washington 98105.

Paul Weiss (Yale), Wilfrid Sellars (Pittsburgh), Richard McKeon (Chicago), and Joseph Owens (Toronto) will be among the participants in a conference on "The Future of Metaphysics" to be held at The Catholic University of America from June 12 to June 20.

The first three days will explore the position of metaphysics within the differing orientations of today. Paul Weiss will open the conference with a paper on "The Problem for Metaphysics," followed by James Cornman (University of Pennsylvania) on "Analysis and Metaphysics," Joseph Owens on "Scholasticism and Metaphysics," William Reese (SUNY at Albany) on "Process-Philosophy and Metaphysics," George Bosworth Burch (Tufts) on "Oriental Metaphysics," James Edie (Northwestern) on "Phenomenology-Existentialism and Metaphysics," and J. N. Findlay (Yale) on "Neo-Hegelianism and Neo-Platonism."

The general sessions of the second week will consist of pairs of papers on the relationship between metaphysics and particular areas of discipline: James Cornman and James Edie, "Language and Metaphysics"; Wilfrid Sellars and Richard Martin (NYU), "Logic, Science and Metaphysics"; Joseph Kocklemans (Pennsylvania State) and Joseph Owens, "Value and Metaphysics"; and Louis Dupre (Georgetown) and George Burch, "Metaphysics and Religion." Afternoon sessions will deal with particular problems within metaphysics along the general lines of "Metaphysics as

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a Science," "Metaphysics and the Life-World," "Thought and Being," and "Structures Within Being." Two panels will discuss "Metaphysics and Personality" and "Metaphysics and Society." Richard McKeon will conclude the conference with some observations on "The Future of Metaphysics."

For further information regarding the program, contact: Robert E. Wood, School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. 20017.

The Journal of Philosophy

A BIWEEKLY journal containing philosophical articles of current interest and encouraging the interchange of ideas. *Editors:* John H. Randall, Jr., Arthur Danto, Sidney Morgenbesser, Charles D. Parsons, and James J. Walsh. $7.50 a year; to students, $6.00; 50 cents a copy.

NOW AVAILABLE: Cumulative *Fifty-year Index, 1904–1953;* articles classified by subject and author; 452 p., cloth, $12.00. Also, *Ten-year Supplement, 1954–1963;* $3.00 cloth, $2.00 paperbound.

BACK NUMBERS and volumes: 1964 to 1968 (LXI to LXV), 50¢/issue, $12/volume; 1904 to 1963 (I to LX), $1/issue, $24/volume.

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Welcome by Robert H. Hiatt, Acting President, University of Hawaii

The making of works of art is one of the most useless (if not harmless) of human activities. The finished products cannot be eaten; they are ill-suited for housing and clothing. Yet despots, at all points on the political spectrum, have always feared artists and have tried to bend them to subserve their own purposes. Artists have been praised as revealers of truth, and they have been damned as corruptors of souls and purveyors of sickness. This very range and intensity of response suggests that artistic activity might, after all, be one of the most useful products of mankind's endeavor. Works of art both reflect and help to form the state of mind of a society; they embody some of its most profound insights and experiences; they articulate its values and concerns. For many persons works of art are the most meaningful, and therefore useful, things that exist.

One of the central tasks of a university, it seems to me, is to give full recognition to the importance of art for life. A university must insure that the great creative traditions of mankind are preserved and that educated men and women have the sensitivity to engage works of art as sources of much of their own most profound experience. Universities today are also becoming more and more the very centers of creative work in the arts—and this is at least one function of the university which doesn't seem to stand in dispute. We have come to recognize that there is indeed a close kinship between all forms of creative work, whether it be in the sciences, in humanistic scholarship, in works of art. The values of search and discovery, independence and persistence, of integrity and sincerity, are exhibited in all these creative endeavors and the maintenance and furtherance of these values is to a considerable extent exactly what a university is all about.

I am very pleased that the University of Hawaii is the host for this Symposium on Aesthetics East and West. The University of Hawaii is dedicated to the application of creative values in the deepening of East-West understanding, and it is quite clear to us that communication through the arts will always be one of the most important means of achieving that understanding. Your Symposium on Aesthetics East and West, then, I believe, is being most appropriately held here in Honolulu, at the University of Hawaii, in the Asia Room of the East-West Center. On behalf of the University, I extend a warm and cordial welcome to our guests and my best wishes for the success of your deliberations.

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This symposium in aesthetics East and West is an experiment—and a rather novel one. To our knowledge this is the first time that some of the best minds in Western aesthetics have come together with distinguished experts in arts of the East, at an American university, to pursue a common theme in aesthetics. And as with all experiments, the outcome will be uncertain, the results tentative.

The need for such an experiment, though, is so obvious today that it hardly requires the telling. We in the West have labored long in aesthetics as though Western art traditions were mankind's sole artistic heritage. Hegel and other philosophical Idealists in the nineteenth century were aware, to be sure, of non-Western traditions, and they tried to include them in their speculative syntheses. The traditions were treated, though, not so much as they were of intrinsic aesthetic value but as they represented stages in a world movement which culminated in certain phases of Western art. One can read literally hundreds of articles in aesthetics that were written in the last decades without once coming across a single concrete example of, or even footnote reference to, the great traditions of Asian art. The anthologies, textbooks, and essays that are used all the time in standard courses in aesthetics likewise tend to neglect completely everything about Asian art.

Now this neglect might be justified if aestheticians were actually and acutely aware of what they are doing—namely, providing structures, concepts, and terms for theoretically interpreting Western art and aesthetic experience alone. A kind of implied and indeed sometimes explicit universality, however, is claimed for their work; and it is perfectly clear to many of us that this claim is unfounded. Much of post-Renaissance art in the West gets appropriately interpreted in terms of "personal expression," "naturalism," "formalism," etc.; but these are not the appropriate categories for dealing with much of Asian art. When referring to the traditional art of Asian cultures, an art which is the creative expression of an entire society, Benjamin Rowland, the noted art historian, writes that "Such an art could be called magic, since the purpose is either to give man control over the great powers that he represents in symbol or to enable him to apprehend the infinite, as displayed in a tangible icon or diagram."[1]

The theme of the symposium is "The Nature and Function of Symbolism in Eastern and Western Art." This theme was selected because we wanted to have a theme that was sufficiently large to provide the needed scope for the diverse talents assembled here and at the same time narrow enough to provide a meaningful focus for our work. We also wanted a theme that was of current interest and relevance in aesthetics. We wanted this not simply in order to be *au courant* but to show that a comparative approach in aesthetics can provide increased richness of understanding.

Increased understanding, however, does not mean the attainment of final answers to problems. In the initial letters of invitation to our guests we set forth several questions for consideration: (1) Is there, or can there be, a general theory of symbolism in aesthetics which is applicable to both Eastern and Western art traditions? (2) With respect to particular arts (music, painting, etc.) do differing social-religious contexts make for different fundamental modes of symbolic communication in Eastern and Western art? We also went on to say that the sym-

[1] Benjamin Rowland, Jr., *Art in East and West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 1.

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posium is conceived not so much as an occasion to offer definite answers to these and related questions, but as an occasion to articulate and isolate the most significant problems in East-West aesthetics. We hope, in short, to be able to discover what the right questions and basic problems are in comparative aesthetics.

The symposium has been organized to deal with both fundamental philosophical issues of symbolism and with special problems in particular art forms. The opening paper by Dr. Hofstadter and the closing paper by Dr. Wieck deal primarily with the large philosophical perspectives and perplexities. Dr. Hofstadter develops his ideas, nevertheless, from concrete examples in Western poetry and Dr. Wieck works out his concepts mainly from examples in contemporary paintings and films. The other three formal papers work directly in specific art forms and Asian traditions. Dr. Malm's paper focuses on aspects of South Asian and Far Eastern music; Dr. Pepper works with problems of perception in Western painting and sculpture, and Dr. Keene is concerned with aesthetic principles in Japanese drama and other arts.

ELIOT DEUTSCH

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

Mu Ch'i, "The Six Persimmons"

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Pablo Picasso, "Guernica" (1937). Collection: Extended Loan from the artist to The Museum of Modern Art, New York City, N.Y. Reproduced courtesy of The Museum of Modern Art.

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Is the work of art a symbol? Is "symbol" a category—not to speak of *the* category—which will uncover the structure and meaning of art as art? I will speak here only of some poems, letting them stand for art.

A symbol is something that stands for something else. For instance, the speaker in Yeats's "Sailing to Byzantium" explains that because his native land is one of youth and generation, neglecting the monuments of unageing intellect, he has

> sailed the seas and come
> To the holy city of Byzantium.

This journey, mentioned in the title and explained in regard to its motive and significance in the body of the poem, is a symbol. It symbolizes the search for the spiritual life, making use of the historical fact that ancient Byzantium had been, as Yeats put it, the center of European civilization and the source of its spiritual philosophy.[1] The journey is but one of a whole group of symbolic images in Yeats's two Byzantium poems: birds, salmon, mackerel, seas, countries, wall mosaics, artificial birds, the Byzantine emperor, Hagia Sophia, the star-lit golden bough, a ghostly mummy, dolphins, smithies, the fire dance on the Emperor's dancing floor.

The Byzantium poems cannot be read comprehendingly unless these symbols are read as the symbols they are, with the definite significance and the indefinite suggestiveness they possess. The mummy, for example, is a symbol of death that comes into life or life that dwells in death and that, by its linking of the two, is able to be the conductor of the spirit to the eternal. The dolphin is the "fish whereon souls ride to Paradise," according to an early draft.[2] Consequently the soul's ride on the dolphin's back is itself a symbol of the speaker's journey to Byzantium, and conversely, the journey is a symbol of that ride, and both the journey and the ride symbolize the invisible, unspatiotemporal translation of the spirit from the natural (the country of the young, the mackerel-crowded seas, the fury and the mire of human veins, the dolphin's mire and blood, the flood, the dolphin-torn, gong-tormented sea) to the supernatural (the holy city, the miraculous golden bird on the star-lit golden bough, the artifice of eternity, Hagia Sophia, the dancing floor).

These symbols stand for something other than themselves. But does either of the poems, "Sailing to Byzantium" and "Byzantium," stand for something other than itself? The question can be repeated for every work of art, wherever symbols occur in art. Even when the total work of art appears as a single grand symbol, as the Great Stupa at Sāñchī in India, the question recurs.

[1] Cf. Curtis Bradford, "Yeats's Byzantium Poems: A Study of Their Development," in *Yeats, A Collection of Critical Essays,* ed. John Unterecker (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 94-95.
[2] Cf., *ibid.,* p. 99.

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The function of the *stūpa* was to enshrine a relic of the Buddha, some of his ashes, within a structure that symbolizes the total structure of the universe in the form of a cosmic diagram.[3] But does the art of this work consist in the symbolism?

Anything that exists—or even that does not exist—can function as a symbol. A tree can be a symbol—a phallic symbol, a symbol of life, a symbol of aspiration, a symbol of the god. But what of the tree itself?

The dolphin—its name derives from the Greek *delphus,* womb—is one of the complex, highly charged symbols in the second of the Byzantium poems, "Byzantium." (It figured in the drafts of "Sailing to Byzantium" but vanished in the final version.) The dolphin, then, is a symbol. It enters into the poem. It also enters into the first sentence of this paragraph. That sentence contains the dolphin-symbol, as well as other symbols, as, for example, the symbol "name" which stands for names, the symbol "poem" which stands for poems, etc. Is the sentence itself a symbol?

The sentence tells us about the dolphin's being a symbol in "Byzantium." If the sentence were a symbol then presumably what it stands for would be what it tells us. But what need is there for it to stand for what it tells us when it has already told us what it says? The dolphin in it helps the sentence to say what it says. The sentence finds the dolphin-symbol useful, because it wants to be a sentence about a symbol in a poem. But as a sentence it takes up the dolphin-symbol within itself and sweeps along in and by means of its other symbols as well in the act of doing what it is trying to do—to say something in the form of a statement, to speak declaratively.

If the sentence itself were to be a symbol, it would first have to be taken as the literal thing it is itself—the speaking declaratively about its subject matter—so as to be able to stand for something other than what it says. A symbol first has to be something in order to be able to stand for something else. What makes the sentence a sentence is not its standing for something other than itself, but its speaking for itself, its declaring of that which it sets forth as the fact.

So it is with the poem. It has first to be the poem that it is in order for it thereupon to be able to stand for something that it is not, if indeed it stands for anything else at all. The poem also speaks—no longer, to be sure, in the shape of the prosy declarative sentence, but nevertheless in the shape of a genuine saying. "Sailing to Byzantium," for instance, describes and explains and prays and declares a fixed resolve, and it does these in a connected way, in the sequence of its four stanzas, so that the declaration emerges from the prayer, the prayer from the explanation, and the explanation from the

[3] Benjamin Rowland, *The Art and Architecture of India* (3d ed.; Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 48 ff.

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description. The question is whether, having said all this in this way, the poem needs in addition to stand for something else, or whether, on the other hand, it is not sufficient, of its own self, in saying what it does.

Or, perhaps, having said what it says, it stands in a relationship other than that of symbol to something symbolized?

I

What do the Byzantium poems say?

The person who speaks in both is the same. "Byzantium" was composed in order to meet a criticism of "Sailing to Byzantium" by Sturge Moore. Moore had written to Yeats that the fourth stanza did not come up to the magnificent level of the first three. The goldsmith's bird, he had complained, "is as much nature as a man's body, especially if it only sings like Homer and Shakespeare of what is past or passing or to come to Lords and Ladies." Yeats speedily produced "Byzantium" in order, as he wrote to Moore, to give an exposition to the idea of the golden bird.[4] "Sailing to Byzantium" is spoken by the traveler who has recently arrived in Byzantium; in "Byzantium" he seems already to have settled into the mood and spiritual ambience of the holy city; his prayer to the sages has already begun to be answered—"Byzantium" is a result of their teaching, one stage of his heart's being gathered into the artifice of eternity.

The speaker is an old man—an old poet—who has sailed from his original homeland to take up final residence in Byzantium. The old homeland is no longer his own: it is no country for old men. It is a world of birth and death and of the passage from one to the other. The constant theme of its life is generation and corruption, with the emphasis on the act of reproduction—the young in one another's arms, the salmon leaping the falls, the seas crowded with mackerel. In the drafts the speaker had begun by pointing even to his God as Christ, an infant on his mother's knees, and to the spirits of Irish folk-lore, his fathers' gods, as making love in the shadow of the twilit trees, hunting, at gallantries under the hills. It is the world of nature, in which everything is young and grows young day by day; but this youth is also spiritual youthfulness, that condition of spirit in which it is caught in the sensual music of nature, sick with desire, fastened to a dying animal, ignorant of what it is. Nature is the realm of becoming; the things in it are things becoming. Byzantium is the realm of the thing become.

The old homeland, from which the speaker journeys toward the new, refused itself to him just as much as he found himself alienated from it. Caught in its sensual music, its inhabitants neglect true art; at any rate, they

[4] Bradford, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

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neglect the art that he believes to be eternally valid. A type of it is Sato's gift—a changeless sword; Chaucer had not drawn breath when it was forged —which lies on the poet's table alongside his pen and paper that it may moralize his days out of their aimlessness: ". . . only an aching heart/Conceives a changeless work of art" ("My Table," in the same volume, *The Tower,* in which "Sailing to Byzantium" appears).

The mankind that lives in the old homeland of nature think they know the truth; they cry that his tale is told, his story sung. Their own song is a song of Plenty's horn, praise of the finite and temporal and transient and of the spawning energy that casts up and takes back again the thronging generations of nature. But the aged man, with his inexpungible memory of the furious surge of natural life, knows better that soul has to look elsewhere for its true home and its true song. An aged man, simply as the worn-out shell of the young being of nature, is a paltry thing. He has come to the end of the line; nothing remains for him to be but a scarecrow, a fraud to frighten the birds, those dying generations. Nothing, that is, in nature; but having exhausted the natural, having attained to the nothingness of the natural, he is first able to send his soul to school where it may learn to sing the true music.

> But now I travel to Byzantium
> . . . . . .
> . . . to unwinking wisdom's home
> The marvel of the world and gardens where
> Transfigurations of the intellect
> Can cure this aging body of defect.[5]

The paltriness of age is redeemed by the marvel of art. True art extols the eternal, makes a monument to praise the unbegotten intellect; in the singing school of eternity the unborn and undying soul and its unbegotten wisdom take the place of nature as object of reverence and praise.

Byzantium, the new land to which the speaker sails, is to be his true home. His prayer to the sages—they are not just images of saints in the wall-mosaic, but eternal sages who stand in God's fire like the images in the golden mosaic—solicits them to descend from their holy height, unreeling the winding flight that leads to their heaven, to teach him the upward path and to help him rise by song to the eternal. That eternal sphere, transcending nature, contains in place of the natural body the body of the work of art. The soul that rises to eternity itself undergoes metamorphosis from being the ignorant, desire-infected soul of a dying animal to being the clairvoyant soul of a living work of art, the poet who can sing of what is past, or passing, or to come. The poet takes for his own the bodily form of the golden bird

[5] See the drafts; Bradford, p. 104.

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made by Grecian goldsmiths to stand on the golden bough—Frazer's image for the world of myth—of the golden tree to sing to the Byzantine nobles or, beside his bedside, to keep the Emperor awake. His heart has been consumed away, the ache of natural existence and experience has been lifted up into what Yeats was later to describe as the essential poetic gaiety that transfigures all dread:

> All things fall and are built again,
> And those that build them again are gay.

The poet in the artifice of eternity is like the Chinamen carved in lapis lazuli whom Yeats delights to imagine seated at the little half-way house on the mountain:

> On all the tragic scene they stare.
> One asks for mournful melodies;
> Accomplished fingers begin to play.
> Their eyes mid many wrinkles, their eyes,
> Their ancient, glittering eyes, are gay.
>
> ("Lapis Lazuli")

The holy city of Byzantium is the new homeland. If in nature the soul does not know what it is, in the land of the spirit it arrives at self-knowledge. It belongs to eternity and, conversely, eternal being belongs to it. That is why it can transfigure all suffering and dread into gaiety. All the content of natural life—of what is past, or passing, or to come—has become the stuff of the song, lifted up out of time into timeless form. As the golden bird is deathless, being artificial and not organic, so too the mummy is deathless, being preserved forever in his winding cloth; and as the bird's song has the gaiety of essential poetry so the mummy's thought, the thought of him who preserves in timeless form the life that he has left behind, that belongs to Byzantine being, is sad in its gaiety and gay in its sadness:

> I have mummy truths to tell
> Whereat the living mock,
> Though not for sober ear,
> For maybe all that hear
> Should laugh and weep an hour upon the clock.
> . . . . . .
> Such thought, that in it bound
> I need no other thing,
> Wound in mind's wandering
> As mummies in the mummy-cloth are wound.
>
> ("All Soul's Night")

What "Sailing to Byzantium" says is this: I have left the old birthplace in time and come to the new home in eternity. Here is where I belong, forever. It tells what the old birthplace in time is, and why, as an aged man, I have to leave it. It pleads here in this new homeland with the native dwellers

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to help me to become one of them. It promises and revolves on my role here, in my true hŏme, where I shall sing the joy that belongs to being here, raising this little monument to unageing intellect.

The poem is about where I belong and to whom I belong, what belongs to me and who belongs to me. It says: my true home is the eternal world of art and my true being the eternal (sad) gaiety of the poet. Saying this, is it a symbol of something else? Does it mean something other than it says?

II

"Byzantium" is replete with symbols, saying what it has to say by means of them. The traveler now dwells in Byzantium. He is out walking at night, when silence has fallen upon all the day-sounds—quarreling soldiers, robbers, harlots, the gong of the cathedral bells. Lit by star or moon, the cathedral dome rises in disdain of man, his existence in nature, and ultimately of all natural existence itself. The sleep of night, brother to death, leaves behind it, by its silence, the brawls of life; the night-dominating dome, image of the dome of the heaven that gives to it the light of stars and moon, lightly soars over the complexities and brawling urgencies of human thought and desire. The dome, like the poem, is also a work of art, as is its bell whose gong, resonating, puts a coda to the din of the natural day.

The traveler treads the emperor's town, all his intricacies grown clear and sweet.[6] Images of day have given way to images of night, unpurged images to images cleansed and shriven in the light of the night-dome. First there is the mummy-image. The mummy stands twice-removed from natural man; he is man who has died to nature and become a shade, a ghost; that ghost, hallowed, has thereupon become a purged image. Having left behind the moisture and breath of natural life, he breathes with no breath, speaks with a voice that is soundless, fit to articulate the clarified mystery of eternity. This mummy is the bobbin of Hades, wrapped in the windings of the mummy-cloth. As the sages were petitioned to perne downward in a gyre, the winding path from heaven to earth, so the mummy may, by the winding of its vesture of eternal life (death-in-life and life-in-death), grant guidance along the upward path, unwinding from earth to heaven. For this reason the mummy is the image that floats before the dweller in Byzantium, guiding his steps along the complexities of its streets, enabling him to tread among the dark intricacies, to traverse all the town's intricacies; for, though wound in the intricate mummy cloth, it knows the winding of the path.[7] At one point Yeats had even written

[6] Bradford, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 117, 118.

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Limbs that have been bound in mummy cloth
Are more content with a winding path
A mouth that has no moisture and no breath
May better summon me
To adore.[8]

The silent night-lit dome disdains the complexities and mire of natural life; the silent mummy shows the thought that illumines them and liberates from them. The golden bird, planted on the star-lit golden bough, breaks the silence. The dome, a silent miracle of art, floats above the earth; the mummy, a silent mystery of spirit, floats before the walker, beckoning and summoning him to follow the winding path. The disdain of dome and mummy for the earthly breaks forth aloud in the scorn of the artificial bird. Sharing the secrets of the birds of Hades—knowing the truth of the death of life and the life of death—this bird is the sounding miracle of the poetry of Byzantium. Made by the smithies of the Emperor, the artists of God, the golden bird sings the truth of spirit. Does it sing in symbols? It crows like the cocks of Hades; it scorns aloud

In glory of changless metal
Common bird or petal
And all complexities of mire or blood.

Its song is the very scorn of natural life; it mocks man, bird, leaf, petal, and man's intricacy of mire and blood.[9]

Dome, mummy, bird—and now, the dancing floor. Led by the mummy to the Emperor's palace, where the golden bird has been planted on a golden bough to keep the drowsy Emperor awake or to sing to his lords and ladies of what is past, or passing, or to come, the walker has stopped at the Emperor's dancing floor. Here above all is the place to which the spirits arrived in Byzantium come to be cured of the furious complexities of life. It is through dancing on the magic pavement that they purify themselves. They are made pure by the agony of a fire-sacrifice in which they themselves are the sacrificial victims. The rite is a fire-dance, performed in the mystic flames of a fire lit by nothing material and fed by nothing material; undisturbed by anything material, its flames are born of flames, the pure fire of the spirit, in which spirits suffer as only spirits can, burning away the dross of life, falling into the trance of spirit, dying into the dance of eternity, a dance in which we cannot know the dancer from the dance.[10]

The dome disdains the complexities of natural life; the mummy unwinds the winding path of life; the golden bird scorns aloud the intricacy of the

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 118.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 119.
[10] Yeats, "Among School Children," viii.

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living mire; but only by the dance in which they themselves engage can the unpurged spirits leave all their blood-begotten passion.[11] Tracing out the simplicity of the intricacy of the enchanted marble, enfolding themselves in the tall flames that wind and unwind on the square, they burn away in the agony of measure the blood's imagination and blood's fury with which life had infected them.[12]

The Emperor's golden smithies, those divine artists who made the golden bird—did they not also, perhaps, create the dome, and design the whole holy city?—made this magic square for the saving dance. By a fiery enchantment the floor's marbles burn away the filth and mire. It is the smithies who do the Emperor's work. It is they who break the flood on which spirits, desperately clinging each to his own dolphin,[13] are carried as they tear through the sea toward the holy city. The image grows confused, complex; images overlap; the dolphins break the flood into spray as their fins torture the tide; the marble of the dancing floor breaks the flood as the crowds of spirits approach; the simplicity and integrity of the dancing floor break the bleak glittering intricacies, the aimless flood of imagery, the bright flood, the bleak complexity where images beget yet worse images—Yeats struggled here to find the image that by its own integrity might break the intricacy of the poem's image-complex.[14] The breaking became multiple and the image of breaking a collage: the smithies breaking the flood, the marbles of the dancing floor breaking bitter furies of complexity, the dolphins breaking the sea-surface. All three constituent images point toward the common content: the spiritual principle breaking the unholy body of nature, reaching an ultimate simplicity of true being through the agony of conquering the complexity of impure existence.

If Byzantium is the holy city, the dome its holy place of worship, nevertheless its holy center is the dancing-floor on the Emperor's pavement, for it is finally there that the spirits are purged. Impure images burn away that element in them that makes them ever beget fresh images; the blood-blindness that causes them to beget ever blinder offspring is purged in the light of the burning flames. Spirits struggling on their dolphin-backs in the sea of life, tormented by the gong of the dome that summons them from afar, yearn to reach a goal they do not yet know to be the magic square on which they can dance out their life-fury. That dancing floor is where they belong in the end of ends. It is the hearth and sanctuary of the home of the spirit.

[11] Bradford, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 120, 123.
[13] —dolphin, one man. Do you know Raphael's statue of the Dolphin carrying one of the Holy Innocents to Heaven?" So Yeats wrote to Sturge Moore in reply to a question about the relation of the dolphin to humanity; Moore was designing a cover for *The Winding Stair*. Cf. Bradford, p. 111.
[14] Bradford, pp. 120 ff.

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"Sailing to Byzantium" tells of the journey made in search of home; "Byzantium" tells of the home ultimately found.

Is the journey in search of home a symbol? Or the telling of it? Is the ultimate home and its ultimate center, the dancing floor of the spirit, a symbol, or is the telling of it such? Is the purging dance a symbol, or the telling of it? The poems use symbols to tell of the journey, the home, and the dance, and so they use symbols of journey, home, and dance. But this poetic telling —what is it?

III

The poems do not make the connection explicit; but may we not ourselves identify the sages of "Sailing to Byzantium" who stand in God's holy fire with those spirits of "Byzantium" who have danced into the fire to purge themselves? What purged spirit would deign to leave its flame—one thinks too, perhaps, of the mandorla that envelops a saint—except to serve as master to a needy soul, to teach it how to sing in the Emperor's castle and how to dance its way into its own flame on the dancing floor? The smithies make the bird and the flaming floor, but the speaker aspires to the singing of the bird and the dancing of the spirit.

The speaking of the poem is the singing of the bird and the dancing of the spirit. What song could the bird sing that would be better suited to keep the drowsy Emperor awake, to tell the lords and ladies of Byzantium of what is past, or passing, or to come, than the song that tells the journey of the pilgrim to Byzantium and his ultimate entry into the magic square? What dance would be better suited to purge the spirit of images than the dance of the poem that breaks its way through all the bitter fury of image-complexity to the pure insight of its own vision of the holy city? Beyond images that yet fresh images beget, beyond symbols that breed symbols, is the dance that needs no further image or symbol, that is itself neither image nor symbol, but . . . a trance.

The symbol is an appearance that points to and stands for a reality that is not itself. The symbol of the song of the golden bird or of the dance of the fiery flame points to a reality, the trance of the enraptured soul. In a trance, the soul has made a transit. The boundary that separates it from its other has been overpassed. The veil of images, of symbols, that stood between it and reality, both disclosing and concealing, but in any case separating as well as connecting, has been pierced, broken through. "Breaking" is itself an image, as is "image." We cannot speak or sing without images; we must make use of them for the act of speaking and singing. But there can be a speech and a song, made of images, that breaks the whole bitter fury of complexity of image-existence.

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Flame that cannot singe a sleeve is fire that does not burn. It does not reach out for material substance to transform. It has no effects, is not a cause. Its being transcends the relationship of cause and effect. It is contained within itself, by itself, in the condition of a trance. It is not the trance of mere inability to act, or of mere unconscious somnolence, but the heightened condition of agonized absorption. Like the mummy who is life-in-death and death-in-life, the dance-flaming-spirit dies into life and lives in that death. Sato's sword's moralizing knew that

> . . . only an aching heart
> Conceives a changeless work of art.

It aches because it knows the agony that must die into life to reach the shape of the sword, the tune of the bird, the winding of the dance. Agony is struggle as well as anguish. The agony of dying into a dance is the struggle against images. Images beget images, symbols beget symbols; the soul engaged with them is stranded in the midst of a dangerous sea. Tormented by the gong that sounds from the holy dome, astride the dolphin that can eventually bring it to the holy city, it suffers still from the bitter fury of the images of its life. Even the dolphin that is its sole vessel to safety may appear to it in its primal form, as the womb into which it must delve in the act of generating fresh images. The dolphin is a potent image: it leads back, in this one way, to the fury of living complexity, but it leads forward to the passage into Byzantium. In the former role, it is an image that multiplies images; in the latter, it is the image that conducts to the land where images are broken, the iconoclastic land.

The causal thinking of the genetic psychologist says: the dolphin as the fish whereon souls ride to paradise is only a sublimated form, a symbol of, a cover for, the dolphin as the real thing—the womb, riding on which is real ecstasy. It says: the poet seizes upon the image of the dolphin and the passage to Byzantium to give scope to what otherwise he is forced to hide: the womb, the sexual ride, the sexual ecstasy. The genetic psychologist can make much of all the images: the stick on which the old man is a tattered coat, the golden bird that crows like a cock, the dome and its gong that succeed the prostitute and her song, the stiff mummy that can unwind the winding path, the entranced dance in the fiery flame.

So long as these symbols are what he declares them to be, they are figures in the nightmarish agony that the poems describe as the bitter fury of complexity, the tortured tide, the blood-begotten passion, man's intricacy of mire and blood. They are then symbols, genuine symbols, of realities that belong to the mire and the blood. The whole poem becomes nothing more than an intricacy of images that stir the blood and stir up the mire. The crow of the cock is a mere liquid sputter, an ecstasy of transient energy, a trance-

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absorption that loses all meaning in the act because all the meaning it has produced has been ultimately only for the sake of the act.

The genetic psychologist has never yet understood the poem. He has not read it as a poem but as a symbol.

It is truer to say that the sexual relation symbolizes the poetic relation than that the latter symbolizes the former. Sexual unity is symbolic of the unity that the spirit seeks, that unity in which soul finds the other that is its own, which belongs to it and to which it belongs, to which it can say and hear in response: I am thine and thou art mine. The moment of the young in one another's arms foreshadows this unity; but it does not last, it has no eternity in it, it leads only to the generation of new young to be in one another's arms. That, to be sure, is no small thing but a great one. The poet does not forget it. By 1940 the war had already flared and Thomas Mann had written: "In our time the destiny of man presents its meaning in political terms." To which Yeats appended this small, comical, and poignant note:

> How can I, that girl standing there,
> My attention fix
> On Roman or on Russian
> Or on Spanish politics?
> Yet here's a travelled man that knows
> What he talks about,
> And there's a politician
> That has read and thought,
> And maybe what they say is true
> Of war and war's alarms,
> But O that I were young again
> And held her in my arms!
>
> ("Politics")

The poem is a sublimation of the sexual relation in the precise sense that it elevates what lies below. It raises to the height of sublimity the nethermost energies of existence. It lifts up the images that belong to the complexity of life into a unity in which they belong to one another forever, simple in their intricacy, purged—like the spirit enfolded in the flame of its dance—of all need to reproduce images. Nothing follows, nothing is to be inferred, nothing further is pointed to.

The height at which the poem soars is described by another modern poet in a poem about modern poetry, which is

> The poem of the mind in the act of finding
> What will suffice.
> It has not always had
> To find: the scene was set; it repeated what
> Was in the script.

The poetic actor, it says, is

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A metaphysician in the dark, twanging
An instrument, twanging a wiry string that gives
Sounds passing through sudden rightnesses, wholly
Containing the mind, below which it cannot descend,
Beyond which it has no will to rise.
(Wallace Stevens, "Of Modern Poetry")

The height is the plane of the right—the sudden rightness that every true artist knows about and seeks in the agony of the creative struggle to reach. It happens where every sound and every image gives itself over to every other sound and image for its safekeeping, and where the mind gives itself over to the whole and takes the whole for itself for their mutual safekeeping.

How high that highest candle lights the dark.

Out of this same light, out of the central mind,
We make a dwelling in the evening air,
In which being there together is enough.
(Wallace Stevens, "Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour")

The height is the singing-place of the sound

That clings to the mind like that right sound, that song

Of the assassin that remains and sings
In the high imagination triumphantly.
(Wallace Stevens, "Extracts from Addresses to the Academy of Fine Ideas," v)

What is, is the ground out of which grows the aspiration to attain to the clarity, simplicity, and sudden rightness of the poetic act of the mind. When these are reached, as in the actual poetry of "Sailing to Byzantium" and "Byzantium," the spirit itself reaches the stage in which it can make with its other

. . . a dwelling in the evening air
In which being there together is enough.

The act of finding what will suffice is the act of finding what is enough: the sudden rightness with which the mind dwells, in which being there together is enough.

As the poem says what it says, it speaks with the accent of that sudden rightness, with a sound that clings to the mind like the sound of the assassin, triumphant in the high imagination. The dolphin, the golden bird, the mummy, the dome, the night-walker, the Emperor and his court, the smithies—all were needed, sublimed, to speak with that sound. The symbols sound and resound in the rightness which does not symbolize but which *is* the belonging together of all the images and all the sounds and of all with the mind and the mind with all, in which the mind sees what it has all along looked for, and is content.

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After long silence, two aged lovers sit together again, in a room at night darkly illumined by a lamp:

> Speech after long silence; it is right,
> All other lovers being estranged or dead,
> Unfriendly lamplight hid under its shade,
> The curtains drawn upon unfriendly night,
> That we descant and yet again descant
> Upon the supreme theme of Art and Song:
> Bodily decrepitude is wisdom; young
> We loved each other and were ignorant.
>
> (Yeats, "After Long Silence")

The poem is not a symbol. It is the speaking of an agony, the agony of the being there together which is enough.

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William P. Malm, On the nature and function of symbolism in Western and Oriental music

Once I had agreed to discuss the formidable topic indicated by my formidable title, I sought to place my thoughts in a frame of reference proper to this symposium. I tried to find out first how the term symbolism was conceived of by contemporary philosophers. I am not sure whether this was a good idea for I began to feel rather compromised by the skill and erudition of such scholars as Susanne Langer, Albert Hofstadter, and Leonard Meyer when they dealt with the subject. Thus, I feel rather like Frodo, the Hobbit, wandering in a new land under the all-seeing eye of more powerful forces. I only hope that I may find the minds now focused on my presentation to be those of benevolent Gandalfs rather than less tolerant forces. I can presume that no Sauron would be invited to this symposium.[1]

If I were to review all that I have read recently about symbolism in art, the musical portions of my paper would be long delayed. Therefore, I shall concentrate on my own less professional views of the subject and quote the authorities only to the extent that they reinforce my own prejudices.

What is symbolism in music? Most musicians thinking rather pragmatically would, I believe, answer this question with three categories of symbols: the pictorial, the associative, and the structural. I will leave it to this symposium to say whether these three terms relate to the ideas of presentation, expression, and meaning as quoted from Cassirer in Professor Hofstadter's interesting study *Truth and Art*.[2] I shall also avoid for the present the most interesting distinctions between signals and symbols.[3] Instead, right or wrong, I shall use the three terms as a jumping-off place for our trip into a relatively unexplored land of comparative symbolism in music.

Pictorial symbolism is quite familiar to us in Western music, particularly through the word-painting in many Baroque pieces. One need think only of the frogs leaping and the flies buzzing in Handel's *Israel in Egypt*. Every period has a touch of this kind of symbolism; it is seen in many madrigal settings, in the turning worms of Haydn's *The Creation*, or in the wonderful awakening of a dragon in Wagner's *Siegfried*. Perhaps even insect sounds, such as those heard in the slow movement of Bartok's *Music for Strings, Percussion, and Celeste*, can also be called pictorial.

We are perhaps less aware of this kind of symbolism in Oriental music, but it can be found there as well. The short fragment of the shamisen part of the Japanese nagauta piece "Goro Tokimune" shown in Example 1 is a case in point. The text speaks of Goro drinking *saké* wine, and the shamisen shows an obvious tipsy tendency at that moment. In the nagauta piece "Shakkyo"

[1] For those not familiar with the popular literature of the 1960's, the references made here are to characters in J. R. R. Tolkien's three-volume work, *Lord of the Rings*.
[2] Albert Hofstadter, *Truth and Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965).
[3] See Susanne K. Langer, *Feeling and Form* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 26.

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

EXAMPLE 1. Excerpt from the Japanese nagauta piece "Goro Tokimune" from W. Malm, *Nagauta: The Heart of Kabuki Music* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1963), p. 307. In all shamisen examples used in this paper the following symbols are used: ∩ means a left-hand pizzicato, V indicates an upstroke, ⌣ is a slide into or out of a tone and ⌐¬ is a glissando between tones.

there is an equally direct imitation of the wind lowing through the trees at the moment when the text says "the wind in the pines" (Example 2). For



EXAMPLE 2. Excerpt from the Japanese nagauta piece "Shakkyo," transcribed from native notation in *Nagauta Shin-keikobon*, ed. Kosaburo Yoshizumi (Tokyo: Hogaku-sha, 1955), vol. 5, item 5, p. 4.

animal effects one can refer to the squeal of monkeys in the nagauta piece "Geiki zaru."

The offstage (*geza*) music of the Kabuki has many similar naturalistic effects, such as the drum pattern called *nami no oto* which depicts the waves pounding on the beach. If one hears the pattern *shinobe sanju,* however, the level of symbolism becomes more subtle. Accompanied by occasional strokes on a large bell, the shamisen plays a direct imitation of the chirping of the cicada insect. These sounds are summer night sounds, but in Kabuki they have the added implication of danger much as a tremolo diminished chord has in nineteenth-century Western music. This example comes closer to the second "associative" concept of musical symbolism to which we turn our attention next.

The best-known associative symbols in Western music are found under the rubrics of the doctrine of affections in the Baroque and in the leit-motifs of Wagner. Baroque examples are replete in Bach's music, where for example,

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mentions of Christ on the cross are usually accompanied by a "weeping" chromatic bass.[4] In Wagner the themes connected with Wotan or the curse of the Walsungs are two of a great host of musical symbols of abstract but highly meaningful natures. The "Fate" theme in Bizet's *Carmen* or the "We Poor People" theme in Berg's *Wozzeck* are two further examples. Even Gregorian chant can show an occasional tendency toward this kind of symbolism in its use of such devices as groups of three notes when speaking of the Trinity.

The kind of symbolism to which we now refer presumes a considerable cultural conditioning on the part of the listener. One is trained to respond to such indicators of emotions and ideas either through repeated exposure within the proper meaningful context or through some kind of conscious "music appreciation" study. Thus, we can expect very little cultural crossover of the proper affective response to a given symbol of this type. For instance, the shamisen pattern in Example 3 is used in the *gidayu* music of the Japanese puppet theater to indicate crying, but I doubt that most Westerners would recognize the pathos of such a tune without either having heard it used in the theater, or having been taught about it in some such presentation as this.



EXAMPLE 3. The crying pattern *naki* used in Japanese gidayu music, transcribed from the general repertoire.

The offstage tradition of the Kabuki mentioned earlier has dozens of melodies whose use is strictly regulated by the dramatic situation. Their appearance can be very meaningful to a knowledgeable listener. For example, the sound of drums and a flute playing the piece "Torikagura" (a kind of shrine music) usually indicates that a geisha is entering or that the scene is in a brothel area. Another example is the *geza* pattern *toyose* or the distant sound of battle which consists of a few sharp raps on a gong plus some drumbeats. These sounds can be combined with the shamisen piece "Jindate" (battle formation) shown in Example 4. The combination is used in war scenes. There is perhaps some naturalism in the gongs and drums, but certainly not in the tune. Yet, the informed listener experiences this music as it was intended.

In Chinese opera there is a concept of two melodic arch types, *hsi pi* and *erh huang*, which can be shaped to produce most of the emotional needs of the

[4] See the "Crucifixus" movement of Bach's B Minor Mass.

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

EXAMPLE 4. The *geza* shamisen piece "Jindate," transcribed from *Kabuki Geza Ongaku Shusei* (Nippon Victor record album SJL 2010-2), record 1, side 2.

drama. The precise musical means through which this is done is yet to be studied, but the principle is certainly another example of a symbolism in Oriental music analogous to that which we have been trained to be familiar with in our own culture.

On a slightly broader plane one could add to this Oriental list the connotations of mood and hours of the day found in the *rāga* system of India. The meanings of a *rāga* also illustrate the ethical side of associative symbolism. When looking at this aspect of the subject we must add that there are moments in both Western and Oriental music when the ethical value of a given musical event quite outweighs its musical considerations. One of the most interesting examples is that of bells. There are many bells, such as those often heard in Mexican churches, the tone of which is not "pretty" except to the ear of a god. The crotal bells and gongs that are jangled before Japanese shrines are another such example, as is the Korean bell whose opening is set right next to the earth so that the souls below may hear it. A variation on this theme is a pair of the double reed *rgya-glin* used in Tibetan music. While their melody may seem completely at odds with the surrounding ritual music, their functions as the voices of God make them a vital element in the general aesthetic of such ritual music.

From these opening remarks it should be evident that the experiencing of musical symbolism on the pictorial and associative levels depends on a degree of cultural conditioning which is less easily appreciated cross-culturally than similar types of symbolism in the other arts. Nevertheless, it is relatively easy to learn the "meanings" of symbols in either of these two categories so that, like the Wagner fan, one can "spot the tunes" as they appear. However, even after one has learned to react to such symbols in ways consistent with their original intent, a full experiencing of the music may not have been achieved, for there is yet the problem of experiencing what Langer has called the "expressive or significant form."[5] If we are to say that we have experienced

[5] Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (New York: New American Library, Inc., 1948), p. 165 ff.

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a non-Western piece in some aesthetic way beyond the pure exoticism of its sound, there must be a moment at which one is aware of some structural outline in the music and some necessity of the music's continuation or cessation. It is at this level that the structural symbols operate.

The nature of structural symbols can be thought of as that of markers along a time continuum. The appearance of one kind of marker creates in the listener an anticipation for the appearance of the next one as well as certain predictions as to its nature. Through such predictions and anticipations a sense of progressing through time is achieved.[6] The establishment of some kind of tonal center at the start of a music is the most common opening marker, while the placement of subsequent cadence patterns is the next most obvious set of signposts. The opening of Mozart's Symphony No. 40 in G minor, for example, begins with a harmony indicative of the tonality, and a clear, solid cadence does appear until the basic exposition of the first theme is completed some bars later. Such a process of moving forward in "virtual" time[7] continues in a like manner from cadence point to cadence point, though the constant subtlety of Mozart's mind delights the listener's sense of anticipation by never being totally predictable.

In our Mozartean example the tonal orientation and the tensions created by moving from it and returning to it are enhanced by the presence of harmony. However, the melodic line in and by itself has its own kinds of special tonal tensions and releases.[8] In non-harmonic music these assume a proportionately greater significance. This is clearly evident in Gregorian chant as well as in non-Western traditions, as seen in Example 5. This excerpt is the

EXAMPLE 5



EXAMPLE 5. Gregorian chant excerpt from *Liber Usualis* (Tournai, 1934), ed. no. 801, p. 460.

finale of an Alleluia. While the first line states clearly the tonal center, D, note the beautiful manner in which the line is kept alive and tense in its final phrase through the constant use of the F with occasional references to the final D.

A look at Example 4 shows how this same kind of tension is maintained in shamisen music. The tones B and E are notes of repose. However, it is

[6] See Leonard Meyer, *Emotion and Meaning In Music* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).
[7] See Langer, *Feeling and Form*, p. 109 ff.
[8] Studies in melodic tension in Western music can be found in the works of pupils of Schenker; for example, Paul Hindemith's *The Craft of Musical Composition* (New York: Associated Music Publishers, 1937).

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the note F that is emphasized during the long pauses (measures nine and seventeen) in order that the sense of melodic flow may be continued to its ultimate goal on B at the end of the piece. This example is rather slow. A faster example would probably show less melodic tension as the rhythmic drive is more prominent. This contention is borne out by a study of many shamisen pieces[9] which reveals a direct relation between the lack of rhythmic density and the increase in melodic tension. Thus, it is obvious that part of the experiencing of "significant form" involves a real feeling for the structural meaning of a given note in the tonal matrix of a specific piece. The F in Example 4 stands for a half cadence just as clearly and potently as a dominant chord does in an analogous position in a Mozart piano sonata.

Melodic tension has been shown to be a vital element in any music, but since our subject matter is of a comparative nature, it is important to make special note of its operation in non-Western examples. We can expand our discussion of structural markers in Asian music by returning to the Indian *rāga* and an improvisation performed in it. The first thing heard in such a performance is a drone which establishes the tonal center of the *rāga*. Other than this drone harmony is of little significance in the music. Tensions and anticipations are created by the performer as he gradually exposes in the matrix of the drone sound the tones and ornaments characteristic of the given *rāga*. This is not the place to discuss all the ramifications of the term *rāga*.[10] It is sufficient to say that a *rāga* is a scalar-melody form; that is, it contains the tonal vocabulary of a piece as well as certain melodic and ornamental characteristics. Under such a circumstance the time required to expose the opening symbol (the *rāga* itself) is far greater that that required for the G minor tonality of the Mozart example. Thus, most Indian improvisatory pieces begin with a long rhapsodic *ālāp* whose function is to thoroughly indoctrinate both performer and listener in the basic structural markers so that the music that follows may be experienced with a high degree of tonal anticipation and prediction. Cadence points in such music are most obviously noted by returns to the basic tone of the *rāga*. However, Indian music also exploits a rhythmic concept called *tāla*.

A *tāla* is defined as a cycle of beats marked off into smaller units by accents. For example, in northern India the *tāla* called *jhap-tāla* has a cycle of ten beats marked off into four units as follows:

$$\overset{>}{1}\ 2,\ \overset{>}{1}\ 2\ 3,\ (\overset{>}{1})\ 2,\ \overset{>}{1}\ 2\ 3$$

[9] William Malm, *Nagauta: The Heart of Kabuki Music* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1963), pp. 214-215.

[10] See further Harold Powers, *The Background of the South Indian Raga-system* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1963), and Alain Danielou, *Northern Indian Music* (London: C. Johnson, 1949).

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The easiest way to mark a cadence in this music would be by the appearance of the basic tone of the *rāga* at the first beat of the *tāla*. However, like Mozart, the Indian musician does not wish to make his music that predictable. In the Indian tradition, I will mention only two aspects of this further refinement of the *rāga-tāla* system. First, let us note that quite often an accent of one unit of a *tāla* will be felt rather than played so that a silence occurs which is actually filled with forward-moving tension. In the *tāla* given above the "silent accent" is usually the third one (marked in parentheses here). Second, one finds that in an improvisation on a melody written in a *rāga,* the tonic note of the *rāga* may appear on the second accent rather than the first. Both of these characteristics are seen in Example 6.



EXAMPLE 6. An Indian *gat* as played by Ravi Shankar, transcribed by Robert Morris from side 1, band 3 of the Ducretet-Thomson record album *Anthologie de la Musique Classique de L'Inde* (320 c 096-8).

We have shown how the cadential markers are present in such a *rāga-tāla* piece, but how does one make the end of one cycle more significant than another? Our example illustrates one additional device, the *tehi.* This is a common cadencing signal which consists of the repetition three times of a rhythmic pattern which is so constructed that the last beat of the pattern falls on the first beat of the first accent of the next *tāla* cycle. The one illustrated is very short compared to some, but it shows the same sense of inevitable movement toward a cadence that one experiences in Western music when confronted, for example, by the first chords of a traditional harmonic cadence.

Until recent times, harmony has been the most convenient element in Western music through which a sense of temporal progression could be explained. However, we have already noted that harmony is not of particular importance in non-Western music. Even when it does exist, the sense of chord progression is not an essential element in it. Since harmony has been such an important structural symbol in Western music, one must then ask if there are some functional substitutes for harmony in the non-Western traditions.

The melodic tensions and cadential markers mentioned above are obviously important means for providing a forward drive in both Western and non-Western music. Thus, they provided convenient comparative materials for

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the beginning of our study. When we brought up the subject of *tāla,* however, we entered the field of rhythm, in which the Orient has many concepts quite foreign to those of the West. Within the context of symbolism we cannot logically discuss all the ways in which special rhythmic tensions are created in non-Western music.[11] However, I wish to extend our rhythmic study by the consideration of three significant non-Western structural principles: the colotomic structure, isorhythm, and pattern progression.

A colotomic structure has been defined as any system which marks off music into temporal units by the entrance of specific instruments in a specific order at a specific time. This principle was first noted by Jaap Kunst[12] in connection with the gamelan music of Indonesia, where various gongs were heard to mark off the music into units until a cadencing sound of the largest gong was heard, after which they began their "progression" again. An example of how this structure operates in Javanese music is as follows. If there are sixteen beats to a period, sometimes they are divided up by four gongs, the *ketuk* (k in our chart), the *kempul* (p), the *kenong* (n), and the gong (g), in the following manner:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
k		k	n	k	p	k	n	k	p	k	n	k	p	k	ng

If one merely says over several times the pattern created by the letter symbols in the above example, one soon senses the inevitable gong on beat sixteen. Note, in addition, the interesting "lift" given to the opening by the lack of any sound at all on beat two. When the symbols are turned into actual gong sounds in the midst of a gamelan performance, the effect is considerably greater. Above this relatively simple structure is created a very complex stratification of polyphonic lines. Thus the colotomic structure, like Western harmony, is not in the foreground of the music, but it is a pacemaking matrix against which or with which the other elements of the music may be experienced as dynamic, forward-moving phenomena.

A colotomic structure such as the one shown above could be considered to be one very large rhythm pattern which, after the entrance of the large gong, is repeated and repeated until the piece ends. In this light it becomes a macrocosmic isorhythm, for an isorhythm can be defined as a rhythmic pattern which is repeated intact while other elements of the music change. Under this definition one can see that, for example, the basic rhythm of the American folk tune "Clementine" is an isorhythm since the

[11] See further Malm, *op. cit.*, and also *Music Cultures of the Pacific, the Near East, and Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

[12] Jaap Kunst, *Music in Java* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1949), 1, 296. The same principle is present in some mainland Southeast Asian music and, in my opinion, is evident in the percussion and string parts of Japanese court orchestra (*gagaku*) music as well.

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melody changes but the rhythm stays constant. However, the repetition of the entire tune with each verse is not an isorhythm since the musical elements remain in the same relationship. Short isorhythmic patterns such as the one shown in "Clementine" are extremely common in folk and popular music, where they are a great aid in the aural retention of the tune. By contrast, the use of long isorhythmic patterns was a common compositional device in medieval European music,[13] but there is a controversy among scholars as to whether these isorhythms were in fact aurally perceptible.

Short isorhythmic patterns are as evident in Oriental music as they are in Western traditions. However, the larger isorhythmic structures of Oriental music have only recently been given much attention. It may be that the unit accents of the Indian *tāla* could be considered as an implied isorhythm, since they are conceived of by the performers as a repeatable unit even though the drummers and melodic instrument players create very fanciful rhythmic variations around them. Returning to Javanese music, one can also note that the drummers of the gamelan often play a rather strict long rhythmic pattern set within the matrix of the colotomic structure which also might be considered as a more complex isorhythm. Extended drum patterns of a similar nature have been noted in the music of mainland Southeast Asia,[14] and preliminary research indicates that they may also be present in the rhythmic accompaniment of Chinese opera.[15] In the context of the definition of isorhythm posited in this article it may be that many of the percussion parts of Japanese festival music (*matsuri bayashi*) can be considered as isorhythmic. In addition, the various rhythmic patterns used to accompany many Near Eastern compositions are in this category, as shown in Example 7. An awareness of such a pattern as this one in a given piece is an essential element in one's ability to "feel" the design of the music.



EXAMPLE 7. The Tunisian classical rhythm pattern *al-musaddar,* as quoted from d'Erlanger in the notes to *Tunisia* (Folkways record FW 8861) collected by Wolfgang Laade. The height of the notes represents higher and lower sounds on a percussion instrument.

The next step beyond isorhythm is rhythmic pattern progression. At the moment this phenomenon has been noted only in Japanese Nō and Kabuki drama music, though future research may reveal its presence in other Asian

[13] See Albert Seay, *Music in the Medieval World* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 133-134.
[14] Judith Becker, "Percussion Patterns in the Music of Mainland Southeast Asia," *Ethnomusicology* (May, 1968), 173-191.
[15] Rulan Chao Pian, "The Function of Rhythm in the Peking Opera," address given at the Asian Music UNESCO Meeting, Manila, April, 1966.

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musics. Under the system, as seen in Japanese Nō, the drum accompaniment consists of named, stereotyped patterns usually in eight-beat lengths. The ramifications of these patterns are many,[16] but for our discussion there are two basic points about these patterns (*tetsuke*) which must be noted. First, each pattern uses a unique combination of beats on the drum plus vocal shouts (*kakegoe*) from the player which establish that pattern as different from all other patterns and which can be easily conceptualized aurally by the listener as a pattern once the system is known. Second, these patterns tend to occur in certain predictable sequences, so that hearing one pattern sets up in the ear a prediction as to the nature of the next pattern. It would be very space-consuming to illustrate this principle fully, but a few examples may help to clarify how this system works.

Example 8*a* is the pattern *uchi kiri* as played on the *taiko* stick drum in the Nō drama. The upper notes are the right-hand strokes and the lower ones are for the left hand, while the drum calls are given below the staff. By merely beating out the rhythms with one's hands a few times while saying the drum calls one can recognize that the distinctive features of the pattern would be considerably weakened if either the accents or the drum calls were missing.

Example 8*b* is a related pattern, *kiku uchi kiri*. In this case it is probably



EXAMPLE 8. Three rhythmic patterns for the Japanese Nō drama *taiko* drum, transcribed from native notation in *Komparu-ryu Taiko Zensho* (Tokyo: Nogaku Shogi, 1953).

the drum calls which most easily help the listener to recognize its relation to the pattern *uchi kiri* itself.

These two patterns may be compared with that in Example 8*c*, which, while part of the *uchi* "family," is from the *uchi komi* branch and not the *uchi kiri* one. A study of all three examples should help to clarify the special ways in which these time units can become conceivable structural symbols. In the *taiko* textbook[17] these patterns are listed along with an explanation of

[16] See Malm, "An Introduction to Taiko Drum Music in the Japanese Nō Drama," *Ethnomusicology* (May, 1960), pp. 75-78.
[17] *Komparu-ryu Taiko Zensho* (Tokyo: Nogaku Shogi, 1953), pp. 106-107.

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what patterns may appear before and after each one of them. There are some ten different ways of approaching these patterns but for all three there is only one pattern that may follow, *kashira,* the fundamental cadencing pattern of Nō percussion music. Thus the appearance of any one of these three patterns immediately sets up in the listener's mind an anticipation of the cadence that is to follow. What is shown in Example 8 is exactly analogous with writing in Western music three dominant formations without the resolving tonics. Indeed, the reader knowledgeable in Western traditional music may have noted that the rhythmic pattern progression concept in Japanese Nō music has in it every attribute of the Western harmonic system except one. Western harmony consists of vertical tonal structures called chords while the pattern progression system consists of horizontal time units called rhythmic patterns or *tetsuke.* Beyond that they are quite parallel in their characteristics of being aurally perceivable as units and being organized into standard orders of progression that enhance prediction and anticipation in the music. Example 8 shows that the systems are similar even in their use of families of related patterns. Thus we can see in this case, at least, a very clear substitute for one of the most powerful symbols of the structure in Western music, harmony. The other principles discussed earlier, as well as many which have not been mentioned in this study, are further evidence that while the need for structural symbolism is essential to all musics, the means through which it is accomplished vary greatly around the world.

The bulk of our discussion has centered on the nature of structural symbolism in Oriental music not only because it is less easily understood than the nature of the pictorial and associative forms, but also because it is more fundamental to the aesthetic experiencing of the music. The fact that music is perceived in the context of an irreversible time continuum makes the functions of various structural markers such as those mentioned above uniquely powerful in the aesthetic responses to the art. The listener to music cannot stop musical time except when reading a score, while the perceiver of painting or literature has a considerable control over the rate and even to some extent the order in which he receives the information of those arts. Even though the flow of musical time is an illusion, hence the term virtual time, the experience of music within its context makes the need for recall and prediction all the more essential. It was Langer who said that the essence of music is the "creation of virtual time and its complete determination by the movement of audible forms."[18] Our discussion of structural symbolism has tried to compare in specific ways how this essence is realized in various musical worlds.

Before closing this essay some consideration should be given to the levels of aesthetic experience that may exist in music listening. The perception of

[18] Langer, *Feeling and Form,* p. 125.

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pictorial and associative symbols is primarily an intellectualized experience and, while the structural symbols could remain at the same level, they also have the potential of sweeping the listener into the irreversible flow of the music as a beautiful system of logic in sound. This kind of perception is considered by most of us to be the true and full experiencing of the art, yet I have been told by Oriental scholars that I shall never appreciate the "deepest point" of the music. As I understand this statement, they mean that the music will never be from "my culture." It will never evoke for me the memories and associations which have grown out of a lifetime of living within a culture which itself may have centuries of tradition behind it. From this point of view bi-musicality is impossible.[19] I agree that this level of experience is probably not obtainable by any conscious effort, but at the same time, the nature of this level is extremely personal and varies greatly with each culture carrier. Even a foreigner can experience some (though not all) of this more national experience as he becomes more involved personally with the culture.

It may be that, as our modern communications world continues over a long period of time to provide us with any kind of music from anywhere at any time,[20] the significance of such intracultural experiences will be lessened. It is my hope that there will always be room for these more personalized aesthetic experiences. However, in the light of the topic of this symposium, such experiences are not germane except as one can say that anyone's response to music has within it the sum of all that he has learned, from his culture and from his internal growth as a sensitive human being, about the potentials for aesthetic satisfaction from sound.

The function of symbolism in the experiencing of music has been shown to be common to all the traditions mentioned though the nature of the symbols used has been most varied. This essay has attempted to clarify the nature of some of these symbols in music. It has also left many unanswered questions upon which I hope the discussions of this symposium may shed some light.

[19] For the possible levels of bi-musicality see Mantle Hood, "The Challenge of 'Bi-Musicality,'" *Ethnomusicology* (May, 1960), pp. 55-59.
[20] See Leonard Meyer, *Music, the Arts, and Ideas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

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Barbara B. Smith — On William P. Malm's "On the nature and function of symbolism in Western and Oriental music"

Dr. Malm deserves congratulations on his paper in which he discusses the relevance of certain musical phenomena to one aspect of aesthetics—that of the symbol—within the difficult context of comparative aesthetics, East and West. Dr. Malm is widely respected among ethnomusicologists for his major contributions to their relatively young and undeveloped field of inquiry (undeveloped both in the number of the world's musical traditions subjected to scholarly analysis to date, and in the degree of sophistication of technique and conceptual framework of most published materials), especially through his *Nagauta: The Heart of Kabuki Music* (Tokyo, 1963), which provides a brilliant and definitive analysis of some phenomena of one particular genre in specifically musical terms.

The paper under consideration today, in contrast to his *nagauta* study, is more exploratory in nature, suggesting some assumptions and fruitful avenues of approach, and presenting some effective examples and tentative conclusions. It is much easier, of course, to criticize certain points in Dr. Malm's paper, to supplement others from personal experience, and to suggest some additional avenues of approach I consider potentially useful, than to present a fully developed argument as he has done. I am happy to be able to take advantage of what I assume to be my privilege as a commentator of discussing only selected aspects of his paper. I hope my comments will be interpreted as corroborative or provocative, but never as pretending to be an authoritative pronouncement, for my interest in his subject is at least equalled by an awareness of how much musicians have yet to learn about the broad aspects of symbolism in music.

In treating such a broad subject for an audience with varying degrees of personal experience in hearing Eastern and Western musics, it is probably impossible to find an ideal balance between a broad generalization which may help indicate the wide range of applicability of a concept and specific designations which will more precisely define its limits (at least to those acquainted with the terminology and its referents). At the risk of concern for tedious detail, I do have some reservations about such broad generalizations as "*Every period* has a touch of this kind of symbolism . . ." [emphasis mine] or "Melodic tension has been shown to be a vital element in *any* music . . ." [emphasis mine], at least for readers who are music students. For example, although the latter statement is probably valid for what musicians call 'common practice music' (eighteenth and nineteenth century European concert music), I doubt that it would be for some of the so-called primitive dance musics in which the melodic component is minimal or overwhelmed by rhythmic percussion, or for some of the contemporary avant-garde aleatoric experiments. (Parenthetically I should admit that Dr. Malm has probably correctly estimated that not everyone here today would call the examples I have given 'music'.)

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Perhaps I have become especially cautious in regard to generalizing where verbal description of music is concerned because of an experience in one of my classes several years ago. I have been interested in what I have referred to as a 'becomingness' of a tone as contrasted to a 'beingness' of a tone. I have the impression that the quality of 'becoming' as it occurs in the tonal components of some Oriental musics is employed functionally and, at least in some instances, symbolically. And I have found that this verbal description has helped some of my students focus their attention on, and enjoy those characteristics of Oriental musical styles not exploited—or at least not so fully exploited—in Western classical music.

One example of what I have called 'becoming' in a tone is found in some *gidayu* music (Dr. Malm presented one example of *gidayu* music, but not one illustrative of this characteristic) where a magnificently effective slowly sliding rising pitch creates melodic tension. In some cases where the dramatic content of a play is that of unresolvable conflict or unmitigable sorrow the shamisen may beat out one pitch with an exasperating insistence while the vocal part approaches slowly from below almost to the shamisen's pitch, but does not quite reach it. The vocal line drops down and again starts to rise, but, as before, does not quite reach it. If, by mistake, the singer did exactly reach the pitch of the shamisen, such agreement would resolve the tension and the emotional conflict portrayed on stage would be repudiated by its associated music and the dramatic effect of the total experience would be lost, or, at least, greatly diluted. I remember being told by a Japanese musician that Western music does not know how to be sad because it always seems to expect the performers to stay in tune with each other.

Another example which seems to me to be characterized by a 'becoming' of a tone may be found in the music of the *shakuhachi* (a Japanese vertical bamboo flute) which has, as significant features of its performance style, gradual changes in pitch, gradual changes in tone quality on some tones of long duration, and variation in both speed and width of vibrato during long tones. Another example occurs in the recitation of Korean *sijo* (a form of poetry traditionally recited with great intensity and deliberation in a prescribed melodic contour and with accompaniment of several instruments), with its dramatic use of change of vibrato and loudness in tones of long duration. And there are many other examples.

Returning to that experience in class which made me more cautious of verbal generalizations, one day a student took the same terms of 'being' and 'becoming' and, by applying them to other aspects of musical design and to other examples, proceeded to demonstrate that 'being' was more identified with Oriental music and, 'becoming' with Western. And the student made a very respectable case for his argument. As a result of this experience I have wondered if it would be valuable to consider 'being' and 'becoming' as polar

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extremities of a line (somewhat as Charles Seeger has suggested in several of his articles). We could then select a number of stylistic components for analysis and designate a 'being-becoming' line for each and attempt to determine where each genre or style we have studied belongs for each component. From this we might learn more of the internal functioning of these interrelationships and how these relate to the more broadly stated verbalizations of aesthetics.

Somewhat along the same line of reasoning (and although I do not argue with Dr. Malm's statement that many musicians, thinking rather pragmatically, would answer a question of what is symbolism in music with three categories, namely, the pictorial, the associative, and the structural—although I do think some Western musicians might combine the first two into a heading of 'descriptive', providing a convenient, if not necessarily adequate, dichotomy), I wonder if we might not also consider this a single component with the most obviously imitative constructs (perhaps imitation of inanimate things or of animate non-human things) at one pole and moving through expression of human action and human emotion to the most abstract structural markers in virtual time at the other. I notice that Dr. Malm presented some examples that he considered not incontestably in one category or another which may strengthen the argument for the usefulness of a continuum rather than of mutually exclusive categories.

It may be advisable to point out here that excerpts different from the previously described example from *gidayu* music might appear in different places along a 'descriptive-structural marker' line. For example, in some parts of *gidayu* music the vocal part rises gradually toward the shamisen's pitch, but just before reaching it the shamisen jumps away to another pitch, although the vocal line continues upward to the previously-sounded shamisen tone. To the best of my knowledge, this relationship of parts is not directly associated with the expression of a specific human emotion nor it it a structural marker in the sense of a cadence, but it does give the listener a perceptibly increased awareness of the irreversible passage of virtual time.

Dr. Malm's comments on the role of cultural conditioning to prediction and anticipation through aurally perceptible units interested me greatly, for among my early impresssions of sitting in a Japanese audience and listening to Japanese music (but not at performances of Japanese music for non-Japanese audiences) was the complete assurance with which the audience responded with the now accepted response of applause (adopted from the West) just before the conclusion of a performance (rather than after it as in the West). At that time I did not have comparable expectations of the imminence of the conclusion of a piece. I asked people (not just professional musicians and scholars, but others too) how they knew the composition was coming to the end. I often received an answer such as "I just know, I feel it coming." At first I wondered if it was just that some compositions were so well known

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that it was a memory response, but I discovered that the response was not limited to only the best-known literature. In due time, I found that I too was responding—not with the assurance of a native Japanese musician, but at least with some sense of prediction and anticipation—although I had not discovered the reason on an intellectual plane such as that elucidated by Dr. Malm.

It may be worth introducing to this discussion something I was told by a fine Korean musician. He stated that in Korean folk music, in contrast to Korean court music, there is no definite beginning or ending. A *kayageum* (an instrument related to the Japanese *koto*) player will pick up his instrument, pluck strings seemingly at random although actually checking the tuning as he does so, and gradually is found to be in the midst of a piece of folk music. There was no finishing of the process of tuning, no bow to the audience or other formal sign of completion of tuning or beginning of a composition. Likewise, endings are not formalized; one plays until one has played what one wants to and then stops—no climax, no formal cadence, no identifiable structural marker even to a Korean audience, if I correctly understand the Korean informant.

I will close with two final thoughts on relationships between the arts in the East and West. I wonder if there is not a closer parallel between the traditional visual arts and the traditional performance arts in the Orient than in the West. This may be particularly true in the case of the horizontal scroll painting which should be unrolled one arm's length at a time and the part already seen rolled up, until the whole painting has been viewed (but at no time is the whole scroll visible at once in traditional viewing practice, although it may be in some museum exhibits today). As in experiencing music, dance, drama, and oral poetry, the scroll painting is viewed through time, not all at once.

Secondly, I wonder if there is not a closer association between the arts of the Orient because they seem to be less specific in their referents. The calligraphy of a poem may appear in the picture space and apparently without overly restricting the painter in his manner of representing the thought content or insulting the viewer with redundancy. Likewise, the majority of the music is associated with poetic text (and in early periods the recitation of poetry was accompanied with musical instruments). Is it possible, therefore, that through the study of these more closely associated manifestations of art we will be able to achieve a deeper understanding of the essence of the function of symbol in art?

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Lee Winters On William P. Malm's "On the nature and function of symbolism in Western and Oriental music"

At the very start I should like to indicate my complete acceptance of the basic distinctions which Professor Malm has introduced into his study of musical symbolism. Therefore, my remarks will be principally in the interest of expanding or modifying some of Professor Malm's assumptions.

Perhaps it is most important at this juncture to identify my own peculiar musical tastes, since they stand somewhat at odds with the preponderantly ethnomusicological point of view manifest on this panel. Though I have lived in the Far East for some years and have dwelt in Chinese temples and attended Chinese musical theater, I must confess to some strange limitations in my musical sensibility that have left me, rather, almost totally committed to the Western musical experience with only at most a modicum of appreciation for music of other cultures.

Because of the tremendous volume of study that has been done on Western music, most of the points I shall make in my discussion of Professor Malm's paper will seem—particularly to musicologists—sometimes obvious, certainly never rare. But for me the distinctions are crucial in any attempt to demonstrate what I still consider to be—in an admittedly old-fashioned view—the preeminence of Western musical achievement.

My initial remarks concern the *associative* use of symbol, which Professor Malm with a measure of correctness insists can exert meaning only after the listener can relate a certain pattern of sounds with a certain intellectual concept, an object or an emotional condition. He cites as a typical instance of the associative what he calls "spotting the tunes" in any of Richard Wagner's music-dramas.

Now, while I am willing to admit that on one level the listener should study his Newman or some other guide to the themes in order to recognize "The Woe of the Walsungs" or the "Sword" motif in the *Ring* dramas, I find more than merely the associative here. To identify the whole complexity of Wagner's leit-motif system as exclusively associative is a gross oversimplification. Beyond what we might call the literal is much that is quite symbolically suggestive. That is, I find that many of the melodic patterns—or motifs—are so conceived by the composer that they bear in their very nature the ability to delineate character. There is, I insist, a remarkable suitability between the theme chosen to represent, for instance, the character of Brünnhilde—most characteristically achieved by a single clarinet—and the character of the goddess-heroine herself, just as the trombones striding boldly down the orchestral scale represent symbolically the character of Wotan, the chief of Wagner's gods.

The great figures in Wagnerian music-drama live because the composer has given them melodic lines and instrumental coloring that establish their unique

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entities. That single quiet phrase for solo clarinet tells us not so much that Brünnhilde is about to appear or that she is spoken or thought of, but that Brünnhilde is a woman who is gentle, sensuous, and beautiful. Ernest Newman makes this same point more splendidly than I when, in writing of one of the motifs in Wagner's *Ring,* he observes "the inadequacy of any one verbal label to cover all the significances which this or that motive originally had in Wagner's mind, or all the symbolisations that clustered about it as he sank himself more deeply into his subject."[1]

In addition to these important qualifications of what Professor Malm labels as the associative, it is worth nothing that the Wagnerian leit-motifs throughout the epical four-part cycle are subjected to transposition, to fragmentation, and to alteration through orchestral coloring, so that we are persistently confronted with something infinitely more subtle and various than mere reiteration.

The crucial question in the closing section of Professor Malm's paper is when is structure simply structure and when does structure take on symbolic implications, that is, when does structure stand not only for itself but also for something more than itself. Certainly in Western music, as in non-Western music, we can discover instance after instance of complex musical structures that challenge the best analytical abilities of the listener to fathom. In the West, one thinks at once of the passacaglia, the chaconne, or the fugue. But these seem to me to be most plainly examples only of monumental, formal structures.

Symbolic form for me would necessitate something more. As an example of this, I think immediately of the Classical symphony, in which each of four movements—in contrasting thematic design, in tempo, in key, in melodic content, and in rhythmic force—manifests its own peculiar structure. Considered separately, no matter how eloquently it may be played, an adagio movement or a scherzo does not exert a symbolic force, but exists only for itself. But once four such totally different movements are juxtaposed within a single organic concept, the resultant symphony becomes considerably more than simply a suite of four movements, the order of which might be freely turned about. Rather, certainly in its finest instances, the symphony projects a drama as powerful as any that Shakespeare or Aeschylus ever mounted upon a stage. I know of nothing in non-Western music comparably monumental in its evocation of structural symbolism.

[1] Ernest Newman, *The Wagner Operas* (London: Putnam, 1949), p. 452.

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Peter Crossley-Holland On William P. Malm's "On the nature and function of symbolism in Western and Oriental music"

It is a privilege to have been asked to respond to Dr. Malm's detailed and valuable paper. I have thought best to do this by stating my own viewpoint as to the nature and function of symbolism in music. I believe this viewpoint to be complementary to that expressed by Dr. Malm for two reasons: first, I have drawn much of my material from music whose background has been more consciously concerned with symbolic considerations; second, I have aimed at a more generalized level of presentation.

There is no doubt that, in its truest sense, music has ever been concerned with affording man a larger perspective and a deeper insight. The matter is fairly put by Julius Portnoy when he says: "Only music that has the power to communicate and enhance experience can broaden our perspective of life."[1] These words indeed represent a very generally accepted point of view. Allowing for differences in expression, we find that the "secretaries" of great civilizations have recorded comparable points of view. In fact, the ancients went further and pushed the "broader perspective" which they believed music could convey to its uttermost limits. The Sumerian temple music represented the voices of the gods, the Confucian ritual was to keep the state and dynasty in tune with the heavens, and still today the Vedas are chanted to uphold the order of the cosmos, while the Tibetan lamas chant and play the sounds of reality. These and many other forms of ritual music are essentially concerned with maintaining a flux or, better, a condition of harmony between the visible and invisible worlds. The old myths expressed such attitudes very poetically, attributing the origins of their musical archetypes and instruments to the unknown world: the Indians to their gods, the ancient Celts to those who dwelt in their otherworld, the Pythagoreans to the harmony of the spheres, the Christian fathers to the angels in heaven.

If we may recognize a common factor in such beliefs, it is surely that high civilizations have one and all seen the true principles of their music as lying, not in the world of phenomena or sense-perceptions, but in noumenal or supersensory existence. At the same time, what they conceived as lying in the noumenal world could only be made intelligible to man—and so hope to broaden his perspective—by creating an image available to his senses: in effect, by *imitating* those eternal archetypes in the here and now. This, to my mind, is the most likely interpretation of Platonic *mimesis* in its highest sense: making images of noumena in the phenomenal world.

Thus a musical system, or a work based upon it, could well stand for eternal truths. But it communicates perforce only through the modalities of the phenomenal world, of tonal time and tonal space, in effect, through the modalities proper to music itself.

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[1] Julius Portnoy, *Music in the Life of Man* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), preface, p. ix.

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Now so conceived, music can only be *pure symbol.* We can reach no other conclusion if we define symbol, even minimally, as that which stands for something other; for instance, as the audible analogue of an inaudible essence. For it would appear to be the work of art *only* in its aspect as symbol that has the power of broadening human perspective which, to quote Portnoy further, is "the prime prerequisite of art's function in the world."[2] The extent to which a work fails to be a symbol, or manages to be only an incomplete or inadequate one, would then be the extent to which it would fall short as a work of art, because its form would be hybrid, its manner of expression uncertain, its power of image-making confused. For, as Frank Howes has pointed out, the "symbolizing propensity of the mind is none other than imagination."[3]

The broader perspective to which man has devoted his arts has not, of course, always been that of an absolute. It has sometimes been the "state," or has gone no further than some human ideal, or has even been limited to a given group of artists. Indeed, in recent times in the West music has often enough been little more than a signature for the psychopathological essence of a given individual. Yet even here there remains the concept of a work of art as communicating a perspective somewhat larger than that of the individual caught in a given moment. We may say with Schopenhauer[4] that music evokes a type of emotion or mood, not a particular and individual instance of it. And whenever art communicates thus, it necessarily stands as the symbol of that larger perspective, of that type, and of the expanded awareness that comes of contact with it.

If we take music to be a non-verbal art of tones then, in a given work, it can only be by virtue of a particular form of symbolism that the tones come to be arranged in this or that way. The tones are organized so as to reflect, so as to stand for, some pattern of existence lying beyond that which makes up its creator's shifting or moment-to-moment perspective. Such would seem to be one of the vital clues to both the nature and function of symbolism in music. But the actual levels of symbolic function and the modalities of symbolic nature will vary according to a number of factors, including the temperament and creative power of the individual, the beliefs and attitudes current in a given order of society and, in another sense, the extent to which symbols may be employed consciously, as in ritual, or intuitively, as by many a creatively gifted artist.

Turning then to the matter of levels in symbolism, we may make the

[2] *loc. cit.*

[3] Frank Howes, *Man, Mind and Music* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1938), p. 43. Cf. also pp. 44, 104-105, 128.

[4] Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, trans. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1961), vol. I, pp. 272-273.

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broadest distinction between those which seem to approach the completely objective and those which we call subjective. By the same token we may recognize the existence of many stages in between.

The most objective level of symbolism we can conceive must be that of pure number. Indeed, certain well-known mathematical laws which are of wide application in physical nature have played a fundamental role in the music theories of all Eastern civilizations that have had such theories, as well as in those of Western civilization during the greater part of its history. Such systems have been based primarily, not upon number symbolism as such, but rather upon the properties of musical sound in itself and through the realization that its musically significant behavior relates to a scheme of simple proportion.

The Greeks, studying the behavior of a stretched string and the sounds emitted by its measurable parts, already knew all the musical intervals known to us as well as many for which we find no use. Though they did not state matters in precisely our terms, it is clear that both the Greeks and the late Latin writers, who transmitted the principles of Greek harmonic science to Europe, recognized the importance of those three familiar mathematical series: the geometric, the harmonic, and the arithmetic. In musical sound, the geometric series is exemplified by a chain of octave relationships, the harmonic by the aliquot divisions of a stretched string, and the arithmetic by the vibration frequencies of those same sound-giving divisions. In this context, as it turns out, the arithmetic is a measure of energy, the harmonic a measure of matter—one being a *mirror image* of the other—while the geometric constitutes the overall framework for the interconnection of the two. From the third century B.C., Chinese writings also imply a knowledge of these series, though they naturally use somewhat different terms.

So the Greeks were dealing, as the Mesopotamians and Egyptians may have done before them, and as the Arabs certainly did after them, with mathematical laws that operate not only in musicial sound but also over a wider field. Music based upon such laws could not help but rely closely upon objective nature for its sonorous material. It is hence not surprising to find that each ancient musical system embraces a number symbolism relating musical sound to that very nature. In all ancient music theories known, it seems, there is evidence to suggest that the number 3 refers to the world of noumena, the number 2 to the world of phenomena. In Greece, Islām, and early Europe, as well as in ancient China and, in a less direct form, in India, these numbers and their multiples, and the proportions based upon them, have been symbolically significant in the divisions of tonal space; they are variously found in the relations of the octave, fifth, and fourth—those three broadest divisions of sound confirmed by modern science as constituting the first three relationships in the musical "harmonic series." The divisions of tonal time, in duple

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and triple relationships, are also symbolically explicit in the musical systems of some of these civilizations.

I believe that at this relatively objective level we are dealing with something in the structure of musical sound itself which comes as near to universal truth as we can find there in terms of reason alone. Its foundation in mathematical science, its relevance to the properties of sonorous bodies, and its appearance in every known traditional music theory cannot lightly be dismissed. A comparative investigation of all such objective elements would be a prerequisite for any semantic theory of music, and the search for such elements of cross-cultural validity could be salutary amidst the utter confusion created by global musical contacts at the present time.

Such, then, is one important aspect of the nature of the musical material traditionally considered a suitable vehicle for phenomenal images of the noumenal world. Moreover, the molding force of such symbolism on the history and development of musical art in East and West must be accounted very great. There are, of course, far greater complexities in the variety of musical sound divisions, as in the systems of symbolism to which manifold investigations have pretended, than those we have here outlined, but I have purposely limited the argument to a level where we find an impressive confluence and correspondence of facts and concepts.

The principles we have been discussing refer of course to "objective" nature. They are physical, objective and, when viewed in the realm of concept, entirely rational. But the qualities needed to reach an artistically creative level, though including the rational, have certainly to transcend that. Emotion, intuition, inspiration and the like, partake of a quite different nature: they incline to the non-physical, subjective, and irrational.

The precise quality of the subjective element which goes into the making of a work of art, as also into the appreciation of it, naturally varies with the nature of the individual, the conditions of his education, the prevailing social norms, and the qualities of the broader culture to which he belongs. In the same way the types and levels of the subjective symbols involved in the creative process will be ever varied and new.

It is not my purpose to pursue these varieties here, important though they be. It is rather to emphasize that the work of art results from the marriage of the subjective with the objective,[5] the irrational with the rational, the non-physical with the physical. In the creative process each of these factors loses its nature as an entity and we are left with a mean between the pairs of so-called opposites. According to the way in which we divide the factors, a

[5] Gordon Epperson, *The Musical Symbol* (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1967), p. 210, doubtless following Susanne Langer, calls symbol the "fusion of the actual and the virtual."

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musical work may be thought of as an organic mean between the objective and the subjective, the rational and the irrational, energy and matter, quantity and quality, sound and that for which the sound stands but which in relation to it can only appear as silence. If either ingredient be taken away, there is no more anything we can call music. Since, therefore, music is neither subjective nor objective alone, it must needs be both in fusion. And if it be both in fusion, yet neither as such, what then may it be said to symbolize? To this question only one answer would seem possible: music may be said to stand for a level of existence where subject and object have no separate meaning. And likewise for the fusions of other "opposites."

Looked at slightly analytically, the function of symbolism in music is above all to convey the impression of the harmonious interrelatedness of all things.[6] In effect, great works of musical art, even if they stop some way short of this, convey at the very least a perspective of ordered relations over an appreciable range.

Every time we communicate with a musical work, we have the subjective and objective in one—a unity which music, by the very directness of its nature, is preeminently suited to express. For in it, neither can exist without the other, and together they exist only in and through man. Man, himself the symbol of that "place" where subjective and objective meet, is also the creator of the musical symbol of that intersection. Where, after all, *can* subjective and objective meet? Or, to divide matters differently, where is it that the intersection of noumena and phenomena could be?

I think that both the ancient Greeks and the ancient Chinese were well aware of the problem. As G. R. S. Mead long ago pointed out in his study on the Orphic mysteries,[7] at the point of intersection of the Platonic *tetractys* the zero power of 2 and the zero power of 3 are both equal to unity, that is, $3^\circ = 2^\circ = 1$. Similarly, an ancient Chinese source[8] makes 3 the numeral of heaven, 2 that of the earth, and 1 that of man. The Hindus say it in a different way: the two halves of the hourglass-shaped drum of Śiva, representing macrocosm and microcosm, intersect at its central point, symbolic of the heart of man.

If we have argued today that symbolism in music displays a wealth of forms, we may perhaps say that its ultimate function is to broaden man's perspective to that point where, the need no longer existing, the symbol ceases to be such.

[6] Speaking of the nature of art in general, P. D. Ouspensky, in *A New Model of the Universe* (2d ed.; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1934), p. 35, says it is based upon "the feeling of the harmonious interconnection of *everything* and the feeling of the 'soul' of things and phenomena."

[7] G. R. S. Mead, *Orpheus* (Adyar, 1896).

[8] Cited by J. A. van Aalst, *Chinese Music* (Shanghai: Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1884), pp. 7-8 and p. 7, n. 7.

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Albert Hofstadter, On William P. Malm's "On the nature and function of symbolism in Western and Oriental music"

Mr. Malm has provided us with a fascinating and helpful introduction to some of the structural devices used in Eastern music for the purpose of building the musical sound-flow. He helps us to realize how differently in detail the sound-flow is structured in the different musics, and yet at the same time how essentially alike they are in their basic nature. What is true of the other features of human culture is true of music too: our cultures differ, but they are all manifestations of a single underlying unity of essential nature, man himself. As man structures his existence in different cultural forms, building up a world and a history of his relation to the world and to humankind, while yet remaining essential man, so in his different musics he builds the outward form of his existence in the audibility of the time-flow, and proves himself essential man, the man of humankind, in that very process of his differentiation.

I will confine my remarks to the topic of this audible time-flow and its structural features. As Mr. Malm makes clear, this is the most important of the three aspects of symbolism—pictorial, associative, and structural—which he discusses.

Structural symbolism is the most important in Mr. Malm's treatment because it brings us closest to the "true and full experiencing" of music, because the essence of music, he thinks (in accord with Mrs. Langer), is the creation of virtual time and the determination of it by musical forms. The structural symbols alone, he says, have the power to sweep the listener into "the irreversible flow of the music as a beautiful system of logic in sound."

I cite this not to disagree but to agree with him. Pictorial and associative symbolism, however universal they may be, do not lie at the heart of music, any more than they do in any other art—even literature. Even non-associative expression of emotion, while essential to all music and especially to music of the romantic type, as in Wagner's *Tristan,* is less central to the essence of music than the flow of pure musicality that Mr. Malm singles out. The great fugues of Bach, the symphonies, sonatas, and quartets of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven, the chamber music of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, say from Schubert to Schönberg—these with much of contemporary music stand as the living display and cogent evidence of Mr. Malm's concept of "the irreversible flow of music as a beautiful system of logic in sound."

The questions I would like to raise are these: Is it fundamentally a matter of symbolism here, or is it something else? Is our experience of music as sound-flow of or in virtual time the experience of something symbolical or is it something else?

What Mr. Malm stresses throughout is the operation of certain structural devices as markers along a time continuum. That is the definition of structural symbols: they are markers along a time continuum. What they do is

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enable us to sense and perceive the form of the time-flow. He uses Leonard Meyer's work as background for the notion that musical form works by means of anticipations, expectations, predictions, their fulfillments and disappointments, to provide the concrete experience of the progress of the music through time. Such marking-functions as tonality and cadence, melodic tension and release, rhythmic tension and release, as exemplified in *rāga, tāla,* and *tehi,* colotomic structure, isorhythm, and pattern progression, are described as making possible a certain kind of experience of the music. What is this experience?

Is it in particular an experience of symbolism, a symbolical experience? The symbolical functions ascribed by Mr. Malm to the structural features are indispensable. In order to sense, feel, perceive the flow of musical time, markers are needed to determine beginnings, middles, and ends, repetitions and variations, tensions and releases, permanences and transiences, and the like. By means of them we can tell when the flow is setting out, anticipate where it is going, find it arriving, and so forth. But now, given the whole flow of musical time in a piece of music, where the different structural markers refer to each other and to the whole—is this whole *itself* a symbol? And if it is, what does it symbolize and how does it symbolize?

Mr. Malm cites both Susanne Langer and Leonard Meyer. Mrs. Langer thinks the whole musical form symbolizes feeling, emotion, the feeling-life; Mr. Meyer thinks it does, too. Mrs. Langer thinks it does it by presenting the form of emotion in a non-discursive way; Mr. Meyer thinks it does it by arousing, disappointing, and satisfying predictions. I think that neither of these views is wholly correct. It is true that the process of musical tension and resolution has an emotional quality, but that does not mean that the function of the musical form is to symbolize emotion by presenting emotion's form. Every real mental process has feeling immanent in it, and therefore the mental process expressed in music has it; but it also has, like every other real mental process, cognition and volition present. There is a mode of intelligence and a mode of will—what Riegl called artistic volition, *Kunstwollen*—in music; it is not a mere matter of expressing emotion or feeling. Mrs. Langer's aesthetics is very one-sided in this respect.

But the intelligence in music is not like that in Mr. Meyer's view—an intelligence that predominantly predicts, anticipates, recognizes, and thus is predominantly disappointed or satisfied. The pleasure of music is not to be found in the mere satisfaction of having anticipated rightly, or of pleasant surprise in having anticipated wrongly, having been playfully dealt with, etc.

There is an everpresent danger in musical aesthetics that corresponds to what William James called *the psychologist's fallacy*. "The great snare of the psychologist," he pointed out, "is the confusion of his own standpoint with

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that of the mental fact about which he is making his report."[1] We might call it here the music-aesthetician's fallacy. Studying music, the theorist discovers structural patterns by which the temporal form of music is determined. He recognizes that these patterns must be operative psychologically in the hearer's mind. Therefore, he proceeds to suppose that the hearer senses them, feels them, perceives them, recognizes them *as patterns of the sort that he, the music theoretician, experiences them as being.* He finds that the patterns "tend to occur in certain predictable sequence,"[2] for instance, and then immediately infers that in the musical hearer as such "hearing one pattern sets up in the ear a prediction as to the nature of the next pattern." But the experience of setting up a prediction as to the nature of a succeeding pattern from listening to a preceding pattern is a typical experience of a scientist, an investigator, a theoretician, not of a musical hearer. The musical hearer is not primarily concerned with acting as a detective to discover how the music is going to go and then commiserating or congratulating himself on failure or success. He may be tempted to predict when he does not yet know the music well. It is, however, only when he knows the music well, and after all predictions have been confirmed or rejected, that he begins to have a fuller musical experience, experiencing the music better now because he knows how it goes.

Thus the symbolic function of being a structural marker, while inescapable, is only preliminary to reaching the stage at which, the structure being apprehended in listening, the hearer can give himself over to the music as such. That is, the structural symbolism does not lie in the foreground of musical consciousness but in the background. Or better, the structural symbolism in music, like the syntactical and grammatical symbolism in language, is an indispensable stratum in the structure of the expression, but it is not the concrete unity of form and content that is the speech or the musical utterance itself. The music itself lies higher in the stratification of the work than the structural underpinning with all the latter's interior symbolism. Indeed, I believe that the listener—unless he be an expert in musicology and music theory, a composer, an analyst, a critic—never arrives at explicit structural listening, any more than we who see, hear, perceive, understand, feel, and will arrive at explicit phenomenological awareness of the structure of the objects or the acts of our consciousness, or any more than we who speak arrive at explicit awareness of the structural symbolism that constitutes the grammar and logic of our speech. The listener turns by instinct and experience to the music in its concreteness and integrity from the very beginning; he hears the structure intuitively and immediately, without reflection on it, without even being conscious of it as structure, because he is concen-

[1] *Principles of Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt, 1890 and 1918), I, 196.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

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trating on something that depends on the structure and includes it, but transcends it.

What does he hear?

Take a simple case, the resolution of harmonic tension. We can listen to a dominant resolving into a tonic by attending to it as structural symbolism; that is, we can then hear the dominant as a chord which makes us expect the tonic, and then, hearing the tonic follow, we find our expectation satisfied. But the experience of feeling expectation satisfied is not the same as the experience of musical tension resolved; and equally, the experience of expecting a tonic to follow a dominant and finding one's expectation verified is not the same as the experience of musical tension resolved. What is it to hear the tonic genuinely as *resolution* of the dominant's *tension*?

That experience is one of rest after conflict, peace after war, agreement after disagreement, coming home after having been poignantly away. We are forced into such metaphors in order to designate the meaningful quality of what we hear. There has been a difference developed that has been overcome, a rift that has been healed; the struggling opponents have been brought back to a unity of kinship. It is a dialectical process of differentiation and integration. Otherness and alienation have been brought back into ownness.

The cadence is a tiny bit of genuine music. We need the symbolic functions contained in the structuring of the cadence, not because hearing the cadence is reducible to hearing the cadential symbolic functions, but because, in order to hear the music of the cadence, the cadential symbolic functions must have been utilized. The music of the cadence, however, is not the structure of symbolic functions by which it is built up. It is something quite different, namely, reconciliation after alienation.

What the unity of form and content is that makes music what it is can take different shapes. Music can build a picture, tell a story, represent ideas, events, objects, persons, gods—it can make use of pictorial and associative and other forms of symbolism to build up things that may or may not themselves be symbols. But in its most essential aspect, it uses structures (and therefore structural symbolism) to build up wholes possessed of musical integrity, musical validity, the rightness that belongs to certain complexes of sound, certain temporal flows, and that makes them precious in our ears.

I have tried to point to this aesthetic rightness and integrity in a series of articles and in *Truth and Art*; it is the main burden of my paper, "The Poem is not a Symbol." One could retain the notion of symbol, as I have on occasion done; the work of art can be viewed as a symbol, but only as a most peculiar kind of symbol, namely, the ontological symbol, the symbol that *is* what it *means* and *means* what it *is*. But that is a symbol which is no longer a symbol—it is no longer something that stands for something and, especially,

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stands for something else. Art does not *stand for* something, in its aesthetic essence; it just stands, in and by and through itself; and in it, we are able to stand and come to a stand in the midst of the flow and transience of time, nothingness, and death.

There is a favorite passage I like to cite from Schönberg in which structural symbolism is given implicit recognition but in which aesthetic rightness, validity, or integrity emerges as the essential musical feature.

> In its most common meaning, the term *idea* is used as a synonym for theme, melody, phrase, or motive. I myself consider the totality of a piece as the *idea:* the idea which its creator wanted to present. But because of the lack of better terms I am forced to define the term *idea* in the following manner:
>
> Every tone which is added to a beginning tone makes the meaning of that tone doubtful. If, for instance, G follows C, the ear may not be sure whether this expresses C major or G major, or even F major or E minor; and the addition of other tones may or may not clarify this problem. In this manner there is produced a state of unrest, of imbalance which grows throughout most of the piece, and is enforced further by similar functions of the rhythm. The method by which balance is restored seems to me the real idea of the composition. Perhaps the frequent repetitions of themes, groups, and even larger sections might be considered as attempts towards an early balance of the inherent tension. . . .
>
> One thinks only for the sake of one's idea.
>
> And thus art can only be created for its own sake. An idea is born; it must be molded, formulated, developed, elaborated, carried through and pursued to its very end.
>
> Because there is only l'art pour l'art, for the sake of art alone.[3]

Schönberg's name for rightness is "balance," a favorite term among artists and critics. It means that everything finally gets into place, is where and how it has to be, not in a dead way but in a way that is full of the life that manifests and reveals the idea. It represents a truly living unity and integrity, that is, the order of necessity that belongs to a mode of life in its absolute freedom. The artist is a man who knows about this, not in philosophical abstraction, but in the concrete daily struggle to reach it, the constant defeat, the eternal dream.

When we hear the music in this musical integrity we hear the inner musical logic, not just the structural symbolism, but the logic of the living musical spirit manifesting its own idea in the sounds that constitute it. The music is the *logos* of that spirit.

We could try to maintain that, heard in this way, an achieved piece of music is and must be a symbol of true reality, of the divine possibility resident in existence. It certainly can be such a symbol, but it is more than that: it is one dimension of the reality itself; it *is* true reality, reality that has climbed

[3] "New Music, Outmoded Music, Style and Idea," in *Style and Idea* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950).

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the mountain of existence to the height of the truth of being, and realizes in itself, in the form of an intuitional image, the divine possibility, a vision of the ultimate kinship of things. Hence it has the symbolical power, in addition, of representing true reality universally. But its essential being lies, not in this subsequent symbolical power, but in its present and actual realization of truth in itself.

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On the uses of symbolism in sculpture and painting

Before entering upon a particular application of symbolism—in this instance, its aspects in Eastern and Western forms of sculpture and painting—a preliminary glance at the range of the concept will be helpful. In its broadest sense a symbol is anything used to represent or stand for something else. And 'symbolism' refers to the use of symbols, or to the types of symbols used. In art our interest is primarily with certain types of symbols.

One important type is that of words. It might be thought that these would not figure in the visual arts. Yet one important kind of painting in China and Japan is that of expressive brushwork with linguistic characters. Here poetry and painting coalesce in a way practically unknown in Western art. The nearest approach is that of the lettering of illuminated manuscripts. But the aim in illuminated lettering seems to be mainly decorative enrichment. Besides, a single letter or even a word of our analytic Western languages cannot express a complete thought or image in the way a Chinese ideograph can. The Oriental painter in his brushwork emotionally symbolizes the symbol for the thought symbolized by the ideograph. It is not to be wondered at that such painting is supremely admired by the Orientals, much as we Westerners admire chamber music as the greatest refinement of our musical art.

So, even verbal symbols as the most abstractly conventional of all types of symbolism find a place in the visual arts. This is a good time to raise the question of how far symbolism depends upon social convention. The relation of 'representing' or 'standing for' which defines the symbol in its reference to what it symbolizes is clearly a human reference. An item taken as a symbol requires a man to interpret it by an act of reference to what it symbolizes. So there are three terms in a symbolic relation: the symbol which carries the meaning and may be called the vehicle, the thing symbolized, and the interpreter who transmits the symbolic reference from the symbol to the thing symbolized. The vital element (in both senses of the word) for symbolism is the interpreter. If there is no interpreter, the vehicle ceases to convey its meaning. Thus Egyptian hieroglyphics lost their symbolic references and their meanings for many centuries, until they were recovered through the Rosetta Stone. It is the same with all symbolism. Strictly speaking a symbol actively exists only during an act of reference by an interpreter. When such acts are not being performed, a vehicle is only a potential symbol. In ordinary usage, however, we do not hold to this distinction. We call a word on a page a symbol even if nobody is using it. We even called the Egyptian hieroglyphics symbols when nobody existed who could interpret them. Yet the distinction is worth keeping in mind, for on certain occasions it can clear up a threatening difficulty.

In spite of its dependence on an interpreter, a type of symbolism can have a high degree of objectivity. In the case of linguistic symbols this obviously comes from social convention. The symbolism holds wherever the language is

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spoken or read. Members of a society learn the language through acculturation. The symbols maintain their meanings throughout the range of that culture for all who have learned the language. Is convention, however, the only source of objective symbolism?[1]

If so, symbolism is purely cultural, which is another way of saying that its objectivity depends entirely on convention. Many assume that such is the case.

This is barely possible, but on much available evidence, it seems unlikely. Symbols that are not based on social convention may be called natural symbols. The aesthetic importance of natural symbols is that they possess cross-cultural objectivity. One need not be brought up in a culture, or in other ways become familiar with the conventions of a culture, to appreciate them.

I will divide natural symbols into three loosely distinguishable groups. The first group is derived from regularities experienced in the human environment. These might be called *physical symbols*. They have to be learned just as conventional symbols do. In the process of acculturation a child learns these physical symbols along with the conventional ones. He does not distinguish clearly between his social and physical environment. He learns that fire burns in the same way that he learns that uttering 'mama' brings his mother. Fire gets interpreted by the child as a symbol for heat and burning, just as the word 'mama' gets interpreted as the symbol for his mother. When the distinction between physical and conventional symbols is noticed the former are often called 'signs' and only the latter 'symbols'. But this shift of terminology should not lead us to think that signs are not still aesthetic symbols when they function in the arts. The only aesthetic difference between them—and it is an important one especially in our present comparative study—is that 'signs' or 'physical symbols' have a wider range of objectivity than conventional symbols. In a picture of a young man holding a lighted match to a draft card, the physical symbol of the burning flame functions in exactly the same way as the conventional symbol of the draft card for any acculturated American. But for a New Guinea tribesman the symbol of the draft card would be meaningless, though he would fully appreciate the symbol of the flame for burning. Let me add that the functioning of this symbolism in no way depends on its being represented in a picture. It would function in just the same way if the tribesmen were witnessing the actual scene.

The second group of natural symbols is derived either wholly or in part from instinctive or unlearned human responses. This is a much more controversial group of symbols than the physical ones. To begin with, there are many psychologists who question the existence of any instinctive behavior and especially in men. This is partly a matter of the definition of 'instinct'.

[1] Of course, a man may invent his own private symbols and never let anybody else share them, or only a select few, as with a secret code or a password. But our interest in the arts is only with relatively objective symbolism.

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The verbal issue can sometimes be resolved by not using the term 'instinct' and referring only to 'unlearned behavior'. I am going to avoid this level of controversy by simply assuming there is unlearned behavior (let the evidence appear as we go along) and by prescriptively defining this kind of behavior as instinctual in at least my terminology. I shall call attention to a number of types of such unlearned or instinctive behavior which admittedly competent observers have described. The descriptive summaries available for such behavior are the evidence for its existence in human experience.

Let me begin with what may be called the *bodily emotional symbols*. Here I refer to the natural bodily expressions of emotions. The expressions themselves are unlearned or instinctive. There is even a well-known theory of emotion (the James-Lange theory) which equates emotions with their clusters of expression internal and external. Though not generally accepted today, the theory does demonstrate how closely connected bodily expressions are with their emotions. Such expressions can thus be observed by an outsider as the signs or symbols for the emotions—clenched hands and teeth for rage, blushing for shame, weeping for sorrow, writhing and outcries for pain, smiles for pleasure. When these and their like are pictorially represented—often depicted with most subtle discrimination—they can be interpreted by people across all cultures in very much the same way. Conventional symbolism may attach itself to the natural. A French child howling with pain in a doctor's office yells 'yi-yi', an American child 'ow-ow', but the basic natural cry of pain is unmistakable.

As symbols these natural emotional expressions are probably mostly learned from experience, just as physical symbols are. The only difference is that the causal connection between the emotion and its expression lies innately within ourselves. Yet the expressing of the emotion is not itself a symbolizing process. To the emotional experience itself must be added the observation of the connection between the emotion and its bodily expressions in ourselves and others. Only when this regularity of connection is interpreted significantly does the bodily expression function as a symbol for the emotion. And this connection has to be learned. The distinction between natural physical symbolism and bodily emotional symbolism is that the latter is derived from instinctive connections we can find in ourselves, the former from the external regularities of nature.

Closely allied with bodily emotional symbolism is that of *natural emotional stimuli*. Instinctive responses are closely tied in with the natural stimuli for these responses. Sex stimuli are obvious examples. Less obvious are a large number of stimuli connected with such aesthetic sentiments as the sublime, the graceful, and the grotesque, which absorbed much of the attention of writers on art in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is not only that mountains and chasms and the starry heavens can directly stir emotions of

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sublimity to which all men appear susceptible. These stimuli also symbolize these emotions. Again, the symbolic role of these stimuli has to be learned as with bodily expressions. It is not enough that these stimuli quite regularly evoke these emotions. The regularity of the evocation has to be observed and interpreted for its evocativeness in order for the stimuli to function symbolically. Then as symbols as well as stimuli they can function with redoubled effect, as in Keats's line, "Huge cloudy symbols of a high romance," hitting right on the head the point I am making.

From these partly unlearned emotional symbols, it is a short step to the group of completely unlearned *depth symbols* which Freud and Jung and others have brought to light. These differ from the emotional symbols just described in that the symbolizing reference itself is unlearned, at least in the ordinary way of learning, and is projected ready-made on the content of experience to which it attaches itself. The total symbolism itself may be instinctive and inherited, if I understand the theories, or it may be that instinctive tendencies attach themselves to suitable objects of perception which then become emotionally symbolic. In the latter case a cultural element may enter in that may almost submerge the instinctive base which is humanly universal. Sex symbols illustrate the process clearly. The typical sex stimuli are instinctive. These traits may be culturally exaggerated by some cultures to a degree repulsive to members of other cultures. Yet the base of the cultural accentuations is instinctive.

But the depth symbols uncovered by psychoanalytical techniques are less obvious than these superficial sex features. Their roots are conceived as below the level of consciousness. The symbols exhibit themselves in dreams and myths and religious creed and ritual, and thence into many of the practical affairs of men, and conspicuously in emotionally moving art.

Theories about depth symbolism are today in a fluid state and highly controversial, but the gross facts referred to by them would be difficult to deny. The inner symbolism of the circle and the pyramid, the horse and the bull, the snake and the apple, the Oedipus myth and the Promethean—these are not easily explained away as merely the result of cultural exposure. They seem to be universally moving. Not that every human being finds himself mysteriously deeply responding to them. But many men apparently do in every culture, so that acculturation alone cannot account for them.

Lastly there are the *mystic symbols,* the ladder from appearance to reality, the all-embracing union with the ultimate totality of nature, the ecstatic and peaceful merging with nothingness. Here again only a limited number of men have the full mystic experience, or even the shadows of it, in any human society. But in every known culture, primitive or civilized, some men have had it without benefit of acculturation. Mystical symbolism creeps into the art of all ages. This has nothing to do with the philosophical truth of mys-

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ticism, and the same is the case with all other forms of symbolism. But it has much to do with the understanding and appreciation of art.

With these remarks by way of introduction, I will now turn to an application of these types of symbols to sculpture and painting East and West.

Since time is limited, I shall concentrate mainly on the problem of representation. Until very lately sculpture and painting were regarded as distinctively representative arts. This was so the world over. What was represented was chiefly man with the occasional addition of his tools and dwellings to depict the situations in which he lived and acted, and his domestic animals and the animals he hunted. Only a generation ago it was an aesthetic maxim that sculpture of any magnitude was limited to the representation of man and the higher animals. No other subjects were interesting enough to justify the massive blocks of stone and bronze in which they were modeled. In painting, landscapes were a late development in Western art. Only in Chinese art have they a long cultural history. So let me speak first about representation in pictures where the problem is most pressing on account of the two-dimensional picture plane on which the representations must be made.

Pictorial representation is clearly symbolic. The artist with pencil, pen, or brush puts lines, shapes, and gradations of ink and color on the pictorial surface which he and other spectators interpret as symbolizing certain objects and their spatial relationships. But just what is being symbolically represented, and how? The prompt traditional answer has been, "Why, of course, the environmental objects we see." And right here the basic philosophical and psychological problem of perception rears up in our path. Is the painter depicting the actual objects, or his seeings of them, his perceptions? Even worse, is he perhaps depicting his concepts, his mental schemas of them, what he thinks they are, what he categorizes them as being? There is the symbol on the paper, the canvas, the wall. That is obvious. And he and the rest of us spectators are the interpreters. But what is the symbol through our interpretations representing? Is it the actual shapes and colors of a physical object out there? Is it a pattern of shapes and colors produced for our perception by the stimulation of an object out there? Is it a concept we have acquired by acculturation and projected upon a source of stimulation out there?

My present predilection is toward the view that visual representation is based on natural symbols acquired through commerce with our physical environment. Without this basis upon natural symbols, we should not have pictorial representation at all, but only some sort of purely conventional symbolism like maps and blueprints. At the same time, in my view, the natural symbols are often modified by other types of symbols, mostly of the conventional order, which may sometimes nearly obliterate the natural symbolism at their base. The various conventional accretions upon the natural symbols

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determine in part the diversity of styles of representation. Modes of formal composition are another element in diversifying styles, and may modify arrangements of natural symbols even to the point of deliberate distortion. But let me set aside the influence of formal elements in painting and sculpture, at least for the moment, so that we can concentrate on the symbolism itself in representation.

Approaching the issue before us, I naturally turn to E. H. Gombrich's outstanding work, *Art and Illusion*,[2] particularly as there are points on which he and I definitely disagree. On first glance, he seems to be a complete conventionalist in regard to pictorial representation. He is so eager to refute the widely held view that ideally pictorial representation is a form of passive imitation like a mirror image or a photograph that he leans way over backwards toward a view of pure conventional symbolism, even denying the very existence of natural symbolism.

After eighty-seven pages devoted to confuting the pure imitation theory, showing that even mirror images change the size of things, and that photographs are arbitrarily and necessarily selective about even the light and shade of things, and much else that is relevant, he summarizes as follows:

> Everything points to the conclusion that the phrase the 'language of art' is more than a loose metaphor, that even to describe the visible world in images we need a developed system of schemata. This conclusion rather clashes with the traditional distinction, often discussed in the eighteenth century, between spoken words which are conventional signs and painting which uses 'natural' signs to 'imitate' reality. . . . But we have come to realize that this distinction is unreal. . . . All art originates in the human mind in our reactions to the world rather than in the visible world itself, and it is precisely because all art is 'conceptual' that all representations are recognizable by their style.[3]

Now, I think there is a lot of confusion here. I think both the imitationists and the conventionalists oversimplify the issue in exactly opposite directions. The source of the problem lies in the nature of visual perception.

I think I can bring the matter quickly to a head by offering a typical example of an extended visual perceptual situation. I am coming in my car to the entrance of my driveway preparatory to driving into my garage. As I approach I have a set of anticipatory references to the location of my garage about fifty feet down the driveway and its doorway somewhat wider than my car. At this stage my anticipatory set is purely conceptual. It may not even be accompanied by a visual image. But it is present, directing my movements with foot brake and steering wheel as I turn down my drive. In short, there is no *perception* of my garage and its approach till I turn the corner and enter the visual field where light rays are reflected from the garage and the

[2] E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1960).
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

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blacktop roadway leading to it. I now receive visual stimulation and a pattern of sensations of shapes and colors. But my conceptual anticipatory references continue to function just as they did before my entering the visual field. Unless my concept had been in error, the references enter right into the perceptual pattern with its rich sensory filling. They merge with it as part of the perceptual content.

Thus Gombrich is right in maintaining that there is a conceptual element furnished by the mind (if we prefer that way of saying it) which enters into our perceptions of nature. A perception is not just a passive reception of the image of an object out of the environment. On this point the imitationists oversimplified the perceptual transaction. But he is wrong in denying that the perceptual pattern when correct is not a deliverance of qualitative relations revelatory of conditions actually present in the environment.[4]

It is important to remember that the biological function of distal perception is to apprise organisms of the presence and the position and the nature of environmental objects at a distance away from the organisms, so that they may reach them as goals for their needs, or avoid them if the objects are dangerous or obstructive. The visual patterns are thus natural symbols of the distant objects from which the light rays are reflected with a high degree of causal regularity. The perception of my garage as I proceed down my driveway is structured with anticipatory references which environmental conditions along the driveway support all the way down. As I go down the drive following the line of vision, I am guided by the light pattern as the pilot of a plane is guided by the beam from a landing field to his destination. The dynamics for following this pattern of light rays comes from my references as readinesses to act on the stimulus of these light rays. But the pattern of light rays itself comes entirely from the environment. The proof of this is that if there is any discrepancy between the light pattern and my anticipa-

[4] In fact, our anticipatory concepts that we keep in store, like mine of my garage, were themselves originally derived from our environment by learning from experience and in the last resort by trial and error. But learning is not, of course, a passive process. It is motivated by the organism in trying out hypotheses for some purpose. Even in 'blind' trial on error, each act is a trial to hit upon a hypothesis that if successful will be learned. Gombrich is right that the traditional passive theory of perception was false, but the alternative is not to the opposite extreme of a purely conventionalistic theory of perception. For where in his view did the conventional schema come from? The fruitful theory is that of a dynamic theory of perception stressing the role of anticipatory sets toward learning the correct hypothesis about the environmental situation and its objects. The aim of the perceptual activity is to obtain a true perception for the fulfillment of some purpose.

There are passages where Gombrich very nearly takes on the view presented in this paper—for instance, in sections 1 to 9 in chapter IX. But then in section 10 he veers off in the radical conventionalistic direction. Even in the earlier sections he may be read ambiguously as if he never implied that the artist was not seeking out ways of incorporating natural symbols into his paintings in order to increase their feeling for reality.

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tory references, it is the latter that are corrected so as faithfully to represent, to 'imitate', to coincide with the former. It is on this point that the imitationists are right as against Gombrich.

Let me point out another thing in this perceptual transaction. As soon as I start coming down my drive, I perceive the size of my garage door to be just that which will take in the width of my car conveniently—about eight feet. I see it as that size steadily all the way down. This is known as 'size constancy' and more generally as 'perceptual constancy'. Yet optics informs us that the image of the garage door passing through the lens of my eye is in its stimulus area much smaller at the entrance of the drive and gets bigger and bigger as I go down. I can even by an effort, and after practice fairly easily, see it that way. A realistic painter rendering perspective becomes very adept at this sort of discrimination. Biologically, and in our everyday human relationships, it is very important to see things with perceptual constancy rather than with perspectival relativity. If a bull is running at me from across the field, it is biologically advisable that I perceive the bull at his full size as it will be when he is about to hook me, rather than at the perspectival size of a squirrel or a mouse.

Gombrich takes perceptual constancy as one of his evidences for the fully conceptual nature of pictorial representation. I cannot agree with this at all. The phenomenon arises from an instinctive mechanism by which the regularities of nature learned by experience automatically register in perceptual stimulation. These are the sizes and shapes of things they are visually perceived as. Our perceptions are correctly (or nearly so) delivering to us the structural and causal relations of our environment. These perceptions are natural symbols of the objects about us. Nevertheless, Gombrich is right in stressing the symbolic character of our perceptual experience. Insofar as the imitationists were assuming that we were perceiving nature directly as it is without any symbolic intermediaries, they were clearly wrong.

Because of their symbolic character our visual perceptions are constantly subject to correction. Gombrich seems to assume that the liability to error is another sure sign of the purely conceptual character of perception and representation. To my mind, it is evidence of just the reverse. Insofar as perception is open to correction, it is capable of veridicality, and the same is true of representation. One of the paradoxical elements in Gombrich's view is that pictures cannot be true. "Logicians tell us," he writes, "and they are not people to be easily gainsaid—that the terms 'true' or 'false' can only be applied to statements, propositions. And whatever may be the usage of critical parlance, a picture is never a statement in that sense of the term. It can no more be true or false than a statement can be blue or green" (p. 68). This is a logician's dogma, loaded with paradox and useful only in a limited symbolic logical universe of discourse. Long before the logicians made such stipulations

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men had ideas, anticipations, and hypotheses, and tried them out on their environment to see if they would work, to see if they corresponded with their expectations or needed correction. I was using one of these anticipatory sets when I was planning to go down to my garage, and began turning down the drive. If the driveway was not as I expected, I would have called my idea of it false, and would promptly have corrected it. But in fact it proved *true*. The door of the garage was just as it was perceived to be—ample enough to take in the car. And similarly a picture representing my perception of my garage and driveway may be true.

Gombrich's paradox is that he denies, as we have just seen, that a picture can be true, and yet is continually calling attention to 'corrections' painters made in the course of the naturalistic tradition. How could there be corrections without assuming a criterion of truth? His aim, indeed, is to show that the concepts and schemas that he shows permeating representative art and perception are hypotheses projected from the artists' and spectators' minds. But again, what are hypotheses for representation except they be trials for a truth of representation? As may be seen, I think Gombrich is right about these hypotheses embedded in perception and representation. I also think perception is a dynamic activity of the organism. But this presumes a perceptual truth for these perceptual hypotheses and so a natural symbolism in proportion to their correctness.[5]

So, having accepted a dynamic view of perception with hypotheses contributed by the organism and corrections contributed by the natural symbols of the environment directing the organism toward a true estimate of the nature of his environment, we can return to the question of what it is the painter represents in his picture and how he does it.

By our theory it becomes obvious that what the painter represents is a perception of nature. As a realistic painter he attempts to render his representation true to nature, corresponding as nearly as possible to a man's correct perception of it. The way he does this is to seek out the cues, and that means the natural symbols, by which a true perception of nature may be had. He seeks out the visual cues that give him the shapes of his objects, their volume and solidity, their depth, their distance apart, what separates them from one another, their illumination, their textures, and the subtle signs of their character especially in portraiture, their gestures, and even their movements, and so on.

[5] Yet Gombrich every once in a while slips into calling a picture's representation 'true'. For instance, cf. p. 178, "no more truthful images of clouds than those painted by Constable," and p. 275, how the interaction of stimuli in paintings "weed out false guesses," and p. 320, "a way out of the prison of style toward a greater truth." Here again I think these slips show how Gombrich is straining to maintain his extreme conventionalistic position against his 'natural' convictions.

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These cues are so numerous that he has to select among them. He may not even have observed them all, so that his picture may reflect the limitations of his observation and still be realistic. His public may be as unobservant as he. But even if his selection is deliberate, his public may be led to accept his selection and find it true and convincing within the self-imposed limitations.

But more than that, the painter has to adapt his perceptual observations to the medium he uses. The medium imposes limitations upon him. He has to represent his three-dimensional perceptions upon a two-dimensional surface. He has to adapt the natural symbols to what he can render on the picture plane. He has to adapt them to the limitations of the values and hues of his pigments and to what he can render by brush or pencil. Much invention on his part is required to find means within his technique to render the natural symbols of the visual perception of nature so that they will be found convincing for the spectator's perception of his picture. This does not require that the perception of his picture give the illusion of a perception of nature. Quite the contrary. The principle of aesthetic distance comes in here. The picture must remain a picture representing nature, not a trick giving the illusion of perceiving nature. Painters, as we know, can indeed do this deceptive thing under some circumstances.

But I must not be drawn here into a discussion of the aesthetic values of representation. These are not seriously to be doubted. Yet one factor in the aesthetic delight we have in representation is the sense of the truth of it, and this requires that the representation be perceived as distinct from what it represents so that an act of symbolic recognition can be made.

Thus a black and white drawing may be as exciting for its revelation of nature as a painting in full color. It may be so in part from its very selectivity. Take the drawings of Rembrandt or almost any classic Chinese painting.

Now, the history of Western painting from the sixth century Greek to the end of the nineteenth century can be told as an almost continuous development toward the ideal of a complete naturalistic representation. There was a break with the Byzantine period and the dark ages, but the ideal was picked up again at the Renaissance and carried triumphantly forward to the impressionists, even including Cezanne. With each new style the claim was that this offered something more nearly true to nature than anything done previously. Even the impressionists disparaged their predecessors as failing to observe that the reality of nature perceived is that of light streaming into the eyes. And by their pointillist technique they rendered the scintillation of reflected colors with a discrimination never so fully developed before. But it was a selection as severe as a Picasso's wire line drawing of a nude. And Cezanne rebelled by introducing an equally severe selection in terms of the solidity of objects through a technique exaggerating our strongest cues for the three-dimensional solidity of objects. With these two schools the ideal of

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naturalism and truth to nature seems to have gone wild through such extremes of selectivity and therewith collapsed into a succession of modern non-representative schools.

Up to this recent collapse, however, the history of Occidental naturalism can be read as almost a steady progress in the observation of natural symbols and the discovery of techniques to render a more and more complete and convincing representation of the human form and the landscape of our natural environment. The primitive limitation to profile shapes was overcome, movement began to be suggested, the rounding effect of light and shade was discovered, and the power of overlapping to produce depth together with the depth effects of size and aereal perspective, and then came the fascination with the laws of linear perspective and foreshortening. All of these cues and others, refined and gathered together as a group, were rendered with differing emphasis and selection by different schools, and came to a point of culmination for Occidental realism in the Dutch school of the seventeenth century. We may even name Vermeer of Delft as the supreme master of comprehensive visual representation. This was Arthur Pope's judgment, well documented in his *The Painter's Modes of Expression*[6] under the heading of "The Mode of Total Visual Effect." Vermeer observed, as few did before him, precisely the effects of the source of light on the values of every reflecting surface in the space he represented, including the reflected lights in the shadows. He even noticed what had perhaps never been observed before, that a color often changed in *hue* as it passed from full illumination into shadow.[7] The result is an extraordinary sense of light filling the whole room in Vermeer's interiors.

In sum, representative painting is the representation of man's perceptions of nature. It is based on the natural symbols, the regularities of visual stimulation, taken as the visual cues for our discrimination of environmental objects and relationships.[8] Styles of painting differ according to the selections a painter makes among these cues and the techniques he uses in communicating them through his pictures. A representative painting need not, of course, be the representation of an actual scene perceived by the painter, though very often it is. What is represented realistically may be the "Crucifixion of Christ" or "Saint George Spearing the Dragon." It is painted as if the event were

[6] Arthur Pope, *The Painter's Modes of Expression* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931), pp. 94-106.

[7] Cf. Carl Cutler and S. C. Pepper, *Modern Color* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1923), pp. 55-66.

[8] A qualification to this statement should be entered here. There are natural tactile and kinaesthetic cues that also get represented in pictures along with the purely visual. In space representation the two may fuse almost indistinguishably. But in young children's paintings the reliance on tactile-kinaesthetic cues often comes out strikingly—the round heads, hairs standing off the head, the five fingers spreading off the hands. Amazingly (or rather naturally), we grown-ups have no difficulty in interpreting them correctly.

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being seen. The representation is an imaginative construction of parts pieced together out of many perceptions the painter has in fact had, and depicted in the regular representative techniques he had acquired.

I turn now briefly to sculpture. The means of representation in this art are in principle just the same as in painting. For relief sculpture this is plain enough. For sculpture in the round, the chief difference is that a lot of the perceptual cues a painter must struggle to render pictorially are given gratis by the solidity and volume of the sculptured material itself. The shape of a head and position of the limbs are as naturally symbolized for perception in the stone as in a living man. Yet the sculptor has his problems too. One of them is to make his statue come alive. This seems to have been the chief concern of the Greeks from the archaic sixth century Apollo's to the time of Myron. Then there is the problem of how to represent the eye and hair, and draperies, and textures generally. Shadows become important as natural symbols in sculpture. And then, when sculptors became exceedingly skillful, not to say facile, in realistic representation, the sculptor's problem became almost reversed. It became that of maintaining the aesthetic distance which their medium could now so easily eliminate to the point of illusion. How keep the feel of the material along with the natural symbols of representation? Emphasis turned ultimately upon the formal elements of line and mass (never, of course, completely neglected in the most admired works) and upon emotional and religious symbolism. We have just been through, in our own generation, a revolt against naturalism eventuating in sculpture as in painting with the total abandonment of representation.

Now a few words about the painting and sculpture of the Orient. Here I will restrict myself to the Chinese and Japanese traditions. It is a commonplace to contrast the dominant naturalism of the West with the abstract spiritual character of the East. The mystical symbolism of Taoism and Buddhism hovers over Chinese art and the restraint of Confucianism. This is brought out with extreme emphasis by George Rowley in his *Principles of Chinese Painting*.[9]

This judgment can be overemphasized, especially for Japanese art and most especially for the popular pungent Japanese woodblock prints, which are by no means to be scorned for their lack of the elevated qualities. These color prints make up for their lack of mystical and poetic sublimity by their earthiness, by their depiction of the common man's interest in the geisha girls, theater, happenings on the streets and the rivers, and along the great Tokaido highway between Tokyo and Kyoto. These subjects are embedded in the formal grace and selective realism of the high Oriental traditions. They com-

[9] George Rowley, *Principles of Chinese Painting* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947).

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pensate for the aristocratic and scholarly aloofness of the art of the higher classes, and show that Orientals can be as heartily human as the Greeks of the vase paintings or the peasants of Bruegel.

However, it is the contrast between Eastern and Western representation I wish to dwell upon. The difference is not in the amount of interest in representation. The continuous tradition for painting and sculpture in both cultures has been until the present generation one of representational rendering. The marked difference is in the degree of selectivity of the natural symbols. Where the dominant aim in Western painting has been toward the maximum of natural symbolism and the fullest possible realism (barring certain exceptions noted earlier), the dominant aim of Eastern painting might with only a little exaggeration be said to be just the opposite—the aim of suggesting reality with the minimum of natural symbolism. The shape of a tree and a shoreline and of a man in a boat fishing, in a few strokes of sumi ink, will be a complete Chinese painting. Even when details are multiplied, the effect is of great economy. Color is not demanded, though it may be added. It seems superfluous. Shadows and modeling are absent or barely suggested. The greatest care goes out into the expressiveness and skill of the brushwork, the elegance of the placing of the figures, the linear movements and harmonies, the tensions of the shapes and of the open spaces, the gradations of the grays, and the mood induced by it all. Yet the scene represented supports it all. Without the scene and its natural symbols, the rest would evaporate in a vacuum.

Here is a distinctive style of painting associated with an extensive Oriental culture. How far can it be understood and appreciated by an outsider, by an ordinary cultivated Westerner, for instance? Quite far, with only a little sympathetic willingness to understand. The natural symbols are easily interpreted revealing the scene, and even its serenity. The spectator may have his own memories of quiet streams and solitary fishermen in boats, or can emotionally imagine it. He may well be astonished at the skill of the painter and the economy of his brush strokes. And he may appreciate the justness of the placing of the figures and other features of the composition. From here on he may be missing a lot and be puzzled. The meagerness of the representation may bother him. The full appreciation of the skill of the brushwork will require a lot more visual experience. The mystic significance of the large open spaces will probably be missed. And all that goes with a specific religious creed is bound to be missed. But notice that what is missed is mostly outside the representational symbolism. I am going to suggest that where we fail to interpret the representative art of other cultures or styles, the difficulty lies more in the strangeness of the selection of natural symbols themselves. Of course, sometimes natural symbols get conventionalized to a point when they are no longer recognizable as such and become as conventional as words or

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numbers. To the extent that this happens cross-cultural communication breaks down.

In this paper I have concentrated on the natural symbols of representation. Other types of symbolism in their bearing on the visual arts East and West have been passed over. I trust they will find their elaboration in other papers. For representation is only one symbolic factor in the full appreciation of even representative art.

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Chung-yuan Chang: On Stephen C. Pepper's "On the uses of symbolism in sculpture and painting"

Having read Professor Pepper's paper, my admiration is not only for his impartial attitude toward imitationist and conventionalist schools of art, but also for his sense of the equal importance of both Eastern and Western art. When Professor Pepper mentioned "a distinctive style of painting associated with an extensive Oriental culture," he asked the question: "How far can it be appreciated and understood by an outsider?" His own immediate answer was: "Quite far, with only a little sympathetic willingness to understand." If we have a sympathetic willingness, then, we can appreciate Eastern tea as well as Western coffee. This sympathetic willingness to understand the art of an alien culture is derived from the inner tranquillity of an unbiased mind, which is the foundation of Eastern philosophy.

I agree with Professor Pepper that pictorial representation is, in and of itself, symbolic. The use of symbols has figured significantly in representative painting in both Eastern and Western art. I also agree with the basic categories in which Professor Pepper has placed the various types of symbols used in representative painting. However, I also feel that there are some categories of symbolism found particularly in Chinese and Japanese art that may need to be more fully explored. The first category includes those symbols which represent the objective reality, rather than the manifold appearance, of things. The second category consists of symbols which represent pure subjectivity, or the mind of thoughtlessness, rather than the mind full of thoughts or perceptions. The third category includes those symbols which are non-representative; that is, non-symbolic symbols, or symbols of symbolessness. These symbols are used in painting that is not intended as representation, but rather as the direct, immediate expression of the contemplative artist as he is in the absolute moment.

Let us discuss the first category of Chinese brushwork which represents the objective reality of things. In the well-known painting [see after p. 220] of Mu Ch'i (13th century), "The Six Persimmons," the flowers appear to be natural symbols. Yet, these six contours do not symbolize merely the appearance of six fruits. Rather, they represent something invisible, unfathomable, and inexpressible, which may be called the reality of things.

In Chinese painting, the straight lines of a bamboo or the gnarled lines of a pine tree or the splashing ink of distant mountains and mists do not merely convey a visual impression or arouse a physical sensation, but their simplicity and directness, their completeness and movement, flow out from the picture and penetrate into the observer's innermost being. No impetus is required for analysis of conceptual components. We throw our whole being into the inexpressible movement of reality and move along with it. To exem-

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plify this objective reality revealed in Chinese brushwork, we have Laurence Binyon's personal experience to speak to us. He says:

I recall a little painting of uncertain date, but inspired by a poem of Wang Wei's, the eighth century poet-painter; the subject is just the sparse wood of stunted trees on a flat foreland; misty water and still sky. . . . Nothing of what to the average mind is beautiful; yet in this forlorn scene there was something strangely moving, just because the painter had absorbed that solitude of trees and water into himself. He had painted it internally, so to speak, not as something alien and seen from the outside.[1]

And in describing "space" in Chinese art, he speaks of it as ". . . an activity floating out from the picture into our minds and drawing us into a rarer atmosphere."[2]

What is this rarer atmosphere that is transmitted from objective scenery to the artist himself, and thence from the brushwork of the artist into the mind of its admirer? This atmosphere is what Hsieh Ho of the fifth century called *ch'i-yun sheng tung,* or "breath rhythm in life-motion." This life-motion breath is the rare atmosphere to which Binyon referred. It is the objective reality in action. The brushwork in the painting not only represents mountains and water, but through them symbolizes the spiritual reality of mountains and water. When the painting reveals the inner spirit of objective reality, it vibrates with the inner reality of man. This vibration is the objective reality in action, which is called *ch'i-yun,* or breath rhythm. Jacques Maritain, in his *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry,* says: "What does the first of the famous six canons of Hsieh Ho prescribe?—To have life-motion manifest the unique spiritual resonance that the artist catches in Things. . . ."[3] And also:

. . . Things are not a dream, they have their own reality. Then Things themselves can be spiritualized—in other words, the spirit they conceal can be discovered and set free by our contemplative grasping. And senses, through which Things are reached, can be purified too. Such a process describes the primary intent of Chinese art.[4]

So the primary intent of Chinese art is to reach this life-moving rhythm of Things which is the function of symbols representing objective reality.

The second category is that of symbols which stand for the pure subjectivity of thoughtlessness, rather than perception. In the ordinary sense, nature constitutes the objective, material world which is separate from man, and in antithesis to man. Chinese philosophers, however, maintain that man and nature are totally identified. There is no antithesis between man and

[1] Laurence Binyon, *The Spirit of Man in Asian Art* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1965), pp. 97-98.
[2] *Ibid.,* p. 98.
[3] Jacques Maritain, *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry* (New York: Meridian Books, 1955), p. 14.
[4] *Ibid.*

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nature; rather there is a deep, underlying harmony in which nature is fulfilled in man, and man, in turn, is fulfilled in nature. Nature is in man, and man is in nature. Hence, man is nature and nature is man. It is because of the fundamental identity between man and nature that man is able to see nature as it is. In other words, man is able to see mountains as mountains because man is in them and they are in man. In a higher sense, pure objectivity is pure subjectivity, or, we may say that through the symbols of objectivity, pure subjectivity is revealed. It is this theory that Chinese artists inherited from Taoist and Buddhist thinkers of a thousand years ago, and applied in their works of art. When Shih-t'ou, the famous Ch'an Buddhist painter of the seventeenth century, held a brush in his hand, the work which he produced was pure subjectivity identified with pure objectivity. At the moment when he painted the objective, natural symbols of trees and mountains, he painted his own purely subjective being. The moment in which he moves his hand, in the Ch'an saying, is the moment of the mind of no-mind, which is free from any thought or knowledge. According to Shih-t'ou, this freedom from knowledge or thought is called the First Principle of art. Once Shih-t'ou taught his disciple, saying

> To come to the art of painting is just as it is to study Ch'an Buddhism. The most important thing is that the artist's mind is free from any knowledge. Then he will achieve the highest work, which is called the work of the First Principle. If he has any ideas or concepts in his mind, his work will fall to the level of the second principle, which is often composed by mediocre hands.[5]

Shih-t'ou immediately painted a picture which illustrated the First Principle of painting. In his picture there were two leafless trees in the foreground, and a barren mountain in the background, with small shrubs and rocks in between. None of the objects could be considered beautiful or powerful or meaningful. They were merely trees, mountains, and shrubs, painted without symbolic meaning to the artist. They simply represented Shih-t'ou's mind of no-thought. Chinese painters would call painting with such symbols *sanmei,* or in Sanskrit, *samādhi,* which is the highest achievement of the tranquillity of the mind of man.

In his *Treatise on Painting,* Wang Yü (17th-18th centuries) interprets *sanmei* as *ts'ing k'ung,* or purity and emptiness. It is the ontological transparency that is reflected in the artist's brushwork. As Ni Tsan (14th century), one of the great Taoist painters in Chinese history, once wrote: "The reason I paint bamboo is to release my inner serenity. How can I care about likeness or unlikeness to the actual bamboo?"[6] Ni Tsan's bamboo painting transcends

[5] Chung-yuan Chang, *Creativity and Taoism: A Study of Chinese Philosophy, Art and Poetry* (New York: Julian Press, 1963), Plate 5 [my translation of Chinese inscription].
[6] Cf. Yu Chien-hua, *Chung-kuo Kuei-hua shih* [History of Chinese Painting] (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1955), II, 32.

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both objective and subjective attachments. He is free from imitation of objective actuality and subjective projection. Being unattached to either realistic objectivity or idealistic subjectivity, his work is the product of absolute emptiness, or *k'ung*. By releasing his inner transparency, his painting is permeated with ontological purity, or *ts'ing*. The absolute emptiness of *k'ung* and the purity of *ts'ing* are both attributes of *sanmei*. *Sanmei* is the inner realm of the artist. Therefore, the brushwork of Shih-t'ou and Ni Tsan represents pure subjectivity, or the mind of no-mind. The symbols used are the symbols of *sanmei*, or *samādhi*.

As we have discussed above, we find in Chinese painting the symbols of objective reality which represent the breath rhythm of things. We also find symbols of *sanmei* which stand for the subjective purity of the artist's mind. Both kinds of symbols are representative of something, either the reality of things, or the mind of no-mind of the artist. However, in Ch'an Buddhism, symbols are used which are not intended to represent either objective reality or subjective mind. The contemplative artist just happens to use a particular symbol to cut the unceasing stream of thoughts for his admirers. In other words, when he produces his brushwork, he does not mean to lay down on the paper or the silk any meaningful pictures, but rather meaningless symbols. These symbols do not add any knowledge or beauty, but serve as *kōans* to awaken the artist's devotees. They are non-representative forms that are often used by Ch'an masters. Early in Ch'an history, we find Ma-tzu, Yang-shan, and Yun-men wanting to enlighten their disciples without using words. They often drew circles or straight lines on paper, on the ground, or even in the air. In Japanese art, we find Ch'an artists such as Sengai (18th-19th centuries), who often painted pictures with a square, a triangle, and a circle, and Ch'an master Hakuin of the seventeenth century, founder of the modern Rinzai School in Japan, who often painted circles, or a few straight lines. These circles and lines are symbols of Ch'an which cannot be understood through intellection. They function as *kōans*, identified with the irrelevant questions and answers of Ch'an. When Chao-chou was asked: "What is the meaning of Bodhidharma coming from the West?" his answer was: "Cypress tree in courtyard." Cypress tree, courtyard, and cypress tree in courtyard are vivid and meaningful pictures, but here they are used as meaningless symbols. When Chao-chou uttered his answer, he did not mean that the cypress tree in the courtyard could represent the meaning of Bodhidharma coming from the West. In logical reasoning, the answer of cypress tree and courtyard has no intellectual significance. It is simply a meaningless utterance. The real answer was Chao-chou's mind at the moment that he uttered the statement. That is, during that moment, his mind was the Buddha's mind. To teach men to be Buddhas was the real purpose of Bodhidharma coming to China. When one is actually being a Buddha, and transmits his light to others through his

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actions, the question is answered. Therefore, it is Chao-chou's state of mind that answers the question, not his verbal expression. The same holds true with Sengai's painting and the brushwork of Hakuin. There is no intellectual meaning that can be drawn from the symbols for achieving enlightenment. But it is through the meaningless symbols that the mind of the artist is reflected, thus allowing the observer to find his own mind, which is the Buddha's mind. In Ch'an *kōan* painting, then, the symbols do not represent anything, but directly awaken the artist's mind.

Viewing the three categories of Chinese symbols discussed above, we may raise the question of how we can define beauty in these types of brushwork. According to Chinese philosophy, the ultimate beauty symbolized by brushwork is not particular beauty in the relative sense. It is the ultimate reality of an awakened Self. In other words, the beauty of the objective symbols lies in the absolute subjectivity of the artist. Thus, the ultimate beauty is that which lies beyond either feelings or sensations or any mode of perception. It is the pure process of emancipation from all the distortions of sensualization or the limitations of conceptualization. Even more so, as shown in Ch'an *kōan* painting, this beauty is completely free from representation. What is beauty, then, is the purity of subjectivity, which is "awakened and at work"; it is not beauty limited to relativity. The awakened Self contains no rigid form, but is the form of formlessness. It is this Self of the form of formlessness from which emerges the real beauty of the great works. Thus, in its highest sense, the symbols used in Chinese and Japanese painting do not aim at representation in the relative sense of either objectivity or subjectivity. Rather, the symbols seek to achieve the supreme beauty of absolute, pure subjectivity, which is the highest quality of man, beyond time and space. Perhaps this awakening of the Self of the artist, wherein is hidden the primordial source of the beauty of all symbols, may become a basic concern in the further development of art in the future.

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Prithwish Neogy On Stephen C. Pepper's "On the uses of symbolism in sculpture and painting"

Professor Pepper's essay is primarily concerned with the problem of representation. Representation is symbolic. The symbol is perhaps a necessary substitute for the unwieldly world or its part, and as such, may be more or less viable in one or another conditioned circumstance.

In art, however, representation is but one of the means to a complex of ends (a machine that makes the currently approved type of representation does not end art).

Three fundamental questions are raised by Professor Pepper regarding what representation symbolizes:

Is it the actual shapes and colors of a physical object out there?

Is it a pattern of shapes and colors produced for our perception by the stimulation of an object out there?

Is it a concept we have acquired by acculturation and projected upon a source of stimulation out there? If the answer is 'no' to the first and 'yes' to the other two questions, the concept of pure perception and the concept of pure conception may be equally inoperative. On the other hand, the first part of a sentence quoted from Gombrich may be acceptable as complete: "All art originates in the human mind in our reactions to the world rather than in the visible world itself. . . ."

Professor Pepper is of the opinion that by means of "natural symbols" (natural to man alone) a true perception of nature may be had; that a realistic painter attempts to render his representation true to nature, corresponding as nearly as possible to a man's correct perception of it. But he goes on to say that cues of natural symbols are so numerous that the painter has to select among them. These limited aspects of perception are further limited by the medium he uses. After much skillful invention the work does not become an illusion of a perception of nature, remaining, as it does, a picture representing nature. Yet the work is convincing for the spectator's perception as being realistic. Professor Pepper does not seem to think that in this case realism is an idea of which the means to achieve and to interpret are contextual.

While making use of many modes of representation, and of symbols of various orders, art retains an otherness, a transcending identity.

In India, the experience of art is treated in terms quite distinct from those used to explore the structure of symbols. Reality as manifest through inscrutable *māyā*, the divine art, is already symbolic of the idea in the supreme being.

This appears to determine the modality of human understanding. Man, with his characteristic limitations, apprehends reality only as permitted by his perceptions and conceptions, necessarily combined. Thus he symbolically

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elicits aspects or images (*rūpa*) which he seems to know by name (*nāma*) or form.

With a work of art, the awareness of reality is further mediated and symbolized. Śri Śaṇkuka in the ninth century noted that a painted horse is neither real nor false (being an image and a symbol). In practice, abstract concepts are presented in sensuous images. The expression *yaddṛṣṭam tallikhitam,* setting down the merely perceived (an intention, actually unachievable), is derogatory. Rather than likeness, representation is metaphorical and ideated correspondence.

An icon may involve a multiple sequence of symbol-structures. The once self-sufficient geometric, zoomorphic, and anthropomorphic images accumulate as attributes and components to later comprehensive polymorphic mega-symbols.

Traditionally, life is archetypal and stylized and therefore, in general, similar to the work of art. Live iconolatry is still practiced in India. One unexpected urban survival is the annual Rāmalīlā celebrations on the outskirts of New Delhi, in the course of which it is not unusual to see parents, in devout obeisance to Rāma, Sītā, and Lakṣmaṇa, impersonated by their own offspring. This conduct is not conceivable ordinarily. Symbolic connotation rather than signal denotation is the desired value.

On the other hand, the icon is manifested or experienced within Cidambaram, the mind-sky. The use of a work of art is in the metrical reconstitution of the self of the user. As quintessence of experience of a work of art, *rasa* or flavor is tasted by the competent as ecstasy informed with intellection, which is likened to the tasting of Brahman.

While the conceivable referent of a symbol is but another symbol, the inscrutalibity of *māyā* avoids the possibility of an infinite regression. Since mediation is inevitable whether in art or life, all meaning is structurally symbolic. But the painted horse, being neither real nor false, has its own kind of existence. A work of art that is imbued with *rasa* is to be experienced (tasted), and not merely to be considered as symbolically referential. When that which is necessarily symbolizing is recognized by the sympathetic *rasika* as art, the experience is inscrutable but altogether real; subjective but convincing. The only parallel is the deepest spiritual intimation envisoned in the culture.

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Leslie B. Nerio On Stephen C. Pepper's "On the uses of symbolism in sculpture and painting"

The following comments will touch on only a few of the many interesting observations which Dr. Pepper made in his paper.

As a footnote to Dr. Pepper's statement that in one important kind of painting in China and Japan "poetry and painting coalesce in a way practically unknown in western art," one might recall a painting of 1918 by Paul Klee consisting of a poem ("Einst dem Grau der Nacht enttaucht . . .") written out in capital letters.[1] Through the judicious arrangement of color, Klee conveys something of the mood of the poem. However, this is not a representational painting and so is not analogous to the Far Eastern works which Professor Pepper has in mind, leaving aside other considerations such as the question of the treatment of the writing as script. Still, the Klee is interesting as an example of certain experiments along these lines in Western art of the twentieth century.

Dr. Pepper also said:

> I am going to suggest that where we fail to interpret the representative art of other cultures or styles, the difficulty lies more in the strangeness of the selection of natural symbols themselves. Of course, sometimes natural symbols get conventionalized to a point when they are no longer recognizable as such and become as conventional as words or numbers. To the extent that this happens cross-cultural communication breaks down.

What Dr. Pepper said leads us to crucial problems in interpretation—that is, interpretation by those not familiar with the art and traditions in question—with regard to certain important schools of Chinese painting of the Ming and Ch'ing periods and their Japanese counterparts. Here, a gross generalization must be made, a generalization important to the understanding of the problem: Chinese painting after the fourteenth century was no longer concerned with representation as such. To be sure, natural symbols were retained in painting until very recent times, and there was no total collapse of representation. But, within this context, one can see that eclecticism, archaism, formalism, fantasy, subjectivity, and a host of other tendencies gradually —and others would say not so gradually—undermined the position of representation to such a point that, in some cases, the natural symbols became conventionalized, to use Dr. Pepper's words. An example: The style of the eleventh century painter Mi Fu (also called Mi Fei) was greatly imitated and alluded to, especially from the fourteenth century on. His style was distinctive enough so that even copies of his works or copies of copies were sufficient to transmit the essential features of his art. When a nineteenth century artist such as Tai Hsi painted a landscape following Mi Fu, he was

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[1] Reproduction in Will Grohmann, *Paul Klee* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., n.d.), p. 153.

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not really interested in the perception of nature.[2] In other words, the natural symbols have become conventionalized and stand for, let us say, the artistic personality of the eleventh century artist Mi Fu. The representational aspect of the natural symbols has receded. We can follow this point even further. One of Mi Fu's greatest followers was Kao K'o-kung, who lived during the latter part of the thirteenth and the early part of the fourteenth century. If Tai Hsi in the nineteenth century had painted a work in the style of Kao K'o-kung—and this is quite possible since this sort of thing went on all the time in the Ch'ing dynasty—the symbols would have to do double duty. They would evoke or stand for Mi Fu as the ultimate source of the style, in addition to Kao K'o-kung. In many cases not only do we have the visual material at hand to make the symbolic reference, but we also have the testimony of literary sources. Quite often the reference is made clear in the inscriptions on the paintings themselves.

During the period under consideration there were, of course, certain exceptions to the general trends which I have touched upon. For instance, one finds examples of decorative realism and works produced by some missionaries from Europe combining Western and Chinese styles. Seen in historical perspective, however, these seem to be of secondary importance.

In the more significant works of this long span of time the problems of style and self-expression were endlessly explored. Natural symbols were often abstracted and used as so much raw material to construct individual styles. We have already mentioned the use of archaism and the revival of old styles. An observation made by Professor Max Loehr in a lecture at the Yale Art Gallery is worth quoting:

> One of the more amusing instances of late Ming encyclopedism in art is an unassuming picture of a few trees and rocks by Tung Ch'i-ch'ang (1555-1636) in the Crawford collection, New York. Its title is *Landscape with Trees in the Manner of Ni Tsan* . . . The remarkable thing about it is that its subject is not the trees, nor actually the style of Ni Tsan, but an historical appraisal. The inscription, by one Wang Wen-chih (1730-1802), leaves no doubt about this: the picture has to be understood as the seventeenth-century scholar's appraisal of the Yüan artist's comprehension of the tenth-century master Tung Yüan. The picture is an art-historical statement.[3]

Professor James Cahill has also delved deeply into these matters.

Despite what I have said so far, I cannot deny that these paintings do contain natural symbols, conventionalized or "made over" though they may be. And one notes that Dr. Pepper said, "without the scene and its natural symbols, the rest would evaporate in a vacuum"—though I take this quote out of context. However, in comparing Eastern with Western art, Professor Pepper

[2] E.g., a fan painting by Tai Hsi in the collection of the Honolulu Academy of Arts.
[3] Max Loehr, "Chinese Painting after Sung," Yale Art Gallery Ryerson Lecture, March 2, 1967.

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said that "the continuous tradition for painting and sculpture in both cultures has been until the present generation one of representational rendering. The marked difference is in the degree of selectivity of the natural symbols." This statement holds true, I believe, only for certain periods and styles. In fact, I have tried to demonstrate that in post-fourteenth century Chinese painting —and, by extension, in certain schools of Japanese painting—the fundamental attitude toward representation and perception underwent a profound change. I feel that it is not so much a matter of the degree of selectivity of the natural symbols which gives this art its distinctiveness but the manner in which they are used.

One can foresee the potential difficulties in trying to communicate these matters in cross-cultural situations. More specifically it can be said that the situation which prevailed in later Far Eastern painting has had some counterpart in the West, but to a lesser degree and without the persistency of the former. Perhaps we might also look to Western music for further analogies. Alfred Einstein discussed what he called "historical re-creation" in the music of Mendelssohn and "creative parody" in the music of Stravinsky.[4] An example which Professor Cahill and I have used before is Ravel's short piano piece of 1913 entitled *À la manière de Chabrier,* in which the *hommage* is to Chabrier, but the actual melody is a quote from Siebel's little aria from the second act of Gounod's *Faust*!

Two more examples of Chinese painting will suffice to illustrate the problems in greater detail. The first is a handscroll in the Seattle Art Museum by the seventeenth century artist Lan Ying which presents, in one continuous sequence, a landscape panorama "in the styles of" four great masters of the past: Tung Yüan, Huang Kung-wang, Wang Meng, and Wu Chen.[5] These masters represent a span in time from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries. A virtuosic feat, indeed, but it should also be mentioned that Lan Ying reinterpreted, in varying degrees, the styles of the past masters in order to obtain a certain consistency with his own style and within the work as a whole.

The other example is a handscroll in the Honolulu Academy of Arts by Ch'en Hung-shou, another seventeenth century artist and a reputed pupil of Lan Ying.[6] The painting depicts episodes in the life of the great fourth century poet, T'ao Yüan-ming, who retired from office because of his distaste for political life. At the same time, it can also be assumed that the poet symbolizes

[4] *A Short History of Music* (4th Amer. ed. rev.; New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 156 and 203.

[5] Reproduced in Harada Bizan, ed., *The Pageant of Chinese Painting* (Tokyo: Otsuka-Kogeisha, 1936), plate 705; Sherman E. Lee, *Chinese Landscape Painting* (2d ed.; Cleveland: The Cleveland Museum of Art, n.d.), catalogue no. 72; etc. The painting is dated in accordance with the year 1624.

[6] Reproduced in Gustav Ecke, *Chinese Painting in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1965), vol. III; etc. This work is dated in accordance with the year 1650.

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the artist's friend, Chou Liang-kung, to whom the painting is dedicated. Ch'en Hung-shou may well have been telling his friend, in this subtle way, not to accept political office under the alien Manchu rule. In style this work is archaistic as well as eclectic (though extremely selective with regard to the features borrowed), and contains pictorial elements taken from the T'ang, Sung, and Yüan periods. The greatness of the artist is fully revealed in this work, in which he demonstrates his ability to forge the diverse elements which he has culled into a unified and personal statement of great expressive power. One is reminded of what Alfred Einstein wrote when he discussed his reasons for considering *Ariadne auf Naxos* as the masterpiece in the collaboration between Richard Strauss and Hugo von Hofmannsthal: ". . . the poet . . . represents everything in the mirror with the baroque frame, in the frame of an almost inconceivable mixture of styles, which makes it possible to say with impunity what is most serious, most profound, and most exquisite. . . ."[7]

[7] "Strauss and Hofmannsthal," in *Essays on Music* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1962), p. 256.

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David Wieck On Stephen C. Pepper's "On the uses of symbolism in sculpture and painting"

As I read Dr. Pepper's paper, his basic question is epistemological: How is it possible that a painted or sculpted thing, as seen by us, be true to nature? His answer, as I read it, is: in just the same way in which perception can be true to nature; that is, by the perceiver's bringing to his experience a system of clues derived from experienced connections. The artist must adapt these clues to the medium in which he works, but we can follow out at least some of the adaptations and see how they are achieved. It is not by convention (to take an example from a kindred art) that we see the frames of a motion picture as a flow of movement rather than as discrete images, and it is not by convention that we see time as having elapsed if a formerly clean-shaven man now appears with a beard. Insofar, of course, we are at the base-line of aesthetic experience. A passport photograph will serve for identification—certainly it furnishes us with a kind of hypothesis about what a man will look like, and so far as I know there is no culture in which a snapshot cannot be used as a means of recognition. And whatever a photograph can do a painter can do.

But if representation through clues derived from experienced connections is therefore possible, the question remains whether this is the manner in which *aesthetic* verisimilitude is accomplished in the arts. Is this the manner in which, to refer to Dr. Pepper's most tantalizing example, a piece of sculpture acquires the appearance not only of visual resemblance but of feeling of *life*? Should we *identify* representation with naturalism, or should we regard the latter as one convention for representation, albeit one founded in non-conventional clues? Is representation, in the sense of depiction of a scene, inferior if the figures are not shown in receding perspective? By these questions I mean to raise the more general question which they imply: namely, whether naturalism is either a sufficient or a necessary condition for representation, if by the latter we mean something which we see as a natural scene. This strikes me as a deep problem; I have not been able to think it through. I put it therefore as a question, one which may seem like a philosophical haggle—but then philosophical haggles can turn out to be useful. I would suppose that we might really be dealing with a factual question, to be settled by empirical observation. But in the case of art such "observation" is always tricky.

My other problem with Dr. Pepper's paper concerns the conceptual framework in which he sets his discussion; in particular his use of the term *symbol*. Dr. Pepper defines a symbol as anything *used to represent or stand for* something. Now I find it uncomfortable on that definition to regard perception (as such) as symbolic. A child establishes a connection between visible flames and sensations of heat and burning. His anticipatory set is that the latter will accompany the former. But is he *using* fire to represent heat and burning? I think not. If he draws (a picture of) leaping flames, and means them to

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stand for heat and burning, then it seems to me that we have a case of *symbol* by Dr. Pepper's definition, and the distinction is important to preserve. (Perhaps we should also call it a symbol if a person uses a visual image in order to think about something different from the image.) I am inclined to agree with Dr. Pepper that our recognition of objects in a painting depends on antecedent connections on the fire-and-burning model, but not that it depends on antecedent symbols in the sense that visible fire *stands for* burning. The point in question becomes more significant when we consider the fact that Dr. Pepper also treats as symbols the clues by which we perceive a figure in a painting *as* a figure of a man. We do not *experience* these clues as symbols and I do not believe that the artist used them to *stand for* something else; at any rate, I think it a doubtful thesis. *Aesthetically,* artist and spectator have the natural image in view; they do not have a set of symbols in view. I believe that Gestalt psychology is clear about this. *Epistemologically,* we might want to say that the picture is, vis-à-vis nature, a symbol. But our interest in aesthetic objects, as has long been said, is interest in appearance and the meaning it encloses, not in something referred to. It is even a moot point whether naturalistic representation has constituted the aim of Western tradition in the manner usually assumed. For these reasons, I would prefer that Dr. Pepper had said, more neutrally, that we can account for the sense of verisimilitude by referring to experiential connections which we bring to the experience. Saying this, he would leave open the question of the *aim* of the art which we label representational. He would also leave us with the possibility of drawing a useful distinction between representational and symbolic painting.

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Almost any general statement made about Japanese aesthetics can easily be disputed and even disproved by citing well-known contrary examples. *Shibui,* the one term of Japanese aesthetics that seems to have found its way into the English language, evokes the understatement and refinement typical of much Japanese artistic expression; but how should this ideal be reconciled with the flamboyance of a performance of Kabuki or with the garish, polychromed temples at Nikkō, long considered by the Japanese themselves as a summit of beauty? It goes without saying that Japanese taste did not stay frozen throughout the centuries, nor were aesthetic preferences unaffected by social class and education, and in making general remarks about Japanese aesthetics these cautions must be remembered. Nevertheless, for all the exceptions that might be adduced, I believe it is possible to say of certain aesthetic ideals that they are characteristically and distinctively Japanese.

A few generalizations probably can be made without fear of contradiction. First of all, one might mention the importance of aesthetic considerations even in seemingly irrelevant areas of Japanese life. Despite the modernization and the internationalization of standards today, the visitor to Japan never fails to notice the flowers, real or artificial, clustered in a little holder near the bus-driver's head; or the flowers gracefully bending down from a wall-bracket over the toilet; or the artistically brushed signboard in the railway station which proves to mean "Left Luggage Room"; or, for that matter, the maddening artistry with which a parcel is likely to be wrapped in a department store when one is in a hurry. These sights surprise the visitor, who marvels that aestheticism should be so pervasive, but he might equally wonder, of course, why busses, toilets, and left luggage rooms in his own country are not considered the appropriate places for floral or calligraphic embellishment. Or, to take the most famous instance of all, the exquisite appearance of Japanese food, despite its often pallid taste, has been praised by every foreign visitor; indeed, a meal served in the private room of a fine restaurant, where every detail from the color of the cushions on the *tatami* and the flower in the alcove to the last little sauce dish has been artistically planned, tends to make the occasion an aesthetic, rather than a gustatory experience. One has only to know how a first-rate Chinese dinner would be served in Jakarta today or in Shanghai in bygone years to become aware of the special place of aestheticism in Japanese life, as contrasted with other countries of Asia.

These examples may seem facetious, but, however trivial, they should suggest how important is the role played in daily Japanese life today of aesthetic preferences that go back very far in Japanese history. Descriptions in the works of fiction of a thousand years ago, as well as in the diaries and essays, plainly indicate how absorbed the Japanese were with considerations of beauty. The European knight wore his lady's glove in his helmet, but it would not have occurred to him to examine the glove first to make sure it

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met his aesthetic standards and confirmed his judgment that his lady was worth dying for; he was quite content to think that the glove had once graced her hand, and an overly fastidious examination of the material, color, pattern and so on would not have endeared him to the lady. The Japanese courtier of the eleventh century, on the other hand, was adamant in his insistence on aesthetic accomplishments in any woman he might offer his love. A note from her in somewhat less than flawless calligraphy, or a disillusioning glimpse of her sleeve that suggested the lady lacked a perfect sensitivity to color harmonies, might easily have dampened his ardor.

The elevation of aestheticism to something close to a religion was achieved at the Japanese court in the tenth century. It naturally involved an insistence on elegance of manners and an attention to protocol that may remind us of Versailles. But at the Japanese court, unlike Versailles, it was not only the *petit marquis,* the fop, who composed verses to his lady, but everyone, from the Emperor down. Letters normally took the form of poems, exquisitely penned on paper of an exactly appropriate texture and in ink of the correct degree of blackness; folded with dexterity and attached to a spray of seasonal flowers, they were entrusted to a page attired in a manner worthy of his master's dignity.

Aestheticism spread from the court to the provinces, and from the upper classes to the commoners. The cult of cherry blossoms, which apparently originated at the court in Kyoto, today is universal: radio announcements inform the breathless public at which sites the blossoms are eight-tenths opened and at which only seven-tenths, and eager busloads of factory workers head for the suitable spots. Not all Japanese homes are aesthetically pleasing, of course, but whenever financially possible it is attempted to create at least in one corner something suggesting the simplicity and elegance of the traditional aesthetics.

Japanese aesthetics can be approached not only through the relatively scant writings of the old literature specifically devoted to the subject, but through the evidence in works of literature or criticism, in objects of art, and even in the manner of life of the Japanese as a whole, so pervasive has aestheticism been. A number of headings under which Japanese aesthetics might be discussed come to mind: suggestion, irregularity, simplicity, and perishability. These related concepts point to the most typical forms of Japanese aesthetic expression though, as I have indicated, exaggeration, uniformity, profusion, and durability are by no means absent.

SUGGESTION

The poet and critic Fujiwara no Kintō (966-1041), dividing poetry into nine categories of excellence, described the highest category thus: "The

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language is magical and conveys more meanings than the words themselves express." To illustrate this criterion he offered the following poem:

honobono to	Dimly, dimly
Akashi no ura no	The day breaks at Akashi Bay;
asagiri ni	And in the morning mist
shimagakureyuku	My heart follows a vanishing ship
fune wo shi zo omou	As it goes behind an island.

Part of the beauty of this poem lies in the use of language and even the sounds (for example, the *o* sounds of the first line echoed at the end), but its chief claim to distinction in the eyes of Fujiwara no Kintō was its power of suggesting unspoken implications. The poem would be less if more specific: if, for example, it made clear that the poet's sweetheart was aboard the disappearing ship or that the poet himself for some reason wished he were aboard. The ambiguity, a well-known feature of the Japanese language, which commonly omits the subjects of sentences, is exploited in this poem so as to expand the thirty-one syllables of the *tanka* to suggest an atmosphere and an emotional state nowhere specifically stated. A sense of mystery is intensified by the mist obscuring the dawn seascape as the ship disappears. What did this sight mean to the poet? Clearly he did not remain impassive, a mere observer. But if the instant when the ship disappeared he felt a stab of parting, he does not choose to explain why.

The reliance of this poem on suggestion, if not a uniquely Japanese phenomenon, is certainly unlike the common European forms of literary expression. Ambiguity was not highly esteemed by, say, Renaissance writers on poetics, who associated it with the humor of the pun.[1] However rich in ambiguity the sonnets of Shakespeare may actually be, some statement of truth or experience is invariably made. But what is the statement in this Japanese poem? Surely it is not the simple recording of the meaningless event of an autumn morning; the sight unquestionably had meaning for the poet, and he assumes it will have meaning for the reader too, but he does not define the nature of this meaning.

The element of suggestion in the poem is the source of its beauty, yet when compared to later Japanese poetry its level of suggestion may seem shallow. By the end of the twelfth century the ideal known as *yūgen* (or, mystery and depth) was developed by Fujiwara Shunzei (1114-1204). *Yūgen* as an aesthetic principle has been defined by Brower and Miner in *Japanese Court Poetry* as "The mid-classical ideal of tonal complexity conveyed by the overtones . . . of poems typically in the mode of descriptive symbolism."[2] This

[1] See, for example, the views of Giangiorgio Trissino in Allan H. Gilbert, *Literary Criticism: Plato to Dryden* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), pp. 228-231.
[2] Robert H. Brower and Earl Miner, *Japanese Court Poetry* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 514.

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ideal may recall Poe's "suggestive indefiniteness of vague and therefore of spiritual effect." The vagueness admired by Poe was easily achieved by Japanese poets, thanks to the Japanese language. The lack of distinctions between singular and plural or between definite and indefinite contributes to the ambiguity, at least to the Western reader who is accustomed to such distinctions. For a Japanese poet precision in language would limit the range of suggestion, as we can easily see from a famous *haiku* by Bashō (1644-1694):

kareeda ni	On the withered bough
karasu no tomarikeri	A crow has alighted:
aki no kure	Nightfall in autumn.

This English translation represents a possible interpretation of the Japanese words, but the arbitrary nature of its choices of singular and plural is apparent from an eighteenth-century painting illustrating this *haiku* that depicts no less than eight crows alighted on a number of withered branches. This equally possible interpretation of the poem presents a landscape less lonely than that of a single crow on a single withered branch, an interpretation of the poem found in other illustrative paintings, but may convey an even more brooding intensity. Again, the last line of the *haiku, aki no kure,* can also be interpreted as meaning "the nightfall of autumn"—that is, the end of autumn. If we were to insist on determining which meaning the poet intended, whether the nightfall of a particular autumn day or the end of the autumnal season, the answer might well be that *both* were intended. If Bashō's phrase were interpreted as meaning nightfall, regardless of whether it were early or late in autumn, it might suggest that the crow (or crows) were alighting on a withered branch in a tree otherwise filled with bright leaves, producing a disharmonious impression; but if the scene intended had been an unspecified time of day toward the end of autumn, it might mean that the crow was alighting in the full glare of noon, an equally inappropriate possibility. Many meanings and implications may be extracted from the seventeen syllables of this *haiku,* thanks to the ambiguity of the language. However, Bashō's ultimate meaning, what he intended the two elements of the *haiku* to say about each other, and how far beyond the words themselves the suggestions reach, may still elude us.

The *haiku* on the alighting crow exemplifies a related aspect of Japanese aesthetics, the preference for monochromes to bright colors. It is true that magnificent examples of Japanese art—the celebrated *Tale of Genji* scroll among them—are brilliantly colored, but I believe that most Japanese critics would agree that the prevailing preference in Japanese aesthetics has been for the monochrome. The black crow alighting on a withered branch at a time of day and season when all color has vanished suggests the lonely beauty admired by countless Japanese poets, or the severity of Japanese gardens

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consisting of stones and sand, or the unpainted interiors and exteriors of a Japanese house. The use of color can be brilliant, but it inevitably limits the suggestive range: when a flower is painted red, it can be no other color, but the black outline of a flower on white paper will let us imagine whatever color we choose.

These words may suggest the aesthetics of Zen Buddhism. Indeed, much of what is considered most typical in Japanese aesthetics stems from Zen. Or, it might be more accurate to say, it coincides with Zen. The simplicity of a Shintō shrine building, the bare lines of its architecture and grounds, was an expression of an indigenous preference which coincided with Zen ideals, and made the Japanese receptive to the more sophisticated aesthetics of the continental religion. The Japanese were equally receptive to the aesthetics of the Chinese artists and poets of the Sung dynasty who also favored monochromes. But the principle of suggestion as an aesthetic technique need not have been learned from abroad.

Suggestion as an artistic technique is given one of its most perfect forms of expression in the Nō theatre. The undecorated stage, the absence of props other than bare outlines, the disregard for all considerations of time and space in the drama, the use of a language that is usually obscure and of abstract gestures that scarcely relate to the words, all make it evident that this theatre, unlike representational examples elsewhere (or Kabuki in Japan) was meant to be the outward, beautiful form suggestive of remoter truths or experiences, the nature of which will differ from person to person. The large role played by suggestion, as contrasted with the explicit descriptions of people and situations we more normally encounter in the theatre, gives the Nō an absolute character. It baffles or bores many Japanese, but it moves others in ways that more conventional, dated varieties of drama cannot, and the same holds true of Western spectators. The groans, the harsh music that precedes the entrance of the actors, may irritate a contemporary spectator, but they may also make him sense in a way impossible with words alone the distance separating the world of the dead from the world of the living, the terrible attachment to this world that causes ghosts to return again to suffer the past, or the pain of being born.

Nō can profoundly move even Western spectators totally unfamiliar with Japanese culture, but it can equally repel others who are committed to a representational variety of theatre. Performances staged in Europe and America have been criticized as having insignificant plots and inadequate characterization. After a performance in New York a member of the Actors' Studio complained that the character Tsunemasa did nothing to convince the audience he was indeed a great musician. Such objections, which would be scornfully rejected by admirers of Nō, cannot be attributed merely to the hostility of people ignorant of tradition. Suggestion as an aesthetic method

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is always open to the charge of deception—of being no more than the Emperor's new clothes. The monk Shōtetsu, writing in the fifteenth century, recognized that the mysterious powers of suggestion designated by the term *yūgen* could not be appreciated by most men:

> *Yūgen* can be apprehended by the mind, but it cannot be expressed in words. Its quality may be suggested by the sight of a thin cloud veiling the moon or by autumn mist swathing the scarlet leaves on a mountainside. If one is asked where in these sights lies the *yūgen,* one cannot say, and it is not surprising that a man who fails to understand this truth is likely to prefer the sight of a perfectly clear, cloudless sky. It is quite impossible to explain wherein lies the interest or the remarkable nature of *yūgen.*[3]

Perhaps this is what Fujiwara no Teika (1162-1241) had in mind when he wrote this famous poem:

miwataseba	In this wide landscape
hana mo momiji mo	I see no cherry blossoms
nakarikeri	And no crimson leaves—
ura no tomaya no	Evening in autumn over
aki no yūgure	A straw-thatched hut by the bay.

Teika looks out on a landscape that lacks the conventionally admired sights of Japanese poetry, but he discovers that it is precisely the austerity of the monochrome landscape that stirs in him an awareness of a deeper beauty. If someone were to deny the existence of this beauty and say that all the poet saw was a wretched fisherman's hut and the rest was an illusion, Teika could not defend himself. Suggestion depends on a willingness to admit that meanings exist beyond what can be seen or described. In the theatre the Nō actors risk failure if the audience refuses to make this concession, but for the Japanese poet or connoisseur of art the pleasures of suggestion could become an end in themselves to the exclusion of considerations of convincing representation. We can infer this from a famous passage found in *Essays in Idleness* by Kenkō (1283-1350): "Are we to look at cherry blossoms only in full bloom, the moon only when it is cloudless? To long for the moon while looking on the rain, to lower the blinds and be unaware of the passing of the spring—these are even more deeply moving. Branches about to blossom or gardens strewn with faded flowers are worthier of our admiration."[4]

A more common Western conception is that of the climax, the terrible moment when Laocoon and his sons are caught in the serpent's embrace, or the ecstatic moment when the soprano hits high C; but for Kenkō the climax was less interesting than the beginnings and ends, for it left nothing to be imagined. The full moon or the cherry blossoms at their peak do not suggest

[3] Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene, *Sources of Japanese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 285.

[4] Kenkō, *Essays in Idleness: the Tsurezuregusa of Kenkō,* trans. Donald Keene (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 115. (Hereafter cited as "Kenkō.")

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the crescent or the buds, though the crescent and buds (or the waning moon and the strewn flowers) do suggest the full moon and full flowering. Perfection, like some inviolable sphere, repels the imagination, allowing it no room to penetrate. Bashō's only poem about Mount Fuji describes a day when fog prevented him from seeing the peak. Beginnings that suggest what is to come, or ends that suggest what has been, allow the imagination room to expand beyond the literal facts to the limits of the capacities of the reader of a poem, the spectator at a Nō play, or the connoisseur of a monochrome painting. Beginnings and ends are also of special interest with respect to the development of the form itself: primitive painting or the moderns are more apt to excite people today than the works of Raphael or of Andrea del Sarto, the perfect painter. Here, as so often, a curious coincidence brings traditional Japanese tastes into congruence with those of the contemporary West.

IRREGULARITY

The emphasis on beginnings and ends implied a rejection of regularity as well as of perfection. We know from the earliest literary and artistic remains that the Japanese have generally avoided symmetry and regularity, perhaps finding them constricting and obstructive to the powers of suggestion. Symmetry in Japanese literature and art, whether in the use of parallel prose or architectural constructions arranged along a central axis, almost invariably reflects Chinese or other continental influence. In the *Fudoki,* gazetteers compiled by imperial order early in the eighth century, we find such passages as: "In spring the cherry trees along the shore are a thousand shades of color; in autumn the leaves on the banks are tinted a hundred hues. The warbler's song is heard in the fields, and cranes are seen dancing on the strand. Village boys and fisher girls throng the shore; merchants and farmers pole their boats to and fro." The relentless insistence on parallel expression, so natural to the Chinese, was normally antithetical to the Japanese, despite occasional experimentations. This passage represented an ill-digested emulation of Chinese writing that contrasts with the almost invariable preference for irregularity, and even for prime numbers: for example, the thirty-one syllables of the *tanka,* the classic verse form, are arranged in lines of five, seven, five, seven, and seven syllables. Nothing could be farther removed from the couplets and quatrains that make up normal poetic usage in so many countries. Even when the Japanese intended to take over bodily a Chinese artistic conception, such as the architectural plan of a monastery, they seem to have felt uncomfortable with the stark symmetry prescribed, and before long broke the monotony by moving some buildings to the other side of the central axis. Soper contrasted the regularity of Chinese temple architecture with its subsequent development in Japan: "What remained from the first generation was

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a sensible irregularity of plan . . . . At the Shingon Kongōbuji on Kōyasan, the central cleared area is a fairly spacious and level one that might have permitted at least a minimal Chinese scheme. Instead, as if by deliberate rejection, the main elements, though they face south, are on independent axes."[5]

Kenkō suggested why the Japanese were so fond of irregularity: "In everything, no matter what it may be, uniformity is undesirable. Leaving something incomplete makes it interesting, and gives one the feeling that there is room for growth." Or again, "People often say that a set of books looks ugly if all volumes are not in the same format, but I was impressed to hear the Abbot Kōyū say, 'It is typical of the unintelligent man to insist on assembling complete sets of everything. Imperfect sets are better.' "[6] Undoubtedly librarians in Kenkō's day were less enthusiastic than he about the desirability of incomplete sets, but as anyone knows who has ever confronted the grim volumes of a complete set of the Harvard Classics, they do not invite browsing.

A partiality for irregularity reveals itself also in the ceramics preferred by the Japanese. If you are a guest at a tea ceremony and are offered your choice of bowl—a lovely celadon piece, or a fine porcelain with delicate patterns, or a bumpy, misshapen pot rather suggesting an old shoe—it is easy to prove your appreciation of Japanese aesthetics by unhesitantly selecting the old shoe. A perfectly formed round bowl is boring to the Japanese, for it lacks any trace of the individuality of the potter.

In calligraphy too, copybook perfection is ridiculed or condescendingly dismissed as something best left to the Chinese; Japanese preference tends to favor the lopsided, exaggeratedly individual characters written by a *haiku* or tea ceremony master. In gardens too, the geometrically executed formations of the Alhambra or Versailles would seem to the Japanese less a place to repose the eyes and heart than a rigid mathematical demonstration. The Chinese garden, more natural than the European formal garden, inspired the romanticism of design so dear to the eighteenth-century English landscape architects. But the Japanese went far beyond the Chinese in the irregularity and even eccentricity of their gardens. Derek Clifford, in *A History of Garden Design,* expressed his disapproval of Japanese gardens, contrasting them with the more agreeable Chinese; according to Clifford, "the Chinese stopped short at the extreme lengths of development to which the Japanese went."[7] Clifford seems never to have actually seen a Japanese garden, but he found the famous stone and sand garden of the Ryōanji, the subject of an admiring essay by Sacheverell Sitwell, to be offensive and even dangerous:

[5] Robert Treat Paine and Alexander Soper, *The Art and Architecture of Japan* (London: Penguin Books, 1955), pp. 210-211.
[6] Kenkō, p. 70.
[7] Derek Clifford, *A History of Garden Design* (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), p. 116.

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It is the logical conclusion of the refinement of the senses, the precipitous world of the abstract painter, a world in which the stains on the cover of a book can absorb one more utterly than the ceiling of the Sistine chapel; it is the narrow knife edge of art, overthrowing and discarding all that man has ever been and achieved in favour of some mystic contemplative ecstacy, a sort of suspended explosion of the mind, the dissolution of identity. You really cannot go much further than this unless you sit on a cushion like Oscar Wilde and contemplate the symmetry of an orange.[8]

The symmetry of an orange was hardly calculated to absorb the attention of the architects of this exceedingly asymmetrical garden. The marvellous irregularity of the disposition of the stones eludes the analysis of the most sensitive observer. Far from being the artless "stains on the cover of a book," the Ryōanji garden is the product of a philosophical system—that of Zen Buddhism—as serious as that which inspired the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. And, it might be argued, even a European might derive greater pleasure from daily contemplation of the fifteen stones of the Ryōanji garden than of the Sistine Chapel, without "overthrowing and discarding all that man has ever been and achieved." The Sistine Chapel is magnificent, but it asks our admiration rather than our participation; the stones of the Ryōanji, irregular in shape and position, by allowing us to participate in the creation of the garden may move us even more. But that may be, again, because our own age is closer in artistic expression to that of the Ryōanji than to that of Michelangelo.

SIMPLICITY

The use of the most economical means to obtain the desired effect, the product of Zen philosophy, is another characteristic of the garden of the Ryōanji. The same philosophy affected the creation of many other gardens—the waterless river that swirls through the landscape of the Tenryūji garden, foaming over artfully placed rocks, or the waterless cascade that tumbles through green moss at the Saihōji. But the preference for simplicity in gardens is not restricted to those of Zen temples. The use of a single natural rock for the bridge over a tiny pond or for a water basin suggests the love of the texture of the stone untampered with by human skill. Even the disdain for flowers as a distracting and disruptive element in a garden suggests an insistence on the bare bones of the abstract garden, which has no need for the superficial charm of an herbaceous border or a flower bed that is "a riot of color." Simplicity and the natural qualities of the materials employed may have been first emphasized by the Zen teachers, but they are now common ideals of the Japanese people. Soper has pointed out: "A feature of Zen buildings which their origin makes curious is their frequently complete lack of painted decoration, interiors

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

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and exteriors alike being left in natural wood. Such austerity is certainly non-Chinese, and must mark a deliberate choice on the part of early Japanese Zen masters . . . in compliance with the spirit of simplicity inherent in Zen teachings."[9] Early Buddhist temples in Japan had been painted on the outside, generally a dull red (as we may see today at the Byōdō-in), but from the thirteenth century onward most temples, regardless of their sect, tended to be built of unpainted wood. The same held true of palaces and private houses.

Kenkō's expression of his own preference for simplicity in the decoration of a house came to be shared by most Japanese: "A house which multitudes of workmen have polished with every care, where strange and rare Chinese and Japanese furnishings are displayed, and even the grasses and trees of the garden have been trained unnaturally, is ugly to look at and most depressing."[10] It is easier for us to assent to this opinion than it would have been for Western writers fifty years ago. Few writers on Japanese aesthetics today would describe the Ginkakuji (Silver Pavilion) in Sansom's words as "an insignificant structure which belies its name . . . simple to the verge of insipidity."[11] The Ginkakuji does not strike me as an insignificant structure. I certainly prefer it to the elaborate mausolea of the Tokugawa at Nikkō, and I believe most other students of Japan would share my views. But traditionally in the West the house which "multitudes of workmen have polished with every care" has been considered the most desirable, as we know from old photographs showing the profusion of treasures with which the drawing rooms of the rich were commonly adorned. Gardens where even the trees and grasses have been trained unnaturally still attract visitors to the great houses of Europe.

Probably the most extreme expression of the Japanese love for unobtrusive elegance is the tea ceremony. The ideal sought by the great tea master Sen no Rikyū (1521-1591) was *sabi*, a word related to *sabi* "rust" or *sabireru* "to become desolate." This may seem to be a curious aesthetic ideal, but it arose as a reaction to the parvenu extravagance of Rikyū's master, the dictator Hideyoshi, who had built a solid gold portable teahouse he doted on so much he took it with him everywhere on his travels. Rikyū's *sabi* was not the enforced simplicity of the man who could not afford better, but a refusal of easily obtainable luxury, a preference for a rusty-looking kettle to one of gold or gleaming newness, a preference for a tiny undecorated hut to the splendors of a palace. This was not the same as Marie Antoinette playing at

[9] Alexander Coburn Soper III, *The Evolution of Buddhist Architecture in Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942), p. 246.
[10] Kenkō, p. 10.
[11] G. B. Sansom, *Japan: A Short Cultural History* (rev. ed.; London: The Cresset Press, 1952), p. 401.

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shepherdess; in fact, it represented a return to the normal Japanese fondness for simplicity and was in no sense an affectation. *Sabi* was accepted because it accorded with deep-seated aesthetic beliefs. The tea ceremony today is sometimes attacked as being a perversion of the ideals it once embodied, but the expense of a great deal of money to achieve a look of bare simplicity is entirely in keeping with Japanese tradition.

The tea ceremony developed as an art concealing art, an extravagance masked in the garb of noble poverty. The Portuguese missionary João Rodrigues (1561-1634) left behind an appreciative description of a tea ceremony he had attended, but he could not restrain his astonishment over the lengths to which the Japanese carried their passion for unobtrusive luxury: "Because they greatly value and enjoy this kind of gathering to drink tea, they spend large sums of money in building such a house, rough though it may be, and in purchasing the things needed for drinking the kind of tea which is offered in these meetings. Thus there are utensils, albeit of earthenware, which come to be worth ten, twenty or thirty thousand *cruzados* or even more—a thing which will appear as madness and barbarity to other nations that know of it."[12]

Madness perhaps, but surely not barbarity! Everything about the tea ceremony was controlled by the most highly developed aesthetic sensibilities. The avoidance of conspicuous wealth was reinforced by an avoidance of color in the hut, of perfume in the flowers displayed, and of taste in the food offered. The interior of the hut, though it embraces many textures of wood and matting, tends to be almost exclusively in shades of brown, with perhaps a pale dot of color in the alcove. There may be incense burnt, generally of an astringent nature, but the typical scents of Western flowers—rose, carnation, or lilac—would be unthinkable. This preference for understatement may stem from the "climate" of Japan. A Japanese teacher once suggested to me that the colors preferred in Japanese art owed their muted hues to the natural colors of seashells. Whether this is strictly true or not, it is certainly easy to distinguish Japanese prints before and after the introduction of Western dyes. But after a brief period of fascination with the screaming purples, crimsons and emeralds of the new, exotic colors, the Japanese returned to the seashells. It is true that the Japanese landscape offers few bright floral colors, and the native flowers have virtually no smell. The aesthetic choices made in the tea hut may owe as much to nature as to deliberate policy.

Japanese food too, and not only that served in the tea ceremony, lacks the intensity of taste found elsewhere. Just as the faint perfume of the plum blossoms is preferred to the heavy odor of the lily, the barely perceptible differ-

[12] Quoted in Michael Cooper, *They Came to Japan: An Anthology of European Reports on Japan, 1543-1640* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 265.

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ences in flavor between different varieties of raw fish are prized extravagantly. The Zen monastery vegetarian cuisine, though the subject of much self-adulation, offers a meager range of tastes, and the fineness of a man's palate can be tested by his ability to distinguish virtually tasteless dishes of the same species. The virtuosity is impressive, but it would be hard to convince a Chinese or a European that a lump of cold bean curd dotted with a dash of soy sauce is indeed superior to the supposedly cloying flavors of *haute cuisine*. The early European visitors to Japan, though they praised almost everything else, had nothing good to say about Japanese food. Bernardo de Avila Girón wrote, "I will not praise Japanese food for it is not good, albeit it is pleasing to the eye, but instead I will describe the clean and peculiar way in which it is served."[13] The absence of meat, in conformance with the Buddhist proscription, undoubtedly limited the appeal of Japanese cuisine to the Portuguese and Spanish visitors, but the characteristic preference for simplicity and naturalness—the undisguised flavors of vegetables and fish—was essentially aesthetic.

The insistence on simplicity and naturalness placed a premium on the connoisseur's appreciation of quality. An unpainted wooden column shows the natural quality of the tree from which it was formed just as an uncooked piece of fish reveals its freshness more than one surrounded by sauce. In the Nō theatre too the lack of the usual distractions in a performance—sets, lighting, and the rest—focuses all attention on the actor, and demands a connoisseur to appreciate the slight differences in gesture or voice that distinguish a great actor from a merely competent one. Within the limited ranges permitted in their traditional arts the Japanese prized shadings. Seldom did the painter, poet, or Nō actor take the risks involved in bold statement, as opposed to controlled simplicity; for this reason there is almost nothing of bad taste in traditional Japan. Simplicity is safer than profusion as an aesthetic guide, but if the outsider fails to develop the virtuoso sensibilities of the Japanese he may find that he craves something beyond understatement—whether the brilliance of a chandelier, the depth of taste of a great wine, or the overpowering sound of the Miserere in *Il Trovatore*. By choosing suggestion and simplicity the Japanese forfeited a part of the possible artistic effects, but when they succeeded they created works of art of a beauty unaffected by the shifting tides of taste.

PERISHABILITY

Beyond the preference for simplicity and the natural qualities of things lies what is perhaps the most distinctively Japanese aesthetic ideal, perishability. The desire in the West has generally been to achieve artistic immortality, and

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 194.

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this has led men to erect monuments in deathless marble. The realization that even such monuments crumble and disappear has brought tears to the eyes of the poets. The Japanese have built for impermanence, though paradoxically some of the oldest buildings in the world exist in Japan. The Japanese belief that perishability is a necessary element in beauty does not of course mean that they have been insensitive to the poignance of the passage of time. Far from it. Whatever the subject matter of the old poems, the underlying meaning was often an expression of grief over the fragility of beauty and love. Yet the Japanese were keenly aware that without this mortality there could be no beauty. Kenkō wrote, "If man were never to fade away like the dews of Adashino, never to vanish like the smoke over Toribeyama, but lingered on forever in the world, how things would lose their power to move us! The most precious thing in life is its uncertainty."[14] The frailty of human existence, a common theme in literature throughout the world, has rarely been recognized as the necessary condition of beauty. The Japanese not only knew this, but expressed their preference for varieties of beauty which most conspicuously betrayed their impermanence. Their favorite flower is of course the cherry blossom, precisely because the period of blossoming is so poignantly brief and the danger that the flowers may scatter even before one has properly seen them is so terribly great. Yet for the day or two of pleasure of the blossoming the Japanese dote on a fruit tree that bears no fruit, but instead attracts a disagreeable quantity of insects. Plum blossoms look much the same and are graced with a scent so faint that even a tea master could not object, but they are less highly prized because they linger so long on the boughs. The samurai was traditionally compared to the cherry blossoms, and his ideal was to drop dramatically, at the height of his strength and beauty, rather than to become an old soldier gradually fading away.

The visible presence of perishability in the cracked tea bowl carefully mended in gold has been appreciated not because it makes the object an indisputable antique, but because without the possibility of aging with time and usage there could be no real beauty. Kenkō quoted with approval the poet Ton'a who said, "It is only after the silk wrapper has frayed at top and bottom, and the mother-of-pearl has fallen from the roller, that a scroll looks beautiful."[15] This delight in shabbiness may suggest the Arabic conception of *barak*, the magical quality an object acquires through long use and care. It is obviously at variance not only with the common Western craving for objects in mint condition, but with the desire to annihilate time by restoring a painting so perfectly that people will exclaim, "It could have been painted yesterday!" An object of gleaming stainless steel that never aged would surely have been

[14] Kenkō, p. 7. Adashino was a graveyard, and Toribeno the site of a crematorium.
[15] Kenkō, p. 70.

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repugnant to the Japanese of the past, whose love of old things implied the accretions of time.

The traditional Japanese aesthetics cannot be summed up in a few pages, but even without verbalizing what they were it is easy to sense them at work in the objects created and in the objects for which we will look in vain. The virtuoso connoisseur seems now to have shifted his talents to distinguishing between brands of beer or tobacco, and the perfectionist workman may be replaced by a machine, but it seems safe to say that the aesthetic ideals which have formed Japanese taste over the centuries will find their outlet in media yet undiscovered and maintain their distinctive existence.

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In Tokyo a few months ago I was taken to a restaurant somewhere in the Ura-Ginza. I suppose one could have ordered beautifully arranged, rather tasteless Japanese food, but the speciality of the place was a kind of do-it-yourself bouillabaisse, as hearty and rich as any to be found in Provence. Besides, the ambience was not appropriate to the Japanese dinner—no *tokonoma,* no flower arrangement, no restrained, ceremonious behavior—but tables crowded together in nightclub fashion, high-decibel conversation and laughter, out-of-breath, sweating waitresses on the run.

There were but three foreigners among the eighty to one hundred customers, most of whom appeared to be young Japanese businessmen out for a night on the town and the expense account. It's possible that by way of international commerce these men had developed a perverse, un-Japanese taste for bizarre food, but I doubt it. Ever since Meiji, certainly, and at times even earlier, the Japanese have been masters of what seems to be cultural doublethink (that 1871 print of the early Meiji, kimono-clad, watch-wearing, beef-eating young man), encompassing not only tastes in food (Yokohama's Shina-machi) but in art as well. Traditional flower arrangement prevails, so does that of Teshigahara. Ceremonial tea cups, Satsuma pottery. Ise, Nikkō.

Few Japanese appear to consider this ambivalence strange; but I gather Westerners do (Fenellosa loved Nō, despised Kabuki) and feel impelled to distinguish between genuine and spurious, good and bad, high-class and vulgar Japanese tastes. The West at this historical point finds the Zen aesthetic attractive, but at the turn of the century "flamboyant" Japanese artistic expression was in vogue. Though demonstrably given to crazes, the Japanese have been cultural hoarders as well, seldom relinquishing a Buddhist thought, a literary device, or a fabric design no matter how tattered they became, at the same time maintaining rather constant aesthetic concepts. Comparatively, Western artistic taste, particularly in the last century, shows a frivolity bordering on giddiness—from Hudson River School to Picasso, Victorian domestic architecture to Bauhaus, Browning to Pound. While the Japanese were inclined never quite to give up anything, the West (until Malraux's Museum without Walls) ran through a series of artistic forms, abandoning the last because the possibilities for further significant statement in it had been exhausted.

I think it is possible to trace in Western art a recurrent shift of movement, sometimes rapid, sometimes slow, between the form which is austere, restrained, suggestive, and non-representational and that which is luxuriant, exaggerated, explicit, and representational, which for all I know may have had its genesis in the antitheses of Paleolithic and Neolithic art and its poetic

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definition in Nietzsche's complementary gods. At any rate, we tend to regard these forms as polar, bending brains to explain the stick figures in cave art. The Japanese, on the contrary, have not experienced mythic or artistic schizophrenia, nor, according to themselves, have they felt the West's alternate attraction to and recoil from nature. Their eventual capacity for synthesis has made possible, for example, the withdrawal of Zen and the involvement of Jōdo Shinshū, and it accounts, I believe, for their ability to hold tastes which seem artistically opposed.

But these attitudes are not so antithetical as they first appear. The Zen-like characteristics that Professor Keene describes are to be found throughout Japanese artistic expression, even the most ornate, if one looks for them beneath the distracting surface. Japanese symmetrophobia is revealed not only in the rearrangement of Chinese temple architecture but in modern excesses of flower arrangement as well. Beneath the surface lavishness of Momoyama decoration or of the Kabuki theatre lies rigidly controlled design. Despite their delight in Western dyes, print-makers returned to "thin" Japanese colors; except for graphic artists who took up oils, there was little temptation to use gradation of color to create the illusion of a three-dimensional surface. The "suggestion" of monochrome has not been relinquished.

The basic qualities of Japanese art are to be found, technically at least, in the West. For all their borrowing from the West the Japanese, however, have not constructed the "monumental" forms of the West and the shattering climaxes which these forms develop. But one wonders (except in the cases, for example, of melodrama and sound-track music) whether we do not share the Japanese predilection for beginnings, tensions, and endings rather than climaxes. If only the climaxes of *Hamlet* engaged us, our interest in the play would be exhausted as quickly as it is in a James Bond movie.

The quality which clearly distinguishes Japanese aesthetics from Western (other than its pervasiveness in the culture) derives from the ancient and still vital sense of a oneness with nature, a sense which differs both in degree and kind from any Western "love of nature" or identification with it. (Clearly, not like being "Rolled round in earth's diurnal course/With rocks, and stones, and trees.") And it is this which not only accounts for the unique quality of Japanese "awareness" but also for the creative processes of Japanese art. As a shared attitude toward actuality, a common point of departure for both artist and spectator, it makes possible the reduction of the aesthetic surface—the gesture of the Nō actor, the stylization of the painted waterfall, the economy of the *haiku*. It is only when we don't "understand" that we insist upon being given all the details. When we're "aware," the mere phrase, the slightest suggestion opens the way to illumination. The artist can therefore make what seem to the West cryptic statements because he knows all Japanese have the keys to them. His statement is not symbolic, at least not in the

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Western notion of a symbol standing for or representing something else; it is simply focusing, within the field of a commonly-held attitude toward nature (and all its multiplicity of impressions), upon the significant image. The patterns and currents of nature are reduced to their essence and so presented; they are not made to stand for "something else."

This is quite a different process from that of the Western artist, particularly the contemporary one, who is forced to devise his own scheme of things, to construct the world of his art out of whatever "facts" of existence he finds usable, and to invest his work with symbols (either Freud's or those of his own invention) in order to convince his audience that there's more here than meets the eye. The traditional Japanese artist doesn't construct new, subjective worlds. He moves in this one and feels no need to rearrange it by "interpretation" or by translating it into symbols. His vision is more acute than that of the non-artists, but his angle of vision is the same.

And so whether Bashō had in mind one, two, or eight crows doesn't seem an important consideration. All Japanese who look through his words see and feel the same concepts. In the West it's possible for a single poet with a variety of subjective angles of vision to conceive thirteen ways of looking at a blackbird.

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The title of Professor Keene's paper started me off on the wrong foot. Aesthetics, from my traditional, Western point of view, is that philosophical discipline concerned either with the analysis of the nature and status of beauty as such (whether in nature or in art), or with the analysis of the nature and status and function of fine art (painting, sculpture, poetry, music, fiction, drama, etc.). The history of aesthetics in the West is, at least in part, the history of diverse theories concerning the nature of beauty or the nature of art. Some philosophers have been more concerned with beauty than with art; some philosophers have been more concerned with art than with beauty; some philosophers have been concerned with both (witness Santayana's *Sense of Beauty* and *Reason in Art*). Against this general background, I seemed to assume that a paper entitled "Japanese Aesthetics" would be concerned with theories of beauty or theories of art which have appeared in the course of the history of Japanese philosophy or Japanese philosophical reflection.

I was delighted to discover, after a few moments of confusion and hesitation, that this was not Professor Keene's intention at all. Aesthetics is a dreary science; and either the Japanese have not devoted themselves to the construction of works comparable to Kant's *Critique of Judgment* (a work to be mastered by the young but usually forgotten by the mature even though it is part three of a trilogy or, possibly, the third member of a trinity), Hegel's *Philosophy of Art,* or Croce's unreadable and influential *Aesthetic*; or if they have (and I doubt it), Professor Keene was not concerned with a survey of such works. Rather, from the point of view of his own feelings and sensitivities, he was concerned, more in the manner of the art critic than the formal philosopher, with talking to himself about what he took to be some of the basic aesthetic values of the traditional Japanese as these values are embodied in or expressed by Japanese poetry, painting, pottery, gardening, and drama —particularly Nō drama as opposed to Kabuki. The Western philosopher of art is, from Plato on, usually concerned with what art *qua* art is or ought to be if it were on the right track; and often (as with Plato in antiquity and Tolstoy in the nineteenth century) art is disclosed as mainly on the wrong track. Plato, like Stalin, apparently did not trust artists although, unlike Stalin, he tended to advocate banishment rather than prison or death for the non-conforming creator. Tolstoy, in his reflective old age, found most of what had been produced in the West (including most of his own writings) in the name of art either counterfeit or exclusive as opposed to true and inclusive. Plato and Tolstoy were both reformers and one is never quite convinced that they liked art at all. Professor Keene, who seems to think like a critic rather than like a philosopher, seems to dig, to be turned on by, Japanese art and at the same time is of the opinion that Japanese aesthetic values are significantly

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different from Western aesthetic values, though he seems to sense, at the end of his paper, the encroachment of the West even among the Japanese.

The critic, if he is to be a good critic, must be close to art in the concrete and must possess an aesthetic sensitivity of his own. The philosopher, concerned with art as such, may be infinitely remote from the concrete and may be aesthetically anesthetic and still be a good enough aesthetician. Professor Keene is a critic and more like Herbert Read than Plato. As such I go along with him with pleasure, interest, and the feeling that I have much to learn.

As for Japanese aesthetic values, Professor Keene lists them (with no claim, surely, to completeness) as involving at least "suggestion," "irregularity," "simplicity," and "perishability." Each of these is complex, each is related to the others, and each (as I see them all) is, at best, one aspect of a total situation.

"Suggestion" involves ambiguity, and ambiguity involves the possibility of multiple interpretation and response; and thus suggestion is both a quality and a challenge. The consumer (to use the meaningful but not very graceful term suggested by Ducasse) must complete the art object *as given* in his own way, finding it meaningful to himself, making it part of himself, listening with his third, fourth, and fifth ear for overtones, suggestions, implications which are both personal and impersonal, neither divorced from the art object nor literally *there* in the art object. Just the other day I saw on the desk of a University of Hawaii secretary a small ceramic vase vaguely in the shape of and vaguely and ambiguously of the color of a green guava. Whatever it meant to the Japanese secretary who had made it, it was for me not a monumentally great work of art (such things are for art galleries and museums—those houses of the dead—only), but a delicate and fragile object (as solid and as firm as it was), hovering ambiguously between the organic and the inorganic, implicitly and without argument abolishing any intellectual distinction between pure and applied art, and full of personal meanings for me, but meanings which emerged from and yet tied back into the vase itself. Suddenly it was something I wanted, something I wanted to live with, something I wanted to have as a part of my life. I asked the secretary if she would make me a vase like it. She said she would, but I knew that another like it would at best be a copy, and a copy of a work of art is, as a work of art, a contradiction in terms. What Keene means by suggestion is itself suggestive; it is full of diverse and interrelated meanings.

"Irregularity," as analyzed by Keene, seems to involve, in part, and be a product of the individuality of the artist and the uniqueness of each act of creation. It is the antithesis of the manufactured. It seems to exploit and to relish the spontaneous and the accidental which are at the very core of creativity though the other side of such spontaneity is a rigorous discipline

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and training. Irregularity, it would appear, is not divorced from suggestion and ambiguity, and all three seem to express the Japanese love of the unique and the particular and the shunning of the ready-made, unambiguous concept as something to slap down on and regulate, rationalize, and smother the particular. For Plato, in the West, a particular seems to be a fallen creature that is good, or more perfectly what it is, to the degree to which it participates in an abstract universal that can be grasped only by the intellect. It would appear that the Japanese are not Platonists. Only particulars exist, contingent to the core of their being, coming into being and ceasing to be, real in all of their individuality and uniqueness, and hence unavoidably, and preciously, irregular.

"Simplicity," it seems to me, is easy to recognize intellectually, not so easy, perhaps, to respond to in the dimension of sense, feeling, and emotion, and extremely difficult to verbalize. Not only different from explicit complexity, it is almost the polar opposite of plainness. It is doing the mostest with the leastest, and is thus related back to suggestion and ambiguity and on, as it were, to perishability. What is simple for the Japanese is not bare but rich. It is not filled to overflowing with explicit fullness and detail, fearful of the emptiness which surrounds us and in which we are caught up. It accepts the emptiness, exploits it, and transcends it. From a Western point of view, between any two points in a given set of points that constitutes a segment one can always construct another point, and so on *ad infinitum*. If the Western artist, knowing this, is concerned with the impossible task of constructing an infinite number of points, it would appear that the Japanese artist is more than happy with a point here and a point there, avoiding like poison the useless passing or *counting* to infinity and accepting emptiness (though an emptiness which is metaphysically full) not with horror but with poise, equanimity, and delight. A Japanese painting to Western eyes may appear, at times, more like a sketch than like a complete painting, something that may be a relative beginning but not a definitive end. From a Western point of view we reach around for a term and come up with *simplicity*. One suspects that from a Japanese point of view such "simplicity" is richness and unbelievable complexity in the dimension of suggestiveness and ambiguity, feeling and emotion. If all the Westerner sees is simplicity in the usual, Western sense of the term, he is not seeing what is there. Thus it is that the Westerner who, turned on by Japanese art, pursues simplicity by deliberately constructing simplicity finishes up with barrenness which, lacking significant fullness, is not simplicity at all.

"Perishability," it seems to me, is, like simplicity, a function of the deep-seated, Buddhist feeling for emptiness, impermanence, the fleeting character of whatever is—a feeling which catches up within itself the dialectically opposed feeling for the permanence of the no-permanence, the emptiness, out

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of which whatever is arises and to which whatever is returns. Perishability, in this sense, is not weakness. A Japanese poem seems to emerge, quietly quietly, out of the infinite nothingness which is its background, its matrix, its substance; no sooner does it come into being than it ceases to be, though while it exists it manifests, suggestively and ambiguously, both being and non-being. However strong it may be as a poetic structure, it is still fragile and short-lived in this world in which nothing is permanently permanent and the way up is the way down. The green vase (the *vase* is surely not the word) I saw on the secretary's desk is, indeed, perishable not because, physically speaking, it is easily broken (one has only to drop it on the floor to terminate its career as a vase), but perishable in the sense that it incorporates nothingness into its very substance and being, hovering between the organic and the inorganic, constructed out of the dust of the earth but taking on a life of its own, asserting enough to be both what it is and what it suggests but by no means protesting its importance, quietly content to be what it is in all of its simplicity and irregular uniqueness, the work not of nature, but of an artist who is both in and of nature, and yet the product of immediate feelings, emotions, and skills which cannot be recaptured because they too, in all of their uniqueness, come into existence and pass out of existence. "Make me one like it," I say. "I will," she replies. I smile and bow. She smiles and nods. We understand one another. If communication has gone on, it is the kind of communication that may go on between Zen masters (or children) who are delighted with situations which hover between the possible and the impossible and transcend both. Here we are in the domain of perishability. Perishability and permanence.

What, of course, I am suggesting is that, for me, Professor Keene's terms *suggestion, irregularity, simplicity,* and *perishability* are terms used by a Westerner and yet must not be regarded as delineating rigid concepts, Platonic forms, clear and distinct ideas, sharply separated from one another, to be grasped by the intellect and to be used like dissecting knives in Western-style philosophical analysis. It is so easy to say from a Western point of view that the terms are inadequately defined, the list of terms is incomplete, the exceptions are so numerous that as "values" in Japanese art they are more honored in the breach than in the observance, and that Professor Keene is guilty of the fallacy of selected instances. So be it. It sometimes seems to me that the Western mind in its senseless attempt to systematize and to understand everything finishes up by appreciating nothing at all and failing to see what stares it in the face. The meanings of Professor Keene's terms are themselves caught up in suggestion, irregularity, simplicity, and perishability. They point like fingers at what is to be seen. Once seen, the pointing fingers are no longer necessary—indeed, they only get in the way.

If the question is asked as to whether Japanese aesthetic values, as sug-

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gested by Keene, are universal or at least identical with, or to be found among, Western aesthetic values, it would seem to me that the only appropriate answer would be *no*. There have been movements and programs in Western art which, while remaining thoroughly Western, may remind us of Keene's Japanese values. Some impressionist paintings (and suddenly I seem to see in my mind's eye a tiny painting of a chocolate cup by Renoir and a spray of roses by Manet) seem to be expressive of suggestion, irregularity, simplicity, and perishability. Some imagist poets have, probably self-consciously, one fears, pursued what John Ciardi speaks of as brevity, the rejection of all restrictions on subject matter, the abandonment of a fixed metric in favor of new rhythms which are cut to fit, fidelity to the spoken language, the refusal to moralize, and the expression of feeling and emotion in terms of images which, clear and distinct on one level, have the ambiguous power to evoke a diversity of relevant yet personal feelings and emotions in the consumer. And yet such poetry, particularly when successful, is surely an exception in the history of Western literature. Genuine examples are not easy to find. The first poem ("Dieppe") of the tiny sequence of poems by Samuel Beckett entitled simply *Four Poems,* constructed first in French and then translated into English by Beckett himself, could be quoted:

again the last ebb
the dead shingle
the turning then the steps
towards the lighted town.[1]

Torn from its context, it may appear to be slight to the point of being inconsequential, and there is surely something "imitative" about it. And yet it does have something; and one feels that, like an iceberg, the one-tenth above the surface is supported by the ambiguous and suggestive nine-tenths that is below the surface. And suddenly one discovers oneself counting the syllables in French, discovering the pattern of 7-4-7-7, though the 4 is really at 5, the fifth syllable in the second line being a "rest," an intrusion of emptiness and nothingness into the structure of what appears to be—and literally is—a quatrain. And yet in this fragile sequence of poems Beckett does not really come into his own until the third poem:

what would I do without this world faceless incurious
where to be lasts but an instant where every instant
spills into the void the ignorance of have been
without this wave where in the end
body and shadow together are engulfed . . .[2]

[1] In the original French: "encore le dernier reflux / le galet mort / de demi-tour puis les pas / vers les vieilles lumières." Samuel Beckett, *Poems in English* (New York: Grove Press, 1961), pp. 54-55.
[2] Beckett, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

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This is a sudden and spectacular reconstruction of the sonnet form, profoundly —almost solipsistically—personal, but with all the tightness and completeness and solidity and sense of monumentality and perfection which the sonnet form makes possible.

Briefly, it would appear to me that if I were talking about Western literature, music, sculpture, and painting at its most perfect and most characteristic (and here I call to mind the plays of Aeschylus and Shakespeare, Dante's *Divine Comedy,* the symphonies of Beethoven and Mahler, the quartets of Bartok, the operas of Verdi, Wagner, and Strauss, Egyptian wall paintings and the constructions of Tintoretto, Cézanne, and Picasso, Greek temples and Gothic cathedrals, Egyptian sculpture and the constructions of Michelangelo and Henry Moore), I would find myself talking not about perishability but monumentality, not about simplicity but about complexity (*pace* Henry Moore), not about suggestion and ambiguity but about clarity and distinctness, not about emptiness but about fullness of detail; and I would have to remind myself of the tremendous gap between the world of art and the world of everyday life. It is possible that aesthetic values in the twentieth century West are shifting. There is simplicity and ambiguity in the paintings of Klee and the sculpture of Moore, yet the dominant tone is surely one of permanence (with Klee) and monumentality (with Moore). Calder may seem to suggest a new direction, but the suggestion is hardly a real possibility and Calder himself, by Western standards, is not only offbeat but really second-rate. But aesthetic values in Japan would also appear to be shifting. My guess is that the Japanese will become Western long before the Westerner becomes Japanese in his aesthetic tastes, values, and artistic orientation. Tokyo, I am told, is Los Angeles with Japanese signs.

Finally, as a sort of postscript, I am taken by what Professor Keene has to say about the Nō theater:

> The undecorated stage, the absence of props other than bare outlines, the disregard for all considerations of time and space in the drama, the use of a language that is usually obscure and of abstract gestures that scarcely relate to the words, all make it evident that this theater . . . was meant to be the outward, beautiful form suggestive of remoter truths or experiences, the nature of which will differ from person to person. . . . It baffles or bores many Japanese, but it moves others in ways that more conventional, dated varieties of drama cannot, and the same holds true of Western spectators.

For although I know nothing about Nō drama, what Keene says is, miracle of miracles, almost precisely what I have been trying to say in my way over a period of ten years and more about the plays of Samuel Beckett, particularly *Endgame* and *Waiting for Godot,* but also *Krapp's Last Tape*—for does not Krapp, who is really dead, return to the world of the living, which is no more, to suffer both the past and the pain of being born again and growing old? In

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writing on Japanese aesthetics Professor Keene has illuminated the plays of Beckett as they have never before been illuminated for me. This is not to say that Beckett is self-consciously and deliberately imitating Nō drama (though suddenly I see that while his characters do not wear masks they *are,* as characters, masks behind which their meanings and personalities hide, though through which they are also revealed) ; nor is it to say that Beckett, as a creative writer, has only one string to his bow. If *Waiting for Godot, Endgame,* and *Krapp's Last Tape* exhibit suggestion, irregularity, simplicity, and perishability, *The Unnamable,* whatever its inherent ambiguity, moves in the direction of the monumental and the infinitely complex and belongs triumphantly to the Western world of the Book of Job and the dramas of Aeschylus and Shakespeare. The 179 pages of *The Unnamable* are, indeed, the apotheosis of the soliloquy:

> The thing to avoid, I don't know why, is the spirit of system. People with things, people without things, things without people, what does it matter. I flatter myself it will not take me long to scatter them, whenever I choose, to the winds. I don't see how. The best would be not to begin. But I have to begin. That is to say I have to go on. Perhaps in the end I shall smother in a throng. Incessant comings and goings, the crush and bustle of a bargain sale. No, no danger. Of that. . . . I am Matthew and I am the angel, I who came before the cross, before the sinning, came into the world, came here.[3]

[3] Samuel Beckett, *The Unnamable* (New York: Grove Press, 1958), pp. 4-5; p. 18.

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Over the past decade and a half we in the field of Japanese literature, and, more broadly, the English-reading public, have come to expect that Professor Keene will provide us, at frequent intervals, with witty, illuminating, and carefully wrought articles and books on various aspects of Japanese civilization, in addition of course to a truly amazing outpouring of polished and accurate translations from the Japanese. Indeed I have often thought—and told him so—that he must really be triplets, for I am sure that at this very moment there is another Donald Keene in New York City finishing a translation of a Mishima novel, while there is yet another in Tokyo or Kyoto doing research on some immensely difficult diary of the Heian or Kamakura period. And once again he—or perhaps one of his two brothers—has not disappointed us, for he has now given us a perceptive and charming paper on Japanese aesthetics. Thus, at the outset I should state that my comments on his paper will be in the nature of amplification of some of his basic ideas with a few remarks on those points on which I differ from him somewhat in emphasis or detail, rather than an overall critique or rebuttal. For I am substantially in agreement with his initial generalizations and with the four underlying concepts, or principles, of "suggestion," "irregularity," "simplicity," and "perishability," which he sees as being central to a discussion of his topic.

I, too, like the tourist fresh off the President Cleveland for his—more likely her—week's sight-seeing in Japan before boarding the ship again in Kobe, have been delighted by the indications that aesthetic considerations inform many areas of life which in the West are not considered "proper" provinces for the application of such aesthetic concern. So far so good. But at this point a slight corrective should be introduced, because I have also been appalled, as I am sure Professor Keene has been too, by apparent lapses in good taste which would be inconceivable even in Los Angeles, Miami Beach, or Las Vegas. I am not here referring to the many-hued shrines at Nikkō or the decidedly un-*shibui* Kabuki performances, which could conceivably be subsumed within an aesthetic principle of the rococo, but rather to such thoroughly offensive sights and sounds as artificial flower wreaths at department store openings or the deafening loudspeakers set up, it would seem, at every street intersection in the nation. Lest we immediately engage in the ever-popular game, particularly popular among Japan specialists, of "Blame the West" to resolve this contradiction, I should point out that such hideous wreaths are used at Buddhist funerals as well as for the opening of the Washington Shoe Store (there actually *are* such stores, one of them in *Shibuya,* of all places!), and the loudspeaker, although admittedly a product of Western technology, may just as well be blaring forth some otherwise lovely *koto* music as it may the latest horror perpetrated by the Rolling Stones.

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I am merely trying to say that the Japanese love of extremes seems to apply to aesthetics as well, and unabashed vulgarity has co-existed peacefully with the most exquisite refinement. But this of course in no way denigrates the remarkable achievements of the Japanese people in the latter realm.

Concerning the elevation of aestheticism almost to the level of a religion in the Heian period, I wish to add that the results were not always as happy as we might expect them to have been. Here I may be accused—and indeed I plead guilty to the charge—of introducing extra-aesthetic factors into a consideration of phenomena to which they do not apply; nevertheless, I think it is important to note that Japanese aestheticism, particularly during the almost four centuries of the Heian period, frequently lost its vigor and degenerated into preciosity or triviality precisely because aesthetic concerns were paramount and so absorbing that they were divorced from, or they succeeded in subverting, the other ideals of truth and goodness. The trinity of truth, goodness, and beauty—following the order of the Japanese term *shin-zen-bi*—was displaced by the primacy of the beautiful, for not only did aestheticism become a religion but religion also became a province of aesthetics. This reversal of roles is nowhere more explicit than in Sei Shōnagon's justly famed *Pillow Book*. Numerous examples can be adduced to show that this extremely clever and talented Japanese court lady of almost a millenium ago attended the many religious observances of her day with a thoroughly worldly attitude and with hardly a particle of genuine spirituality. One brief passage from an English translation of the work should suffice to show what I mean:

> There was, however, a well-born-looking man not at the general night service but a special one. He wore full trousers of a bluish-grey, very stiff, and several white dresses one above the other. He was beautifully dressed and had many retainers, who were all well dressed and surrounded him with the utmost observance, though he looked almost a boy. It interested me immensely.[1]

Even more unfortunate, again from a non-aesthetic viewpoint, was the fact that Sei Shōnagon combined extraordinary sensitivity to beauty with a sharp and even cruel tongue. L. A. Beck's comment—"She has the cold, brilliant sparkle of a diamond whose whole use is adornment, and adornment achieved at much cost to others"—is quite apposite.[2]

Although Sei Shōnagon was undoubtedly an extreme example of this tendency toward the elevation of aesthetics into a religion and the subversion of religion to aesthetic ends, it cannot really be denied that much of Heian culture exhibits such a tendency. With the revitalization of Buddhism in the late Heian period, and particularly with the flowering of Zen Buddhism

[1] *The Sketch Book of the Lady Sei Shōnagon*, trans. Nobuko Kobayashi (London: John Murray, 1930), p. 132.
[2] *Ibid.*, Introduction by L. A. Beck, p. 11.

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in the subsequent Kamakura period (1192-1333), however, Japanese aesthetics received a firm grounding in religion which it has never completely lost during the vicissitudes of the intervening seven hundred or so years. Despite the impressive achievements in the realms of poetry and fiction—and of course, pre-Zen, Buddhist sculpture and painting—prior to the Kamakura period, Japanese art can be said to have acquired a true spiritual and metaphysical foundation only after the introduction of Zen Buddhism from China. (Of course, it may be argued that the plastic arts of the Nara period [710-794] and earlier had such a foundation in the Buddhism prior to Zen.) Perhaps Professor Keene is correct in saying that much of what is considered most typical of Japanese aesthetics does not so much *stem from* Zen as *coincide with* Zen, but I am sure he would agree that Shintō did not really provide an adequate metaphysic or spiritual milieu for the development of Japanese aesthetics. Shintō, with its animism and its emphasis on man as a part of nature, did, however, prepare the way for the acceptance of a Zen view of the world and its expression in Japanese art, as Professor Keene indicates. Indeed, the distance between the Great Shrine of Ise and the stone garden of the Ryōanji is greater geographically than it is spiritually.

Few would argue with Professor Keene's assertion that "suggestion" is a a prominent feature of much of Japanese art, and he has given us excellent examples from drama and poetry. I merely wish to add that such suggestiveness is closely related to another quality, particularly in evidence in *haiku,* which, rather than *suggesting* "remoter truths or experiences," will actually *jar* or *jolt* the beholder or reader into a deeper awareness of those truths, or of Ultimate Truth. Even the early Kamakura poet Teika's *tanka,* which Professor Keene quotes, is susceptible of the interpretation that Teika is not so much depicting an austere autumn landscape and savoring its somber beauty as he is experiencing the plenitude of the Void, and is jolting his reader into a similar awareness by deliberately removing two of the most common subjects of Japanese poetry, the cherry blossom and the crimson leaves. The straw-thatched hut, instead of being the focal point of the poem, may serve merely to emphasize the awesomeness of the absence of color and to underscore the paradoxical fullness of the vast empty landscape in much the same way that the mountains, rocks, or trees of Sesshū's monochrome paintings serve to make the blank expanses come alive and express creative *mu,* or nothingness, the core Zen concept, whence all things emerge and to which they all return. Although I admit that I may be on uncertain ground in relating Teika's *tanka* poetry to Zen, since Zen had only begun to make its influence felt in Japan in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, I am on the firmest ground in relating Zen to the *haiku* of the Tokugawa period (1600-1868), particularly to those of the famed poet Bashō and his disciples. Of course this is hardly a new idea, since Japanese critics have been doing

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the same thing for generations. More recently, every American Zen faddist has taken his turn at pondering over Bashō's famous old pond, jumping frog, and splashing water, and any other English translation of *haiku* he can uncover. Nevertheless, in the context of Japanese aesthetics it can scarcely be over-emphasized that *haiku* at once exhibits many of the fundamental aesthetic principles of the Japanese people and is imbued with the Zen spirit. For example, the well-known *haiku* by Bashō's disciple Kikaku:

kojiki kana	There a beggar goes
tenchi o kitaru	Heaven and earth he's wearing
natsugoromo	For his summer clothes[3]

can be clearly seen to depend on Zen paradox for its startling effect: the near-naked beggar has nothing but he has Everything. Once again the poem does not so much *suggest* anything as startle the reader or hearer into an understanding of Zen truth which is beyond intellection.

Professor Keene's comment on the Japanese preference for beginnings and ends rather than climactic moments was an especially perceptive one, which sheds light on a central concern of Japanese aesthetics. I wish simply to add that this characteristic is amply borne out in the overwhelming preference for spring and autumn rather than summer and winter as seasons to treat in poetry. Spring and autumn, the transitional seasons, which look both backward and forward to the peaks of summer brilliance and winter desolation or its stark grandeur, naturally have a greater appeal for the Japanese. This fact can even be proved statistically since the first imperial anthology, the *Kokinshū* (905), began the pattern of allotting, out of the traditional twenty, two scrolls, or volumes, each to spring and autumn poems but only one each to summer and winter poems. Such preference of course also relates to the fourth aesthetic principle which Professor Keene mentioned, "perishability." The cherry blossoms of spring and the scarlet leaves of autumn both fall and vanish swiftly and thereby, as Professor Keene states, are prized all the more highly. Here again, however, I wish to note that together with their keen sense of poignancy at the evanescence of life the Japanese, or at least their greatest poets and artists, such as Bashō and Sesshū, did glimpse and even capture the universal within the particular, the eternal within the fleeting moment. Surely here is precisely where Zen intuition exalted and transformed the indigenous, pre-Zen Japanese sense of *mono no aware*, or "sadness of things," a sensibility to and empathy for the beauty of nature which became the ideal for the Heian courtier-poet. The four-character Chinese compound *fueki ryūkō* ("unchanging flux," or "the unchanging within the changing"), although by no means specifically limited to Zen, became the fundamental principle maintained by

[3] Harold G. Henderson, *An Introduction to Haiku* (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1958), p. 55.

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Bashō, which he articulated in many *haiku* by juxtaposing two elements, one timeless and the other transient, such as the turbulent waves of the sea channel to Sado against the infinite stretches of the Milky Way, or the celebrated frog leaping into the old pond. In so doing Bashō saw, and makes the reader see as well, that the wild beauty of the raging waves and the effortless grace of the leaping frog exist in a realm beyond space and time and are invested with the infinity of the heavens and the agelessness of the pond. Indeed, Bashō gave exquisite poetic expression to the concept of *eien no ima* (the eternal now) which is so important in the thinking of the twentieth-century philosopher Nishida Kitarō. Yet, despite these assertions, I of course do not intend to contradict Professor Keene's emphasis on "perishability" as a significant component of Japanese aesthetics.

The role of irregularity, or asymmetry, the third "Keeneian principle" in Japanese aesthetics, is also an important one. Many a visitor to a Japanese home has marveled at and delighted in the asymmetrical placement of the stones in the front walk and contrasted it with the dull regularity of the straight-line concrete walk in front of his home in, say, Darien, Connecticut—that is, unless he or she has read some special Japan issue of *House Beautiful* or *Better Homes and Gardens* and perhaps has already removed the offending concrete walk and replaced it with one conforming to Japanese aesthetics. Thus I share Professor Keene's indignation against Derek Clifford's attack on the Japanese garden, although I differ from him somewhat in my interpretation of the significance of that most famous of all Japanese gardens, which consists of the fifteen stones and carefully raked sand in the precincts of the Ryōanji. I do not argue with Professor Keene's position that the Ryōanji garden is imbued with as much religious meaning as the Sistine Chapel—in fact, we could say that it has *more* meaning. I do, however, think that the Ryōanji garden was not primarily intended to allow us "to participate in the creation of the garden" but was intended to serve as a kind of visual Zen *kōan*. For Professor Keene has rather oddly neglected to mention a salient feature of the Ryōanji garden, namely, that only fourteen or fewer stones can ever be seen at one time, no matter what physical position the viewer takes. Thus no European, or Japanese for that matter, could derive any "pleasure from daily contemplation of the fifteen stones of the Ryōanji garden"—at least not by employing merely his physical eyes. If he employs his spiritual eye, however, everything is changed. For by attaining *satori*, or enlightenment, one can "see" all fifteen stones together. Nevertheless I am sure that no enlightened Zen priest would object to an unenlightened person's enjoying and experiencing the fourteen stones on the lower, purely aesthetic level. I might make a parallel between the unenlightened and enlightened viewers of the Ryōanji garden and two viewers of a Vermeer painting, one who admires Vermeer's use of light on an aesthetic level and another for

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whom that same light transcends the aesthetic and acquires a religious dimension. Great art always points beyond the beautiful to the realms of the true and the good.

Simplicity, or naturalness, can also be seen as fundamental to the Japanese aesthetic consciousness. In this regard I have little to add to what Professor Keene has given unless it be a comment on a rather perplexing sentence in his paper: "The aesthetic choices made in the tea hut may owe as much to nature as to deliberate policy." I am perplexed by this because he seems to imply that perhaps the Japanese merely selected unthinkingly the material at hand for preparing the *chashitsu,* or tea hut, rather than making a conscious or deliberate aesthetic choice. I think this possibility can be rejected—indeed *should* be rejected—since to allow it is to deny the compelling force of the entire edifice of Zen aesthetics. The Japanese did not merely stumble across the harmony of subdued colors and arrangement of material evident in all aspects of the tea ceremony, for they were required by the basic principles underlying such a ceremony. In other words, the Japanese had at some point to adopt consciously a Zen view of life or the tea ceremony would never have developed. Yet in the broader sense Professor Keene may be correct, for it was the Japanese affinity for nature and sense of unity with it, in evidence from before the introduction of civilization from the Asian mainland, which enabled them to accept Zen so readily during the Kamakura period.

One concluding note on Professor Keene's slightly pessimistic statement about the present and future of Japanese aesthetic ideals: If the literary virtues of a Kawabata Yasunari, who is so clearly in the mainstream of the great Japanese aesthetic tradition, are still alive and have finally, for whatever reason, even been recognized by the West, and if that same great tradition has succeeded in finding such a sensitive interpreter and gifted spokesman as Donald Keene, all hope for its continued vitality is not yet lost. And finally, even today's deliberations may attest to the fact that Japanese aesthetics is still capable of commanding attention and provoking discussion.

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Keene's descriptive analysis of the refined aesthetics that has come to permeate Japanese culture is so clearly presented and feels so essentially true that a commentator can hardly say more than amen. Even the obvious exceptions of the Kabuki and the Nikkō temples fall into place. Such exuberance has to burst out once in a while to maintain the tremendous restraint and calmness of the dominant ideal. Aren't these outbursts one of the traits inherent in the cultural pattern? I think of the student and labor uprisings. The last time I was in Japan I recall my surprise at the orderliness and organization of their massive marches down the streets. I also recall my surprise at the underlying orderliness of the extravagant garishness of the Nikkō architecture. My point is that even in their violence there is a sense of decorum. But I would agree with Keene that the inner soul of Japanese aesthetic culture is what he cites by the term *shibui.*

So, I have no comments to make on the correctness of his analysis of this basic aesthetic ideal and its manifestations. It may be relevant, however, to try to evaluate this ideal. There are frequent comparisons in Keene's paper between the ways of the Japanese in art and of the Western peoples. Where the Japanese seek suggestiveness, the Westerners resort to statement. Where the Japanese revel in irregularity, the Westerners seek regularity. And similarly with simplicity versus complexity, and perishability versus permanence. Keene notices that these contrasts are more evident in the older Western traditions than the modern. With this I would agree—and would it not apply vice versa? One reason is presumably the influence of the East upon the West, and in recent times vice versa. Keene, I find, is careful not to make remarks about the possible superiority of one to the other except to restore the balance when he quotes some Westerner who has been disparaging of the Japanese—for instance, in the comparison of the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel with the Ryōanji garden.

On broaching such a question of comparative evaluation, one is tempted to say that comparisons are invidious. Every culture, on this stand, has its own aesthetic ideals, each as legitimate as the other. But this position is itself an evaluation, and may well be questioned. It amounts to the theory of cultural relativity, the theory that as between cultures there are no justifiable evaluative criteria. If we start along that path we may as well go to the end of it and propose individual relativity—that is, *de gustibus non est disputandum.* The emotive judgment theory of recent popularity pushed this view to the limit of asserting that no value judgments are cognitively justifiable since they are not propositional statements but only imperatives or optatives or something of the kind. I have not been able to go along with any of these blocked-off relativities. Would you bear with me while I try applying an

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evaluative procedure I proposed some years ago in my *The Basis of Criticism in the Arts?*[1]

There I suggested that the best justifiable aesthetic criteria are those which are derived from the most adequate world hypotheses. This is an empirical approach, because world hypotheses are comprehensive orderings of all available facts or evidences. The evaluative criteria are thus backed up by the best wisdom of our times. Four types of aesthetics came out of this approach. They are all familiar to all of us—the hedonistic aesthetic of the naturalists, the formalistic aesthetics of the Greek and scholastic realists, the organistic aesthetics of the objective idealists, and the vividness of intuited quality aesthetics of the contextualists. The central criteria of aesthetic value here were respectively: pleasure, conformity to type, organic unity, and vividness of quality in experience. Apart from their philosophical backing, the very least that can be said of these four aesthetic criteria is that they do represent the four principal aesthetic ideals developed in the Western world. But in the comparison we are making, the world view basis of the four is pertinent, because Keene and others regularly call attention to the basis of the Japanese aesthetic ideal in Zen Buddhism.

Now, how do these Western ideals evaluate the Japanese ideal based on Zen?

Begin with the hedonic criterion. As regards suggestiveness, there is, of course, a delight in stimulating the imagination, but when the obsession for suggestiveness cuts out full sensuous enjoyment in colors, and odors, and tastes, it has perhaps lost more than it has gained. Likewise, why make a fetish of simplicity and irregularity? Sometimes these are nice, but so is regularity, and especially exuberance. As for perishability, a hedonist would not mind this much, though preference for it over permanence seems sort of perverse.

We turn now to the formalistic criterion. Here suggestiveness and vagueness run directly counter to formal fulfillment. For an aim, it seems madness. But paradoxically, the aim leads to one of the greatest feats of aesthetic craftsmanship, namely, the expression of the most with the least. Particularly in painting with the sumi brushwork, the technical fulfillment of this ideal has reached one of the highest levels in visual art. It actually converts transiency into permanence. For the Japanese, sumi masterpieces have become classics and are treasured and preserved and copied. Even the tea ceremony becomes formalized and traditional and a ceremonial to be fulfilled to the minutest detail. Moreover, how would irregularity be noticed but as an offset from regularity? It is not chaos. It must suggest the regularity from which its irregularity is recognizable—as asymmetry contains the feel of the axis of sym-

[1] (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945.)

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metry in its essence, as the crescent moon contains the shadow of the full moon in its arms. So the formalist is deeply moved by Zen art for the fulfillment of forms it implies through its subtle techniques of suggestion, discriminating symbolism, and ceremony. Its aim is indeed to present the essence of things beneath the surfaces of appearance, and by no means just blank and empty nothingness.

Similarly, the organicist will find much to admire in Zen art. He will often miss the explicit realization of organic structure, as in a gothic cathedral where every member finds the fulfillment of its aesthetic demands clearly to be seen in every other member. Voluntarily to forego this objectivity of mutually confirming internal relations in a work, for a deliberate vagueness of mere suggestions, would seem to him as self-contradictory as for a gardener to plant seeds in the soil and as soon as they sprouted to cease watering them. But in practice he finds the Zen artist much more rational than he perhaps pretends to be. One notes that there is a range of relevancy in the suggestions emerging from a seventeen-syllable haiku, or from a twelve-line sumi drawing. The crow or crows cannot be sparrows nor the bough unwithered nor the time noon time, nor burgeoning spring. The interrelationships of the images are subtle and open to numerous relevant fulfillments, but as Keene plainly brings out they are not free for all. And when one thinks of the temples of Horyuji, which are among the most clearly integrated and perfectly proportioned buildings in the world, the organicist finds nothing further to wish for. These temples are for wood construction what gothic cathedrals are for stone. And as for the Japanese love of empty spaces, these are not empty in any aesthetic sense but alive and vibrating in the context of their compositions.

Lastly we turn to the contextualists and their aesthetics of the vivid intuition of the quality of things. The Zen ideal and this Western ideal of aesthetic quality fit right together, only the Zen ideal is more delicate and shrinks from the quality of harsh or dramatically violent situations. In this retreat from the human scene, the contextualist finds the Japanese ideal unnecessarily squeamish. But within the quietness of the domain of this mystic calm and simplicity, the contextualist is in deep sympathy with the Japanese ideal. He would understand completely Keene's observation that "the insistence on simplicity and naturalness placed a premium on the connoisseur's appreciation of quality. An unpainted wooden column shows the natural quality of the tree from which it was formed." And a contextualist could fully understand the functions of the tea ceremony.

In summary, the criteria of Western aesthetics widely corroborate those of the Japanese Zen. They spread out wider and value highly some things that might even be revolting to Zen. And this is an evaluation which I think

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is worth attending to. The aesthetics of Zen is more limited than is necessary, more limited than even comes out in some of their own artists' works.

If we are looking into the philosophical bases of aesthetic ideals, these limitations lead directly back to those of the mystic philosophy that engenders it. Mysticism is a systematic denial of the many realities which all but mystics so forcefully see and feel, and which the mystics themselves must equally see and feel but hope to evade by denying that they exist, when other world hypotheses do their best to comprehend the world as it is without restriction. The mystics attempt to limit it by rejection. In terms of cognitive evaluation it is an inadequate philosophy because it lacks scope. It is a world hypothesis that does not even try to confirm its hypothesis. This limitation in philosophy I find reflected in its aesthetic ideals. They are excellent as far as they go, but they leave out so much.

And yet having said this, I do confess to a qualm of philosophic conscience. The mystics have contributed so much to the encouragement of art and artists. I wonder if there is not something there that no other philosophy, even though much more comprehensive and rational, has been able to include quite satisfactorily. There may be still a unique intuitive contribution that mysticism makes to the world, never adequately cornered and honored by any other world theory. But if so, it is still true that mysticism is a very limited world view, and it would never do for all of us to become mystics all the time. We must sometimes, indeed frequently, become lusty, and be normally rational, and humanly integrated, and interested in the qualities of conflict and tragedy and achievement, and sweat, and bitterness as well as in calm and gentleness, and friendly companionship. The world can only afford to have a few saints who are complete converts to Zen.

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As my contribution to the present symposium I shall offer a philosophical view of symbolism grounded in the Western philosophy and Western art with which I am familiar. Whether a theory based in Western experience can explain the artistic life of other cultures is a question which, unfortunately, the fate of a particular approach to a single aspect of art is unlikely to decide. But in the attempt to work toward an adequate re-conception of aesthetic symbolism, for its own sake, some premises for thinking about the problem of universalizing aesthetic theory may be gained.

I

I begin by considering our encounters with art and by trying to see the place of symbols, in usual senses of the term, in aesthetic experience. First of all (tongue in cheek) a work of art is just what it is, and nothing else. A film, for example, is *just these images* as they unroll for human spectators when certain lights, shadows, and colors are projected for human vision.[1] We do not see passively, in the theater any more than in everyday life. We see these images intelligently, with comprehension, so that they are not, for us, areas of light and darkness and two-dimensional configurations. We see *objects* and *scenes* and we grasp *the course of the action* (by hypothesis, let the film be of that sort), we see the hand-on-the-doorknob as *someone's* hand. This is how film images exist for us. No more than in everyday life, of course, perhaps less, do we give labels to the objects and scenes we have in view. Although we could usually, if asked, say something sensible about "what is going on," and although the revelation that *this* person is a lawyer, a prostitute, etc., may be essential to our understanding the film, we seldom verbalize to ourselves explicitly. We are interested in, engrossed in, this *X*, this scene, this film, this whole which a statement would express lamely. When we find ourselves thinking "Well, that was the Recognition Scene," the occurrence of this thought indicates that we are finding something mechanical about the film (I record my experience with *Electra*)—unless one is already at odds with the film, or has obligated oneself to write a review.

An intelligent and sensitive spectator perceives much—subtleties of scene, shifts in color and lighting, the rhythms and intonations of a speech, the interplay of visual and auditory continuities. He also notices—our spectator is of course contemporary—the "Freudian" symbolism of objects and events; here again the sense of "notices" is normally non-verbal. If what is symbolical to

[1] I shall stay with films for my initial examples. I would not find much difficulty in adapting my vocabulary to other visual arts, or to the literary arts. Music offers great problems—I am not quite sure that the usual concepts of aesthetic experience carry over to it fully—but I believe that the basic features of the present description can be applied to music and to that other theoretically troublesome art, the dance.

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the spectator seems unfitting to the context then for him there is something wrong with the film. Some such symbols are in their context quite explicit. Others are exceedingly ambiguous (plurisignificant, suggestive, etc.) and often, one thinks, the more interesting for it.

As well as "Freudian" symbols, the spectator also "notices" religious symbols or cultural symbols (say, a particular song-fragment at a particular moment). The archetypal and mythic critics have further enlarged our consciousness of symbolism, so that the spectator may recognize "the Wise Old Man" just as confidently as "the Hero" (or "the Anti-Hero"). Classical Freudian (or Jungian) symbolism may have a universal psychological foundation which some other types of symbols lack—it is hard to estimate the frequency with which cultural symbols have universal elements (schemata) which are culturally particularized—but with regard to their aesthetic functioning there seems no reason to distinguish systematically between "conscious" and "unconscious" symbols. The so-called unconscious symbols no longer require excavation.

There is also abundant evidence, however, that persons who are unable to explain a symbol, do not attend to the symbol as a symbol, "take it at face value," may yet be affected by it profoundly. One would assume that the context tends to limit such affect just as context controls other emotive responses and other more "intellectual" responses.

Symbolic "implications" of which one is more or less consciously, more or less murkily, aware, or which affect one without what is usually counted as awareness of meaning, have a considerable claim to be regarded as integral to the work. A director is choosing each frame for us, he is controlling the vectors of our attention and excluding extraneous connotations, and it is plausible that what comes forward to and affects viewers who are immersed in the work is (artistically) *meant* and exploits cultural or universal psychological facts. The meanings of such symbols are as much part of the experience as are the meanings of words. To suppress awareness of Freudian and religious symbolism while viewing a movie by Fellini or Bergmann is to risk losing touch with the film. In their ordinary world people see phallic symbols; in the theater, with no assistance from psychoanalysts, they understand what rain on the windowpane is meant to signify.

Sooner or later (to go a step further) the viewer gets a sense of the overall movement and thematic patterns of the film. He begins to see that *this* character's problem is that of dealing with memories, or that *these* characters' problem is ennui. It is important to see that the "problem" of Resnais' leading characters in *Muriel* is *their* memories, *their* remembered life-experiences, not Memory in general; these persons are highly individuated. The atmosphere of ennui in *L'Avventura* and elsewhere in its director's work is a quality of the lives of *these particular persons*. On the other hand, and this

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point is made more seldom, nothing prevents a film from dealing with abstractions. When one sees the persons and scenes of the film as abstracted, to the point that one does not feel the persons to be complete or the scenes to be "real," to the point that one feels the actions to be "symbolical," then the film may well be an exploration, through clear or murky symbolism, of "the Unconscious," of "Memory," of "the Past," of "Identity." The critic who talks in such terms about *Last Year at Marienbad* has by no means taken the film as a mere text or topic for philosophizing about life.

So far I have spoken of symbols chiefly as elements or particulars in works of art. With respect to some of these symbols the artist is creative only secondarily by forming these existents ("Freudian," cultural, religious, etc.) into the work-complex. This creativity is a significant aspect of his art, for he has to control these symbols, make them work for his ends, limit their implications and associations, or allow them to exist in an artistically effective ambiguity. Insofar the artist modifies and transforms the symbol and insofar the symbol in the work must not be confused with its pre-artistic antecedent. Mythic and archetypal symbols, on the other hand, and characters and scenes and actions which are indefinitely symbolic in the sense described in the preceding paragraph, manifest a greater *primary* symbolic-artistic creativity. At a further stage we have a great cultural heritage of elaborate symbols *created by* works of art, especially by literary and dramatic works. Their creation is very near to being the *raison d'être* of the work.

When a critic begins to reason about Ahab and his whale as *symbolical,* he has obviously read the novel in some other frame of mind than have many thousands of readers.[2] But he has not, in the good cases, read it with, or only with, an eye to "what one might make out of this" speculatively. We would like to believe that his eye is on the texture and form of the work, that his feelings are attuned to its mood, that he is reading the novel more intelligently, profoundly, and rightly than have those who see merely a story of whaling adventures. A proper account of such symbolism is hindered by the fact that, for example, we now make Kafka's Castle carry a burden as a cultural symbol that the novel can sustain if at all only with great difficulty. In such fashion do we make art enrich life, as we build upon its symbols, try them out in new contexts, let our imagination play creatively with them. Yet one can hardly read *The Castle* without feeling that the Castle *is* a symbol, K's experience *is* symbolical. The mere fact that a reader has such feelings does not guarantee the propriety of setting off on foot to talk about the Castle as a symbol (to say nothing of talking of the novel as an allegory). The whale in critical works of exegesis does not always resemble closely enough

[2] I turn here to other media because the film has not yet had time to produce such familiar examples. Chaplin's tramp moves in the direction indicated.

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the whale in its original aesthetic habitat. But careful critical discussion of the Castle as symbol (similarly of the whale) illuminates the work of art, and it can even make us heedful of when the symbol *in the work* shades off in our meditations into the symbol *derived from the work*.[3] And if careful critical discussion illuminates the work, insofar validating our feeling that the work is symbolical, we may, by analogy with the case of psychologically-given symbols, suppose that the affective power which the work exerts over persons who read it primarily as a whaling story can be attributed in part to its symbolic shape and to its suggestiveness as a symbol; for there is usually reason to suppose that the artist builds his symbol from universal psychic materials, of which the whale and the castle would be good instances.

At the same time that the moviegoer (to return to our original case) is aware of what we may call, conveniently but at risk of misleading, the "objective" film, which has occupied us so far, he may, if attentive, be getting a sense of (let us call it) the *cinematic act of perception* by which a director has created this particular reality for us. This cinematic act of perception may constitute a very inventive style or mode of perception. The viewer in such a case is in a curious situation of quasi self-consciousness which is hard to characterize. We are being aware, but usually only if we are knowledgeable about films, of our own perception, which is ours but, because determined for us by the director, not ours: perception defined by composition, use of light, camera movements, editing, cutting, and so on. Earlier I referred to shifts of color and lighting (for example) as helping us understand the scene before us. But a director who cuts from color to black-and-white is (from there on) *seeing* with a different eye, and so, consequently, is the audience. When Warhol's camera stares for eight hours at a single object, the camera's catatonia delivers us one kind of vision; Bresson's camera which remains by habit at middle distances but is not static yields another; Godard's perfectionist cutting gives us another. Just because it is an art in emergence, into which contemporary talent is entering vigorously and in which the artist's hand is only recently powerful enough to force recognition, the film provides us with an especially valuable opportunity to see this aspect of art.

Perhaps we are aware also of a moral tone which is characteristic of the director or specific to the particular film, a tone say of irony, or pity, or lovingness, or curiosity. On close consideration this moral tone may be seen to derive from the mode of perception as much as, perhaps more than, from the objective content. One might find it hard to disassociate Godard's affectionateness toward his young people in *Masculine Feminine* from the "style" in which he "sees" them. If one suspects about Warhol's films not only "put-

[3] Needless to say, much critical discussion of *The Castle* has been insufficiently careful in the sense implied here.

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on" but insincerity, this may be (aesthetically) because we feel catatonia itself to be insincere and a put-on.

In these matters the arts seem to vary in emphasis and characteristic tendency. The translation of *Ulysses* from novel to film emphasizes the differences. In one sense of that term, the film *aestheticizes* Joyce's work, and a masterpiece of the infinitely dense subjectivity of the writer and of certain of his characters, a concrete study of thinking itself, is supplanted by the clarified objectivity of visual images, which lack force as acts of thought. A novel of this sort invites re-reading, further attention to nuance and ambiguity, fuller submersion into the interior world of the author, the noticing of obscure threads, the recognition of formal structures. To all of this the film as medium would seem to lend itself little. But it may be that the subtle working of the directorial mind in modern films, although more difficult to penetrate than the linguistic activity of the novelist, is equally vital to the art. Perhaps we shall learn before long how to grasp it. If that is so then the problem of *Ulysses* may be chiefly the problem of translating a work of high genius.

In discussing "perception" I have not spoken of symbols. We do not ordinarily use the term to describe such features of artistic experience. Their presence in this account is justified sufficiently by my intention to sketch the artistic context within which symbols function, and I leave open for now the question of whether there are fundamental connections or similarities between these features and what we more commonly call symbols.

I shall return to all these points. Let me add one more observation, which will also be pertinent later, namely, that the claim might be substantiated that many or all of the works of art which we count as major or great have a distinctly *philosophical* character. Indeed, philosophical exploration of *terra* more or less *incognita* may have much to do with feelings of aesthetic excitement at the exploration of what are also novel *aesthetic* dimensions. If this is so, the prizing of uniqueness and novelty in art would be no more strange than their prizing in philosophy—or their dis-prizing in both, in cultures where that is the rule.[4]

By *philosophical* I do not mean in the manner of Dante, as Dante is usually interpreted, of giving poetic form, and of course something more, to a pre-given philosophical doctrine. Even Lucretius and Goethe are misleading examples. To explore memory, time, perception, guilt, psychological determinism, language, emotion, space, existence, necessity, one or more of these in a particular work through particular concrete thoughts and images, "symbolically" or more "directly," is (in one sense, a sense which I would tolerate)

[4] There are of course arts where the continuation and renewal of traditions, or the new expression of ancient themes, rather than philosophical exploration, holds our interest. To say nothing of the stable arts of Eastern traditions, comedy and tragedy are *ritual* arts primarily, secondarily vehicles for the thought of a particular age.

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to *do* philosophy. Persons impatient with "the psychological" in art and literature, for example, should realize that the imaginative-psychological, say in a novel by Dostoevsky, is also the exploration of a certain kind of *being,* the kind of first interest to us, human being. If no one knows how to say or imagine something fresh and insightful about the psychological, that does not signify the fruitlessness of the exploration (perhaps it signifies the contrary). In a narrow sense philosophy is the effort to find words in which to "say it" (in a treatise). But finding ways to "show it" artistically may be at least complementary, and insofar as the aim of the theoretical is to reach beyond itself to the moral, i.e., to existence, the treatise, or even the philosophical dialogue, may be no match for great art.[5]

Shall we call this aspect of art *symbolic*? Again I want to leave the question open. At any rate this is an aspect difficult to distinguish from the symbolism of the whale and the castle. It is a kind of "meaning," and it is by no means directly given.

II

Such are the aspects of aesthetic experience which I see as relevant to questions about the aesthetic status of symbols.

In discourse about art works, in the theory of art (or in theories of the arts), in the explanation of aesthetic experiences and artistic creation, what place and what sense or senses can the term "symbol" most usefully have? I put these questions almost misleadingly formally, given that I believe exactitude to be a characteristic of a particular philosophical style not appropriate to this subject matter, which is aesthetics and not mathematical logic. But in any case these questions indicate the directions toward which I point my thought.

Such questions cannot be disconnected from conceptions of the purposes of critical discourse, from the kind of art theory held in view or from the general aesthetics and general philosophy within which the questions are being put.[6] Fortunately there appears to exist in this century in the West, once linguistic-analytic philosophy and Marxism are disregarded, a very considerable convergence of thought on aesthetics and the philosophy of art. It may even be that we have or are close to what can be considered solutions,

[5] Whether philosophical character may be attributed to *all* art is certainly problematical. I have avoided such claims in favor of trying to identify aesthetic capacities which we see realized in at least *some* art.

[6] With respect to the purposes of critical discourse I should make it explicit that I am not much interested in judgments of comparative worth and am primarily interested in criticism as contributory to intensification of experience.

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in the sense in which philosophical solutions are possible, to major questions in the philosophy of art.

The convergence cuts across epistemological and metaphysical positions so that one has a sense of dialogue among Croce, Dewey, Collingwood, Sartre, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Cassirer. If one studies Albert Hofstadter's *Truth and Art* closely, it may occur to one that although there is more difference than difference of terminology among the writers he discusses and criticizes, although in each case there are distinctive ultimate conclusions, there is a common phenomenological (as opposed to classic-metaphysical, scientific, historistic, dialectical, or narrowly analytical) control of interest, a common sense of the object of inquiry, and a high degree of inter-translatability. Unless one's studies are keyed toward an ultimate question, say about truth and spirit, one of these guides, allowance made for idiosyncrasy, is as reliable as another. This philosophical community is, I believe, sufficient foundation for the kind of exploratory study in which I am engaged.

In the first part of this paper, in which I have discussed certain symbolic features of aesthetic experience, I have been critical implicitly, and I hope at least moderately revisionary and reconstructive, of the ways in which the aesthetic functioning of symbols is commonly described, but I have used the term "symbol" rather uncritically.

The term presents the peculiarity that it is not a primary term of discourse. In most branches of philosophy one is involved in analysis of some crucial unavoidable term of common speech, such as "is" or "ought" or "thing." Even aesthetics has its share of such terms in usages specific to aesthetics: "seems," "looks," "feels," "sees," to mention only some key verbs. The term "symbol" makes its entrance when we try to explicate "means" in the context of discussion of art and literature, or when we refer to and try to account for certain shifts from "seems to be" to "is," or from "seems to say" to "really says," or when we try to puzzle out the curious "standing for" relation. In literary criticism the term is notorious. Philosophers have already made it into a technical term. Our problem, to repeat, is not that of discovering how the term *actually* functions but that of finding a theoretically valuable sense for it, a sense, preferably, not at confusing cross-purpose to customary usage.

To begin with, certain discourse is *literal,* certain other discourse is *symbolic,* and whenever we apply this distinction, as to religious writings, we suggest some degree of artistic creativity.[7] Old cabalistic traditions dominate many discussions of symbolism (I have in mind the symbolism of "three" and

[7] In choosing this starting point I deliberately stay clear of (for example) the Lockean or Peircean starting points, which too far commit one to science (and science interpreted in a certain way) as paradigm. In the discussion of history and science, further on, the purpose of this avoidance will become apparent.

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"four"), and a translationist conception that would allow the construction of symbol-lexicons is frequently encountered. Perhaps the most reliable connotation of "symbolic" is that certain writings have an obvious but limited "superficial" meaning and must be read imaginatively. We are convinced that certain literary works, certain visual and dramatic works, perhaps certain musical works but this is doubtful, cannot be understood fully unless elements in them are "read" as symbols for something fairly specific and non-apparent, and that we must (further) see a total symbolic meaning in the work; failing such recognition we would grasp neither the richness nor the unity nor the meaning of the work. Culture itself, apart from literature and the arts, is rife with *symbols*: of religion, of authority, of nationhood, of human qualities, and so on. Certain actions make no sense unless we take them as symbolical: from pledging allegiance to a flag to burning a draft card; and many actions not particularly oriented toward saying something can be construed as some kind of statement, that is, as *symbolical* statement, or as a "showing" which approximates a "saying."

We soon see that nothing in the world or in thought is "merely what it is" in an unqualified sense of literalness. "Thus "2 + 2 = 4" makes a specific mathematical statement, literal enough. But one can easily constitute a context in which "2 + 2" is an example of addition, or is symbolic of mathematics, or is symbolic of "the obvious," of "triviality," etc. When we assert that "S is symbolic" or "S is a symbol for T," we seem to mean that in the context given S and T are not merely connected but in some way *bound*—that S, which is immediately (or more immediately) present, draws T into its sphere, and that to answer a question about the "meaning" of S is to be forced for the sake of completeness to mention T. (This does not define "symbol" satisfactorily, however.) S may be linguistic or not, or anything at all so long as it is an object of experience. This is not to say that every relation is a relation of S and T; merely that anything may be material for symbolization, for *perception* as a symbol.

That anything which is immediate to experience and is related to something else intentionally—as distinct from causally or symptomatically—may be a symbol, does not much clarify the case of art. But it does suggest that we may look outside art for clues to what is the case in aesthetic experience. In doing so I shall be particularly interested in the *functions* which symbols perform (or the functions which we perform by means of symbols). I am convinced that the definition of symbolic relation as "standing for" is extremely misleading, and I shall be seeking to correct this definition.

Freud should have given a major impetus to theoretical understanding of symbolism. No one before him had recognized the possibility of using dreaming as a model for the study of artistic imagination. That the primary mental processes are imagistic, and that dream-images may furnish a route to dis-

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closure of experiences, feelings, and attitudes, which the dreamer would not himself have recognized as his and which are in some way bound up with the dream-images which opened the way to them—these are valuable clues to the working of all imagistic processes. So is the fact that certain objects "seen" in dreams turn out, by a kind of emotional equation usually sustained by structural or formal similarity, to be translatable, for practical purposes and with respect to the *recounted* dream at least, into other objects. When the symbols of religion are examined with an eye informed by familiarity with "unconscious" symbolism, the ceremonies and doctrines of the religions become more accessible to understanding.

Clearly there is a wrong turning in Freud's work, and it can be demonstrated with respect both to his analysis of religion and his analysis of art. Treating works of literature as complexes of symbols and primary-process thought, ordered into verisimilitude by secondary elaboration and patterned for aesthetic pleasure, Freud saw these writings as the sharing of secret wishes and feelings made plausible and palatable. This theory accords badly with notions of aesthetic value which we are not ready to give up. It accounts for the emotional appeal of bad popular art which is lavish with obvious symbolism and lends itself to spectator identification with the hero or subject. But it appears invariably to demean what we count as good art. Our experience of art, above all of major art, is one of achieving satisfaction in understanding, seeing, knowing, if only in understanding of formal structure, and all this is in the realm of what Freud considered mere secondary elaboration. Psychoanalyzed as dreams, works of literature become less rather than more interesting. Having tried to look at art in Freud's way, the culture fails to recognize Freud's constructions in its experiences. This need not be labored.

There is, notwithstanding, much in Freud that is very helpful to our understanding of art. If we bring to art-creation and art-experiences a mental-emotional background which draws our most serious life-feelings, of love, death, loss, joy, fear, rivalry, mystery, into constellation with certain "symbols" and permits connection with images, then we can understand the emotive power of the materials with which an artist works, and the capacity of his work, regarded as a single image, to "reach" and even to resolve strong feelings. What is true of "depth" symbols in this respect is, I believe, true of symbols in general and of all the symbols discussed in the first part of this paper; the Freudian analysis leads us to an understanding of the sources of *power* in art. It helps to explain the power of drama if we can by close psychoanalytic examination see that the characters in certain plays can be read as projections of different facets of a single character, so that Iago is an aspect of Othello, and insofar a symbol. Works of art manifest a kind of aliveness, they seem based in strong psychic energies, and if we do not always have to

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leave the aesthetic surface to account for this, the surface often seems insufficient.

So far we are gaining insight into art. But if the artist draws on a primary imagistic process for realizing his art-images, and can count on analogous capacities for response in his audience, it does not follow that these means can be utilized for only one end, that is, for the sharing of repressed wishes. If an artist either copies his visual or experiential reality, in the sense of "copies" that we *see* it as a copy, or if he exteriorizes his wishes, we can recognize it for what it is. He may catch us the first time around by giving sustenance to our secret dreams (as I was caught the first time around by *The Organizer*) but we can learn to recognize that and tell that it is not art. Art is a work neither of ego nor of id. It is not an objective registering of what the self *is,* or what our most secret wishes *are,* or what the perceptual world *is*. It draws materials from each of these but its standpoint is different from any of them and it is not subject to any of them.[8] In the superego Freud had, I believe, a concept by which to account, naturalistically and psychologically, for the sources of the creative character of art, and in his analysis of humor, where his theory of laughter reaches to art, he virtually laid the groundwork for conceiving of the superego as capable of transcending its narrow introjective beginnings and becoming what we can only call, however misleading the term, spirit. But Freud held instead to a restrictive, punitive conception of superego, which could not explain the creativity of art.[9]

Freud's error was natural, given his therapeutic goal. He was not as psychoanalyst interested in symbols or symbolic images except as they uncovered psychic processes, buried memories, repressed desires. Symbols stood in the way of the goal of rationality. Freud's most influential contribution lay therefore on the side of symbol as disguise, symbol as convenience, symbol as pleasure-basis—the theory which symbol-hunting students pick up and which leads them to believe that the "real" meaning of symbols is what "really" matters. In Freudian theory we have, I think, an excellent foundation for understanding the working of symbols, if we see symbols as means of unifying thought and feeling, means of forcing us to see obliquely, means of bringing the non-experienceable within the range of experience. But it is a foundation only.[10]

[8] I assert this dogmatically, so obvious does it seem. But I am also prepared to argue it.

[9] Granting Freud's thesis that "superego" is the introjected values of parents and therewith of culture, it is an authoritarian psychic institution. It could not as such be the source of artistic creativity. But if the individual can become free of the superego's specific dictates it can be for him the source of idealization, ideality, and even the revaluation of values.

[10] Fromm's revision of Freud's theory of symbolism avoids much that is unacceptable in the doctrine of the teacher. I have reserved that discussion for another time.

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To illustrate and derive what will hopefully turn out to be a better view, I shall consider four examples of symbols outside the formal realm of art, and try to describe their functioning. In an extended sense of the term, something "artistic" is involved in at least three of these examples; but this is not the aesthetic sense of artistic.

1. If I should say, as I might, that Vietnam is a symbol of American foreign policy, and if I should be asked to explain this, I would say that I do *not* mean merely that Vietnam is *typical* of American foreign policy, a *symptom* of it, or a *consequence* of it. What I would be saying is that one who understands "Vietnam," namely, the facts of American involvement in Vietnam, will understand something *different in type,* namely, an attitude, a policy, a disposition, a habit, a spirit.

By means of just such indicated and closely explained symbols, historians "evoke the spirit of an age," that is, give their readers a "sense" of the time; through Versailles they show us the spirit of the eighteenth-century French ruling class. The fundamental mistake of empiricist-minded philosophical students of historiography, the fundamental reason for the failure of their analysis, is their reluctance to recognize a symbolic mode of knowledge and the pervasiveness of symbols in historical writings (or if one balks at the word "knowledge," then "understanding," where the term will indicate a subjective sense of cognitive satisfaction). Our rapid acquisition during adolescence of general notions of the human world, an incredible accomplishment, depends on the rapid absorption of symbols which, if well selected and well presented, do an irreplaceable work—at any rate, one which we do not know how to replace.[11]

2. When the young men of the Resistance burn draft cards, their dramatic symbol likewise has a certain indispensability. They are "saying" what they sometimes say more directly as "Hell no, we won't go!" But they are doing more than making this statement obliquely: they are showing us their determination to resist conscription and the war, they are showing us the spirit of their opposition, something which neither the slogan nor their reasoned arguments could do. To put it another way, both slogan and reasoned argument are symbols also, but with good reason we give them much less credence as signs of conviction. They are for their purpose poorer symbols.

3. Even the dreamer (if one dares chance anything about the dreamer) who dreams that he is flying is doing something different than substitution or disguise. He has objectified his own bodily experience in an image which transforms "something happening to oneself" into "an occurrence which one

[11] Whole-symbols, as Morris and Sullivan have both emphasized, have great capacity for distorting our world. But this fact is less amazing than their function in enabling us to absorb and make our own, for possible re-shaping, a vast store of contemporary and ancestral experience.

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can observe" without loss of what is essential in the experience. The dreamer is therefore not repeating an experience: he is having its felt significance as now an exterior fact. (It will not change matters importantly if he is imagining an experience he never had.)

4. In the apparently limiting case of logical symbols, we may think that they simply indicate relations which are found to exist among sentences or between parts of sentences. But so far as logic is itself related to sentences (i.e., is interpreted) it does not designate something which exists independently of itself. It occupies a creative position, performs a creative work. Among other correct things we can say of this symbolism is that it is (as a system) a set of instructions for *taking* certain R's as the relations among sentences or between their parts, even in the face of more natural ways of understanding those relations (most notoriously perhaps in the case of the material conditional). The system—and its symbol-components are meaningless unless understood in, that is, defined by, their system-role—gives meaning to that to which it is intended to apply. Viewed independently, the system is symbolic machinery not yet placed in a symbolic relation; or, somewhat more abstrusely, in that it structures possible subject matters it is already a working symbol.

Certain characteristics are common to the above symbol-situations. Unless we believe that there is no other kind of access to what is symbolized—and except for God I cannot think of anything of which this would be absolutely so—a standard of adequacy or truthfulness is relevant. Once I have gone beyond mere assertion and have given content to the symbol it can be debated whether I am right in saying that Vietnam is a symbol of American foreign policy. The cognitive and interpretative value of this symbol is perhaps more obvious than for the other cases but an analogous statement could be made for each. Given the indeterminacy of the T symbolized, demonstrative argument is excluded but rationally persuasive argument is not.

One can ask similarly, "Is this a *good* symbol?" by which one will mean not only "Is it true?" but "Is it apt for this particular symbolic functioning?" In short one can ask just the same questions as about scientific theories, when we think of the latter as "saying something" about Nature or as interpreting some raw data and not as merely extrapolating or furnishing postulates for particular statements. That scientific theories are in this sense symbolic is not an important thesis for our purposes here; what is important is the general applicability of truth and value whenever a symbol or system of symbols is considered in relation to something else symbolized.[12]

[12] In view of the generally cautious posture which I have tried to maintain in this paper, the universal claim embodied in "whenever" alarms me. Certainly I have not

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More important still, in all cases the S differs in type from the T, and this difference is *not* that of S's being linguistic and T's being non-linguistic, or of S's being imaginal and T's being non-imaginal. Consider the examples cited: historical events, and the "basic attitude" which lies behind them; an action, and the determination which it "expresses"; an event visualized, and an experience lived; a system of logical relations, and sentences. If we think of symbols as connectives merely, one might go either direction, and regard either S or T as symbol. But it is clear that in the more usual and useful meanings of "symbol" S is tangible, perceivable, describable, while T is not; S is "objective," T is "subjective"; S is capable of being made distinct, T, although not totally without articulation (or else its symbolization would be a total mystery) is, formally speaking, an X.

If we conceive of symbols in general in this way, the functioning of symbols in artistic experience can be seen as continuous with the functioning of symbols in our "ordinary" experience. We need no longer be afraid to say that a work of art functions symbolically, *is* a symbol, if we are careful in our description of this symbolic functioning, above all of *what* it may be said to symbolize and *how* it symbolizes.

A work of art does not refer to the world: it draws the world into itself. But this is what symbols in general do. An analogy with philosophy may make the point about art. A philosophy and its vision are present in the painful and sometimes crabbed struggle to understand taking place in a philosophical treatise and embodied in the syntax, the thought-rhythm, the manner of demonstration or exhibition, the orders of precedence, the unexplained and unjustified twisting of language. We lose the philosophy as soon as we extract its propositions. Very commonly the philosopher asserts a logical system which has hardly any resemblance to the complexity of his own thinking. The philosopher's vision, or re-vision, is in an ultimate sense locked into his work—whether it is that of Wittgenstein or Hegel. The work draws the world into itself, as symbols in general do. So a work of powerful art may bring into itself for disintegration and ordering in a new way something as complex and extensive as natural reality, divine reality, human love, and the artist will have striven to find a mode of perception which achieves a satisfying re-vision. Again, the re-vision is locked into the work, inseparable from it, and the particular symbols within the work lose power and even intelligibility when not seen as *of* the work-symbol, although nothing prevents us from taking the work-symbol, or particular symbols which it elaborates, as

begun to establish this universal proposition. But my inclination is to believe that it is so and can be justified.

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starting points for new artistic explorations or as images through which to see our lives.

III

Well, then, problematic were: the unicorn, the halo, the dove, the cruciform design of a church, the monochromatic palette, the serpent, the rain on a windowpane, the endless corridors, Faust, the Castle, the whale, (the purity of) white, Godot, *Godot,* etc. Or (an example which especially irritated Susan Sontag) that Stanley Kowalski "represented the sensual and vengeful barbarism that was engulfing our culture." We wanted to say something about the *aesthetic* status of such symbols, and I have tried to develop or at least indicate a *theoretical* view on the question. But if I am concerned with an individual work, experiencing it and understanding my experience and speaking of it to others, how shall I speak?

One might argue that any linguistic interpretation, any effort to elucidate the intentional character of S, wholly misleads by trying to say in inappropriate language what has been said, and can only be said, in the aesthetic "language." If one weakens "wholly misleads" to "may easily mislead," there can hardly be argument. In the metaphor I should like to improve upon, the symbol and its "saying" and "showing" are said to be locked into the work. Their "meaning" is their meaning in the work and as defined by the work. But there are stronger theses, certainly more interesting and challenging. By these, symbolic relations are assigned to the psychological origins of works of art, and excluded from their aesthetic presence; or the aesthetic character of symbolic images is seen as subsumed in aesthetic experienceability; or the entire symbolic character of art is thought to lie in the way in which aspects of the work mutually limit, define, and control each other, so that the emotional character of a given patch of blue is absorbed into the creation of an ordered relation with a certain patch of yellow, with consequent aesthetic feelings.

Now surely if the meaning of an ordinary-language word has to be said to reside in its use—and I would affirm this in the strong Crocean sense that in a non-logicized language there are no synonyms—then surely no element in a work of art can even be mentioned without falsification. Looked at in a formal way, the emotion resolves into one complex emotion and the images into a single image. The question is, however, this: Can one talk about the work in such a highly restricted language, and if one cannot, must one be content to be silent? I shall try to answer the question by means of a hopefully persuasive example; or one which, repeated with respect to other works, might end by becoming persuasive.

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If I consider *Guernica* [see after p. 220], a work upon which I have meditated, from some sense of affinity with Picasso, I suppose, and because when it was still new it was one of the first paintings to impress me, if I consider *Guernica* I am aware of a host of "symbols" in the work, but I am aware of them because I have heard much talk about them. I do not find myself inclined to join in the discussions of the bull, the horse, the electric light, etc.—the discussions do not interest me, although the animals, etc., do interest me as individual objects of attention. Not that everything that is said about these "symbols" is false—on the contrary. But these symbols rise (as if) into the whole. I would suppose that if one does not have a feeling for Spanish culture and tradition—as the years go by this becomes increasingly difficult—then one would need clues to what are, at least in part, cultural symbols, pertaining to a religious and humanistic past. Experientially these are symbols for me—I suppose I simply understand them too well, in a pre-conceptual way, to be patient with talk about what they "represent." Incidentally I do not, despite the title of the work, specifically connect *Guernica* with Guernica, even though at the time the bombing of the village stood forth as a shocking act of massacre and wanton destruction, as terror rather than as what was, in that distant time, regarded as legitimate warfare. To Guernica nothing is specific except the title.

The way in which I explain my apprehension of *Guernica* is this. I see the canvas as the pictorial realization of the devastation and the suffering of Spain and the Spanish people, and therethrough, ultimately, of Humanity. I see this pictorial realization as controlled by a profound sorrow, such as is just able to contain this vision of ruin, which in turn is painted with a will to truth (as I think of it), a will to make of it a picture through which a reality would be made visible and a spectator would be made to stop and *look* and not be permitted to escape into slogans and emotions. I feel that this painting was made to be seen by men and women—and for this reason I speak of a will, as I would not in every case of art. The emotion of the work, again, I take to be sorrow, steeled by a will to show. Sorrow, note, is a reflective rather than an immediate emotion, an emotion attained to, so that seeing the devastation and the suffering *in just this way* makes this emotion possible, as this emotion makes this vision possible. (This dialectic is crucial.) To create this scene Picasso has brought a sense of the being of Spain and the Spanish people—intangible both, ideas both, yet known to the artist as part of himself, as his culture, as his symbolic language—and we feel this in his image, and feel the authenticity of the image. In this work, in short, a sorrow which can look and survive, and a vision of the suffering of a people come conjointly to creative realization.

I do not talk about this painting in purely "aesthetic" terms. One reason

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why Picasso is less popular by far among artists than with the public is that much of his work seems to call for other than purely aesthetic comment. The latter would not name "Spain" or "sorrow" or "Humanity," and would not speak of truth or authenticity or a will. It would refuse even to name a "referent" or an emotion, although it would acknowledge that the work draws upon materials from the world, and that it has a unifying emotion. I find no explanation in such talk, because it gives no hint of the struggle of understanding, or of the work which this painting does as a work of art. The "problem" of the painting, as I see it, is an *aesthetic* problem: how to *see* what is nearly unbearable, and threatens to overwhelm us, how to bring to visibility what is idea, how to master one's emotions so as to control the image. The mode of resolution is aesthetic and creative of a symbol which rises above the brute reality.

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When reading a foreign literature in translation we find that some symbols are immediate intelligible, even if the literature is totally unrelated to our own; other symbols can be understood imperfectly or only with effort; and still others, even when explained, remain alien, isolated bits of esoterica. Professor Wieck's paper would seem to deal chiefly with the second category—symbols that are not immediately apparent, but have their roots in some universally valid attitudes, perceptions, or emotions. If such symbols can be shown to be an important part of art, both of East and West, they may provide a means of analyzing and appreciating works belonging to entirely different traditions as part of common human experience.

The "Freudian" symbolism of which Professor Wieck spoke provides one basis for the search for common foundations for aesthetic expression. Certainly the traditional literature of China and Japan contains such symbolism; in the folk tales particularly we find themes that reappear, seemingly without connection, in widely scattered regions of the world, and these folk tales have served as the raw material for many works of more evolved forms of literature. In every kind of literary expression we find, of course, mentions of mountains, lakes, and other "Freudian" symbols, and it is sometimes possible for us to discover through such symbols meanings of which the authors themselves may have been only dimly aware, if at all. A sash, which figures in one eighteenth-century Japanese play as the token of a certain woman's affection for a man, may appear to us to possess symbolic overtones not shared by another gift the woman might have offered—a book, for example. Sometimes, indeed, even the rudest grasp of Freudian theory may enable us to feel embarrassingly as if we knew better than the author what his work was *really* about. I confess that I had this feeling on reading *The Bostonians,* though in so saying I doubtlessly am doing Henry James an injustice.

But we must be wary of interpreting even the most obvious symbols when they originate in an unfamiliar culture. I am not referring here to the third category of symbols to which I referred above: the fact that in India the owl is associated with stupidity rather than wisdom is of interest but not of great aesthetic importance because owls rarely figure in literature or sculpture. But what about more pervasive phenomena? Professor Wieck says of people that "in the theater, with no assistance from psychoanalysts, they understand what rain on the windowpane is meant to signify." I confess that I am not sure precisely what I should understand. Obviously, that it is raining; but everything else that is signified is presumably conditioned by what I think about rain in general, and what rain means to me at that particular moment in the film.

Rain is generally thought of in the West or in Japan as being gloomy and depressing. It would normally not occur to a poet to compare his beloved to

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a rainy day, or for an artist like Hiroshige to suggest by the diagonals of rain in a print that the little figure crossing the bridge is delighting in the weather. But that is precisely what an Indian picture might mean. Khushwant Singh wrote, "An Indian, when the rains come, runs out into the street shouting with joy and lets himself be soaked to the skin." Unlike European or Japanese poets who grieve to see heavy clouds portending rain, "the Indian scans the heavens and if cumulus clouds blot out the sun his heart fills with joy."[1]

What then would an Indian make of the rain on the windowpane of Professor Wieck's film? Perhaps it would suggest an impatience to run outside and frolic in the puddles, or perhaps only mild elation, but presumably not the gloominess associated with rain elsewhere. As for the Western spectator, the rain on the windowpane might depend for its symbolic meaning entirely on what had preceded. If the previous scene had shown an Oklahoma dustbowl housewife sadly shaking her head as she let a handful of parched earth trickle through her fingers, the rain on the windowpane might approximate the meaning it would seem to have for Indians. On the other hand, if the previous scene had shown young lovers reunited after long absence, and the close-up of the rain trickling down the windowpane was prolonged and accompanied by suitable music, we should know what *that* meant. But in most circumstances, and certainly in a Japanese film, the sight would stand for loneliness, depression, or perhaps even for the tears the impassive-faced heroine is shedding in her heart.

The possibility that aesthetic symbols can provide a basis for our appreciation of works of art from cultures other than our own deserves further exploration, but (as I hope I have indicated) differences in culture may sometimes obscure the meaning of seemingly universal symbols.

[1] Khushwant Singh, *I Shall Not Hear the Nightingale* (New York: Grove Press, 1959), p. 103.

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Professor Wieck's paper, like a many faceted stone, flashes light into corners, dark or undiscovered, where the aesthetic symbol is to be found. The range of the aesthetic symbol's function, as he defines it, its meanings on many levels, its shifts of meaning with the change of medium and context are contributions for which the reader must surely be enlightened and grateful.

The paper contains from beginning to end a fascinating ambivalence: on the one hand Wieck sees the aesthetic symbol from the point of view of the critic, the analyst, and, on the other hand, he sees it from the point of view of the engrossed intelligent celebrant of the wonder, insight, terror, and inspiration provided to man by the arts. The aesthetic symbol, then, is seen in his paper both from the spectator's point of view and from the participant's point of view.

There is no doubt in this reviewer's mind that Professor Wieck's sympathies are with the participant's view of art. He seems somewhat uncomfortable talking about the term "symbol" since it is not a primary term in aesthetic discourse. Further, he frequently seems dubious about the values of verbalizing symbols; their verbalization in the films, which he uses for illustration, sometimes indicates a deficiency in the work of art itself. When discussing abstractions such as Memory and Identity, again in the context of an illustrative film, he remarks that a critic who talks in these terms has left the film behind and has taken it as a topic for philosophizing instead. Further, he claims that a critic who begins to reason about the symbolic meaning of Ahab and the whale is reading with a special frame of mind in terms of what might be made of this in a speculative way. Freud's wrong turn, he tells us, lies in seeing works of art as a sharing of secret wishes and feelings made plausible and palatable; this mode of analysis reduces what is primary in a great work of art to something secondary—a result of Freud's therapeutic method becoming dominant. This commentator is in complete agreement with the emphasis of Professor Wieck upon the foregoing trends.

The central fascination of this paper lies in the previously mentioned ambivalence between the spectator's and the participant's points of view which is inherent in the structure of the paper itself. When writing about the film in the beginning of his paper, Professor Wieck speaks in the first paragraph as a participant who actively sees not only the images as they unroll but also as one who grasps the course of action and becomes "engrossed in the whole of this *X* which a statement would express lamely." However, in the next paragraph he refers to this same person as an intelligent, contemporary spectator who sees many symbols, including the Freudian symbolism of objects and events—at an essentially non-verbal level to be sure.

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It is precisely here that the ambivalence appears: we are to notice the Freudian symbolism even though the meaning context of this symbolism, the system of Freud, reduces what is primary in it to a secondary meaning. Such symbols, he tells us, have no longer to be excavated; they are non-verbal and put there by the director, and they are to be suppressed only at the risk of losing touch with the film. That some knowledge is thus necessary in order to participate in the art experience is obvious, but where and how does one draw the line? This unanswered question runs throughout the paper.

The knowledge which Professor Wieck would have us possess is not verbal because the whole of an artistic experience cannot be expressed adequately. However, we are to know the symbols that compose the *X*. Further, we are told that all great works of art have a philosophical character—not in the sense of a pre-given philosophical doctrine but rather as a unique and novel experiential encounter with memory or guilt or other emotion. It is an encounter with a kind of being—a way of doing philosophy. He finds, however, that this kind of symbolism is difficult to distinguish from the critic's example of Ahab and the whale when the latter symbolism is in its original aesthetic habitat.

Professor Wieck sees this knowledge as excluding demonstrative argument but not excluding a rationally persuasive argument. It makes perfectly good sense to ask as he does: Is this a good symbol? One can ask the same question of art that one can ask of science when they are each saying something about nature or interpreting raw data.

It is at this point lies the chief source of the ambivalence between the spectator and the participant's views. The analogy with science is essentially misleading in that the primary relationship in aesthetic experience is between the symbol and the self-in-the-world, not between the symbol and the world. While it is obvious that the self and symbol are in the natural world and in the myriad worlds of discourse—Freudian, Christian, Buddhist, Marxist, etc.—the fundamental role of the aesthetic symbol is that it is an appearance that points to and stands for a reality other than itself, to use the language of Professor Hofstadter.

This reality to which the symbol points is that of the self, not as object observed by the spectator but as a subject who is the participant, the subject who lives, moves, and has his being for a brief span in the myriad worlds of love and hate, success and failure, confidence and fear, and in childhood, adulthood, parenthood, disease, and final death.

The "knowledge" or "truth" of a work of art seems to this commentator to be in its relevance to the existential condition of the self, day in and day out in all of the flux of feeling and thought. In the language of Professor Pepper, it is contextual; it provides the quality of vividness and intensity and

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also provides clarification of experience. The clarification here is not that, however, of the scientist, mathematician, logician, or analytic philosopher. It is what Whitehead termed the most important judgment of philosophy, the judgment which suspends the issue of truth or falsity in a narrow propositional sense—the suspended judgment in which one considers certain possibilities for incorporation into the living nexus. It is what both Kierkegaard and Josiah Royce called the achieving of a continuity between hope and memory. This clarification is the primordial truth of Heidegger, who would uncover what is covered over, namely, man's ownmost sense of being.

Some may think this sounds unwelcomely religious. So be it. What is important to recognize at this juncture is the inextricable tie of what has been called at this conference "great art" with the religious, magical, and mystical traditions. This bond has never been omitted from consideration here, but it has not been faced squarely enough either.

The history of the arts east, west, north, and south points to this nearly inextricable tie between the arts and the magical-religious-mystical aspects of culture. Can the arts survive, can great works of art be fashioned, when this matrix is weakened by all-pervasive secularism—whether in Asia or in the West—or by a systematic campaign to destroy the hold of a religious value-system, watered down though it may be, by substituting a social-political-economic value-system as the new, if not true, matrix for great art—Soviet realism, for example?

This issue may seem merely an interesting academic question to those of us whose ways of thinking are permeated if not saturated with the values of the Enlightenment—powerful values of great yet limited merit. It may well be the case that the possibilities of man's survival as a potentially fully humane individual rest essentially on the viability of the religious-magical-mystical resources available to him. In some brave new worlds there is no magical mystical religious component; nor is there any art, nor is there authentic individualism.

Let Plato's Ion be my last thought on the aesthetic symbol. Ion, you will recall, was a rhapsodist who held crowds enraptured when he recited the exploits of Homer. Socrates inquires of Ion regarding his source of power. Ion, possibly seeking the authority of a science, answers that he has a special knowledge of Homer. Socrates inquires further into this knowledge and finds that everyone else has more knowledge than Ion; for example, the charioteer knows more about chariots than does Ion; the general knows more about war than Ion. Always there is someone who knows more about the referent of one of Homer's aesthetic symbols than does Ion. Ion's power, Socrates thinks, is not cognitive, not rational in the usual sense.

Socrates forces Ion to admit that either he is dishonest or he is inspired by

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the gods. Faced with this choice, Ion somewhat reluctantly opts for inspiration; instead of possessing knowledge of fact, Ion participates in a chain of being—a divinity moves him through other inspired persons and through his participation he draws each member of his audience into his own participation with his own being. As Michelangelo's Jehovah gives life to Adam, so Ion brings his listener to his own life, his own fullness of being. The merely spectator frame of mind has now become a participant's mind. What is immediately present has symbolic reference to the individualized self; it is the losing of an everyday empirical spectator self and a finding of a more fundamentally empirical participative self.

The entire dialogue between Socrates and Ion transports the aesthetic symbol into a magical-mystical realm.

> Now this is like the Muse, who first gives to men inspiration herself; and from these inspired persons a chain of other persons is suspended, who take the inspiration from them. For all good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems not as works of art [by skill], but because they are inspired and possessed . . . . And the soul of the lyric poet does the same, as they themselves tell us; for they tell us that they gather their strains from honied foundations out of the gardens and dells of the Muses; thither, like the bees, they wing their way. And this is true. For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired. . . . God takes away the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers . . . in order that we who hear them may know that they speak not of themselves who utter these priceless words . . . but that God [the god] is the speaker. . . . [B. Jowett, trans.]

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In a series of lectures delivered at Harvard University, and entitled *The Spirit of Man in Asian Art,* Laurence Binyon, a distinguished student of Asian art, made this observation: "Looking on our world as it is, there are moments when one may be provoked to think that the most conspicuous characteristic of mankind is a gift for making a prodigious mess of its affairs, even one might think, an unteachable stupidity, with all the cruelties directly and inevitably springing from that stupidity."[1] Binyon goes on, however, to plead: "But let us retain some faith in our kind. Behind this world-bewilderment, beneath the tangle of political and economic problems, lives still a spirit which, in spite of its folly and vileness, is delicate and sensitive, courageous and devoted. The best is hidden."[2]

In this symposium we have talked about some of the best in the artistic achievements of the East and West. We have touched upon, and hopefully we have brought into the open, many aspects of these achievements—and some conclusions, however tentative they may be, have, I think, been arrived at. Many questions and problems have also been raised that remain unanswered or unresolved, and I should like to sum up briefly (and in a very rough way) what I see to be the tentative conclusions reached and the unresolved problems that have emerged from these deliberations.

One important conclusion, I believe, that we have arrived at is our recognition that, especially in the light of Asian art traditions, we need to revise somewhat the fundamental conceptions of "symbol," "signification," "reference," and perhaps even "art-object" that are generally accepted in Western aesthetics. We have found that in the classical traditions of India, China, and Japan the entire work of art is frequently taken as a symbol—as something that both represents and points beyond itself to a spiritual state of being. The art work (and particularly with Indian examples which unfortunately have been somewhat neglected here in the presence of an overwhelming Japanese force) is not taken as an end in itself, an object for disinterested contemplation; rather it is taken as an efficacious means for self-transformation. As Heinrich Zimmer notes: "In India the beauty of images is not intended for the aesthetic enjoyment of the secular beholder; it is a contribution to their magical force as 'instruments' or 'tools' (*yantra*)."[3]

The subject of many works of sculpture in India is "Kṛṣṇa Fluting" [see after p. 220]. But "Kṛṣṇa Fluting" is not really about a particular god—

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[1] Laurence Binyon, *The Spirit of Man in Asian Art* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 4.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Heinrich Zimmer, *The Art of Indian Asia,* ed. Joseph Campbell, Bollingen Series, XXXIX (New York: Pantheon Books, 1955), I, 318.

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Kṛṣṇa—playing a tune on an invisible flute; it is about the universal song of the soul being beckoned to a divine unity and embrace. "Kṛṣṇa Fluting" points to and participates in that which is beyond symbol. The spectator is to become or better is to regain, is to realize, that state of being which Albert Hofstadter has so eloquently described: "The boundary that separates it [the enraptured soul] from its other has been overpassed. The veil of images, of symbols, that stood between it and reality, both disclosing and concealing, but in any case separating as well as connecting, has been pierced, broken through." The power of this image lies precisely in its capacity to at once stand for and to engender this unity.

But the problem, then, is: How can a definition or conception of symbol be formulated which makes sense of the art-object's being symbolic without its having any clear denotation or reference? How can we overcome the tension between Wieck's sense of "meaning locked in a symbol" and Pepper's "representation"? One possible clue to an answer may be found in the etymology of the word "symbol." " 'Symbol'," we are told,

> stems from the Greek *symballo,* to throw together, join, or unite. It derives from the ancient custom, the *symbola,* signs of recognition between a host and his guests. The host would break an earthenware object or a ring and distribute some of the pieces to his guests. He would retain some of the remaining fragments. When host and guests met again, the broken pieces would be joined together and served as a sign of recognition. Symbol, in its original context, meant secret sign of recognition. . . .[4]

Now *to recognize* means to know through participation. Recognition is immediate and direct. To recognize the symbolic value of the entire work of art means to become what is symbolized by it. We need, then, a definition of "symbol" which encompasses, as with much of Asian art, the experience of the work of art as pointing to and participating in that which is non-symbolic and which, in the intensity of immediate experience, is *recognized* as such.

A second conclusion, and not a very surprising one, that we seem to have arrived at is that aesthetic experience is culture-bound to a considerable extent. As Donald Keene and David Wieck have shown, to comprehend the art-object means very often to respond to its conventional symbols and to its power of suggestiveness. William Malm has insisted that, initially at any rate, there is much that is closed to one who encounters works of art from other traditions as there is nothing necessary or god-given in the structural symbolism that is indispensable to a work of art. Stephen Pepper and to some extent Albert Hofstadter have taken exception to this, at least on one level, where they maintain that there are universal features or natural pos-

[4] Peter Fingesten, "The Six-Fold Law of Symbolism," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,* XXI, no. 4 (1963), 387.

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sibilities exhibited in traditions and that, although they might be expressed in different and diverse ways, they are quite readily learnable, being the reflection of pervasive human tendencies, and are capable of eliciting satisfying aesthetic responses. In any event, we can, I think, conclude that any culture tends to select certain features of its environment for notice and emphasis, and each culture tends to rely upon its own special experience, upon its own symbols. One might be able to enjoy, in a vague sort of way or indeed even in an intense way, a work from another culture without comprehending in depth its symbols, but one is not then appreciating the work of art as it is in its total complexity and simplicity. One is not seeing it as it was intended to be seen, or, ontologically speaking, as it has its being.

The problem then becomes one of specifying and determining just what dimensions of the art-object from an alien tradition are essential for meaningful aesthetic experience (with the terms "essential" and "meaningful" standing here in need of explication).

This problem suggests other questions that have been raised: Is the special aesthetic attitude of a culture (e.g., the Japanese) itself *symbolic* in some sense? Are criteria of excellence or canons of criticism in art transposable from one culture to another? Stephen Pepper thinks they are. Personally I am doubtful, as I think many aestheticians and art critics are, but we stand open to convincement. Another related question is: Is an aesthetics itself necessarily culture-bound? When we have, as we do in India and China, an insistence upon continuity with the past, what meaning do "originality," "personal expression," or our "isms of style" have? When we have, as at times we do in Japan, what Donald Keene has described as "the elevation of aestheticism to something close to a religion," how can aesthetics be marked off as a distinct discipline? Why is it the case that aesthetics, as we have come to know it in the West as a theoretical effort to comprehend the nature of the creative process, the art-object and our aesthetic experience of it, never developed very far in India, China, or Japan—civilizations which produced so much magnificent art work and developed such extraordinary aesthetic sensitivities?

We are left with these and many other questions. If the symposium has done nothing else, let us hope that it has shaken up a few biases and preconceptions and that it has succeeded in raising a few extremely interesting problems.

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CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM. Edited with an Introduction by *Michael D. Bayles*. A644. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1968. Pp. vi + 305. $1.45. Paper.

A RUMOR OF ANGELS (MODERN SOCIETY AND THE REDISCOVERY OF THE SUPERNATURAL). By *Peter L. Berger*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1969. Pp. xi + 129. $4.50.

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EPISTEOLA DE TOLERANTIA (A LETTER ON TOLERATION). Edited by *Raymond Klibansky*. Translated by *J. W. Gough*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Pp. xliv + 171. $6.40.

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THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD POLITICS IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. By *Werner Levi*. Spectrum Book S183. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968. Pp. vi + 184. $2.45.

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MILL (A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS). Edited by *J. B. Schneewind*. Doubleday Anchor Original AP7. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1968. Pp. xxi + 455. $1.95. Paper.

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PANCHADASHI (A VEDANTA CLASSIC). Translated by *H. P. Shastri.* 2nd ed. London: Shanti Sadan, 1965. Pp. xxxvi + 486. 55*s* net.

ŚAMKARA AND BRADLEY. By *S. N. L. Shrisvastava.* Delhi, Varanasi, Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1968. Pp. 270. Rs. 25-00.

SYĀD-VĀDA-MANJARĪ (THE FLOWER-SPRAY OF THE QUODAMMODO DOCTRINE). Translated and annotated by *F. W. Thomas.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1968. Pp. 176. Rs. 25.00.

LITERARY AND ART THEORIES IN JAPAN. By *Makoto Ueda.* Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1967. Pp. xiii + 274. $7.50.

RĀMĀNUJA ON THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ. By *J. A. B. van Buitenen.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1968. Pp. xiii + 187. Rs. 20-00.

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The SIU Translation Center, Humanities Division, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville, Illinois, announces that it has been collecting information about translations in progress in the field of philosophy. From its files it is able to advise translators whether or not the work they intend to translate is already in the process of translation elsewhere. Mr. Fritz Marthi, Director of the Center, requests any translators at work or others considering a translation to get in touch with the Center.

The *Adyar Library Bulletin* has published a special Felicitation Volume [Vols. 31-32, 1967-1968] for Dr. V. Raghavan. Readers of *Philosophy East and West* will be especially interested in the following articles: Masatoshi Nagatomi, "Arthakriyā"; Sengaku Mayeda, "On the Author of the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad—and the Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya"; George Bosworth Burch, "A Footnote to K. C. Bhattacharyya's Philosophy"; Hajime Nakamura, "Yājñvalkya and Other Upaniṣadic Thinkers in a Jain Tradition"; Unto Tähtinen, "Non-Violence and the Modern Technical World."

The archives of Dr. Paul Carus and the Open Court Publishing Company of LaSalle, Illinois, have been deposited in the Morris Library of Southern Illinois University by the Carus family.

This collection, consisting of some 60,000 letters and manuscript pages, has been brought to the Carbondale campus and a contract with the Carus family has been signed by President Morris.

The Carus papers, the largest body of manuscripts thus far acquired by the University Library, constitute one of the major archives of modern philosophy. The Open Court Publishing Company was founded in 1887 by Edward C. Hegeler, a LaSalle manufacturer, who brought Dr. Paul Carus to LaSalle the following year as editor of the *Open Court,* a new journal of the philosophy of science and comparative religion. Through the *Open Court* and *The Monist,* which was established later, and through his work as director of the editorial policies of the Open Court Publishing Company, Dr. Carus made LaSalle the most important publishing center for philosophy in America for a period of more than 30 years. After Dr. Carus's death in 1919 the Carus family carried on the work and the Open Court is still one of the nation's major publishers in the fields of philosophy and religion. One of Open Court's major series is the Library of Living Philosophers, edited by Professor Paul A. Schilpp of the SIU faculty. *The Monist* is edited by Professor Eugene Freeman, San Jose State College.

Dr. Carus and his associates conducted a voluminous correspondence with philosophers, scientists, and men of letters throughout the world, so that the archives offer a major source for the historical study of philosophy from 1888 to 1920. There is correspondence with John Dewey and C. S. Peirce, whose early writings were published by Open Court; J. M. Baldwin, Couturat, DeVries, Höffding, Husserl, Eucken, Harnack, Hasegawa, Lévy-Bruhl, Lovejoy, Lombroso, Lutoslawski, Mach, Montgomery, Morgan, Poincaré, Royce, Sarton, Suzuki, Throndike, Vaihinger, and Wundt. In addition to letters from philosophers, there is correspondence with such leading figures in other areas as Elisabet Ney, Luther Burbank, David Belasco, Jack London, and Leo Tolstoi. Much of the material is unpublished.

In addition to the correspondence, there are files of manuscripts in various

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stages of preparation for publication, galley proofs, and original art work for book illustrations.

The Carus papers are to be made available to qualified scholars without regard to university affiliation. Even before the collection could be properly arranged, two scholars (one in California, the other in Wisconsin) requested and were granted permission to use the letters of Ernst Mach, the German philosopher of science.

Arrangements for the deposit of the papers were made by Professor Lewis E. Hahn of the Philosophy Department and Director of Libraries Ralph E. McCoy. Manuscript Archivist Kenneth W. Duckett is in charge of organizing the papers and making them available for use. They are now being microfilmed so that the Carus family will have a film record.

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The Concept of Man in Early China

Donald J. Munro

On the basis of very early Chinese bronze and bone inscriptions, as well as classical texts, the author reaches new conclusions about the ancient Chinese view of man's possibilities and limitations, and his relations with other men and with the universe. The work also serves as a new approach to understanding the nature of early Chinese philosophy as a whole. The crux of early Chinese thought is the idea that men are naturally equal. This doctrine is philosophically more important than the well-known Chinese beliefs in the necessity of social hierarchies and the unequal moral worth of man, and, as the author shows, it is in no way incompatible with them. Throughout the book, the author offers illuminating comparisons from Western philosophy. $7.50

Lao Tzu and Taoism

Max Kaltenmark

Translated from the French by Roger Greaves. Lao Tzu is one of the most eminent figures in Chinese antiquity. The book attributed to him, the *Tao Te Ching,* is the classic statement of the system of thought known as Taoism. Much of the doctrine of the *Tao Te Ching* was later clarified and modified by the greatest of the Taoist philosophers and writers, Chuang Tzu, whose chief work bears his name. The major ideas contained in these two early texts form the basis of this concise yet comprehensive history and analysis of Taoism. The book also presents biographical information on Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu and an account of religious Taoism, whose influence on intellectuals has led to much of China's greatest art and literature, persisting as a spiritual force to the present day. Paper, $1.95; cloth, $5.95

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Descartes saw that he could not identify himself with his body. He therefore vacillated between identifying himself with his mind, and with an awkward amalgam of his mind and his body. Gotama Buddha more profoundly argued that one could not identify himself with his mind either, nor, indeed, with anything at all. This is his doctrine of *anattā,* that there is no self. He evidently considered rejection of belief in the self as essential to blessedness, as Lucretius similarly abominated belief in life after death, for similar reasons.

It is essential to note, however, that the self whose existence the Buddha denied was an inner enduring self, having an identity through time and presumably being, therefore, capable of an existence independent of the body and the world, even after death. Thus:

> If there really existed the Self, there would be also something which belonged to the Self. As, however, in truth and reality, neither the Self, nor anything belonging to the Self, can be found, is it not therefore really an utter fool's doctrine to say: 'This is the world, this am I; after death I shall be permanent, persisting, and eternal'?[1]

And all speculations on the self—whether or not it is the self that perceives the self, whether or not the self is permanent, or subject to change—he dismissed as "mere views, a thicket of views, a puppet-show of views, a toil of views, a snare of views" through which no man will ever be "freed from rebirth, from decay, and from death, from sorrow, pain, grief and despair"—in short, from suffering.[2]

Without considering the ethical and religious implications of this teaching, I wish in an indirect way to defend the claim itself, that there is no personal self. My approach will be indirect, in the sense that I shall maintain that a particular person or self is one and the same thing as his body.

This will, moreover, be quite in keeping with the claim of the Buddha, for in one place he said:

> It would be better for the unlearned worlding to regard this body, built up of the four elements, as his Self, rather than the mind. For it is evident that this body may last for a year, for two years, for three, four, five, or ten years, or even for a hundred years or more; but that which is called thought, or mind, or consciousness, continuously, during day and night, arises as one thing, and passes away as another thing.[3]

Now one should not, of course, on the basis of such passages as this, represent it as the teaching of ancient Buddhism that the self and the body are one, for it was clearly the doctrine of Gotama that there simply is no self. The differ-

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[1] *The Word of the Buddha,* ed. Nyanatiloka (Colombo: Word of the Buddha Publishing Committee, 1952), p. 34.
[2] *Ibid.,* p. 34.
[3] *Ibid.,* p. 40.

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ence between these two claims is, however, only one of emphasis; for, given that there are such things as living human bodies, i.e., living men, which the Buddha hardly denied, then the two claims are logically equivalent. For, given this uncontroversial presupposition, it is one and the same thing to say (a) there is no self, and (b) the self and the body are one and the same or, perhaps better, there is no personal self other than just the body.

I shall, in pursuing this theme, address myself to the question, What is a person? And I shall maintain that any given person, such as oneself, is identical with, or is one and the same thing as, that palpable physical object he refers to as his body; in short, that no philosophical reason can be given for believing in any inner "self" or person other than this. One argument often put forth for denying this claim, namely, that a man retains his identity through time, while his body does not, will be briefly discussed at the end.

Now this claim, that there is no inner self, or, as I prefer to express it, that the only thing a man can claim as himself is his body, is a purely negative one, and cannot therefore be proved by any philosophical discourse. All I can do, therefore, is to show that it is consistent with common sense, not inconsistent with anything that is known to be true, and that the typical philosophical arguments that are often given against it are inconclusive and, usually, question-begging.

What is a person? Now this question can, of course, be answered in a silly and superficial way, by saying that any given person is simply identical with himself. This, however, only calls attention to the identity of the ordinary concept of a person and the philosophical concept of the self, for it is just conceptually true that every person is a "self" and vice versa. And it is just for this reason that we are entitled to ask, What is a person? rather than the seemingly more esoteric question, What is the self?

But it is, of course, possible to suggest answers that are not merely analytic. One might say, for instance, that a given person, such as oneself, is (a) a particular body; for instance, that I am, or that I am identical with, or that I am one and the same thing as, that palpable physical object which I refer to as "my body." Or one might say that a given person, such as oneself, is (b) a particular mind; for instance, that I am identical with that thinking thing I refer to as "my mind." Or again, it might be claimed that a given person, such as oneself, is (c) an amalgam of these two; for instance, that I am identical with that composite of things I refer to as "my body" and "my mind." Or finally, it can be argued that a person is none of these things, but rather that a given person, such as oneself, is (d) something "primitive"; for example, that I am identical with something which is neither a body nor a mind, but something (namely, a given person, myself) which *has* both physical and mental properties.

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This last answer is, I believe, esoteric. There is, in any case, no need to examine independently any of the last three answers if the first answer will do.

Persons and bodies. Apart from certain religious presuppositions, which I shall leave aside, there appear to be two kinds of consideration, and only two, which have led philosophers to doubt that persons are simply identical with those physical objects we see about us all the time and which we refer to as living human beings, or simply as men. The first is linguistic, and the second metaphysical.

Linguistic considerations. The grammatical forms we use to refer to our bodies and their parts appear to suggest a distinction between ourselves and our bodies. Thus, everyone can say truly "I am a person, and I have a body," though there seem to be no contexts in which one could say "I am a body, and I have a person." Again, it is usual for one to refer to his bodily parts, and even to the totality of these, by means of a first person possessive pronoun. For example, I can speak of my hands and feet, my heart, my brain, and even my body, which seems to suggest a relationship between myself and my body which is perhaps something like ownership or possession but not, apparently, identity.

Reply. Such purely linguistic considerations as these are highly superficial and prove nothing. In fact, if one compares them with the manner in which we commonly speak of other ordinary physical objects, they appear perfectly consistent with the supposition that there is no self in any absolute sense, but only bodily constituents related to each other and functioning in such a way as to constitute a human being. The Buddha has, with familiar analogies, made this point:

> Just as that what we designate by the name of 'chariot,' has no existence apart from axle, wheels, shaft, carriage, and so forth; or, as the word 'house' is merely a convenient designation for various materials put together after a certain fashion so as to enclose a portion of space, and there is no separate house-entity in existence:—in exactly the same way, that which we call a 'being,' or an 'individual,' or a 'person,' or by the name 'I', is nothing but a changing combination of physical and psychical phenomena, and has no real existence in itself.[4]

And I would express what I take to be the same point as follows.

Every man can truly say, "I have a body." But in the same way one can say of any physical object whatever that it has a body. Thus, I can say of my car that it has a body, or of a table that it has four legs and a top—and this might be *all* it has. This hardly suggests that the car or table is one thing and its body another. Similarly, I can say that I have (say) a heart, legs, arms, brain, and so on, but no special relationship is here connoted by "have."

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

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Such a statement only means, or certainly may only mean, that I consist of a heart, legs, brain, and so on, along with other physical parts, all related to each other and functioning in a manner necessary to constitute a living human being or, which is the same thing, a person.

Metaphysical considerations. If one ventures any true description of something, A, and likewise any true description of something, B, then one is entitled to affirm that these are alternative descriptions of the same thing—or in other words, that A and B are one and the same thing—if and only if the description rendered of A, whatever it might be, can now be applied to B without ceasing to be true; and, of course, vice versa. Thus, if one were to describe a given man A as the father of numerous children, and a given man B as the junior senator from New York, then one would be entitled to affirm that A and B are one and the same man only if one could likewise say that A is the junior senator from New York and B the father of numerous children. And in case *every* descriptive statement true of A turns out to be true of B as well, and vice versa, then it follows that A and B are the same man; or in other words, that these are all just alternative ways of describing one particular man.

Now philosophers have been apt in pointing out the incongruity of certain descriptive locutions which, it would seem, would not be incongruous if men thought of themselves and their bodies as identical things. A person can sometimes truly say of himself, for example, that he loves his country, is subject to quick changes of mood, admires Plato's theory of forms, is politically liberal, and things of that sort. It would seem utterly incongruous, however, to assert such things of any body whatsoever, and hence of one's own body; to assert, for example, that his *body* is politically liberal. There should not be such incongruity, however, if persons and their bodies are identical. For if I am one and the same thing as my body, then it must follow that if I, for example, admire Plato, then that physical object I refer to as "my body" must admire Plato too, this body referred to in the second statement and this self or "I" referred to in the first being one and the same thing, namely, that person I call "myself." But since this consequence seems absurd, we seem obliged to reject the antecedent from which it is derived; namely, that I and my body are one and the same thing.

Can matter think? There have in the history of thought been many ways of expressing essentially this same metaphysical point, all of which are capsulated in the dictum that "matter cannot think." Thus, it has been claimed that *ideas* can exist only in a mind, not in a body. Or again, it is thought obvious that matter cannot experience *self-awareness;* but since persons are undoubtedly sometimes aware of themselves, it follows again that persons are not bodies. Or again, it is said that sensations and feelings are not material states or

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processes. One could never say that *sensations* or *feelings* are transpiring in a test tube, for example, because the only kind of process that can occur there is a physical process. Persons, however, do have sensations and feelings, and are therefore quite unlike the matter that can exist in a test tube. Or again, there are certain uniquely mental things—*mental images,* for instance—which can by no means be described in terms of the concepts we apply to bodies. One can neither say, for example, that such images are soluble in alcohol, nor that they are not. Persons, however, can possess such things as mental images, so it would seem that persons must themselves be nonphysical things; and so on.

It is fairly clear that all of these and similar familiar remarks are but more or less crude ways of saying that matter cannot think, construing thinking sufficiently broadly to include feeling, sensing, imagining, and so on. And this dictum, that matter cannot think, is itself a crude, epigrammatic way of expressing the previous metaphysical point, to the effect that there are many descriptive predications which are applicable to persons but not to their bodies. What we have here are certain descriptions which, it is claimed, "make sense" when applied to persons, but "make no sense" when applied to any body whatsoever, and hence make no sense when applied to one's own body.

Reply. In order to overturn this line of thought we have to get a fresh orientation on the thing, and this I propose to do as follows.

When one sees a man—sees a man tilling a field, for instance, or assembling an engine—what one sees is a person. One can point to that man and say, for instance, that he, that person, is tilling, tinkering, or whatnot. It would be incongruous to say that his visible *body* is tilling or tinkering, unless this were understood as a funny way of saying that the man himself, the person pointed to, is tilling or tinkering; for this latter is the truth of the matter. One might say of the man assembling the engine, for instance, that he is reading the instructions, inferring the proper position of this part or that, getting things wrong sometimes, perhaps, and right other times, adjusting this or that, contemplating the result, checking against diagrams, and so on. It would be quite strange to say that his body was doing these things. It would be incongruous, indeed, absurd, to set all these activities down to his mind; to say that his mind is reading instructions, adjusting this and that, and so on. It would be downright primitive to attempt distributing these various tasks between two things—to say, for example, that his mind makes the appropriate inferences, that his body then makes the needed adjustments, that his mind then contemplates the result, his body moving parts this way and that, and so on—as though the work of assembling the engine were somehow divided between them.

Clearly, we are talking about one and the same being when we say all of

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these things. And the being we are describing is a certain man, whom we see and point to. And that man, thus described, is a person; for nothing except a person could be so described.

The next thing to observe, then, is that this man, whom we see and point to, and who is one and the same thing as the person we are describing, is a visible, palpable, physical object. What else, indeed, *could* one see and point to? And from this it surely does follow that the person we are describing, the man who is assembling the engine, is a visible, palpable object, a living human body or, in short, a body.

Two common mistakes. Why, then, do such commonsense observations as these fail to satisfy so many philosophers? The explanation is mainly found, I think, in two common mistakes. The first is to treat certain psychological states and activities as things rather than as states and activities, and the second is to suppose that the human body, being a body, can have only those capacities that are discoverable in lifeless things. I shall consider these in turn.

The first mistake. Instead of saying, for example, that a given person, such as oneself, "has" an image, sensation, or thought, one can simply say that he imagines, senses, or thinks. For instance, instead of saying that I "have" a mental image of my birthplace, I can surely say, conveying exactly the same claim, that I *imagine* my birthplace. The former inept but common expression implies the existence of a thing called an image. It is true that no such thing can be a physical thing, but it should not therefore be supposed that it must be a nonphysical thing. One can say, rather, that there is no such thing to begin with; that there is only a person *imagining* something. This implies only the existence of that person, that is, a certain man, or living human being, and, perhaps (though not necessarily), the thing imagined. There is no reason why that person may not be the very man one points to when one points to him. Indeed, it must be, for otherwise we could not point and say truly that he, the person so indicated, is imagining his birthplace.

This same observation can be applied, I think, to every other philosophical locution that is brought forth as implying a distinction between persons and their bodies—such as "idea," "sensation," "thought," and so on. At least, I have discovered none which cannot be so dealt with.

The second mistake. It seems quite obviously gratuitous to assume that the living human beings we see (which are bodies) can have no capacities not exemplified in inanimate things, and to rest this assumption on nothing more than the fact that things of either kind are bodies. One might as well claim that inanimate things, like bricks and stones, *can* think, resting this on the fact that, like men, they are bodies. If one gravely asserts that matter cannot think, and then quite validly infers from this that persons, who think, are not bodies,

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we can surely reply that since those living human beings we see around us all the time *do* think—or at least, that there is every reason to believe they do, and no reason to doubt it—then the proper inference should be that some physical objects, namely, those very men we see, do think. And the same, of course, applies to every other capacity which is alleged to be a unique capacity of a person: the capacity to reason, daydream, plan for the future, and so on.

Personal identity through time. Are there, then, any special problems arising from the identity of a given person through time which cast doubt on the foregoing suggestions? I cannot attempt discussion of all such alleged problems, but one or two samples will, I believe, typify them all. And it can be seen, I think, that they simply beg the question.

Thus, it might be asked, what if two persons changed bodies—perhaps gradually, bit by bit, over a long period? Or what if they merely exchanged brains? Or suppose you and I were physically conditioned, perhaps unbeknown to us, in such a way that I (note) "woke up" with all your memories and you with all mine. Which would be you, and which me? What if, for example, I were forced to decide which of these bodies should suffer pain and death, the other to be set free—which, out of self-interest, would I designate for each fate?

Now it should be obvious that in all such questions it is simply presupposed that a person is something distinct from his body, such that the question can, it is thought, be seriously asked, Which person goes with which body?

To see the absurdity of these questions and others like them, let us consider two nonhuman things, such as two automobiles, yours and mine, and fabricate similar "problems." Thus, what if the two cars changed bodies, perhaps gradually, bit by bit, over a long period? Which would be yours, and which mine? Or what if we merely exchanged their engines? Or suppose my car were made to look just like yours, and yours like mine. Suppose further that each was physically conditioned, perhaps unbeknown to us, in such a way that there was every reason to believe that what I supposed was my car had the history which was uniquely that of your car, and vice versa. Which would be which? What if I were forced to decide which of the two cars should be wrecked, and which overhauled? Which, out of self-interest, would I designate for each fate?

Now to affirm an analogy here is, of course, to presuppose that persons are, like cars, identical with their bodies. But to deny the analogy is equally to presuppose that they are not. So, just as this alleged analogy does not *show* that persons are bodies—which it was not intended to show—the denial that the two cases are analogous does not prove any distinction between persons and their bodies. It merely presupposes that distinction.

I do affirm, however, that no absurdity whatever can be derived from

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giving the same kinds of answers to both sets of questions. If my car were made to look like yours, I might think it was yours—but I would be wrong. If it were conditioned to appear to have had the history yours had, I might think it was yours—but I would be wrong. If all the parts of these objects were gradually exchanged, there would be a point at which each would be about half yours, half mine. If the engines were switched, the exact truth would be that my car had your engine, or that your engine had my car. And, I submit, exactly the same kinds of answer can be given, with no absurdity whatever, to the similar questions about persons and their bodies. What any man would *think* or *say* under such fanciful circumstances is not in every case easy to see, but what the truth of the matter would be to someone not misled and knowing the facts, knowing just what has happened with respect to the two men involved, is not so recondite.

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I. THE BASIS OF COMPARISON

A. The origins of Neo-Confucianism and the wen-jen aesthetic. In the Five Dynasties period (907-960), landscape painting began to emerge as a respectable and highly cultivated artistic mode in China. While sophisticated landscapes had been produced in the T'ang period, it is the Sung (960-1127; 1127-1280), the Yüan (1280-1368), and the Ming (1368-1644) periods which hold the position of highest regard in the medium's development.[1] It is also these same periods which serve as the source for the development of the *wen-jen* aesthetic.

As a roughly contemporary cultural development, the Sung also saw the formulation of a revived form of Confucianism, a form of thought which had been indirectly shaped by the intervening years of Buddhist dominance in China and resulted in the most speculative and metaphysical frame into which Confucianism had yet been cast. This new form of Confucianism was termed *Tao Hsüeh*[a], or in Western terminology, 'Neo-Confucianism'. It seems possible to trace the movement partially to a T'ang impetus in Han Yü (768-874) and Li Ao's (844 D.C.) attempts to reinterpret the Classics *Ta Hsüeh* and *Chung Yung,* although their almost complete lack of interest in the concept *li*[b] renders them somewhat incomplete as a source for a school largely identified with that concept.

It was not until the eleventh century and the efforts of Chou Tun-yi[c] (1017-1073), Chang Tsai[d] (1020-1077) and the Ch'eng brothers, Ch'eng Hao[e] (1032-1085) and Ch'eng Yi[f] (1033-1108), that these ideas developed into a discernible system.

However, the line of development from Chou Tun-yi was, as Graham points out, perhaps not so direct as Chu Hsi and recent scholars have claimed it to be.[2] Prior to the middle of the eleventh century, Chou Tun-yi belonged to a school which considered itself quite distinct from the orthodox Confucians who followed in the spirit of Han Yü[g]. Quite unlike the latter group, Chou Tun-yi's school took a great interest in numerical speculation. Indeed, the

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AUTHOR'S NOTE: *I am indebted for the suggestions and criticisms contributed by Professors Peter A. Boodberg and James F. Cahill of the University of California at Berkeley. But my deepest debt is to the late Joseph R. Levenson, Sather Professor of History at Berkeley. His kindness, stimulation, and scholarship were the humane instruments of a great teacher. To those grappling with the Confucian tradition, his untimely death touches each of us and in his gentle way diminishes us all.*

[1] This high regard for the Sung, Yüan, and Ming periods must be tempered by the fact that the T'ang works which have been highly praised by former Chinese critics have almost totally disappeared except for some rather uncertain copies. Therefore, as there is little basis on which to compare the T'ang works with those of the Sung, Yüan, and Ming, the latter win partially by default.

[2] A. C. Graham, *Two Chinese Philosophers* (London: Percy Lund, Humphries & Co. Ltd., 1958), pp. 152-168.

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group actually traced their origin to the computations of the Taoist Ch'en T'uan (d. 989).

There is little doubt that the Ch'eng brothers did study under Chou Tun-yi for a time, even though this relationship was terminated when the elder brother was no more than sixteen and the last recorded direct contact between them occurs two years later in 1049. Yet the writing of the Ch'engs and their father's cousin, Chang Tsai, does not seem to reflect a conscious recognition of Chou as an important influence. Such recognition was to wait until the twelfth century, when Chu Hsi made the connection direct and significant and cited Chou as the ultimate source of all *Tao Hsüeh* branches. While there has been some objection to this connection, the traditional Chinese interpretation, and also that of modern Western scholars, has seemed to accept the explanation of Chu Hsi[h].[3] In response to other members of the Chou numerical school, the Ch'engs were openly critical of Liu Mu[i] (fl. 1040) and little interested in the cosmology of Shao Yung[j] (1011-1077), even though they were personal friends of the latter.

Graham, in a very perceptive analysis, sees an evolution in reasoning processes occurring between the Chou Tun-yi-Shao Yung group of thinkers and the Ch'eng-Chang Tsai group. Specifically, the transition was seen in the supplanting of the key element of *T'ai Chi* (Supreme Ultimate) by *li* (Principle). Along with this change in key elements was a shift in emphasis from calculations which sought to intrigue the mind by insights into geometrical and mathematical symmetry to an explanation which attempted to convince more through logical argument. Their respective attitudes toward the *I Ching* differed in that the diagrams and charts which so frequently appear in the Chou group's approach to the classic are absent in the Ch'eng-Chang Tsai group and reappear only with the twelfth century synthetic interpretations of Chu Hsi. However, the Ch'engs and Chang Tsai, unlike earlier Confucians, were greatly interested in the *I Ching*. Their approach to a given subject might vary, yet that their interests were aroused by similar phenomena is significant and partially explained by the fact that they shared a common speculative spirit. Such a spirit was a new phenomenon within the Confucian tradition and the Chou Tun-yi school of thinkers seems to be the most direct source of this contribution, even though ultimately Buddhist and Taoist influences may be more responsible.

The *Tao Hsüeh* ultimately branched into two distinctive schools, the *Li Hsüeh*[k] and the *Hsin Hsüeh*[l]. This need not concern us here, though it should be pointed out that reference to Neo-Confucianism in this study will primarily signify the earlier of the two schools, namely, the *Li Hsüeh*.

[3] See Graham (p. 161) for an enumeration of several scholars who specifically objected to Chu Hsi's explanation.

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As the title implies, the thrust of this paper is directed toward developing a positive relationship between Neo-Confucianism and *wen-jen* aesthetic theory. The resultant common features should be seen as the property of neither Neo-Confucianism nor *wen-jen* tenets, but rather as developing out of the more basic substratum of Chinese culture. In short, the problem becomes one of specifying these emerging elements. While the early development of *Li Hsüeh* was contemporary with Su Shih (Su Tung-p'o[m]), the school had received its definitive theoretical formulation and had introduced much of its cultural contribution by the death of Chu Hsi in 1200. This means that most of the *wen-jen* tradition followed after the Neo-Confucian formulation had been relatively complete.

The relationship between philosophy and art normally shares certain features through the common source of the culture. Sometimes the connection which these features imply seems less direct, as is frequently the case with Western philosophy and art. However, with the *wen-jen* development in China, the common features are consciously intensified to the point of a partial convergence of philosophy with art. What the following study attempts is to explore the nature of this convergence by examining some of the concepts most relevant to the development of the aesthetic of the *shih-ta-fu*[n] (scholar-gentleman) or *wen-jen*[o] (literatus). For the methods of analysis to be appropriate to the subject matter, there must understandably be a partial convergence of the methods of the philosopher and art historian, and perhaps unfortunately somewhat of a sacrifice of "purity" of respective methodologies in the process.

The Confucian scholar-official class had existed in at least germinal form since the fifth century B.C., and although it had suffered from a temporary demise after the fall of the Han dynasty, the class was vigorously revived during the T'ang. This class of educated and cultivated gentlemen had then accumulated an approximately fifteen-hundred year history prior to its developing an interest in painting. The class had long before acquired an interest in poetry, and many of the most famous T'ang poets were also high officials. The late date at which the class became occupied with painting is probably partly due to the equally late date at which painting acquired respectability as a gentlemanly pursuit.

B. Su Shih and the Ch'eng brothers. If the definition of the *wen-jen* attitude were limited to extant paintings as sources, the beginning could be traced in limited fashion to the works of Su Shih, Mi Fu[p], Mi Yu-jen[q], and Li Kung-lin[r] of the later Northern Sung.[4] More substantial support in extant paintings

[4] Other less famous artists of this germinal style include Wen T'ung, Wang T'ing-yün, and Wang Shen.

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is available in works from the Yüan. However, there are also Northern Sung aesthetic texts which offer a firmer, though not completely undebatable, basis for the beginning of the *wen-jen* tradition.[5]

Su Shih (1036-1101) was one of the earliest articulators of the *wen-jen* attitude. He himself was also identified with another school of thought, the Su school, founded by his father, Su Hsun[s] (literary name: Lao Ch'uan), and participated in by Su Shih's brother, Su Che[t]. The Su school, along with the Hu school, was one of the more important schools that rivaled the emerging Sung school, later known as the *Li Hsüeh* of Neo-Confucianism.

It is to the Ch'eng brothers that the divergence of the system of thought into *Li Hsüeh* and *Hsin Hsüeh* is traced. The disagreement centered upon the definition of the term *li,* as Ch'eng Yi saw *li* as transcending time and space, while Ch'eng Hao saw *li* as a natural force which existed within the object itself. These differing conceptions proved to be the point ultimately of divergence from a more or less unified system into the quite different systems of Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming[u] (1473-1529) respectively. However, the disagreement had not yet become quite so significant during the brothers' lifetimes.

It seems significant that Su Shih's life dates (1036-1101) coincide almost precisely with those of Ch'eng Yi (1033-1108). Also, the greatest *Li Hsüeh* master, Chu Hsi (1130-1200), had been dead for only sixty-nine years when the first of the Four Great Yüan Masters, Huang Kung-wang[v] (1269-1354), was born. Obviously such famous men who were contemporaries, or close to it, would have been well-known and would have exerted a certain amount of influence, whether negative or positive, upon one another. But the objective here is not simply to hypothesize direct relationships or influences, for the relationship between any system of thought and mode of art is certainly of a far less direct and more complex nature.

The formulators of the *Li Hsüeh,* unlike the developing *wen-jen,* did not combine with their cultivation of thought an ability in aesthetic technique. Furthermore, they showed no great interest in doing so. Certain of these formulators, including the most eminent, Chu Hsi, seemed to display only a mediocre critical ability toward painting.[6] On the other hand, neither could many of the formulators of the painting tradition which preceded the *wen-jen* be characterized as philosophers. Many, excluding such examples as Wang

[5] This point is debatable as the texts in question lend themselves to somewhat contradictory interpretations. However, contradictions do not necessarily totally negate the premise that the origins of the *wen-jen* aesthetic lie in the Sung. Any newly emerging aesthetic is likely to contain contradictions due to unmodified concepts which carry over from the older aesthetic. One then is quite possibly justified in qualifying the description of Sung origins of the *wen-jen* as a stage of early, but incomplete, development.

[6] Chu Hsi, "Portraits," quoted in *Gems of Chinese Literature,* ed. Herbert A. Giles, 2 vols. in 1 (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp. and Dover Publications, Inc., 1965), I, 202-203.

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Wei, were craftsmen who were rather restricted to an interest and ability in their own art as a profession. Yet in the eleventh century these two traditions were to converge in that both the *Li Hsüeh* formulators and the early painters were important influences in shaping the style of life whereby the *wen-jen* lived. "Style of life" for the *wen-jen* here implies more than the "what" of Chinese culture for that time. As highly cultured men who moved through many fields with amateur—not professional—familiarity, the *wen-jen* were conscious of a comprehensive cultural inheritance. Of course, theirs was not merely a cultural amalgam, for they absorbed and synthesized both a set of beliefs and a way for enacting these beliefs. "Style of life" for the *wen-jen* includes not simply *what* they believed, but *how* they expressed these beliefs. In short, the *act* of expressing these beliefs represents what this paper will attempt to develop as the essence of the *wen-jen* aesthetic. And it is this "how" or style of expression which may serve as the analytic medium through which the indirect, not direct, relationship between Neo-Confucian thought and the *wen-jen* aesthetic may be defined.

The theoretical disagreement between Su Shih and the Sung school was not total, but centered primarily on differing interpretations of the Classics, particularly of the terms *hsing*[w] and *ming*[x].[7] The confusing mixture of common sources held by the two interpretations becomes apparent when one considers that the Su school supposedly derived their definition for the terms from Buddhist and Taoist sources.[8] Yet Buddhist and Taoist sources were equally influential though perhaps differently applied in Neo-Confucian thought.

Unlike the theoretical divergencies between the Su Shih and the Ch'eng Yi groups, the personal differences between the two seemed severe and irreconcilable. In part, the severity was probably brought on by Ch'eng Yi's critical and uncompromising tendencies. The result was that the factional disputes of the time included a particularly intense struggle between a Szechuan group led by Su Shih and a Lo-yang group headed by Ch'eng Yi. Both, however, seem also to have had common enemies among Wang An-shih's New Law reformers, for by 1100, Ch'eng Yi and Su Shih were among the hundreds of scholar-officials who had been blacklisted.[9]

[7] Cyril D. Le Gros Clark, *The Prose-Poetry of Su Tung-p'o* (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., 1935), p. 28. One must, however, read this study with caution as the book is occasionally inaccurate. Clark's reference to the disagreement in question is based in part on a Su Tung-p'o *fu* entitled *Cho-lao yu miao li fu* which Clark translates as "Mysterious Are the Eternal Verities that Lie in Thick Wine" (see pp. 191-204). However, even Clark admits that his translation and interpretation is in dispute and notes that Chinese, as opposed to foreign, commentators see the *fu* as less satirical in tone (p. 194).

[8] J. Percy Bruce, *Chu Hsi and His Masters* (London: Probsthain & Co., 1923), pp. 197-198.

[9] Chu Hsi and Lü Tsu-ch'ien, *Reflections on Things at Hand* [*Chin-ssu lu*], tr. and notes by Wing-tsit Chan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. xxx-xxxi.

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There was apparently general agreement between the two schools on cosmogony, and cosmogony was an essential part of Neo-Confucianism. Su Shih's emphasis upon action and process rather than on static states is apparent in his definition of 'good'. To see 'good' as a static human condition is wrong; 'good' is rather the act of *living* the *Tao*. Su Shih and Ch'eng Hao, but not Ch'eng Yi, agreed in this definition of 'good' as phrased by Su Shih:[10]

> The Yin and Yang interacting produce things, the Way connecting with things produces good. When things are produced the Yin and Yang hide, when good is established the Way is no longer seen . . . Good is what succeeds (*chi*[y]) the Way but cannot be identified with the Way.[11]

The agreement in the areas of cosmogony and the idea of 'good' as a process of "how" rather than a state of "what" has important implications for the emerging *wen-jen* attitude. The thought of Su Shih, a formative *wen-jen* theorist, is an example of the beginning of this absorption of ideas akin to that of Neo-Confucianism. The following section presents certain basic Neo-Confucian concepts that came to be shared by the *wen-jen* aesthetic.

II. SOME BASIC NEO-CONFUCIAN CONCEPTS

A. Neo-Confucian cosmogony: The T'ai Chi. Early Neo-Confucianists took a great interest in cosmogony and it is this interest that explains much of the Neo-Confucian attention toward the *I Ching*. The Third Appendix of the *I Ching* introduces the concepts of the *T'ai Chi*[z], *yang*[aa], and *yin*[ab] as primary elements in the cosmogony. It is not fully clear to what degree the *I* contains a developed cosmogony based on the *T'ai Chi* or whether the cosmogony was a later development of Chou Tun-yi. The problem becomes more complicated in that Chou Tun-yi used a diagram which he quite possibly borrowed from certain Taoists in quest of the immortal elixir. And while it was Chou Tun-yi who originally presented the diagram in Neo-Confucian terms, the ultimate Neo-Confucian interpretation belongs to Chu Hsi.

The *T'ai Chi T'u*[ac] (Bruce: "Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate," or Needham: "Diagram of the Supreme Pole") is presented in Figure 1. The aim here must be a limited one, and therefore the interpretation will purposely

[10] Cf. Graham, pp. 134-135. Chang Tsai, Ch'eng Hao, and Su Shih tended to view 'good' as a process of *how* one acts rather than the nature of *what* one receives at birth. Ch'eng Yi seems to represent the beginning of an important shift in that he adopts Mencius's position on the inherent goodness of *li* and therefore of nature (*hsing*) also. The importance of Ch'eng Yi's position is established by Chu Hsi's adoption of his position in the next century. Something fundamental seems to have happened here, for on one side the emphasis is on *process* which tends to lead toward flux, and on the other the emphasis is on *nature* which leads toward stability.

[11] *Su-shih Yi-chuan*, 159/13-160/6, trans. and quoted in Graham, p. 135.

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

Figure 1: The *T'ai Chi T'u* [Diagram of the Supreme Pole] of Chou T'un-yi.

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emphasize certain elements. The entire diagram from segments one through five may be considered as a process which both begins and ends with the same form, namely, a symbolic circle. Of course, while these diagrams represent a cosmogony, they do not represent the actual and historical sequence of creation. They represent rather a logical sequence which is valid only when viewed symbolically, i.e., it yields only the logic underlying the empirical details, not the empirical details themselves. In this sense, *yang* and *yin* should not be too concretely limited to the male and female connotations, nor should the five elements be totally identified with their literal and empirical namesakes.

Chu Hsi designates segment 1 as representing the *T'ai Chi,* which is the source of both the energy and inertia that produce the positive and negative modes, respectively. The concentric circles of segment 2 are divided between left and right, which represent *yang* and *yin* taking up their respective functions and establishing the Two *I* (*Liang I*[ad]).[12] The design of concentric circles with divided shading is particularly appropriate since the Two *I* actually breed and absorb one another in cyclical fashion. Segment 3, which is graphically connected to segment 2, represents the transformation and union of the positive and negative modes to produce the Five Agents (*wu hsing*[ae]). The Agents are aligned on the appropriate side according to whether their respective natures are more positive, negative, or mixed. The order of sequence is represented by the numbers beside the Agents (numbers are the addition of the author). The small circle with four lines converging into it, at the base of segment 3, represents the Two *I* and Five Agents unified into the *T'ai Chi.*

Segment 4 symbolizes the Ether of the Two *I* as operating through the principles of *Ch'ien*[af] (hexagram ䷀) and *K'un*[ag] (hexagram ䷁) to become the corresponding male and female principles of the universe. The circle sym-

[12] Bruce has translated *pu* as "Mode" and many have followed suit. However, Professor Boodberg suggests the translation of "slant," as in the natural slant of a hillside. Viewed in terms of the definition presented in the later pages of this article which sees the cycle of *yang* and *yin* as a rhythmic thrust and decline, this idea of slant seems more definitive than the rather vague "Mode." Viewed in terms of Professor Boodberg's graphic representation of the *yang* and *yin* process as presented in the accompanying illustration, the idea of two slanting elements seems particularly appropriate. The two forces, *yang* and *yin,* converge upon and diverge from one another. The point of convergence represents the point of unity which on its largest scale may be taken as the *T'ai Chi,* and on a smaller scale, any point where *yang* and *yin* forces (*yang* and *yin* roles are defined in terms of *function* rather than essence) converge, are transformed into an indistinguishable unity following which they diverge again as distinct *yang* and *yin* forces. The fluid and interchangeable nature of the forces is fundamental. The convergence into *chi* (pole) involves a sense of urgency, a tension between two forces which is resolved by the convergence, only to be created again with the ensuing divergence.



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bolizes their unity within the *T'ai Chi.* Segment 5 represents a summation of the entire production of the myriad forms (*wan wu*) proceeding from unity and returning to it again. In terms of analysis, the cycle is complete. In terms of actual functioning, however, the process is much too complex and interwoven ever to designate the "end" of a cycle.

The above-presented *T'ai Chi* Diagram of Chou Tun-yi, along with the "Explanation of the *T'ai Chi* Diagram" (*T'ai Chi Tu Shuo*[ah]), represent two of the more important elements of Neo-Confucian thought, but this was also to have important implications for the life-style of the *wen-jen.* The above explains not simply the creation of the universe, but more important, *how* the universe perpetuates itself. The diagram does not actually begin from a unique or new point of genesis; rather, the creation is made out of what has disintegrated or decayed. As such, creation does not necessarily imply a "new" or "unique" phenomenon. The concept of creating from nothingness was not a prominent concept in traditional China, as it was in the West. Creation is but a process in a cycle and is consequently somewhat reduced in importance vis-à-vis the Western concept of creation, whether the latter be the *nous* of the Greeks, the thunderous creation of Genesis, or certain cataclysmic origins postulated by modern physics. This does not mean that creation becomes unimportant, but that it must share prominence on a more equal basis with other processes.

B. The cycle as rhythm. Western philosophy has largely thrived on speculation and abstraction that frequently implies an attempt purposely to avoid the concrete. This prejudice against the concrete as inferior was early defined by Plato and has been adopted by much of Western philosophy almost as an axiom. In China such a prejudice is largely unknown. A concrete image was as desirable in Chinese thought as in Chinese verse. In this sense Chinese philosophy never separated itself so severely from the concretely oriented arts of verse and painting as did Western philosophy. Therefore, in order to comprehend fully the concept of cycle implied in Neo-Confucian cosmogony —that is, hopefully to understand the concept as the Chinese themselves did— a more concrete interpretation must be found.

The cosmogony represents the *T'ai Chi* as the source out of which all phenomena arise and into which all recede. The immediate problem is to specify as clearly as possible the process by which the *T'ai Chi* engages with the universe and both sets phenomena into and takes phenomena out of existence and motion. *T'ai Chi* has been translated by Needham as "Supreme Pole," and while this seems more precise than the suggested "Supreme Ultimate" of Bruce, it is still perhaps necessary to analyze the term *chi* as "pole" more closely. The Western concept of pole typically presents a vertical image, but the Chinese pole is frequently seen as horizontal, such as in the ridgepole

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of a house. Furthermore, the pole which is assumed to run through the Son of Heaven's throne and the Pole Star (North Star) is not perfectly vertical, that is, perpendicular to the earth's surface, but is rather slightly inclined.

The difficulty with the polar interpretation as an explanation of the *T'ai Chi* cycle lies in its apparently limited application to only a few situations. Beyond these situations, the polar concept lacks the flexibility to be adapted as an explanation for a wider variety of phenomena. The explanations based on the models of a pivot or a vortex share this same limitation in that they too will apply only to a limited number of phenomena. However, there is an explanation which has not only wider applicability, but also strong etymological support. This explanation views the cycle of the *T'ai Chi* as a rhythm, and it contains some rather fascinating implications for Chinese painting.

It was seen in the *T'ai Chi* diagram that *yang* and *yin* are the efficient manifestations of the *T'ai Chi* and as such are associated with the Two *I*, *Tung*[al] and *Ching*[aj] respectively.[13] A consideration of the etymology underlying the terms *yang* and *yin* may offer some insights. The common analysis of the terms reduces *yang* into the component elements of radical #170, *fou*^{3} [ak], which means "mound" or "slope," and the character *yang*^{2} [al], which means "to expand, open out; bright, glorious." (Raised italic numbers denote tonal qualities.) The recognizable component of the latter character is radical #72, *jih*^{4} [am] or "sun." *Yin* is subdivided into *fou*^{3} (hill) and *yün*^{2} [an] (cloud).

The key element in *yang*^{2} [ao] is *yang*^{2} [ap]. The latter's meaning as used in the former becomes clear when one considers its use as an element in certain other characters. One of these other characters is *yang*^{2} [aq], which means basically "to raise up" or "to spread." When used in conjunction with the character for "to fly," a compound is formed of *fei yang*[ar] meaning "to soar (as a bird)," or "upsurge." When used with the character meaning "to put forth" or "rise," the resulting compound is *fa yang*[as], which means "to expand." Professor Boodberg suggests that *yang*[at] is almost interchangeable with

[13] The relationship between the *T'ai Chi* and *yang* and *yin* is perhaps made more explicit by the following passage from the *T'ai Chi Tu Shuo* by Chou Tun-yi. The translation is mine.

(1) *Wu chi êrh t'ai chi*[bv].
Under the circumstances of lacking a pole (an ultimate), there is the Supreme Pole (Supreme Ultimate).
(2) *T'ai chi tung erh sheng yang*[bw].
Under the circumstances of the Supreme Pole moving, yang is produced
(3) *Tung chi erh ching*[bx].
and with movement reaching its ultimate, there is stillness.
(4) *Ching erh sheng yin*[by].
Under the circumstances of stillness, yin is produced
(5) *Ching chi fu tung*[bz].
and with stillness reaching its ultimate, again there is movement.
(6) *I tung i ching hu wei chi ken*[ca].
The alternation of movement and stillness mutually constitutes their (common) source.

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yang[au]. Certainly the above analysis implies that there is some basis to this suggestion. In terms of Neo-Confucian cosmogony the suggestion offers a great deal of potential, particularly when counterposed to the equally obvious cloudy or dark (side) of the hill implied in *yin*[av]. But in terms of contrasting *yang*[aw] and *yin*[ax], the phonetic element *chin*[ay] offers much that is not so obvious. In earlier pronunciations *chin* shared the same pronunciation of 'həm' (either level or entering ancient tone) with radical #180[az], which means "sound." The sound of 'həm' when pronounced is almost identical with that of a low humming noise. The above then establishes a possible connotation for *yin*[ba] of a humming sound perhaps akin to a primordial humming comparable to that caused by the vibration of heavenly bodies within the universe.[14] In addition, there is the connotation of darkness. That the concepts of humming and darkness were not unrelated in the Chinese mind may be confirmed by the appearace of *chin*[bb] as an element in both *yin*[3 bc], which actually means "to hum," and *ch'ien*[1 bd], which means "black."

The connotations of upsurge and brightness in *yang* could be juxtaposed to the low humming and darkness of *yin* to yield a rhythm of a thrust followed by a decline. Perhaps, then, in developing the cyclical basis of Neo-Confucian cosmogony, one should move from the concept of a geometric circle to that of a repetitious or cyclical rhythm in which the thrust may be equated with *tung* (motion) and the decline with *ching* (quiescence). However, the process of thrust and decline is not to be viewed as a vertical plunge. Such thought is more appropriate to the vertically-minded West, where history is frequently interpreted in relation to the "rise and fall" of a particular civilization, in which the "height" of such a civilization is clearly designated. In the Neo-Confucian process the thrust is more that of an oblique rise such as is

[14] There is a possible similarity between the "primordial humming" postulated here and the function attributed to music in Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*. Both the "humming" and the "music" are primordial sources of forces that transcend individual barriers. In the Chinese framework, the humming is a primary cosmological force. In the Nietzschean framework, the music is part of the Dionysian element which opposes the individuating Apollonian force. Nietzsche describes the position of music as follows: "Language can never adequately render the cosmic symbolism of music, because music stands in symbolic relation to the primordial contradiction and primordial pain in the heart of the Primal Unity, and therefore symbolizes a sphere which is beyond and before all phenomena. Rather are all phenomena, compared with it, merely symbols . . ." (Friedrich Nietzsche, *Birth of Tragedy*, trans. Clifton P. Fadiman [New York: Modern Library, 1927], p. 979).

In addition, one might consider the Sanskrit *Om*. Here is a sound of an obviously humming quality which has several primordial implications. Linguistically, *Om* is supposed to contain all other syllables in the Sanskrit phonology. As for meaning, the term is a name for the Absolute and is used in mantras, as the modern chanter could well testify.

While the nature of these implications associated with the sound of a humming quality is somewhat speculative, it appears nevertheless that something like an archetype would not be impossible as a unifying factor.

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represented by the expression *fei yang,* meaning upsurge as in a bird's ascent. The interval between where the upsurge ends and the decline begins is *not* a clearly differentiated apogee. The process is more comparable to the flow and ebb of waves at a seashore with their vaguely divided transition between where the flow ends and the ebb begins.

Chang Tsai seems to offer support for viewing the basic universal process as such a pulsating rhythm. T'ang Chün-i cites Chang's basic formulation that all things originate through the "extension" *shen*[be] and "contraction" *ch'ü*[bf] (or "transformation" *hua*[bg]) of *ch'i*[bh]. The extension leads to intercourse with and "prehension" of another thing followed by contraction. The extension is caused by the inherent void in each thing which seeks to be fulfilled by embracing other things.[15] Here the processes of extension and contraction are readily associated with the rise and fall of the *yang-yin* rhythm. *Shen* (extension) is associated with the union of two things, i.e., the movement from quiet to activity. *Hua* (transformation) is associated with the dissolution of things, i.e., the movement from activity to quiet. The similarity between this dualism and that of the *T'ai Chi* diagram and explanation becomes apparent when one considers the latter's movement from *yang* to *yin* and back *to yang* with the corresponding qualities of *tung* (movement) and *ching* (tranquillity).

More specific representations of the *yang-yin* rhythm could be drawn which incorporate the idea of pivot or pole (*chi*). However, the example of a pole is a bit limiting on the concept of the cycle, for while a concrete interpretation is desirable, it need not necessarily be so visually concrete. Perhaps one should interpret 'concrete' more as a very clear *feeling* or *experience,* and perhaps we move even closer to the meaning of the rhythmic cycle if we interpret it in a kinesthetic sense. One example which can be seen, heard, and—perhaps more importantly—felt is that of the flow and ebb of human blood through the arteries and veins. The cyclical and rhythmic flow is in turn caused by another rhythm, the systolic contraction and diastolic expansion of the heart, which in turn could be referred to the rhythmic cycle of the individual life and therefrom ultimately referred to the rhythmic (and creative) cycle of the universe. The *T'ai Chi,* through its production of the *yang-yin* rhythm, shows its manifestation to be in the form of a pulsating rhythm. Taking the *T'ai Chi,* the most basic element of the universe, it is possible to link these two elements through the medium of the rhythm. As with expressing the body's pulsation of blood, a concrete experience of the self becomes connected with and projected into a concrete experience of the world through the phenomenon of a rhythmic cycle.

[15] T'ang Chün-i, "Chang Tsai's Theory of Mind and Its Metaphysical Basis," *Philosophy East and West* VI, no. 2 (July 1956), 124-126.

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III. THE RHYTHMIC CYCLE IN WEN-JEN THEORY

The problem now remains of relating these elements of Neo-Confucian thought to *wen-jen* painting. In the *wen-jen* aesthetic, brushwork was fundamental. The motivation here was in part literary, for accomplishment in calligraphy had been a respected ideal long before painting was accepted by the literati. A *wen-jen* was by definition a literate man and therefore a man somewhat accomplished with the brush. Calligraphy represented an art mode unto itself in which the rhythm of the line was all important. When calligraphic elements were carried over into the painting of the *wen-jen,* rhythm of brushstroke became a prime criterion of artistic quality. But what was underlying the *wen-jen* interest in rhythm? What did rhythm mean to them?

In attempting to comprehend what rhythm meant to the *wen-jen* one must consider the term as one which pervades more than the realm of painting. This is not to make an unjustified extension of the term. Rhythm has already been seen in the above paragraph to extend into calligraphy which, no matter how closely related to painting in *wen-jen* theory, does maintain a distinct nature. The extension is further supported by the eclectic influence brought to bear upon the *wen-jen* through their own preference. By interpreting 'rhythm' in terms of the definition of pulsating process developed in the previous section, one perhaps comes closer to understanding not only what importance rhythm held for the Neo-Confucianist, but also for the *wen-jen.* And it is helpful to bear in mind when considering *wen-jen* brushwork that rhythm was defined in the last section as a concrete feeling or experience combining the visual, the audible, and especially the *kinesthetic* senses.

The *Wu-sheng shih-shih*[bi] offers a pertinent description of Tung Ch'i-ch'ang[bj] (1555-1636), a late and influential *wen-jen* theorist:

> Still, when approaching the age of 80, he could read by lamplight books with characters no larger than a fly's head, and write equally small characters. This was possible because he held the creative power of nature in his hand and was nourished by the mists and clouds. . . . His brush harmonized with the spirit of things and thus he reached the very essence of "life-breath and movement" (*Ch'i-yün sheng-tung*) i.e., spirit resonance. Consequently it may be said that everything in his paintings, whether clouds, peaks or stones, was made as by the power of Heaven, his brushwork being quite unrestrained like the working of nature.[16]

That Tung Ch'i-ch'ang followed five hundred years after Su Shih need not in this case make the passage inapplicable. The men shared certain characteristic *wen-jen* attitudes. The *wen-jen* were greatly interested in achieving in their brushstroke a rhythm like that of nature. As such, by imitating nature's rhythm, they would effectively create. One might pause here to compare this

[16] *Wu-sheng shih-shih,* Lithographic Reprint, c. 4, Ib-2a, quoted in Osvald Sirén, *Chinese Painting,* 7 vols. (New York: Roland Press Co., 1956-58), V, 4.

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attitude with that of a Western painter. The Western landscape painter may try to imitate the appearance of nature and even capture the spirit in it, but he has not normally been concerned with reproducing the rhythm of nature in his own hand. In contrast, the *wen-jen* was far less interested in attaining a likeness of nature than in capturing nature's rhythm and thereby perhaps capturing the spirit not only of nature, but of life itself. As a result, the rhythm is not only conveyed to the painting, but also experienced by the painter himself in the process of painting.

In the above description of Tung Ch'i-ch'ang, Tung's achievement in capturing nature's rhythm is repeatedly emphasized, e.g., "he held the creative power of nature in his hand . . ."; "everything in his paintings . . . was made as by the power of Heaven"; ". . . his brushwork being quite unrestrained like the working of nature." The phrase "His brush harmonized with the spirit of things and thus he reached the very essence of 'life-breath and movement' " reflects the usage of Hsieh Ho's (ca. 500) first canon *Ch'i-yün sheng-tung*[bk]. As Hsieh Ho's canons were formulated in a period with a quite different attitude toward painting, it is likely that the original interpretation underwent some modification, though the exact degree of modification is difficult to define. Certainly chronology excludes the possibility that Neo-Confucianism influenced Hsieh Ho's original interpretation, yet *ch'i* is a fundamental Neo-Confucian term, and one of the two most basic elements (the other being *li*) in the *Li Hsüeh* system.[17]

Yün[4] [bl] etymologically stems from the semantic *yin*[1] [bm] (sound, musical tone) and from the phonetic *yün*[2], *yüan*[2] [bn]. While the character is listed in the dictionary under radical #30, *k'ou*[3] [bo] (mouth, hold), actually the graphic devolution shows that the top element is not the mouth radical, but a circle[bp]. The latter element consists of a circle and *pei*[4] [bq], the term for "cowrie shells" and hence "wealth." As such, the term refers to the counting of money, which was one of the functions of an official and therefore one of the definitions of that occupation. It may be that the phonetic[br] also functions as a semantic in *yün*[4] in the sense that rhyme and particularly rhythm involve the sense of counting sounds.

There is, however, an alternate character for *yün*[4] which perhaps more

[17] One must not be overly homogeneous in treating terms with such complex histories as *ch'i*, *li*, and *yün*. The treatment of *ch'i* and *li* within this paper is generally within the Neo-Confucian context which sees *ch'i* as roughly equivalent to 'matter-energy', which is organized or patterned with ethical connotations according to *li*. It is very difficult to offer any acceptable English translation for *li*, including the most frequently offered rendering of 'principle'. Hsieh Ho's first canon, which utilized the term *ch'i*, has received a vast and varied amount of interpretation which is beyond the scope of this paper. What is noted here is simply the common occurrence and primary importance of *ch'i* in both Hsieh Ho's canon and Neo-Confucian thought. In addition, the treatment of *yün* which also occurs in the first canon is rather theoretical, without specific reference to Hsieh Ho's meaning.

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clearly establishes the meaning. Rhythm only becomes rhythm as such when there is some distinct and regular demarcation in an indefinitely continuous string of sounds. The regularity of the demarcation seems somewhat confirmed by the alternate form of *yün*^{4}, namely, *yün*$^{4\ bs}$. The radical *yün*$^{2\ bt}$, which seems to act as a phonetic and in part a semantic, means "to divide equally," or "equal; even."

The demarcation normally defines the repetitive (and cyclical in that it repeats itself) element in the string of sounds and thus defines a pattern. Of course, eventually the pattern may—and probably will—modify, but there always remains a common element. For instance, a musical theme begun in 2/4 musical measure will normally remain in that rhythmic measure until completed. While it is certainly possible for the composer to break into a 3/4 measure, the dividing point would generally be so disruptive as to break that pattern of rhythm to the extent that the new measure would be identified with a new rhythm. In short, then, a rhythm involves a repetitive element which may vary within a degree, but once this variance exceeds this degree, then the rhythm is broken and a new pattern established. While the demarcation of the rhythm is accomplished by some form of counting, it must be emphasized that the counting need not be of the conscious or analytic variety. In fact, the mastery of an unconscious form of counting is equally important to the musician, the poet, and the painter.

Painting was the last of the three art forms to be accepted by the literati, and with this acceptance came the development of an aesthetic which attempted to integrate all three forms not simply into the same artist, but even to a degree into the same medium. Perhaps the *wen-jen* acceptance of painting and the aesthetic which motivated that acceptance may be partially accounted for by pointing to the cultural sophistication attained in China. Perhaps the presence of highly and widely sophisticated minds is a prerequisite for awareness of so sophisticated a concept as the pervasiveness of rhythm throughout not only painting, verse, and music, but life itself. H. C. Chang, discussing the importance of the Yüan *wen-jen* masters, refers to their search, not for the unique, but for the force which pervaded all forms of natural and human experience: "The search, after all, was not for the new and untried, but for greater mastery of the medium of brush and ink, and complete blending with that spirit which informs nature, art and life alike."[18]

Further support for extending the rhythm of Neo-Confucian cosmogony to Chinese painting comes from Victoria Contag.[19] She sees Hsieh Ho's first canon, "The harmonizing movement of lifebreath," as manifesting a rising

[18] H. C. Chang, "Inscriptions, Stylistic Analysis and Traditional Judgement in Yüan, Ming and Ch'ing Painting," *Asia Major* VII (1959), 227.
[19] Victoria Contag, "The Unique Characteristics of Chinese Landscape Pictures," *Archives of the Chinese Art Society of America* VI (1952), 56-57.

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and falling rhythm. While Miss Contag refers in her presentation to the paintings primarily of Ming artists, the impression is that her remarks are meant to apply to most of the *wen-jen* tradition and perhaps to even a broader range of painters.

One perhaps better realizes in light of the above how and why the Chinese differed in their attitude from the concept of creativity predominant in the West. The *wen-jen* strived to capture the method of nature's creation. This method which they sought was nature's rhythm, and the method was important not merely because it was nature's method but also because they as humans shared with nature the category of "life." By capturing the rhythm of the universe's most common denominator, the process of life itself, they achieved an identification which probably does not totally admit itself to discursive description. Yet it is most interesting to note the very concrete and non-mystical nature of the *wen-jen*'s means of achieving this identification. It makes a distinct contrast with the abstract and purposely nontangible, frequently mystical means used by Western minds in their attempts to identify with a supraindividual force. Whether the attempts be Plato's ascent to enlightenment or Hegel's "infinite embrace of the universe," the intervening two thousand years of Western experience did not dissolve the West's basic aversion toward the material.

In contrast with the West, the Chinese were not to seek totally new methods in their art, but rather to *create* by means of *imitating*. The imitation was achieved by coming into harmony with the rhythm of life and therefore with life itself. It is unlikely to be mere coincidence that *yün*, besides meaning "rhythm," also denotes "harmony."

The notion of being in harmony with the universe has implications not only for the *wen-jen*'s definition of individuality but also of moral significance. These implications, along with the question of how coming into harmony with the universe through imitation of the universe's rhythm was ethically desirable, are subjects to be pursued in another article.

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a 道學
b 理
c 周敦頤（濂溪）
d 張載
e 程灝（明道）
f 程頤（伊川）
g 韓愈
h 朱熹
i 劉牧
j 邵雍
k 理學
l 心學
m 蘇軾（東波）
n 士大夫
o 文人
p 米黻（芾）
q 米友仁
r 李公麟（龍眼）
s 蘇洵
t 蘇轍
u 王陽明（王守仁）
v 黃公望
w 性
x 命
y 繼
z 太極

aa 陽
ab 陰
ac 太極圖
ad 兩儀
ae 五行
af 乾
ag 坤
ah 太極圖說
ai 動
aj 靜
ak 阝，阜
al 昜＜昜＜昜
am 日
an 云
ao 陽
ap 易
aq 揚
ar 飛揚
as 發揚
at 揚
au 陽
av 陰
aw 陽
ax 陰
ay 今
az 音

ba 陰
bb 今
bc 吟
bd 黔
be 神
bf 屈
bg 化
bh 氣
bi 無聲詩史
bj 董其昌
bk 氣韻生動
bl 韻
bm 音
bn 員
bo 口
bp 員＜負＜貝。
bq 見
br 員
bs 韵
bt 勻
bu 儀
bv 無極而太極
bw 太極動而生陽
bx 動極而靜
by 靜而生陰
bz 靜其復動
ca 一動一靜互爲其根

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REALITY AND APPEARANCE

Advaita Vedānta is at once the most widely held philosophic position in India today, the most startling in its claims about the nature of the world and our perception of it, and the most difficult for Westerners to comprehend—let alone accept. Volumes of literature have been written both in defense and in exposition of it, but perhaps the most famous statement of its doctrine is in the following *śloka* (stanza) from the *Bālabodhinī,* a work usually attributed to that most famous of all Advaitins, Śrī Śaṅkarācārya (A.D. 788-820):

ślokārdhena pravakṣyāmi yad uktaṁ graṁthakoṭibhiḥ
brahma satyaṁ jagan mithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ.

With half a *śloka* I will declare what has been said in thousands of volumes: Brahman is real, the world is false, the soul is only Brahman, nothing else.

That is to say, there is only one thing which can, properly speaking, be called "real" (*sat*), and that is Brahman. All else which we might call "real," including the human soul, is identical with that one reality. Anything which cannot be so identified with that one reality is "false" (*mithyā*), or in other words is only *apparently* real—is only an appearance, an illusion (*māyā*).

This is a remarkable claim, indeed! It implies that the whole of the world of our ordinary experience is an illusion. It implies that you are not *really* reading this article, that I did not *really* write it, that the room you are in does not *really* exist, that you cannot *really* look out your window and see *real* buildings, sky, and clouds, etc. It implies that all these things are only *apparently* so. This is what Advaita means when it claims that the world is "false."

And when Advaita states that the world is "false," in the sense of illusory, that must mean not only the external physical world, but the internal psychical world as well, since both are experienced as pluralistic and Advaita maintains that reality is unitary. As Ras Vihari Das puts it in his article, "The Falsity of the World":

> The world does not mean merely the external visible world with its sensible qualities. It means this and more than this. . . . In fact whatever can be presented to us either externally or internally, to the mind or the senses forms part of the world which as a whole as well as every item in it is said to be false. Falsity is thus asserted of everything that we can sense or feel, think of or imagine as an object.[1]

But clearly, the world cannot be totally *un*real in the sense of being fictitious or nonexistent. We do, after all, perceive it. Falsity, then, although it excludes

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[1] Ras Vihari Das, "The Falsity of the World," *Philosophical Quarterly* [Amalner] XIX, no. 2 (July 1943), 80.

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reality (*sat*), does not entail unreality (*asat*). This is what is meant by calling the world an illusion. Although an illusion has a peculiar ontological status, it is not that of nonbeing or nonexistence. The very word '*mithyā*' seems to me to bring this out.

The word '*mithyā*' is a contraction of '*mithūyā*' derived from the root '√*mith*', which means either (1) "unite" or "couple," (2) "meet" or "engage" (in altercation), or (3) "alternate." The word '*mithyā*' comes from the third sense and is used adverbially (often with respect to a person's behavior) as meaning "invertedly," "contrarily," "improperly," or "incorrectly." This sense is extended to a nominal form meaning "false." Actually, it would seem more literal to extend it to "mistaken," that is, "taken or perceived incorrectly," even though that translation might not always read well in English, such as in the *śloka* quoted above. Such a translation would bring out more clearly Advaita's claim that the judgments we normally make about the world, on the basis of our sense perception of it, are mistaken. Certainly, if reality is unitary, then the plurality of the world cannot be real; we must be mis-perceiving the world and then mis-judging it on the basis of our ignorance of the truth of the matter.

But why, one might ask, does Advaita take this very unusual attitude toward the world? Why does Advaita refuse to accept anything except Brahman to be worthy of the title "real"? Time and again in Advaita literature, one is confronted with arguments like: "This cannot be real because it is changing," or "That cannot be real because it is dependent upon something else for its existence." On the other hand, words like 'eternal', 'immutable', 'unlimited', 'unchanging', and 'permanent' are constantly used in conjunction with the word 'real' (*sat*). Why do Advaitins refuse to acknowledge a thing to be real unless it is eternal, immutable, unlimited, and unchanging? There are, I believe, a number of considerations involved in an answer to these questions, but perhaps the most basic of them involves Advaita's definition of the word 'real'. A discussion of this may help throw light on some of the basic tenets of Advaita and make those tenets a bit more intelligible—even if no more credible.

Before turning to Advaita's definition of the word 'real', however, it would be well to review first what we ordinarily mean in the West by that term. We find that the word is not used in one single sense, but rather has a number of different meanings. The following seem to me to be the most important of these:

1. One common use of the word 'real' is "genuine"—as opposed to "fraudulent" or "fake." This is what we mean when we speak of "real diamonds" (as opposed to "paste" diamonds) or "a real Rembrandt" (as opposed to a forgery).

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2. Another common use is "natural"—as opposed to "artificial." We find this use in phrases like "a real pond" (as opposed to a man-made pond) or "a real ruby" (as opposed to a synthetic ruby).

3. Then again, 'real' may mean "nonimaginary" or "nonillusory," e.g., real water (as opposed to that seen in a mirage) or a real dagger (as opposed to the one Macbeth thinks he sees before him). This begins to sound more like what Advaita seems to be saying.

4. The word 'real' is also used to mean "lasting" or "permanent," which, again, is very close to the way Advaitins want to use the term. But this would appear to be an axiological rather than an ontological use of the term in English, whereas Advaita must clearly be using the term ontologically. That is to say, this use of the word 'real' seems to imply the application of a system of values to a situation, beyond the bare description of the facts. Thus, we speak of "real satisfaction" (as opposed to a temporary satiation of desires) or "real peace" (as opposed to a temporary cessation of hostilities). For, if war is fighting and the fighting has stopped, is that not peace? It certainly would seem so, considering the situation ontologically; that is, considering the bare state of affairs itself. And since the cessation of fighting is an actual state of affairs, is not the peace *real* peace? The fact that we often do *not* consider it so indicates that more than mere description of the situation is involved in this use of the term 'real'; a system of values, that is, axiology, is involved as well.

5. Finally, in a more general sense, 'real' means to most English-speaking people simply "existent," just as does the word *'sat'* in Sanskrit.[2] This, of course, does not say very much, but it does rule out purely fictitious entities. One common criterion for "existent" is "experienceable," a criterion I believe Advaita wants to use for reality, though this criterion has some unfortunate implications. More of this later.

Philosophically, the most interesting is the third use of the word 'real' as "nonillusory" or "nonimaginary." A brief comment on this will serve to lead into a discussion of Advaita's use of the term.

How do we determine a thing to be illusory or imaginary? One way we have of determining this in ordinary life is to look at the thing in question again, or to scrutinize it more carefully. For instance, to take the most common example from Advaita, when we look at a rope coiled in a dimly lighted room and misperceive it as a snake, we may take a closer look at our "snake"; upon doing so, the imagined "snake" disappears and we see the rope for what it is—and for what it had been all along. As Advaita puts it, we *sublate* the

[2] For a detailed discussion of the fact that *'sat'* means both "real" and "existent," see P. T. Raju, "The Conception of *Sat* (Existence) in Śaṅkara's Advaita," *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* XXXVI (1955), 33-45.

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erroneous "snake" percept with a veridical rope percept. Sublation, then, is one way of determining that a previously perceived thing was unreal in the sense of "illusory" or "imaginary."

Another way we have of determining that a thing is not real in this sense is by subjecting it to a wider range of scrutiny; for instance, trying to touch it as well as see it, or looking at it under different circumstances, or submitting it to some kind of test. In effect, this is what Macbeth does when he sees the dagger in front of him. He says:

> Is this a dagger which I see before me,
> The handle toward my hand? Come, let me clutch thee.
> I have thee not, and yet I see thee still.
> Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible
> To feeling as to sight? or art thou but
> A dagger of the mind, a false creation,
> Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain?
> . . . I see thee still,
> And on thy blade and dudgeon gouts of blood,
> Which was not so before. There's no such thing:
> It is the bloody business which informs
> Thus to mine eyes.

This is also what we do when we see a stick apparently "bent" where it enters the water; we pull the stick out of the water, see that it is straight, and decide that its bent appearance *in* the water must be an illusion. In all such cases, we examine the object in question under a wide range of circumstances and determine that our initial perception of it must have been mistaken because that perception is not consistent with the rest of our experience. Examining its consistency with a wider range of experience, then, is another way we have of determining that a thing is unreal in the sense of "illusory" or "imaginary."

We are now in a better position to appreciate Advaita's use of the word 'real' (*sat*), since both sublation and consistency are important considerations in its use. In fact, Advaitins, I maintain, use the word 'real' in a combination of the third, fourth, and fifth senses suggested above. That is to say, in order for Advaitins to apply the word 'real' to something, that thing must be (1) experienceable, (2) nonillusory or nonimaginary, and (3) stable, lasting, or permanent. Three rather unusual consequences follow from this.

First, the third criterion, as was mentioned previously, seems to confuse axiology and ontology. At best, it uses the word 'real' in a very special philosophical sense. Advaita has, I must hastily add, a reason for this use of the word. It comes from Advaita's basic claim that *Brahmajñāna*—the direct realization or knowledge of Brahman—is the experience which sublates all other experiences but is itself unsublatable. I do not intend to question that claim here, but it may be pointed out that if sublation is a criterion for

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illusoriness, then reality must be unsublatable. And if *Brahmajñāna* is indeed the experience which sublates all others but which is itself unsublatable, reality must be stable, lasting, permanent, eternal, and unchanging.

Second, the first criterion rules out, by definition, the existence of theoretical entities (such as electrons, protons, and neutrinos) in modern physics, since they cannot be directly perceived. Of course, Advaita could hardly have considered this a serious flaw in its system at the time of its formulation! This is a problem for modern Advaitins to solve; I need not consider it further here.

Third, although Advaita will want to say that 'real' in the strict sense of the term can only be applied to something which meets all three of the above criteria, Advaita will also be able to use the word 'real' in a less strict sense and to allow for degrees of reality insofar as some things are experienced but are illusory and other things are nonillusory but are impermanent. A statement of the form "this is more real than that" will be perfectly intelligible in Advaita, however odd it may sound to many contemporary philosophers. Advaita does, in fact, want to say something of that sort, so I believe that the above three criteria for the use of the word 'real' bring out some of the fundamental aspects of Advaita philosophy in a uniquely clear way.

DEFINITIONS OF 'REAL' AND 'UNREAL' IN ADVAITA PHILOSOPHY

Let me now turn to the literature of Indian philosophy to support my contention that Advaita's definition of 'real' is "that which is (1) experienceable, (2) nonillusory or nonimaginary, and (3) stable, lasting, or permanent."

The closest Śaṅkara comes to an actual definition of 'real' (*sat*) is in his commentary on the *Bhagavad Gītā* where he defines veridical perception in terms of changelessness: "That awareness (*buddhi*) which does not vary with its object is 'real' (*sat*), that which does vary with its object is 'unreal' (*asat*)."[3] It is tempting on the basis of this passage to say that the term 'real', by extension, means "unchanging" as far as Śaṅkara is concerned. But his point here is that the reality-element in the perception does not change, whereas the content-element does. That is to say, to use his example, in the succession of judgments "real pot," "real cloth," real elephant," the object (pot, cloth, elephant) constantly changes, whereas reality does not.[4] But this is merely "word-magic." One could as well use the expressions "blue dress," "blue water," and "blue sky" to prove that only blue is invariant, therefore real, whereas dresses, water, and the sky are not. Even should Śaṅkara avoid this by claiming, as I suspect he is trying to, that all judgments implicitly refer

[3] Śaṅkara, *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* 2.16. Cf. his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2.1.11, where he states that correct knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) has a single form (*ekarūpa*), because it is dependent upon the object rather than upon the volition of the perceiver.

[4] *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* 2.16.

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to reality,[5] this amounts to hypostatization of the word 'exists' (*asti*)—to which the word 'real' (*sat*) is related (since they come from the same root, $\sqrt{as}$). It amounts to saying that all things "have Being." But that is like saying that all things "are Are"! It is, of course, true that in Advaita all judgments *do* implicitly refer to reality, but that is because all judgments amount to superimpositions of name and form (*nāmarūpa*) upon Brahman, the substratum of the world-illusion. If this is what Śaṅkara is trying to say, he is putting it rather poorly.

In the post-Śaṅkara literature of Advaita, the word 'real' is usually defined as "unsublatable throughout the three times (i.e., past, present, and future)" (*trikālābādhyatva*).[6] Since it is illusory or imaginary objects that are said to be sublated, this definition combines the second and third criteria I have listed above. In the sense that it sums up the most important of the three criteria, it might be said to be Advaita's "final" definition of 'real'. Furthermore, sublation brings out the fact that there is, between the substratum of an illusion and the illusion itself, a dependence relation. Professor Karl H. Potter has observed that the word 'real' is generally accepted by most Indian philosophers to refer to "the stable end of a dependence relation."[7] This is straightforward enough in the context of illusion. The rope coiled up there in the corner of the garage is real relative to the snake which we mistakenly perceive it to be; as such, the rope is perceptually stable while the illusory snake is both perceptually unstable, since upon further examination the snake vanishes, and also dependent upon the rope for its very existence, since without a *non*-snake substratum the snake would not be illusory. In other philosophic systems, the notion of a dependence relation must mean something else, but that is not Advaita's concern.

Another common definition of 'real' in Indian philosophy is "possessing practical efficacy" (*arthakriyātva*).[8] This definition, interestingly, embodies the first two criteria I have suggested. For a thing to be pragmatically useful, it must satisfy the demands of practical life. To switch to another common Advaita analogy, which is of the same basic logical structure as the previous one, we realize that the post off there in the field is not a man when we shout to it and it fails to respond. Or, as Professor Potter puts it, using still another

[5] Raju (*op. cit.*, p. 35) makes the same claim, quoting in support of it the phrase *"sadaṁśe sarvam abhrāntaṁ prakāre tū viparyayaḥ,"* i.e., "all [things] are nonillusory in [their] aspect of existence, but with regard to [their] form are mistaken." Raju gives no reference for this phrase.

[6] Cf. Karl H. Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 221. (Hereafter cited as *Presuppositions.*)

[7] Karl H. Potter, "Reality and Dependence in the Indian Darshanas," in *Essays in Philosophy*, ed. C. T. K. Chari (Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1962), p. 155. See also his *Presuppositions*, pp. 140-141, 162, and 226.

[8] Cf. Potter, *Presuppositions*, p. 141; and Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2.2.26 and 3.2.3.

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common and structurally similar analogy, we realize that the shell we picked up on the beach is not a piece of silver when we "carry it to the market and try to get a metallurgist to assay its worth."[9] But a nonillusory man does respond to our shout, and nonillusory silver has purchasing power in the marketplace. Even if the Advaitin wants to claim that, in the final analysis, the man and the silver (as well as the post and the shell) are illusory along with the rest of the world, nevertheless he can accord a degree of reality to them on the basis of their possessing practical efficacy, that is to say, possessing two of the three criteria of reality.

Another obvious meaning of 'real' in Indian philosophy must be "being the subject of a valid means of knowledge" (*pramāṇa*), otherwise there would be little sense in the elaborate defense of these *pramāṇas*.[10] This is not the place to go into a detailed discussion of what Advaita accepts as a valid means of knowledge, but it may be observed that one such means—indeed, the first and most fundamental one—is perception (*pratyakṣa*). Insofar as the first criterion of 'real' which I have suggested is experienceability, we might say that this very minimal criterion is reflected in the definition of real as "being the subject of a valid means of knowledge," although that definition will have a wider application also. In this sense, even the illusory "rope-snake," "shell-silver," etc., will have some degree of reality.

To sum up Advaita's use of the word 'real': in the very minimal sense of the word, as Ras Vihari Das puts it, "Nothing experienced is absolutely unreal, hence there must be levels of reality culminating in Brahman as the substratum of all experienced objects."[11] In fact, Advaita "is so realistic that it grants some reality even to illusory objects."[12] But, on the other hand, more strictly speaking, only Brahman is real, since *Brahmajñāna* sublates all other experiences.

Thus, in the strict sense, we may say that reality is (1) independent, insofar as Brahman is the stable end of the only significant dependence relation; reality is (2) unlimited by anything else, insofar as it is independent of anything else, therefore related to nothing that could limit it; reality is (3) nonpartite and (4) unchanging, insofar as it is unlimited and unrelated; reality is (5) indivisible, insofar as it is nonpartite, and (6) nonacting, insofar as it is unchanging; reality is (7) unitary, insofar as it is indivisible; and reality is (8) eternal, insofar as it is nonpartite and unchanging. All of these eight characteristics are predicated by Advaitins of Brahman at one

[9] *Presuppositions*, p. 223.
[10] Cf. Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1957), I, 444.
[11] Ras Vihari Das, "The Theory of Ignorance in Advaitism," in R. Das, G. R. Malkani, and T. R. V. Murti, *Ajñāna* (London: Luzac & Co., 1933), p. 82.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

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time or another, and all of them can be traced back to Brahman's being the substratum of the alleged world illusion. This allegation, in turn, is based upon Brahman's unsublatability. And that is based upon accepting *Brahma-jñāna* as the experience which sublates all other experiences. It is that claim, then, which underlies Advaita's definition of the word 'real' (*sat*).

But, if this is Advaita's meaning of the word 'real' (*sat*), what can Advaitins mean by 'unreal' (*asat*)? Śaṅkara seems to use the word 'unreal' in three different ways, corresponding to the contradictories of each of the three criteria given for the word 'real'. He frequently applies the word 'unreal' to everything other than Brahman. On other occasions, he will include the commonly perceived world within the denotation of the word 'real,' reserving the word 'unreal' for dreams, hallucinations, "rope-snakes," and the like. And then again, he will sometimes use the word 'unreal' synonymously with 'non-experienceable', giving as illustrations the examples so common in all Indian philosophy: "hare's horn," "sky-flower," or "barren woman's son." Frequently, in this latter context, he will use the phrase "*completely* unreal" (*atyantāsat*) to refer to such imaginary entities. Therefore, although Śaṅkara is by no means consistent in his usage of these terms, what he says implies a fourfold distinction between the completely real, the practically real, the illusory, and the completely unreal. More often, however, he seems to make merely a threefold distinction between the real, the unreal, and the completely unreal.[13]

Later Advaitins, who tried to point up the peculiar ontological status of the world more sharply, restricted the meaning of 'unreal' to imaginary objects. Their usual term for the apparent world was 'false' (*mithyā*). Occasionally Śaṅkara uses this term also.[14] Their position on the distinction between 'real' and 'unreal' is summed up by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (sixteenth century) in his *Advaitasiddhi;* he states that "unreality is not the contradictory of reality, whose nature is unsublatability in the three times, but rather is what never forms the object of cognition as reality in any substratum whatever."[15] Or to phrase it in a slightly different way, 'unreal' means "having no perceived instance at all." In this case, the real (*sat*) is what is unsublatable in the three times, the unreal (*asat*) is what is completely uninstanced, and the category termed 'false' (*mithyā*) is everything left over, i.e., what is neither real nor unreal (including both the "practically real" and the illusory).

[13] Although this observation about Śaṅkara is based upon my own reading of his works over several years, I find that A. B. Shastri has made much the same observation in his *Studies in Post-Saṁkara Dialectics* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1936), p. 241.

[14] Even if the *Bālabodhinī* is not a genuine work of Śaṅkara, there are other references one could cite, e.g., *Ātmabodha* 63.

[15] Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, *Advaitasiddhi,* ed. with three commentaries and critical summary by MM. Anantakrishna Sastri (2d ed. rev.; Bombay: Nirnayasagar Press, 1937), pp. 50-51: ". . . *trikālādhyatvarūpasattvavyatireko nāsattvam, kiṁtu kvacid apy upādhau sattvena pratīyamānatvānadhikaraṇatvam.*"

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The one difficulty with Madhusūdana's analysis of the world is that it fails to identify the clear division between pragmatically useful objects and illusory objects, that is, the division between the substratum and the appearance in ordinary perceptual illusions—the division between the rope and the "snake," the shell and the "silver," the post and the "man." To have only three terms for this fourfold distinction is confusing. A more precise categorization of the world into four levels of reality is needed. This is, in fact, to be found in a common fourfold distinction that follows very neatly the division which I suggested above in my discussion of the three criteria for the definition of 'real' and the final criterion that I suggested for the definition of 'unreal'. These levels of reality are termed "ultimately real" (*pāramārthika*), "pragmatically real" (*vyāvahārika*), "merely illusory" (*prātibhāsika*), and "utterly unreal" (*tūcchika*).[16]

Actually, this distinction has a fairly long history in Indian philosophy. As early as the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*—which probably is later than the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Chāndogya Upaniṣads* (ca. 900 B.C.), but earlier than, for example, the *Praśna* and *Maitrī* (ca. 500 B.C.)—a distinction was made between two levels of knowledge, a higher (*paravidyā*) and a lower (*aparavidyā*).[17] By Śaṅkara's time, the distinction had become known as that between the "ultimate" or "final point of view" (*paramārthadarśina*) and the "worldly" or "pragmatic point of view" (*lokavyāvahārika*).[18] Prior to Śaṅkara, the two Schools of Northern (*Mahāyāna*) Buddhism, Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda, had reflected this Upaniṣadic doctrine in a twofold distinction between the "ultimate truth" (*paramārthasatya*) and "practical truth" (*saṁvṛtisatya*), suggesting that the latter was, at best, qualified truth and was based upon ignorance.[19] They then made a further distinction between "practical truth of the world" (*lokasaṁvṛtisatya*) and "practical illusions" (*mithyāsaṁvṛta*), the latter being "practical" only in contradistinction to calling the entire world an illusion. As for things like "hare's horn" or "sky-lotus," they called

[16] Cf. Potter, *Presuppositions*, pp. 166, 223; Dasgupta, *History*, II, 2; and Shastri, *Studies in Post-Saṅkara Dialectics*, p. 18.

[17] *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 1.4-5.

[18] Śaṅkara, *Muṇḍakopaniṣadbhāṣya* 1.4. The word *'paramārthadarśina'* is the one Śaṅkara uses here, though he frequently uses merely *'paramārtha'* or *'pāramārthika'*; and he glosses *'aparavidyā'* by the word *'dharmādharmasādhanatatphalaviṣayā,'* i.e., "that which is the object of merit, demerit, holiness, and its result," one of several common expressions he has for what he often refers to as "practical worldly activity" (*lokavyāvahārika*). See *Works of Shankaracharya*, II, part 1, ed. Hari Raghunath Bhagavat (2d ed.; Poona: Ashtekar & Co., 1927), 500, lines 20-22.

[19] Interestingly, this is very similar to what Śaṅkara says in his commentary on the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* passage mentioned above. He states: "The lower knowledge is merely ignorance, that which is to be refuted" (*aparā hi vidyā avidyā sā nirākartavyā*); *Works of Shankaracharya*, II, part 1, 500, lines 23-24.

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Levels of reality in Indian thought

Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad	Śaṅkara	Post-Śaṅkara Advaitins	Mahāyāna Buddhists	Later Advaitins	Advaita's Definitions	My Criteria of Application	Examples
higher knowledge (*paravidyā*)	real (*sat*)	real (*sat*)	ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*)	ultimate reality (*pāramārthika*)	unsublatable throughout the three times	permanent, stable (3)	Brahman (*ātman*)
	unreal (*asat*)	false (*mithyā*)	practical worldly truth (*lokasaṁvṛtisatya*)	pragmatic reality (*vyāvahārika*)	possessing practical efficacy	non-illusory non-imaginary (2)	ropes, snakes, shells, silver
lower knowledge (*aparavidyā*)			practical illusion (*mithyāsaṁvṛta*)	mere illusion (*prātibhāsika*)	being the subject of perception	experience-able (1)	"rope-snake," "shell-silver," mirage, dream
	completely unreal (*atyantāsat*)	unreal (*asat*)	mere stupidity (*avidyāmana*)	utter unreality (*tūcchika*)	never being the object of cognition in any substratum whatever	totally un-instanced	"hare's horn," "barren woman's son"

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them "mere stupidity" (*avidyāmana*).[20] Here you have, then, a fourfold distinction between "ultimate reality," "worldly reality," "worldly illusion," and "mere stupidity," closely paralleling the later Advaita distinction, though differing from it somewhat in terminology. Gauḍapāda (fifth century), in his exegesis of the Advaita doctrine, adopts both this fourfold distinction[21] and some of the Buddhist terminology. Śaṅkara often follows Gauḍapāda's lead—although altering the terminology—but just as often he uses the terms 'real' and 'unreal', as we have seen, rather imprecisely, leading to a threefold rather than a fourfold distinction.

We may now catalogue these distinctions in the manner shown in the accompanying chart (p. 394).

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE DISTINCTIONS FOR ADVAITA

Occasionally, there has been a movement among a few Advaitins either to minimize these distinctions or even to dispense with them altogether, on the grounds that they are more pragmatic than essential to Advaita. Such seems, at times, to have been Gauḍapāda's attitude[22] and such very certainly was the attitude of the sixteenth-century Advaitin Prakāśānanda.[23] More recently, Indian philosophers like H. M. Bhattacharyya and S. K. Das have attempted to blur the distinctions between these levels of reality. H. M. Bhattacharyya, for instance, says:

> If we take the distinction between the *vyāvahārika* and the *pāramārthika* strata in a little wider sense we may very well maintain that the distinction is only a general hint as to the *Relativity of Apprehension*. What is real or existent . . . from the stand-point of a particular inquirer with a special interest and a particular type of intellectual capacity, proves unreal or non-existent from a higher point of view, where the interest is wider and the powers of apprehension keener and more penetrative. And the same stand-point which seems *pāramārthika* or higher is itself found to be lower or *vyāvahārika* only by an inquirer of higher intellectual powers. Thus the distinction between the two strata is entirely relative and also *truth is relative to the inquirer*. . . .[24]

[20] One interesting feature of Indian philosophy is that it makes no distinction between a mere null class (cf. *tuccha*, empty) and a self-contradiction. Phrases like "hare's horn" and "barren woman's son" are used interchangeably as examples of entities that have no experienced instances. Undoubtedly this is due to the practical thrust of Indian philosophy; it never remained mere speculation for speculation's sake, as has often happened in Western philosophy. The speculative aspect of an Indian philosophic system was aimed at convincing the inquirer that that particular system could lead to *mokṣa*; cf. Potter, *Presuppositions*, pp. 45-52. Under such circumstances, there was little use in logical refinements, such as the analytic-synthetic distinction.

[21] Gauḍapāda, *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* 1.18, 3.28, and 4.87-88.

[22] Cf. Gauḍapāda, *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* 2.1-10, 3.10, 3.30-31, 4.26, 4.32-52, and 4.61-72.

[23] Prakāśānanda, *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, ed. and trans. Arthur Venis, in *The Pandit*, Nos. 11-12 (1889-90; reprinted in Benares, 1898). See also Potter, *Presuppositions*, pp. 224-225; and Shastri, *Studies in Post-Śaṁkara Dialectics*, p. 11.

[24] H. M. Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Philosophy* (1st ser.), Punjab Oriental Series, no. 22 (Lahore: Motilal Banarsidass, 1933), p. 6; italics are his.

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S. K. Das puts it as follows:

> It is better, therefore, to speak of the degrees of adequacy with which Reality is apprehended, and such apprehensions are endlessly various. . . . There are, therefore, only degrees of completeness in our apprehension of objects, and degrees of correctness in our beliefs about them. Indeed, the assumption of the reality of Degreees, whether honorary or otherwise, looks more like an academic prejudice than a matter of universal recognition.[25]

Both of these philosophers, however, make the completely arbitrary and dogmatic assumption that this "relativity of apprehension" holds for everyone else *except* the Advaitin, who, of course, is in possession of the final truth. H. M. Bhattacharyya states:

> The wider one's outlook—the more analytic one's apprehension—the less and less real do the objects with their individualities and differences begin to appear—they seem to dismantle themselves of their cloaks of false realities one after another as one's capacity of apprehension gains in depth and minuteness of analysis, until finally, the absolutely *pāramārthika* or real stage is reached where there is no further *vyāvahārika* stratum possibly thinkable, and in which the absolute reality of Brahman in its indeterminable homogeneous eternity is realised.[26]

Now, you cannot have it both ways. Either you hold a view of relativism, abandoning any supposed "absolute reality," or else you maintain an "absolute reality," as Advaita clearly does, and abandon the completely relativistic position. But together the views are incompatible.

Furthermore, these philosophers overlook a very important point. As Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya observes: "Were it not for the experience of *prātibhāsika* or illusory being, the possible unreality of the *vyāvahārika* or empirically real world—the elimination of its given-ness—would be utterly unintelligible."[27] That is to say, without clear-cut distinctions between the *pāramārthika* and *vyāvahārika* realms on the one hand and the *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsika* realms on the other, the relation of superimposition (*adhyāsa*), which is supposed to account for the illusoriness of the world, would be unintelligible. Furthermore, the alleged illusoriness of the world would be inexplicable. It is my contention, which I cannot develop here, that Advaita attempts an explanation of the illusoriness of the world by means of analogy. Examples such as those of the "snake" being superimposed on the rope and of water being superimposed on the desert (in a mirage) function, I maintain, as models to explain how the allegedly illusory world is superimposed on Brahman. To deny the doctrine of levels of reality is to eliminate

[25] S. K. Das, *Towards a Systematic Study of the Vedānta* (Calcutta: by the author, 1931), p. 117.
[26] H. M. Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Philosophy*, p. 7.
[27] K. C. Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Philosophy*, 2 vols. (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1956), I, 95.

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the possibility of explaining the illusoriness of the world, since the analogy must have one of its elements (the substratum) in a relatively more real realm than its other element (the superimposed entity) in order to be analogous to the relation between the completely real Brahman and the illusory world superimposed upon Brahman.

It might be possible to hold something like a "relativity of apprehension" doctrine *within* the pragmatically real realm (insofar as a *sādhu* has more insight into the nature of reality than a sophomore), but the lines delimiting the four main levels of reality must be absolutely sharp or else Advaita's hopes of explaining the alleged illusoriness of the world are lost. It is for this reason that Gauḍapāda uses the word *'sakṛdvibhāta'* (sudden illumination) to characterize *Brahmajñāna.*[28] It is for this reason, too, that Śaṅkara finds no continuity between the higher and lower truths.[29] Professor Potter has characterized such a view as "leap philosophy,"[30] identifying Sureśvara (ninth century) and Prakāśānanda (sixteenth century) as the only Advaitins explicitly holding such a view.[31] In point of fact, I believe, *all* Advaitins must subscribe to a discontinuity between the *vyāvahārika* and *pāramārthika* realms, so in that sense *all* Advaitins are "leap philosophers."[32] But, on the other hand, all Advaitins—Sureśvara and Prakāśānanda included—agree that there is a path to *mokṣa,* that is, that there are certain more or less well-defined steps which the aspirant must take, each of which leads him nearer the goal.[33] There is nothing really inconsistent between these two positions; in the final analysis, all Indian philosophers are going to have to say that one only attains *mokṣa* when one attains *mokṣa,* and until then one is still bound to the cycle of births and deaths (*saṁsāra*). One may even have to incarnate a number of times as a holy man (*sādhu*) before attaining the final insight, *Brahmajñāna,* which confers release from the bondage of transmigration.[34] But, it must be evident that Advaitins will say that one has to *be* a holy man before one can even be *eligible* for insight. Thus, the Path is that which takes one out of the ordinary affairs of the world and up to the point of illumination; it can, however, go no further—at that point illumination is sudden (*sakṛdvibhāta*) as far as Advaita is concerned. This follows, indeed, from the fact that

[28] Gauḍapāda, *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* 3.36 and 4.81. Cf. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 2. 3. 6 (which uses the word *'sakṛdvidyutta'*) and Śaṅkara's commentary thereon.
[29] Śaṅkara, *Muṇḍakopaniṣadbhāṣya* 1.4. Cf. Shastri, *Studies in Post-Saṁkara Dialectics,* p. 18; see also p. 11, where he makes the same observation about Vācaspati Miśra.
[30] Potter, *Presuppositions,* pp. 94, 99, 110-111, 140, and 236.
[31] *Ibid.,* pp. 100, 174, 236, and 242-247.
[32] Professor Potter also makes this observation, although he suggests that "some labor harder to keep it as hidden as possible"; *ibid.,* p. 181.
[33] Even Gauḍapāda admits that there are steps toward *mokṣa*; see his *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* 4.81.
[34] See Śaṅkara, *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* 6.42-45.

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Brahman is unitary, indivisible. One cannot know pieces of Brahman; either one has the final knowledge or one does not. Nor does this conflict with the view that the *sādhu* is "nearer the goal" than, say, I am; this progress can easily be defined in terms of ridding oneself of egoism, pride—*ahaṁkāra*.

CONCLUSION

I have tried, in this paper, to show how some of the fundamental ideas of Advaita metaphysics are related to Advaita's definition of the word 'real.' I have also attempted to show why Advaitins feel constrained to define it in the way they do. Reality, in Advaita, will be that which is (1) experienceable, (2) nonillusory or nonimaginary, and (3) stable, lasting, or permanent. The three criteria for reality will, correspondingly, be (1) "being the subject of a valid means of knowledge" (*pramāṇa*), (2) "possessing practical efficacy" (*arthakriyātva*), and (3) "being unsublatable throughout the three times" (*trikālābhādhyatva*). In a loose sense of the term 'real', this will lead to the doctrine of levels or degrees of reality, which I have argued is an indispensable doctrine of Advaita metaphysics. In the strict sense of the term 'real', however, there is only one thing which fulfills all these three criteria, and that is Brahman; this is why Advaitins say that reality is nondual (*a-dvaita*). This is why Advaitins claim that everything which is pluralistic must be an illusion (*māyā*). These startling claims rest directly upon Advaita's assertion that the knowledge of Brahman (*Brahmajñāna*) is the experience which sublates all other experiences but which is itself unsublatable—a very startling claim itself!

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I. INTRODUCTORY NOTES

Hsiung Shih-li (1885–)[1] is an original contemporary Chinese thinker. Though no one accepts his philosophical system as such, his influence upon those who are attempting to reconstruct Chinese, especially Confucian, philosophy has become more and more felt in recent years. Wing-tsit Chan[c] goes so far as to say that "he has influenced more young Chinese philosophers than any other contemporary Chinese philosopher."[2] In his early days he studied Buddhist philosophy, primarily *Wei-shih*[d] (Consciousness-Only doctrine), under the celebrated lay Buddhist scholar Ou-yang Ching-wu[e] at the Chinese Institute of Buddhism at Nanking. However, he soon became dissatisfied and turned to the *I Ching*[f]. He named his own philosophy New Consciousness-Only doctrine, which is negatively a criticism of the old Consciousness-Only doctrine, and positively a constructive philosophy based upon essentially Confucian philosophical insights with elements added from his lifelong study of Buddhism. In his analysis of the problem of causation he follows the usual procedure in presenting the theory of causation of the *Wei-shih* school first, then stating a series of objections to this position, and finally setting forth his own theory as a synthesis of Confucianism and Buddhism.

II. HSIUNG SHIH-LI'S EXPOSITION OF THE WEI-SHIH THEORY OF CAUSATION

Hsiung sees that within the Buddhist tradition there are several theories of causation which are subject to different and sometimes even contradictory interpretations. He simplifies the problem by concentrating his discussions upon the *Wei-shih* theory of causation as presented in *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*[g] (*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, or *Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only*), following mainly K'uei-chi's[h] interpretation.[3] According

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[1] For a short account of Hsiung Shih-li's life and works see Wing-tsit Chan, trans. and comp., *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 763-772; also the same author, *Religious Trends in Modern China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), pp. 33-43, 126-135. Though O. Briere, in his *Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy 1898-1950* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956) also mentions briefly Hsiung's thoughts (see pp. 48-50), his comments are often misleading and cannot withstand critical examination.

[2] Chan, *Source Book*, p. 765.

[3] *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* was written by Hsüan-tsang[i] (A.D. 596-664), who brought back with him from India Vasubandhu's *Vijñaptimātratātriṁśikā* [Treatise in Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only] along with ten different commentaries on this work. According to Hsiung, Hsüan-tsang originally intended to translate them all, but was persuaded by his pupil K'uei-chi to write a new commentary as a synthesis of these varied interpretations following mainly the lines of Dharmapala. The end result was the *Ch'eng wei-shih*

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to this theory causes are to be distinguished into four different types: (1) *yin yüan*[m], or cause proper; (2) *teng wu-chien yüan*[n], or the preceding moment; (3) *suo-yüan yüan*[o], or object; (4) *tseng-shang yüan*[p], or the predominating condition.[4] Let us examine each of them in greater detail.

(1) According to Hsiung's account the *Wei-shih* school asserts that *yin yüan* or a cause proper must have the following characteristics: (a) it must be a real cause with energy to produce an effect; (b) it must produce an effect distinct from its own being; (c) it must produce its effect in terms of its own force without mediation. Hence a cause proper not only creates but also determines its effect. According to Hsiung, though certain Hīnayāna schools talked about six causes, none of them can fulfill the strict definition of a cause proper as described above; rather, they are merely variants of the predominating condition, which is only a supplementary form of cause. Therefore the theory of cause proper is a product unique to the *Wei-shih* school.[5]

(2) *Teng wu-chien yüan,* or the preceding moment, is a supplementary cause that has the following characteristics: (a) it must precede the next moment, and its substance as well as its function must be similar to that of the next moment; (b) it must be continuous with the next moment without interruption—it must not only leave room for but actually must lead toward the next moment; and finally (c) it must inevitably be followed by the next moment. Hence the phenomenal universe appears to be orderly rather than chaotic. Without *teng wu-chien yüan* no causal relationship will ever be conceived by an intellectual mind.[6]

lun we have today. K'uei-chi (A.D. 632-682) himself wrote *Ch'eng wei-shih lun shu-chi*[j] [Notes on the Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only]. Without this work it is virtually impossible for us to get at the real meaning of Hsüan-tsang's *Treatise.* Cf. Hsiung Shih-li, *Fo-chia ming-hsiang t'ung-shih*[k] [A General Explanation of Buddhist Terms and Concepts], 2 vols. (Peking: Peking University Press, 1937), II, 4-7. However, owing to a general lack of interest on the part of the Chinese intellectuals K'uei-chi's work, along with some other Buddhist texts, was lost and forgotten in China. In 1880 a lay Buddhist scholar, Yang Wen-hui[l], brought back with him some important Buddhist works from Japan, including K'uei-chi's *Notes.* It was, however, his pupil Ou-yang who established the Chinese Institute of Buddhism where Hsiung received his *Wei-shih* training.

[4] Hsiung himself gives us only the Chinese terms of the four causes. See Hsiung Shih-li, *Hsin wei-shih lun*[q] (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1947), p. 145. Edward J. Thomas noticed that the doctrine of the four causes—cause (*hetu*), object (*ālambana*), the preceding moment (*anantara*), and the predominating condition (*adhipati*)—can be traced back to the Sarvāstivādins. See Edward J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1959), p. 220. However, Hsiung thinks that the *Wei-shih* theory of causation is much superior to the Hīnayāna ones because it gives an entirely new interpretation of cause proper. Hence he deals with the *Wei-shih* formulation of the theory only.

[5] Cf. Hsiung, *Hsin wei-shih lun,* p. 27, and also his *Fo-chia ming-hsiang t'ung-shih,* II, 72-75.

[6] Cf. Hsiung Shih-li, *Fo-chia ming-hsiang t'ung-shih,* II, 75-77.

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(3) *Suo-yüan yüan,* or object, another form of supplementary cause, must have the following characteristics: (a) it must be correlated with a subject as its object; (b) it must determine and also be determined by its correlated subject; (c) it must be the objective portion of the consciousnesses which is strictly correlated with the subjective portion of the consciousnesses. Objects may be direct or indirect, physical or nonphysical. Object as cause is thus a conditioning factor in the formation of our phenomenal knowledge.[7]

(4) Finally, the so-called *tseng-shang yüan,* or the predominating condition, must have the following characteristics: (a) it must exert a predominating function over its effect; (b) it must either be the sufficient or the necessary condition of its effect; (c) it must remove the conditions that obstruct the coming into being of its effect, and it must create new conditions that lead toward its realization. There are degrees of predominating conditions; that is to say, some predominating conditions may be direct, others indirect.[8]

From the above analysis it becomes clear that from the *Wei-shih* point of view only a cause proper is in the strict sense a cause; the other three are only causal conditions or occasions, hence only in a secondary sense causes. *Tseng-shang yüan* or the predominating condition has the widest scope, because in different contexts we may interpret different factors as predominating conditions; sometimes the factors concerned could be very remote ones. For example, the equilibrium of heavenly bodies may be taken as an indirect predominating causal condition that enables me to stand in this room. Hsiung specified that only cause proper is concerned with the metaphysical "world of seeds"; the other three are concerned with the phenomenal world of manifestations.[9] In order to understand the distinction between the two worlds, first we have to give a brief summary of the *Wei-shih* cosmology as a whole.

From the *Wei-shih* point of view nothing in the universe is substantial or eternal; everything is a product of aggregates. The phenomenal universe as experienced in daily life is thus not a real world by itself. On the contrary, it is a product of elaborate constructions. The content of the sensible world can be analyzed first of all into the subjective portion and the objective portion of the first five consciousnesses. On the one hand, there are the five sense organs: eyes, ears, nose, mouth, and the body; on the other hand, there are five kinds of sense objects: colors, sounds, smells, tastes, and touches. The five consciousnesses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch are the products of the interaction between the sense organs and the sense objects. Moreover, sense organs and sense objects are not to be separated from each other; the relation between the two is that of reciprocal determination. Since both the sense organs and the sense objects are not substantially real by them-

[7] Cf. *ibid.,* II, 78-84.
[8] Cf. *ibid.,* II, 85-87, and *Hsin wei-shih lun,* pp. 37-40.
[9] Cf. Hsiung, *Hsin wei-shih lun,* p. 319.

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selves, they are effects rather than causes in a metaphysical sense. These five consciousnesses have the function of discrimination. However, if we have only the five consciousnesses, it will be impossible for us to have a unified, integrated world. Thus the *Wei-shih* school further establishes the sixth or the sense-center consciousness (*manovijñāna*), which has the synthesizing function. According to Hsiung's interpretation of *Wei-shih* these six consciousnesses all direct their attention to objects of the phenomenal universe, and have the tendency to erroneously presume these phenomenal objects to be real ontological entities. The origin of this error is to be traced back to the function of the seventh or the thought-center consciousness (*manas*). This consciousness is the ego-consciousness which clings to the self as a real, substantial, ontological entity. It is because of its tenacious faith in the substantial reality of the self along with its world that we are entangled within the cycle of life and death and suffer from its deep-rooted sorrows. In the final analysis, however, its object is nothing substantial, but is the eighth or the *ālaya* consciousness, which may also be called the storehouse consciousness because of the function it performs. Within the *ālaya* consciousness are contained the impure and the pure seeds. Therefore both the subjective portions and the objective portions of the first seven consciousnesses are in reality nothing but the transformation of the *ālaya* consciousness. They are manifestations that can be traced back to the function of the seeds contained in the *ālaya* consciousness as their causes.[10]

The relation between the seeds and the *ālaya* consciousness is a complicated one. The *ālaya* consciousness has as its objective portion the seeds, the root of the senses, and the material world. Thus even *ālaya* consciousness itself is the product of aggregates. It is able to transform itself into the root of the senses as well as the material world. But it is still a manifestation created by the seeds, which are the only real causes in a metaphysical sense. In this particular case, however, the cause and the effect exist simultaneously. Therefore it is possible for the *ālaya* consciousness to store the seeds within itself.[11]

Next we need to enumerate the characteristics of the seeds. (1) The seeds are individual existents. Each seed is different from the other. This is why we have all the differences in the universe. (2) The seeds are real. However, they are not to be taken as substantial entities like the atoms of Democritus. They maintain their identity in terms of a kind of dynamic equilibrium. A seed is able to maintain its selfsameness just like a human body, which changes every moment yet keeps its identity. If the seeds are truly substantial entities, then there will be no way to account for any creation in the universe. (3) The relation between seeds and manifestations is that the seeds create the manifes-

[10] Cf. Hsiung, *Fo-chia ming-hsiang t'ung-shih*, II, 12-27.
[11] Cf. Hsiung, *Hsin wei-shih lun*, pp. 310-315.

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tations. The seeds are always hidden; only the manifestations are manifested. The two worlds are in sharp contrast with each other. (4) Different seeds create different manifestations. They never violate the rules. Hence the universe is orderly, not chaotic. (5) But the relation between seeds and manifestations is also a reciprocal one. The seeds create the manifestations, yet the manifestations have the power to "perfume" the seeds, which again become the causes for further manifestations. The perfumed seeds are thus distinguished from the original seeds. However, Hsiung recognizes that this is a controversial issue within the *Wei-shih* school and may be subject to different interpretations. (6) The subjective portion and the objective portion of the same consciousness are created by different seeds. Even the mind and its functions are to be traced back to different seeds. Therefore the *Wei-shih* school is advocating a radical pluralism. (7) There are pure seeds as well as impure seeds. However, from time immemorial the evil seeds have flourished. They seem to form a torrent. Only when the function of the impure seeds contained in the *ālaya* consciousness is completely stopped can the pure seeds manifest their functions. Then the eighth consciousness will no longer be called *ālaya* consciousness. This is the state of *tathatā*.[12]

Combining this theory of causation with the theory of the four cases we discussed above, we can easily see that the concept of cause proper applies only to the seeds. Here the cause, that is, the seeds, directly creates the effect, that is, the manifestations, and determines the effect. The other three causes are concerned only with the relationship between manifestations and manifestations. One manifestation may be the preceding moment, or object, or predominating condition of another manifestation. The sciences only study the proximate causes, which are nothing but varied forms of the predominating condition. Only philosophy has penetrating understanding of the nature of real causes.[13]

III. HSIUNG SHIH-LI'S CRITICISMS OF THE WEI-SHIH THEORY OF CAUSATION

After stating what he conceives as the *Wei-shih* position, Hsiung offers a series of criticisms of this position.

(1) Hsiung thinks that the *Wei-shih* school has betrayed the original Buddhist spirit by hypostatizing the doctrine of dependent origination into a doctrine of seeds which suggests a structural realism. According to Hsiung, the great merit of the Mādhyamika school lies precisely in its employing dialectical arguments as a means to destroy all sorts of structural realism within and without the Buddhist tradition. The *Wei-shih* school, however, reverts to the untenable position by erroneously postulating innumerable seeds

[12] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 315-319.
[13] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 319.

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as the real causes of the phenomenal universe. Apparently it has not been able to get at truth on the ultimate level and fails to realize the great function of the Principle of Creativity.

(2) The innumerable seeds with disparate qualities postulated by the *Wei-shih* school lack true unity. According to Hsiung, even the *Wei-shih* scholars themselves realized this to be a deplorable situation needing to be remedied. This is why they had to postulate the *ālaya* consciousness to store the seeds. However, *ālaya* consciousness, in turn, is not one, but many. Every living being has its own *ālaya* consciousness. The relationship between these individual *ālaya* consciousnesses is by no means clear in the *Wei-shih* framework of thought. The ground is very shaky from Hsiung's critical point of view.

(3) According to Hsiung the *Wei-shih* philosophy has not only a pluralistic tendency but also a dualistic tendency. It is a dualism between the world of manifestations and the world of seeds; it is also a dualism between the impure and the pure seeds; and finally it is a dualism between the pure seeds and *tathatā*. From Hsiung's point of view the world of manifestations is unduly separated from the world of seeds. Again, since the pure seeds and the impure seeds are both ontologically real, the dualism between the two is a final one not to be transcended in any sense. Finally, according to Hsiung, since the *Wei-shih* school asserts that the cessation of the function of the impure seeds brings about the function of the pure seeds, the traditional Buddhist doctrine of *tathatā* becomes superfluous. It is a leftover which is not reconcilable with the *Wei-shih* doctrine of seeds. Since *tathatā* can in no way be identified with the pure seeds, it really should have no position in the *Wei-shih* philosophy; thus the *Wei-shih* scholars still stick to the old name without giving a satisfactory explanation.[14]

IV. HSIUNG SHIH-LI'S OWN THEORY OF CAUSATION

Once the old Consciousness-Only doctrine has been disposed of, Hsiung is ready to give his own theory of causation.

(1) Hsiung accepts the basic Buddhist insights that there is not a real world that can exist apart from the transformation of consciousness, and also that nothing is substantial or eternal in the phenomenal universe. However, he maintains that the ultimate metaphysical principle must be one, rather than many, or else it would be extremely difficult to explain the unity of the universe. But this metaphysical principle is one of creativity, in sharp

[14] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 140-149, 321-322. A number of *Wei-shih* scholars repudiated Hsiung's viewpoints and were engaged in hot disputes with him, but in this particular article I am concerned only with the exposition of Hsiung's ideas, not with the criticism of his ideas. For Hsiung's criticisms of *Wei-shih* also see Chan, *Religious Trends in Modern China*, pp. 130-135.

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contrast to the Parmenidean One, which is unchanging, eternal, and immutable. The principle of creativity creates incessantly according to the principle of the unity of opposites. Creativity without creating forms would be no creativity at all; forms suggest order and stability. Hence in its process of creation the principle of creativity has a tendency to work against itself and to manifest itself as a world of form and order as if it were constant and stable, even if in reality nothing is stable and constant. Hence in the final analysis the manifestations are the manifestations of the principle just as the waves are the waves of the ocean. It is in a process of "forgetful of being" that people lose sight of the fact that only the principle of creativity is the true metaphysical cause, mistake the phenomenal causes for metaphysical causes, and consequently fall into illusions. Thus it is clear from Hsiung's point of view that only the principle of creativity is the cause proper. The others are merely apparent causes.

(2) Since the principle of creativity by its nature creates incessantly, the preceding moment as a supplementary form of cause holds. Every moment rises and perishes. It always leaves room for and leads toward the next moment. It is only in this way that novelty and new creations are conceivable. Though sense perceptions may fail us, the universe in reality is an evergoing process with never a stagnant moment. We may discover constant associations between the preceding moments and the following moments. Hence this is a creative universe with order predominating in it. Therefore the succession of moments acquires a positive significance in Hsiung's system which one cannot find in the original Buddhist doctrine of *karma,* since the latter teaches that all phenomenal moments are rooted in an original Ignorance (*avidyā*).

(3) The object as a supplementary cause also receives new interpretations from Hsiung's point of view. The objects in the phenomenal universe, though not substantially real, are not to be taken as entirely illusory. Hsiung seems to teach a philosophy of "as if" that asserts that the principle of creativity in its functional aspect has to manifest itself in an orderly phenomenal universe. Neither the objects nor the subjects are ontologically substantial or eternal. As causal occasions they mutually condition and even determine each other. Life's sorrows begin when one hypostatizes what is merely phenomenal into something substantial and eternal. Hence the phenomenal world is real to the extent that there is a constant correlation between the objective portion and the subjective portion of the consciousnesses, but unreal to the extent that these are erroneously taken as interactions between substantial ontological entities.

(4) Finally, from a phenomenal point of view, since each subject, and each object as well, has to manifest itself in some way as a center of action, the predominating condition as a supplementary cause also holds. According to Hsiung, all the sciences are studying the predominating conditions from a

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phenomenal point of view. Only philosophy is capable of revealing the metaphysical principle of creativity. Consequently, science and philosophy cannot possibly contradict each other, in that the sciences are studying the functional aspect whereas philosophy is studying the ontological aspect of the same reality. Only when the sciences claim to do the work of metaphysics do they fall into their own disgrace.

Hence Hsiung concludes by pointing out that if we start out with the reality of phenomenal existents, it would be impossible for us to discover the metaphysical truth. Only if we are ready to sweep off phenomena altogether from the very beginning can we uncover the principle of creativity that works incessantly both within ourselves and the world at large.[15]

Hsiung thus converts Buddhist doctrines to Confucian ends, and he revives the concepts of "closing" (*ho*^{r}) and "opening" (*p'i*^{s}) that are in the *Book of Changes*. Let us hear his own explanations:

> We must realize that original substance has neither physical form nor character, is not physically obstructed by anything, is absolute, whole, pure, strong, and vigorous. However, in the functioning of the original substance to become many manifestations, it is inevitable that there is what we called closing. This closing possesses a tendency to become physical forms and concrete stuff. In other words, through the process of closing individual concrete things obtain their physical form. As perpetual transformation manifests itself as a tendency to close, it almost has to be completely materialized as if it were not going to preserve its own nature. This may be said to be a reaction.
>
> However, as the tendency to close arises, there is another tendency arising simultaneously. It rises with perpetual transformation as the basis. It is firm, self-sufficient, and would not change itself to a process of closing. That is to say, this tendency operates in the midst of closing but is its own master, thus showing its absolute firmness and causes the process of closing to follow its own operation. This tendency—strong, vigorous and not materialized—is called opening. . . .
>
> The tendency to close is integrative and tends to form physical things. On the basis of what it is, we temporarily call closing "matter" or "the operation of matter." The tendency to open is strong and vigorous, operating in the midst of closing but makes it follow itself. On the basis of what it is, we temporarily call opening "mind," or "the operation of mind."[16]

It is in terms of the interaction of the function of closing and the function of opening that everything is the case. This is a sketch of the main ideas of Hsiung Shih-li's metaphysical theory of causation.[17]

[15] Cf. Hsiung, *Hsin wei-shih lun*, chaps. III, IV, pp. 26-91.
[16] *Hsin wei-shih lun*, pp. 56-59; quoted in Chan, *Source Book*, p. 766.
[17] Since this article purports to give an exposition of only one aspect of Hsiung's comprehensive philosophical system, it does not pretend to give a complete picture of Hsiung's metaphysical system. The latter will be a future topic of study.

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V. CONCLUSION

Whether Hsiung's interpretations of the *Wei-shih* philosophy are sound, his criticisms valid, or his own theory of causation defensible, are questions requiring further investigation; but it cannot be denied that this is a serious attempt to synthesize Confucianism with Buddhism. In so doing Hsiung reveals his unmistakable Chinese mentality by advocating the principle of creativity and the principle of unity between substance (principle) and function (manifestations). Both these ideas can be traced back to the philosophy of the *Book of Changes* and the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming[t] (1472-1529) in the Ming dynasty.[18]

[18] Though some have compared his philosophy with that of Bergson, Hsiung himself rejects this comparison because, as he sees it, Bergson based his philosophy on new discoveries in the biological sciences while Hsiung is talking at another level of truth. See *Hsin wei-shih lun*, p. 352.

[a] 劉述先
[b] 熊十力
[c] 陳榮捷
[d] 唯識
[e] 歐陽竟无
[f] 易經
[g] 成唯識論
[h] 窺基
[i] 玄裝
[j] 成唯識論述記
[k] 佛家名相通釋
[l] 楊文會
[m] 因緣
[n] 等無間緣
[o] 所緣緣
[p] 增上緣
[q] 新唯識論
[r] 翕
[s] 闢
[t] 王陽明

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David Dilworth **The range of Nishida's early religious thought: Zen no kenkyū**

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The intellectual career of Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945), generally regarded as Japan's foremost modern philosopher,[1] grew out of his early Zen experience and his philosophical interest in the question of religious experience. The efforts of many Japanese thinkers who, indebted to Nishida, have contributed to the movement of "philosophy of religion" in modern Japan are illustrative of this central orientation in his own thought. This movement has its roots in the wider spiritual, particularly Buddhist, heritage of Japanese tradition, and even in modern times can be thought to antedate Nishida.[2] Nevertheless, probably the first philosophically original assimilation of Eastern and Western religious ideas in modern Japan is attributable to Nishida Kitarō, whose range of epistemological and metaphysical ideas introduced a broad conceptual framework which became, and remained, the point of departure for the "Kyoto school" of modern Japanese religious philosophy.[3]

Nishida's overall contribution was hardly limited to religious philosophy. Nevertheless, his whole career was a developing process of articulation of fundamental religious attitudes which permeated his early Zen training prior to the publication of his first major work, *Zen no kenkyū* [A Study of Good].[4] To express these deepening attitudes he continued on his intellectual journey from the publication of that work in 1911 until his death in a Zen monastery at Kamakura in 1945. His religious philosophy was thus coextensive with his whole literary career, which itself was grounded in his own personal re-

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[1] See Takeuchi Yoshinori, "Nishida's Philosophy as Representative of Japanese Philosophy," under "Japanese Philosophy," *Encyclopedia Brittanica,* 1966 ed.

[2] Takeuchi, *op. cit.,* p. 959. Cf. Watsuji Tetsurō, *Nihon no rinri shisōshi* [A History of Japanese Ethical Thought], 2 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1952), II, 781, 792. In his early works, Hatano Seiichi (1877-1950) stimulated a study of Western thought by such works as *An Outline of the History of Western Philosophy* (1897), *The Origins of Christianity* (1909), and especially *A Study of Spinoza* (1904, in German; translated into Japanese in 1910).

[3] Hans Waldenfels, "Absolute Nothingness: Preliminary Considerations on a Central Notion in the Philosophy of Nishida Kitarō and the Kyoto School," *Monumenta Nipponica* XXI, no. 3-4 (1966), 354-391. This article treats of Nishida Kitarō, Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962), Nishitani Keiji (1900–), and Takeuchi Yoshinori (1913–), and gives copious references to a wider literature of the "Kyoto school."

[4] *Zen no kenkyū* [A Study of Good], trans. V. H. Viglielmo (Tokyo: Japanese Government Printing Office, 1960). Professor Viglielmo's forthcoming study, *Nishida Kitarō: The Early Years,* to be published by Princeton University Press, will be the most comprehensive coverage of Nishida's early religious life up to the publication of *Zen no kenkyū* that is available in English. Further information on the life and thought of Nishida in English is in G. K. Piovesana, *Recent Japanese Philosophical Thought, 1862-1962* (Tokyo: Enderle, 1963), pp. 85-122; and in L. Knauth, "Life is Tragic: The Diary of Nishida Kitarō," *Monumenta Nipponica* XX, no. 3-4 (1965), pp. 335-358. Waldenfels, Piovesana, and Knauth furnish further information on translations of Nishida's works.

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actions as an intellectual of the late Meiji, Taishō, and Shōwa periods.[5] We must note his participation in this wider social experience which, subject to cultural and intellectual influences from both East and West, formed the concrete tissue of feelings and ideas available to him as a person living through a time almost coextensive with modern Japanese history up to the end of World War II. Nishida's writings have particular interest, as they are representative of the sophistication of philosophical ideas which the modern Japanese intellectual world attained in a relatively short period of time. Scholars interested in the theme of "modernization" in the late Meiji and early Taishō periods can find in Nishida's case an important example of a continuous assimilation of Western categories which contributed in part to the development of Japanese philosophy to its present high level.

Judging from the subsequent orientation of the "philosophy of religion" movement in Japan, the synthesis of Eastern and Western ideas achieved in Nishida's thought has indeed had its main impact in the area of religious philosophy, as noted above. While to some, including the present writer, such a development may seem to be an unnecessary restriction of the possibilities which his thought suggests, it can hardly be denied that Nishida's own focus of attention stimulated that direction.[6] From his key transitional work of 1927, *Hataraku mono kara miru mono e* [From the Acting to the Seeing], which began an explicit articulation of a generalized Zen "logic of the East" centering upon the concept of the "*topos* of nothingness" (*mu no basho*[a]), Nishida's ideas were a deepening quest intellectually to repossess certain fundamental "Oriental" religious experiences. He thus began a dialogue with Western religious ideas which, particularly from a Buddhist position, has continued down to today.[7]

[5] *Nishida Kitarō zenshū* [The Complete Works of Nishida Kitarō], 19 vols. (2d ed.; Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965). A partial listing of Nishida's major philosophical works must include: *Zen no kenkyū* [A Study of Good], 1911; *Jikaku ni okeru chokkan to hansei* [Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness], 1917; *Ishiki no mondai* [Problems of Consciousness], 1920; *Geijutsu to dōtoku* [Art and Morality], 1923; *Hataraku mono kara miru mono e* [From the Acting to the Seeing], 1927; *Ippansha no jikakuteki taikei* [The Self-Conscious System of the Universal], 1930; *Mu no jikakuteki gentei* [The Self-Conscious Determination of Nothingness], 1932; *Tetsugaku no kompon mondai* [Basic Problems of Philosophy], 2 vols., 1933-34; and six volumes of philosophical essays.

[6] Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960), while indebted to Nishida's thought, is one example of a modern Japanese philosopher working outside of the "philosophy of religion" movement. Watsuji's *Fūdō* [Climate: A Philosophical Study], trans. G. Bownas (Tokyo: Japanese Government Printing Office, 1961), is available in English. Its introductory essay is particularly suggestive of the possibilities of philosophical thought outside of the specific context of religious philosophy. Watsuji's major writings were in the field of ethics, e.g., *Ethics as a Philosophy of Man* (1934), *Ethics* (3 vols., 1937-49), *A History of Japanese Ethical Thought* (2 vols., 1952). Cf. Takeuchi Yoshinori, "Watsuji Tetsurō," *Encyclopedia Brittanica*, 1967 ed.

[7] For example, Takeuchi Yoshinori, "Buddhism and Existentialism: the Dialogue between

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The present article can do no more than mention the full career of Nishida Kitarō, and those of his followers and critics. It is primarily intended to be a summary of and commentary on the religious ideas which Nishida presented to the world in his first major work, *A Study of Good*. Because of this restriction, it will be impossible to trace here the gradual transition in Nishida's position from 1911 to his later "logic of the East," which has become his chief claim to originality as a world thinker. A few excellent introductions to this total development of Nishida's career already exist in English.[8] My aim will rather be to focus upon this limited area of Nishida's first work as one illustration of the kind of assimilation of Western philosophical ideas which occurred in Japan during the late Meiji (1868-1912) and Taishō (1912-1926) periods. It will also be to study these ideas as philosophical categories that are intrinsically interesting as philosophical categories.

THE STRUCTURE OF A STUDY OF GOOD

Nishida's career was launched with the publication of *A Study of Good* in 1911, the year after he became assistant professor of philosophy at Kyoto University. This work, which won Nishida instant respect and which has been the most widely read of his works, was the product of a long period of maturation during his years as an instructor in the Kanazawa school system in the last decade of the Meiji period.[9] But in a certain sense his intellectual preparation for the writing of this book took an even longer time. When the

Oriental and Occidental Thought," in *Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich,* ed. W. Leibrecht (New York: Harper & Row, 1959); Takeuchi, "Hegel and Buddhism," *Il Pensiero* VII, no. 1-2 (1962), 5-46; Abe Masao, "Buddhism and Christianity as a Problem of Today," *Japanese Religions* III, no. 2 (1963), 11-22; no. 3, 8-31; "A Symposium on Christianity and Buddhism," IV, no. 1-2 (1964), 5-52 and 26-57; "Christianity and Buddhism: Centering Around Nihilism and Science," V, no. 3 (July 1968), 36-62. For further references to relevant literature see Waldenfels, *op. cit.*, p. 354 and *passim*.

[8] Introductions in English to Nishida's thought are found in Takeuchi, *op. cit.*, and "The Philosophy of Nishida Kitarō," *Japanese Religions* III, no. 4 (1963), 1-32; Matao Noda, "East-West Synthesis in Kitarō Nishida," *Philosophy East and West* IV, no. 4 (1954-55), 345-359; Shimomura Toratarō, "Nishida Kitarō and Some Aspects of His Philosophical Thought," trans. V. H. Viglielmo in his *A Study of Good,* pp. 191-217; *Nishida Kitarō: Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness,* trans. with an introduction by Robert Schinzinger (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1958); Nishida Kitarō, "The Problem of Japanese Culture," trans. Masao Abe, in *Sources of Japanese Tradition,* ed. Ryusaku Tsunoda, William T. de Bary, and Donald Keene (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 857-872.

[9] *A Study of Good,* p. 3. All references are to vol. 1 of *The Complete Works of Nishida Kitarō* (see above, n.5). While I am quoting the Japanese text, I have made full use of V. H. Viglielmo's translation of *A Study of Good*. My translations in some instances differ slightly from his. I have had the advantage of invaluable conversations with Prof. Viglielmo on Nishida during his stay in Kyoto during the spring of 1968.

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work was published in his forty-first year, it was already the culmination of at least twenty years of thought and experience; that is, the last two decades of the Meiji period.

In retrospect, this process of intellectual maturation in an individual growing up in the relatively remote area of Kanazawa during the turbulent 1890s and 1900s is a fascinating example of how intellectual currents pulsate like electronic waves across a land to come to focus in an individual localized form. His first steps as a student of philosophy; the stimulation of several brilliant classmates and friends, including D. T. Suzuki; his youthful "Meiji liberalism"; his three introspective years at Tokyo University, where he came into contact with the new German philosophy that has dominated Japanese philosophical circles ever since; a deepening interest in Zen practice from his early twenties; his writing, at the age of twenty-three or twenty-four, a study of the British Hegelian philosopher T. H. Green; his first teaching assignment at the age of twenty-five, followed by busy years teaching psychology, ethics, and history of philosophy; actual Zen practice from about this same time which reached its greatest intensity during his twenty-seventh through twenty-ninth years—these experiences formed traces on Nishida's subconscious spiritual life which, by a constant process of condensation and recondensation in the light of new experiences for another decade, were to issue forth in *A Study of Good*. The question of religion seems to have dominated his attention from before his thirtieth year, when he also began to show a more critical philosophical mind and to write brief philosophical pieces.[10] From around 1903 he began to turn his attention to the task of transforming his lecture materials and new insights into *A Study of Good*. Years of further study and reflection produced the work which, in retrospect, was probably the single most influential contribution to Japanese philosophy in modern times.

A careful analysis of the content of *A Study of Good* also suggests that it reflects a gradual transformation of earlier materials into book form. While Nishida had integrated its contents into a coherent system by the time of its publication in 1911, it was still a rather loosely joined entity comprised of four main sections: (1) "Pure Experience"; (2) "Reality"; (3) "The Good"; and (4) "Religion." Nishida confirms this structural impression by his statement in the Preface that he wrote the second and third sections first. He actually planned to publish the ontology of Section Two immediately, but was prevented by illness from doing so. Section Three was ostensibly a reformulation of his early essay on Green's ethics in the light of his later lectures and reflection. The first and fourth sections were then written, presumably in that sequence, as internal evidence suggests. Perhaps out of a consideration of this history of the manuscript, Nishida invited his readers, in the Preface of 1911,

[10] Viglielmo, "Nishida Kitarō: The Early Years" (manuscript), pp. 47-54, 60-63.

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to skip over the initial portion (four chapters) of the first section, "Pure Experience," and begin the sequence of ideas from Part Two, which he called the "core" of his philosophical thought at that time. But he named the work *Zen no kenkyū* [A Study of Good] after the content of Sections Three and Four to indicate that his ontological ideas were meant to lead up to the central questions of moral and religious, i.e., human, life itself (pp. 2-3).

What the history of the manuscript indeed reveals is that the last section on "Religion" was the final form of Nishida's thought to that juncture. In that sense it rounded out the system of ideas with which he launched his philosophical career. We can only touch upon the contents of that system here. Section One, "Pure Experience," took off from William James's notion of the same name. It was a rejection of both the atomistic psychology of classical British empiricism, and the sensationalism of the later positivistic epistemologies which had been vaguely, and illogically, allied with the classical material atomism of post-Newtonian cosmology. Nishida aligned himself with this modern endeavor to read the immediacy of experience in terms of a functional analysis of organically relating tissues of relations in which the classical dualisms of subject-object, mind-matter, etc., were regarded as abstractions superimposed upon the immediacy of experience itself. At the end of Section One Nishida exhibited a clear intention of reading the notion of "pure experience" as a primary "religious intuition" of the experient subject.

In Section Two, "Reality," Nishida went on to part company with James's radical empiricism in favor of a kind of idealistic rendering of reality in terms of "spirit" in language which was predominantly that of Berkeley and Hegel.[11] For example, citing Berkeley, Nishida proceeded to shift the center of metaphysical gravity away from the "independent thing" categories of traditional philosophical description to the "experient subject" categories of the *esse est percipi* point of view. He thus began to ontologize the notion of experience in a way somewhat foreign to William James, but consistent with his Zen insights. Particularly in his brief treatment of God in Section Two, chapter ten, entitled "God as Reality," he showed signs of a larger spiritual ken which we know to have included Buddhist insights. However, he formulated his ideas here in language drawn directly from Western idealistic categories, which were in turn subsumed and developed into the fuller treatment of the notion of "Religion" in the fourth part of the text. Even the third part, as previously noted, was an elaboration of a notion of moral "self-realization" which came from the ethics of the British Hegelian philosopher, T. H. Green.

[11] The chapter headings of Section Two themselves bear witness to his point: "Phenomena of Consciousness are the Only Reality" (chap. 2), "True Reality Always has the Identical Form" (chap. 4), "The Basic Form of True Reality" (chap. 5), "The Only Reality" (chap. 6), "The Differentiation and Development of Reality" (chap. 7).

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With this brief sketch of the background to Section Four, "Religion," of *A Study of Good,* let us turn directly to the first formulation of explicit religious categories in Nishida's career. For purposes of analysis I will follow the categoreal development of its four main chapters as they occur in the text, paying particular attention to the philosophical language and logic of Nishida's argument.

THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION AND PANTHEISTIC TENDENCIES

1. The opening chapter of Section Four, entitled "The Religious Demand," serves as a point of departure for Nishida's formal remarks concerning the nature of religion, which incidentally shed light on his own understanding of the notion of pure experience. This is evident from the opening sentence of the chapter, where it is said that "the religious demand is the demand with regard to the self, a demand concerning the life of the self" (p. 169). The whole work to this juncture is a metaphysical discourse on the life of the self, that is, a rational articulation of the various implications of the notion of subjectivity itself. In this present context Nishida turns attention to felt moral and religious exigencies in the life of the person as the basis for further philosophical analysis: "It is the demand wherein the self perceives its relativity and finitude, and at the same time joins with the absolute and infinite power, thereby desiring to acquire the true life of eternity." Nishida thus makes a start on the basis of the philosophical datum of the religious exigency itself. If we recall his formal Zen training and personal religious interests, this point becomes more plausible. The religious demand, he insists, is identical with the life demand. It is "the deepest demand of man's heart," since it seeks an all-embracing unity which transcends even the unities of knowledge and the will (p. 172). Therefore, the question of the religious demand is made central to the notion of pure experience in *A Study of Good.*

Now, what is the religious demand in concrete terms? Nishida first affirms, contrary to much vulgar superstition which has traditionally passed under the name of morality and religion, that the true religious attitude cannot be based on thoughts of selfish merit or fear. Nor is it a demand for "self-peace," which mistakenly finds the significance of religion in "extinguishing the temperament of enterprise and activity by taking up a negative life of small pleasure and no distress" (p. 170).[12] He states that "peace" is rather the result of true religious experience, the demand for which, positively taken, is "the great demand of life which one is unable to end even if one wishes to do so." It is the demand of the appetitive center of the personality, the most powerful

[12] This fine rendering, as well as several others in this section, is that of V. H. Viglielmo's translation of *A Study of Good,* p. 158.

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desire of which is to center the self in the universe of its experiences. Moreover, it is the demand for the largest experience of the self as unifying center. In the process of discovering this true center the self perceives the fact of its relative perspective in the world of pure experience. Accordingly, religious experience is precisely that pursuit of "absolute unity" by wholly casting aside one's own finite relativity. This phenomenology of the religious attitude clearly suggests Nishida's Zen background. But in the precise formulation of it Nishida returns to his idealistic position of the unity of consciousness, which is the source and center of the original state of the subjectivity of the self. He writes that the religious exigency is identical with "the demand for the unity of consciousness, and at the same time for union with the universe" (p. 172). Thus the question "why is religion necessary" is synonymous with "why is it necessary to live," for the demands of religion are those of life itself (pp. 172-173).

In sum, we note that Nishida launched his explicit religious ideas with a kind of phenomenological analysis of the experiential exigency of the religious attitude itself. While the larger premises for this chapter are already contained in the preceding sections of the book, the present chapter is also a fresh confrontation of experiential content relating to the religious exigency itself. A certain generalized Zen religiosity may well have been the deeper motivation for Nishida here. The chapter is an implicit statement of precisely the kind of personal religiosity which Nishida developed in his later writings in which a Zen ontology predominates.

2. In Chapter Two, entitled the "Essence of Religion," the structure of the religious experience is more deeply analyzed. Generically, religion is defined as the relation between God and man. Here God is intended to mean "the foundation of the universe," and man is said to mean "our individual consciousness." Nishida then affirms that the mutual relation of things differing in essence cannot be established outside of self-interest. Therefore he positively defines the religious relation to be the "relation of a God and man of the same nature," i.e., "there must be the relation of father and son" (pp. 173-174). Why Nishida uses the analogy of father and son[b] at this juncture is not perfectly clear. Nor does it seem perfectly apposite in the light of the general orientation of his thought, which, using his own terms, is more pantheistic[c] than theistic[d]. But apart from the merits of his use of the anthropomorphism of father and son, Nishida's account consistently endeavors to enunciate a doctrine of internal relation between God and man, where the "basic thought of all religion" is defined in terms of a twofold requirement: (1) that "God and man have the same nature," and (2) that "man returns to his origin in God." The text continues: "But merely for God and man to have the same interests and for God to help us and protect us is not yet true religion. God

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must be the foundation of the universe, and at the same time our foundation, for our returning to God is returning to that source. Moreover, God must be the object of all things, i.e. God must also be the object of man, and every man must find his true object in God" (p. 174).

Precisely because of this experience of God as immanent ground and source do we "feel infinite warmth in God and are able to attain to the essence of religion, which is to live in God" (p. 176). As both Augustinian and Buddhist traditions have maintained, each in its own way, we lose our self to find our true Self.

Another way Nishida articulates the relation of immanent ground, which is the essence of the religious relation, is that "our spirit is the partial consciousness of God." Even though God and man do "possess the foundation of an identical spirit," it might still seem possible to conceive of God and man as mutually independent. But he cautions that this is "viewing from the flesh and distinguishing spirit temporally and spatially," for "those who possess the same foundation in spirit are the same spirit." He even affirms that our spirit[e] (*seishin*) must be the "same substance as God"[f] and that "God and man are the same substance"[g] (p. 177). Citing Boehme's mystical idea of *die innerste Geburt,* he declares that we reach God through the deepest internal life.

Further clarification of the basic thought of this chapter seems unnecessary at this point, since the theme of the relation between God and man is given even more explicit philosophical structuring in the next two chapters, which deal with "God" and with "God and the World," respectively. Here we may note that Nishida's position has quickly moved far beyond the phenomenology of the religious exigency of the previous chapter. In addition to analogies with types of Buddhist thought, it shows awareness of the main line of mystical and pantheistic thought in the Western tradition, to which Nishida frequently alludes in this final section of *A Study of Good.* The key point of this *itinerarium mentis in Deum* tradition is the concept of internal and immanent relation, based on identity of substance, between God and man. Nishida has taken this central point and generalized it into the essential definition of the religious relation itself. In a certain sense his thought here exhibits a degree of eclecticism and use of Western philosophical categories which probably cannot be said to be truly Zen in connotation. For the Zen concept of the experience of "self-mind"[h] and the Western concept of *itinerarium mentis in Deum* part company over the question of duality, which Western religious thought retains to some extent. Nishida avoids all reference to this problem in the present context.

3. The subsequent chapter, entitled "God," may be said to be the most important chapter of this series, in that Nishida's conception of God is developed in a philosophical language that is precise and systematic. It therefore

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serves to clarify some of the ideas previously entertained. At the very start, for example, Nishida reiterates his contention that God is not to be conceived "as a transcendent creator outside the universe," but as "directly the ground of this reality." He elucidates this point by adding: "The relation between God and the universe is not such as that between an artist and his work, but is the relation between essence and phenomenon, and the universe is not a thing created by God, but is a 'manifestation' of God" (p. 178). In this context Nishida seems definitely to be employing a "substance" language in the description of God. "Essence and phenomenon,"[1] "manifestation of God"[1] and the like are all expressions of this "substance" language and the "logic of identity" consistently witnessed throughout this important chapter. At no time does Nishida really depart from the Spinozistic or Hegelian frame of reference previously noted, although Nishida's rendering of this line of thought may well be original. However, we may be permitted to inquire whether "substance" language, even in a Spinozistic or Hegelian (i.e., non-Aristotelian or non-Cartesian) sense, is the most adequate kind of language in a philosophical description of God and of the relation between God and the universe. Nishida himself does not seem to entertain this question in *A Study of Good,* even though his previous discussion of pure experience may have prepared us for the possibility of alternative kinds of philosophical categories in articulating these metaphysical concepts.

I will leave this question of philosophical language pending for the time being in order to follow Nishida's own argument. Having begun with the repudiation of God as external creator in favor of his own notion of the internal manifestation of God in the universe, Nishida somewhat inconsistently goes on to offer an argument which is almost literally a page from Newton (he also mentions Kepler), when he argues from the order of natural phenomena to "the one unifying power behind them in control." This notion is even applied to the human soul as well, when it is said that ". . . throughout the East and West, a tremendous unifying force is in control" (pp. 178-180). Nishida himself had rejected the "causal" argument for God's existence in a previous passage (pp. 98-100). The present line of reasoning seems inconsistent with several previous premises, and is in fact not pursued too far. Returning to his *esse est percipi* position that "we cannot know matter separately as an independent reality apart from our phenomena of consciousness, Nishida reiterates the point that "the facts of direct experience . . . are only these phenomena of consciousness." He therefore postulates that we must return to the self, for "the secret key to explaining the universe lies in the self." Even what Newton and Kepler observed as the order of natural phenomena is actually nothing more than the order of our phenomena of consciousness (pp. 181-182). But God, it has been argued, is the foundation of reality; therefore God, as the unifier of consciousness, is the unifier of the universe.

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In a fuller text: "God is the unifier of the universe, and the universe is the expression of God. This comparison is not merely metaphoric, it is fact. God is the greatest and ultimate unifier of our consciousness. Indeed, our consciousness is a part of the consciousness of God, and its unity comes from the unity of God" (p. 182). What we are seeing, then, is that despite his basic Zen religiosity Nishida tended to philosophize in *A Study of Good* in language which was heavily indebted to Western idealism.

To summarize the remaining arguments of the present chapter, I will endeavor to reduce a longer text to three fundamental premises and three conclusions. The first premise is that "that which controls spirit must be the laws of spirit." Second, "spirit is not merely the combination of these functions, but behind spirit there is one unifying force, and these phenomena are its expression." The third premise (itself a conclusion) is that this unifying force connotes a spiritual personality, and God "is the one great personality who is the ground of the universe," or conversely, the universe is "the personal expression of God" (p. 182). The first conclusion is that "reality must be directly the thought and will of God" (quoting Spinoza, *Ethics* I. 16). Second, because of God's universal consciousness, "in God everything is actuality, and God is always active. . . . In God there is neither past nor future. . . . God resides in the eternal now. . . . In God there is no hope, reflection, or memory, and consequently there is no consciousness of a special self . . . . God is absolute freedom. . . . In this kind of God there is no variable will" (pp. 183-184). God is "infinite love" (p. 185). Third, God's personality must be transpersonal, by virtue of being "the one great intellectual intuition at the base of the universe," and "the unifier of pure experience which embraces the universe" (p. 186). These citations represent the substance of Nishida's argument concerning the attributes of God, as the scholastic philosophers might call them. To a student of Western theism they are familiar ideas. Nishida himself offers a generous sprinkling of allusions to Augustine and the Renaissance mystics throughout this chapter.

4. The fourth chapter, entiled "God and the World," does not introduce radically new material. It is a continuation of the main threads of the preceding chapter, with further emphasis on the relation which obtains between God and the world. Nishida's argument is that this relation can be inferred from the relation of the unity of consciousness to its content. On this premise, he concludes to the pure subjectivity of the Divine. This is the concept of the Divine inscrutability, which is common to Buddhism and the *via negativa* of Western theology. Here we may expect to find Nishida developing the idea of *via negativa* along Buddhistic lines, as he does in later writings. However, no such attempt is made. Nishida pursues his idealistic position in a most thoroughgoing manner. He writes: "such things as God's eternity, omnipresence, omni-

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science, and omnipotence, must all be interpreted from the characteristics of the unity of consciousness" (p. 190). Citing Hegel, he concludes:

> Nothingness separated from being is not true nothingness; the one separated from the all is not the true one; equality separated from distinction is not true equality. In the same way that if there is no God there is no world, if there is no world there is no God. Of course, when I here say the world, I do not mean only this world of ours. Since, as Spinoza has said, the 'attributes' of God are infinite, God must include infinite worlds. However, the universal expression must belong to the essence of God and is certainly not an accidental function. It is not that God previously created the world but that He is its eternal creator. (P. 190)

From here Nishida goes on to speak of God's "necessary" or "essential" manifestation in the phenomenal world. Thus "God reflects on Himself, i.e. makes a mirror of Himself prior to the revelation . . . and from this, God and the world develop." In another expression of the Hegelian logic, "God in expressing His deepest unity must first be greatly disintegrated" (p. 192). While Buddhist overtones may perhaps be read into these statements, Nishida himself chooses to take an analogy from Christian sources: "Man, if seen from one side, is directly the self-awareness of God. If we employ the legends of Christianity, precisely because there was the fall of Adam is there the salvation of Christ, and consequently the infinite love of God has become manifest" (p. 193).

From the foregoing material we can conclude that Nishida's first formulation of ontological and religious categories was an interesting assimilation of Western idealistic language which had a certain originality in that its pantheistic direction was further grounded in his own notion of pure experience. On the whole, it reflects a comprehensive grasp of the literature and thought structure of Western mysticism and transcendentalism. Nishida was evidently drawn to Western pantheism at this early stage in his career.

CONCLUSION

In this survey of the religious categories of Nishida's first major work, *A Study of Good,* we have noted a definite trend in Nishida's thought to ontologize the notion of pure experience in a way somewhat foreign to William James. Certainly his pantheistic conclusions differed from the theistic ideas of James's *A Pluralistic Universe*. Since James and other authors suggest alternative ways of developing this initial notion, we may conclude that Nishida's basic affinities lay elsewhere. He had been introduced to the writings of William James by D. T. Suzuki, and had read James and Bergson in the years immediately prior to the publication of *A Study of Good*. Their writings seem to have mediated his own earlier ideas concerning a "condition of pure experience" prior to subject-object distinctions in the immediacy of experience.

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But he found similar ideas in Berkeley, Spinoza, Hegel, and the tradition of Christian mystical writers. In the last analysis, his greater affinities were with the latter stream of idealistic and pantheistic tradition in the West. When he proceeded to formulate his own religious categories in *A Study of Good* he took pains to identify his own position with this mystical element of Western tradition. He subordinated Buddhistic insights to this thought structure, presumably because he was still in the process of finding his way among these ideas to his own position. In this first work we see the beginning of Nishida's lifelong process of drawing upon the rich background of Eastern and Western tradition and attempting to assimilate it into a larger position. This catholicity of interest should be evident from even the foregoing brief survey. Nishida's mild eclecticism at this early point in his career gave evidence of his desire to participate intellectually in the widest structure of theistic ideas.

In his next three major works, *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness* (1917), *Problems of Consciousness* (1920), and *Art and Morality* (1923), Nishida continued to feel his way among Western religious ideas. But a polarity between the language of God and of the "self" began to emerge with increasing emphasis on the "self" itself. Thus Nishida's early interest in Western pantheism, evidenced especially in *A Study of Good* and *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness,* gave way to a deeper philosophical anthropology in which the interchange of "God" and "self" suggested a deeper ground. He explored this deeper ground beginning with his epochal *From the Acting to the Seeing* (1927), where he explicitly moved his position to a generalized Zen ontology of the "*topos* of nothingness" by pursuing a demand to "give the philosophical basis" of the experience of "seeing the form of the formless" and "hearing the voice of the voiceless" which lies "at the root of Eastern culture transmitted by our ancestors for thousands of years" (*From the Acting to the Seeing,* p. 6). By this time, however, he had already gone through a long process of assimilation of Western categories, so that his interest in articulating the "logic of the East" was in a sense mediated, and enriched, by his knowledge of Western ontology. This philosophical *itinerarium* gave Nishida greater insight into his own tradition, and added to his appreciation of the contrast between Eastern and Western spiritual disciplines. He became the spokesman of the logic of the East only after immersing himself in the logic of the West.

A Study of Good was only the first step for Nishida Kitarō. As philosophy in the sense of pure *tetsugaku*[k] it may well be judged to be the work of youth. One is prompted to make this criticism in the light of Nishida's later sophistication as an original thinker. Yet even in his own times *A Study of Good* represented original philosophical talent and fresh insight that won the acclaim of contemporary readers. This fact also suggests that Nishida's early assimilation of Western ideas was more than eclectic. It was the beginning of a new

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synthesis of East and West. Its creativity contributed to the "modernization" of the intellectual life of modern Japan by setting a new standard for Japanese philosophy. His early religious ideas especially heralded a new direction which was to become the "philosophy of religion" movement of the "Kyoto school."

[a] 無の場所
[b] 父子の關係
[c] 汎神論
[d] 有神論
[e] 精神
[f] 神人同一體
[g] 神人同體，神人合一
[h] 自心
[i] 本體，現象
[j] 神の表現
[k] 哲學

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Man lives with his objects chiefly—in fact, since his feeling and acting depends on his perceptions, one may say exclusively—as language presents them to him. By the same process whereby he spins language out of his own being, he ensnares himself in it; and each language draws a magic circle round the people to which it belongs, a circle from which there is no escape save by stepping out of it into another.

Wilhelm von Humboldt

This paper is chiefly an attempt to reflect upon the mysteries of the magic circle, which has left a permanent deposit in my thinking. I will present a critique of Chinese thought through an examination of the language from which it has stemmed. I am not, however, concerned here with examining any one type of Chinese philosophy, such as Confucianism or Taoism, nor with exposing the philosophical system of a Chinese thinker like Lao Tzu or Mencius, but rather with making explicit some subtle common trends underlying Chinese thought as a whole, through the examination of some major characteristics of the Chinese language.

The procedure of this paper consists in the following steps: First, I will present the main structures of the Chinese written characters and some notable syntactical features of the Chinese classical language. Second, I will expose some essential characteristics of Chinese thinking as revealed by the graphic structure and the syntactical features of the language. Third, I will direct attention to the commonly-held thesis that the Chinese language is a better medium for poetic insights than for logical thinking.

I

There is very little doubt about the belief that the most characteristic feature of the Chinese language lies in its written characters. Every Chinese character is an integrated visual structure of lines or strokes which expresses a single image or concept. From the study of their origins, characters can be grouped into three categories: simple characters, complex characters, and compound characters.[1] Definitions and examples of each type follow.

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[1] Traditionally Chinese characters are grouped into six categories: (1) *Hsiang-hsing* 象形, (2) *Chih-shih* 指事, (3) *Hui-i* 會意, (4) *Hsing-shêng* 形聲, (5) *Chuan-chu* 轉注, and (6) *Chia-chieh* 叚借. The earliest systematic interpretation of these six categories was given by Hsu Shen 許愼 of the Han dynasty (202 B.C.–A.D. 220). His interpretation was summarized in *Shuo Wen Chieh Tzu* 說文解字:

象形者，畫成其物，隨體詰詘，日月是也。
指事者，視而可識，察而見意，上下是也。
會意者，比類合誼，以見指撝，武信是也。
形聲者，以事爲名，取譬相成，江河是也。
轉注者，建類一首，同意相受，考老是也。
叚借者，本無其字，依聲託事，令長是也。

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A. Simple characters. By simple character we mean an unanalyzable unit that is self-sufficient in expressing an image or concept, and is, at the same time, a building brick of other types of characters. Most of the names of animals belong to this kind. For instance, "horse" is written as in the Shang inscriptions,[2] and becomes in Chou inscriptions,[3] in *Hsiao Chuan,*[4] and in Ni Shu,[5] which is very close to the current form 馬 .[6] It is quite obvious that, the earlier in history, the more the character resembles the real object. In the Shang inscriptions, the earliest Chinese written language discovered, one can still identify in the characters what natural objects they represent. A list of examples can be given as follows:[7]

a cow

a goat

Hsiang-hsing roughly means "pictographs" or "imitative symbols" which are primarily rough sketches representing natural objects or living creatures. *Chih-shih* roughly means "indicative symbols" or "demonstratives" which suggest meanings symbolically. *Hui-i* roughly means "logical aggregates" or "ideographic combinations," combining two or more characters to suggest a new meaning. *Hsing-shêng* roughly means "phonetic-ideograms" or "ideophones," being composed of a phonetic symbol and an ideograph. As to *Chuan-chu,* owing to the obscurity involved in Hsu's definition, there have been many different interpretations, none of them conclusive. *Chia-chieh* is a way of using language, primarily the using of a word metaphorically to suggest a new meaning.

This traditional classification is illogical and inaccurate. First, it has confused the structure of characters with the use of characters. Second, *Chuan-chu* has never been clearly defined and has allowed different interpretations. Third, this classification was based primarily on the written characters of the Ch'in dynasty (221-207 B.C.), which were somewhat distorted from the original written forms. A systematic and penetrating critique of this classification was given by T'ang Lan 唐蘭 in his *Chung Kuo Wên Tzu Hsueh* 中國文字學 [Study of Chinese Characters] (Hong Kong: Tai Ping Book Co., 1963 reprinting), pp. 67-74.

[2] The Shang dynasty (about 1300 B.C.) was the earliest dynasty of archaeological evidence. Shang inscriptions were carved on oracle bones or shells known as *Chia ku wên* 甲骨文 and were discovered at Anyang 安陽 in Honan 河南 Province during the early period of this century.

[3] Chou inscriptions were the written characters on bronzes and were discovered and identified as the product of the Chou dynasty (about 1115-403 B.C.). This kind of inscription is usually called *Chung ting wên* 鐘鼎文

[4] *Hsiao chuan* 小篆 was the style of the Chinese written characters in the Ch'in dynasty (221-207 B.C.). This style was authorized and enforced by the central government.

[5] *Ni Shu* 隸書 was the style of the Chinese written characters in the Han dynasty (202 B.C.-A.D. 220).

[6] The current form is called *K'ai shu* 楷書 , which was stabilized since the Chin dynasty (280-420), owing to the invention of printing.

[7] All the illustrations for the graphic structure of characters in this article are taken from the late Professor Lincoln Hung-Chin Kao's *The Origin and Development of Chinese Characters,* vols. I and II (Taipei: Kwang Wen Book Company, 1960, 1964). 中國字例 (一名中國文字學大全) 上下冊 高鴻縉著 台北 廣文書局印行

In order to minimize the complication of documentation, no individual footnotes will be given to each illustration. I find that of the studies of Chinese characters Professor Kao's work is the most insightful and best organized.

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a turtle

a person—variations are and

a woman

a hand—variations are , , , , and

a crossroad

a gate

rain

water

From the mere observation of the foregoing examples, one may have the impression that Chinese characters are primarily images of corporeal objects. However, if one observes the ancient inscriptions with sufficient care, one may discover that the Chinese people also invented characters for abstract concepts. A number of examples can be given:

above, over, higher, upper, the upper class, to go up, etc.

beneath, under, lower, the lower class, to go down, etc.

to meet, to join, or to come across

ill omen or misfortune

long

B. Complex characters. By complex character we mean a character that is composed of at least one simple character and some symbol which is not, itself, a character. Examples follow:

means "fruit." resembles the shape of a fruit, but itself is not a ready-made character, and by itself is very ambiguous. But if it is combined with , which means "a tree," its meaning is more distinct.

means "mother." , as already indicated, is the image of a woman. The two dots represent the breasts which are characteristic of a mother, yet they are not ready-made characters.

means "to stand." , again, as already noted, is the image of a person. — denotes the place where the person stands.

C. Compound characters. By compound character we mean a character that is composed of two or more characters of either one (or both) of the former two types. This type constitutes over ninety percent of the Chinese vocabulary and is much more sophisticated. Through the combination of two or more simpler units, even very abstract ideas can be expressed. Here are some notable examples:

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means "the will." This character is composed of two simple characters. is the image of the heart. means "to go." Here "the will" is represented by the meaning "toward which the heart goes."

means "to open." is the concrete image of a gate, as already noted. When it is barred, the ideogram for it is , which is a complex character meaning "is barred" or "to bar." In order to open it, one has to remove the bar. is a complicated picture indicating the action of two hands removing the bar.

means "to wash one's hands." is the picture of a basin, stands for water, and are the two hands.

means "to marry" or "to have sexual intercourse with." It is composed of , the image of a woman, and , which, as noted above, means to meet or to join.

As to its syntactical nature, the Chinese language is known for its simplicity in grammar. Although there seems to be subject-predicate distinction in a sentence, the connection between the two parts is often very loose as compared to that in English. In fact, whether this distinction (which is primarily the product of the study of European languages) is adequate for the Chinese language is quite questionable. In addition, the Chinese language is notable for its lack of inflection. There are no tenses, no cases, no genders, no numbers, and in classical writings, even no punctuation. Owing to such syntactical characteristics, expressions tend toward a high degree of simplicity. It is observable that a Chinese classic in English translation is always lengthier than the original, while a European classic in Chinese translation, particularly a translation into classical Chinese, is often shorter. For a typical case, the Confucianist's slogan in education, *Yu Chiao Wu Lui* 有教無類, contains only four syllables. *Yu* means "to have" or "there is" or "there are" (of course with their variations in tense and number). *Chiao* means "education," "teaching," "instruction," "culture," or "religion." *Wu* means "to have none," "there is not" (with its variations in tense and number), or "nonexistence." *Lui* means "class," "species," or "kind." It is technically impossible to get an English translation which is shorter than the original. My translation of this sentence is: "Where there is education, there is no class-distinction." James Ware's is shorter: "Instruction recognizes no castes."[8] Nevertheless it has doubled the original in number of syllables.

It is interesting to observe that in classical Chinese writing a noun can be used as a verb without any change in form. For instance, in the *Confucian Analects*,[9] *Chun Chun* 君君 means "the king acts as a king"; *Fu Fu* 父父

[8] James R. Ware, trans., *The Sayings of Confucius* (New York: The New American Library, 1955), p. 103.
[9] Cf. *Lun Yu* 論語. XII, 11 (translated by the author).

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means "the father acts as a father." This syntactical feature leads to very sophisticated (but not commonly found) compositions of Chinese literature. The following is an interesting example. It was, from the memory of the present author, about twenty years ago in mainland China that a man was promoted to the post of the director of a bank. One of his friends expressed congratulations by presenting him a couplet saying:

行行行行行行行
長長長長長長長

This piece of literature appeared very puzzling, because each sentence was composed of only one word repeated seven times. The character 行 means "the bank," 長 means "director" or "leader." Thus the couplet reads:

Bank, bank, bank, bank, bank, bank, bank;
Director, director, director, director, director, director, director.

This, at first sight, seems to make no sense. But if it is read with some imagination and knowledge of some specific syntactical features of the Chinese language, the couplet makes very good sense. As already explained, the Shang inscription for 行 is , which is the picture of a crossroad. Its essential meaning is "a road" or "a way." Since a road is for walking, a derivative meaning of this character is "to walk." From "the way" emerges the meaning "profession" (as a noun pronounced *Hang*); from "to walk" emerges the meaning "that it works" or "it is all right" or simply "OK" (as a verb pronounced *Hsing; Pu Hsing* 不行 means "it does not work," or "it is not OK"). Chinese people call the bank *Yin Hang* 銀行, which simply means "the money profession" (*Yin* 銀 means "silver" or "money"). Idiomatically *Hang* 行 can be used as the short form for *Yin Hang*. This is why *Hang* 行 can mean "the bank." Thus the sentence with seven 行 should read: "This profession will do, that profession will do, every profession will do." (The pronunciation for this sentence is: *Hang hsing, hang hsing, hang hang hsing. Hang hang,* two together, means "every *hang*.") As to the sentence of seven 長, it is to be interpreted in a similar way. As already noted, the Shang inscription for 長 is , a picture of the long hair of a person. The original meaning is "long." From this original meaning, the idea "always" (long in *time*) emerges. At the same time, another meaning, "leader," arises. (Perhaps according to the psychology of primitive men, the longest one is the leader.) Thus the second sentence should read: "Always be the leader, always be the leader, always always be the leader." (The pronunciation for this sentence is: *Ch'ang chang, ch'ang chang, ch'ang ch'ang chang.* The two adverbs *ch'ang ch'ang* occur together only for emphasis, unlike the two nouns *hang hang*.)

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II

From the studies of the constructions of the Chinese characters and the syntactical features of the language, some characteristics of Chinese ways of thinking are revealed; namely, the expression of general concepts in terms of particulars, simplicity, and a process view of reality. In this section, each of these features will receive some attention.

Professor Nakamura is quite correct in saying that in Chinese thinking the particulars play a very important role. However, he is mistaken in maintaining that the lack of consciousness of universals is essential to Chinese thought.[10] It is demonstrable from historical texts written before the time of Confucius that quite a number of abstract concepts were discussed.[11] During the Spring and Autumn (722-481 B.C.) and the Warring States period (403-221 B.C.), varieties of abstract concepts were under discussion. The notion of Central Harmony in *Chung Yung* 中庸, Human-heartedness (or *Jên*) in the *Confucian Analects,* Universal Love in *Motse,* Justice or Righteousness in *Mencius,* and the concepts of *Tao,* Being, and Nonbeing in *Lao Tzu,* are all abstract concepts. Nevertheless, they are not universals in the sense of being self-sufficient in themselves; they are expressed through the particulars. This feature is revealed in the construction of the Chinese characters. It is to be noted that in the Chinese written language, abstract concepts like "the will," *Tao,* and *Jên* are symbolized in a very concrete fashion, sometimes constructed in a metaphorical manner.[12] A very notable way of using metaphors is to symbolize the abstract in terms of the concrete. *I Ching* [The Book of Changes] is a book in metaphysics. Most of the key concepts were nevertheless expressed in concrete images. The two fundamental forces of the universe were symbolized as *Yin* 陰 and *Yang* 陽, which etymologically mean the "shadowy side" and the "sunny side" of the mountain. With very few exceptions, the sixty-four hexagrams which signify human as well as natural phenomena were named in a very concrete fashion. Nevertheless, if students or scholars do not understand this particular way of using language, namely, symbolizing the universals in terms of the particulars, they may

[10] Hajime Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples,* ed. Philip P. Wiener (rev. ed.; Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1964), p. 185.

[11] A noted example is *The Book of History* or *Shu Ching* 書經, in which abstract concepts like *Wei* 危, *Wei* 微, *Ching* 精, and *I* 一 were discussed.

[12] The character for "the will" was already presented and analyzed in the first part of this article. The character for *Tao* is 道, which is composed of two radicals, 首 and 辶. 首 means "head" or "leading," and 辶 means "to go" or "that which is for going." These two radicals combined together yield the meaning "the way" or "the leading way." The character for *Jên* is 仁, which is composed of two radicals: the left one, 亻, means "man"; the right one, 二, means "two." Hence, the meaning of *Jên* is concerned with the relation between man and man. These illustrations show that in Chinese characters, abstract concepts are symbolized in a metaphorical way.

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commit the fallacy of taking the concrete for the abstract. It is adequate to say that universals are developed in Chinese thought, but they are by no means universals in a Platonic sense, nor even in the sense of the Lockian abstraction or Kantian synthesis of the manifold. It is Bishop Berkeley's theory which characterizes this mode of Chinese thinking. For Berkeley, "an idea, which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort."[13]

Westerners who are vaguely familar with Chinese culture may already have the impression that *simplicity* is a major characteristic of Chinese life. In fact, it is a cardinal methodological presupposition of Chinese thought. Chinese characters exhibit a high degree of simplicity in symbolizing complexities of corporeal objects, human affairs, and natural phenomena. Owing to the fact that drawing characters is considered a fine art, Chinese aesthetic taste has been tremendously influenced by the art of calligraphy. During the T'ang dynasty (618-906), which is the golden age of Chinese poetry, the most valued literary form was the four-sentence poem (called *chieh chü* 絕句 in Chinese), which is composed of merely twenty-eight or even twenty syllables or characters. In philosophical teachings, epistemological shortcuts were advocated and encouraged. Confucius, who was primarily an enthusiastic teacher, wanted to teach through silence.[14] In Taoism, this principle seems to be more radically formulated. The Taoists seem always to be encouraging us with the following slogans: in administration, maximum of effects through minimum of action; in communication, maximum of ideas through minimum of linguistic symbols; in battles, maximum of victory through minimum of military forces; in education, maximum of productivity through minimum of teaching effort. The concept of *Wu Wei* 無爲 in Lao Tzu is really an Occam's Razor in an Oriental version.

Indian Buddhism was imported into China very early in history. Mahāyāna Buddhism has had vast metaphysical systems developed in very sophisticated ways. For instance, the Yogācāra school which was founded by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu has developed complicated epistemological theories. However, the great Chinese monk Hsuan Chuang 玄奘 has simplified and summarized the whole system in his own version.[15] Since the Chinese Buddhists could not stand the unnecessary analyses in Buddhist metaphysics, they formed their own Buddhism, which is less complicated in its theoretical aspect. Hua Yen 華嚴 and Tien Tai 天台 are the well-known examples. Still, this is not the

[13] George Berkeley, *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (New York: The Library of Liberal Arts, 1957), p. 12.
[14] Cf. *Lun Yu* XVII. 19.
[15] Hsuan Tsang's version of Yogācāra Buddhism is usually called 唯識 in Chinese. He has summarized the principle of this school in his poem called 八識規矩頌 which has been viewed as the "shortcut" introduction to Yogācāra Buddhism.

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Chinese way. They want something with a higher degree of simplicity. Eventually, Chinese Zen Buddhism (the Chinese way of pronouncing the character 禪 is *Ch'an;* since it has been known widely in the Western world as *Zen,* I prefer to adopt the latter) is founded. It is, in fact, the manifestation of the Chinese artistic spirit. The dialogues of Zen convey poetic insights rather than religous faith. However, Zen is still a religion in form and is founded upon the following four maxims:[16]

> Outside teaching; apart from tradition.
> Not founded on words and letters.
> Pointing directly to the human mind.
> Seeing into one's nature and attaining Buddhahood.

The second maxim is really an echo of what Lao Tzu said two thousand years ago: "The Tao that can be told of is not the eternal Tao."[17] The spirit of Zen has been interpreted as transcendence of language. How many Zen scholars realize that Zen emerged from the language which has already transcended itself? By nature the Chinese language has a great simplicity, and Zen Buddhism is a good manifestation of this feature. A Neo-Confucianist, Lu Chiu Yuan 陸九淵, once said: "If I acquire the understanding of Tao, the Confucian classics are but footnotes to me."[18] This is the spirit of Zen, an exemplification of the cardinal virtue of the Chinese language.

Professor Nakamura made another mistake when he asserted that Chinese people understand phenomena statically, and that "in Chinese there is no single word capable of expressing precisely the meaning of 'to become' as there is in modern European languages," and that the Chinese language is "poor in verbs expressing change and transformation."[19] But as Professor Abraham Kaplan has rightly pointed out, Chinese philosophy is primarily a process view of reality: "Specifically, the Chinese look out on the world as something dynamic and relational. It consists, not of fixed substances with attributes which can be abstracted and ordered into some logical system, but of concrete affairs and interactions exhibiting constant changes."[20] Kaplan's in-

[16] The Chinese originals for these four maxims are as follows: 教外別傳，不立文字，直指人心，見性成佛。 The English translation is adopted from Alan W. Watts, *The Way of Zen* (New York: Random House, 1957), p. 88. The reason for not adopting D. T. Suzuki's translation is, from the viewpoint of the author, Suzuki's translating the Chinese word *hsin* into the English word *soul* is highly misleading. Cf. D. T. Suzuki's *Zen Buddhism,* ed. William Barrett (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1956), p. 9.

[17] Wing-tsit Chan, trans., *The Way of Lao Tzu* (New York: The Library of Liberal Arts, 1963), p. 97.

[18] This is a very popular quotation. The Chinese original is: 苟得道，六經皆我註脚 It is translated into English by the author.

[19] Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples,* pp. 177, 204.

[20] Abraham Kaplan, *The New World of Philosophy* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 270.

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sight can be demonstrated through the history of Chinese metaphysics. With the exception of Leih Tzu, it is very difficult to find any metaphysicians who conceive the universe in a static way. *The Book of Changes* is a great piece of work on interaction, transformation, and the dynamics of the cosmic process. Lao Tzu's concept of *Tao* is not to be conceived as a static substance. Instead, it is an ever-evolving process through which all beings emerge. As Joseph Needham pointed out, ". . . Chu Hsi in the +12th century, developed a philosophy more akin to the philosophy of organism than to anything else in European thought."[21] What he meant by philosophy of organism is the type of philosophy initiated by Leibniz, developed by Hegel, and completed by Whitehead. This type of philosophy is obviously not static metaphysics, but process philosophy. This "process" feature of Chinese metaphysics can be observed through the study of the language. Alan Watts has pointed out: "In English, the differences between things and actions are clearly, if not always logically, distinguished, but a great number of Chinese words do duty for both nouns and verbs—so that one who thinks in Chinese has little difficulty in seeing that objects are also events, that our world is a collection of processes rather than entities."[22] Watts's insight has already been supported by the present writer's presentation of examples like *"Chun Chun," "Fu Fu,"* and the couplet. There is no need of further explanation here.

III

Sixty years ago, Ezra Pound edited Ernest Fenollosa's article "The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry."[23] Since the publication of this article volumes have been written on the Chinese language. In spite of the early date when this article was published, it still stands at a place of foremost importance, not only because it is a pioneer work in the field, but also because its title is suggestive in characterizing the uniqueness of the Chinese language. Later scholars have followed what Fenollosa has suggested and have accepted the view that the Chinese written language is a better medium for poetry than for scientific thinking, but very few of them have given philosophical justifications for this thesis.

In order to explain this thesis, the present writer would like to turn to Croce's theory of art. In the opening chapter of his *Aesthetic,* he makes a very important distinction between two forms of knowledge: "Knowledge has two forms: it is either *intuitive* knowledge or *logical* knowledge; knowledge ob-

[21] Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China,* 4 vols. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1956), II, 291, 496, and 505.
[22] Watts, *The Way of Zen,* p. 5.
[23] Reprinted in Karl Shapiro, ed., *Prose Keys to Modern Poetry* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1962), pp. 136-155.

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tained through the *imagination* or knowledge obtained through the *intellect*; knowledge of the *individual* or knowledge of the *universal*; of *individual things* or of the *relations* between them: it is, in fact, productive either of *images* or of *concepts*."[24] For Croce, logical knowledge and intuitive knowledge are different names for science and art. I do not want to side with Croce on the identification of intuition with expression, but will take this distinction as a starting point of a discussion which is relevant to the thesis of this paper. The major distinction, I believe, between art and science is not so much found in their respective knowing processes as in their modes of communication. The scientific way is a manipulation of abstract concepts, while the artistic mode is a construction of concrete images. The one requires truthful description; the other encourages selective characterization. In general, the scientific way is the describing of particulars in general terms, while the artistic is the revealing of the universals by means of the particulars. As to communicative effects, one yields the recognition of empirical facts and logical relations, the other produces the pleasure of empathy and the enjoyment of sensory qualities. Although in actual experience the two are not separable, they are distinguishable in theoretical analysis.

If the Chinese language is examined with the criteria stated above, there will be no doubt that it is an artistic language. A character itself is a concrete image, a selective characterization of a natural object or event. The way of constructing a character is the representation of the universal by means of a particular. As to producing the enjoyment of sensory qualities, the Chinese language performs this function very efficiently, not only with vividness of visual images, but also with musical tones that may arouse subtle feelings. Besides, it is a monosyllabic language which can easily be arranged musically as the writer wants it to be.

There are still two very important factors which have made the Chinese language a good medium for poetry. They are: (1) the reduction of syncategrammatic words to the minimum, and (2) the fondness of using metaphors. Owing to these habits, expressions become more concise and concrete. For example, let us take Li Shang-Yin's 李商隱 "Poem of No Title" 無題:

相見時難別亦難，東風無力百花殘。
春蠶到死絲方盡，蠟炬成灰淚始乾。
曉鏡但愁雲鬢改，夜吟應覺月光寒。
蓬萊此去無多路，青鳥殷勤爲探看。

The following is a word-by-word translation which seems to make little sense:

Mutual seeing time difficult departing also difficult,
Eastern wind no power hundred flowers fading.

[24] Benedetto Croce, *Aesthetic* (rev. ed., New York: The Noonday Press, 1953), p. 1.

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Spring silkworms till death silk then finish,
Wax torch becomes ashes tears then dry.
Morning mirror but sad cloudy hair change,
Night moaning should feel moon light cold.
Pêng Lai this going no more way,
Blue bird sin-cere for visit see.

Here a much more readable English translation is provided by the present author:

With anxiety we met, disappointed with tears
we go separate way.
The spring breezes weakened, the flowers
fading away.
The silkworm spins no more only when
she dies.
The candle sheds no tears only when
it dries.
The mirror depressing me, my hair turns
to greyness.
Shivering under the moonlight, I moan
in loneliness.
Attractive is the Fairy Land, but no ways
even to see.
O Blue Bird, bring a message for me!

If we compare the English translation with the original or the word-by-word translation, we may realize that the English translation is actually an interpretation which has explicated the unexpressed meanings by supplying syncategrammatic words that were not in the original. Poetic expressions are suggestive, as contrasted with the scientific use of language, which is essentially descriptive. The power of suggestiveness is to leave the unexpressed for the reader's imagination. A reader of poetry is in a certain sense a poet, because he has to construct the meanings or images which are unexpressed in, but essential to, the poem. The Chinese written language is an excellent medium for poetry in the sense that one of its linguistic habits is to minimize the syncategrammatic words and leave more room for the reader to create images and meanings.

The poetic use of metaphor is a feature of all languages. It seems that the difference between the use of metaphor in Chinese and in other languages is only a matter of degree. However, Fenollosa pointed out the qualitative difference that the "Chinese written language has not only absorbed the poetic substance of nature and built with it a second world of metaphor, but has, through its very pictorial visibility, been able to retain its original creative poetry with far more vigor and vividness than any phonetic tongue."[25]

From what has been discussed, there is no doubt that the Chinese language is a good medium for poetry. But, does it follow that it is not a proper medium

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[25] Shapiro, *Prose Keys to Modern Poetry*, p. 149.

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for scientific thinking? Logically speaking, there is no contradiction between what is scientific and what is artistic. Nevertheless, through an observation of the cultural history of China, one finds it demonstrably true that Chinese science is far less developed than Chinese poetry. During the 289 years of the T'ang dynasty, 48,900 poems were written by 2,200 poets.[26] But throughout the history of Chinese culture there has been very little systematic scientific thought comparable to that of Aristotle, Newton, Kant, and Einstein. The judgment based on history, however, seems merely a contingent fact. Logically speaking, we do not see any necessary connection between the underdevelopment of Chinese scientific thought and the language. I would, however, like to point out that the underlying impulse of the Western mind is the search for clarity and certainty.[27] This is a vital source of scientific thinking which has been weak in the Chinese language and Chinese thought. In order to have a better medium for scientific thinking, a language reform is necessary. As a matter of fact, there has been a movement of linguistic reform in China since the May Fourth Cultural Movement of 1919. An appraisal of these reforms goes beyond the scope of this discussion, and requires a separate paper.

[26] Robert Payne, ed., *The White Pony: An Anthology of Chinese Poetry* (New York: The New American Library, 1960), p. viii.
[27] Cf. my "Contemporary Western Philosophy from an Eastern Viewpoint," *International Philosophical Quarterly* VIII, no. 4 (Dec. 1968), 491-497.

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S. G. Sathaye The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa and the Republic

The purpose of this article is to compare and contrast the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* of the *Ṛgveda* with the *Republic* of Plato. These works might be regarded as philosophies of the transitional periods in the East and the West respectively. There is, however, a difference in the nature of the transition which is reflected in their differing attitudes to the problems of social behavior. The *Republic* may be regarded as Plato's answer to the failure of democracy, or, as is done on rare occasions, as his parody or *reductio ad absurdum* of the Spartan totalitarianism. Broadly speaking, it is an attempt at wholesale social reform. The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* does not consist of a total rejection of what has gone before, but is in part a rationalization, consolidation, and institutionalization of the social arrangements as they were actually developing in the early Aryan society. The *Republic* gives an analysis of moral judgment, whereas the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* offers a religious technology for the conduct of ritual behavior which it equates with acting rightly.

Both the *Republic* and the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* interpret society in terms of hierarchical structures; in neither is the hierarchy determined by economic factors. For Plato, possession of knowledge, in his special sense, is the criterion for the selection of rulers, and those who only have beliefs and opinions are relegated to the lower strata of society.[1] In the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* the criterion used is the capacity to possess esoteric knowledge appertaining to the conduct of rituals and sacrifices. According to this criterion the priestly class is the highest. However, the respective highest classes are regarded somewhat differently in the two works. In the *Republic* the rulers are not ranked among themselves, but in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* the priests are in a sense graded according to the degrees of sacredness of their functions in various sacrifices. The *brāhman* or priest, as superintendent at sacrifices, is in a more privileged position than the *adhvaryus, hotars,* and *udgātars* who assist him. He receives the choicest portion of the animals sacrificed, whereas the rest receive inferior portions.[2] Another difference lies in the fact that Plato's rulers are sifted through his educational plan. They have not only to pass the grade of soldiers but also to prove their capacity for attaining philosophic knowledge.[3] The priestly class in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa,* on the other hand, is an entirely separate unit from that of the *kṣatriya* or warrior class, and those belonging to it did not have to pass endurance and other tests that Plato employed in selecting his rulers.

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[1] *Republic* III. 410 (p. 100). All page references are to the first American edition of Francis MacDonald Cornford's translation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941).

[2] *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa,* trans. Martin Haug, 2 vols. (Bombay: Director of Public Instruction, 1863), Vol. II, p. 441.

[3] *Republic* III. 412 ff. (pp. 102 ff.).

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Plato's philosopher king is superior to the auxiliaries, and so is the king in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* to the soldiers who serve under him. However, the king in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* did not have to show that he was capable of attaining religious knowledge. Possession of such knowledge or capacity to possess such knowledge was the monopoly of the priestly class, to which he did not belong. In fact, at the *mahābhiśeka* ceremony at which he was crowned he was required to enter into a contract with the officiating priest whereby he undertook not to harm the latter. If he broke his contract the priest was not only entitled to declare the king's pious acts null and void, but was also authorized to divest the king of his position, his life, and even of his progeny.[4] Thus the soldier king of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* was a limited monarch, whereas the philosopher king of Plato had absolute power.

Plato's educational scheme allows to some extent for social mobility. Although on the whole Plato adheres to the myth of differences among classes in terms of gold, silver, iron, and brass in the constitution of their members, he admits that children of golden parents could sometimes be born with a silver constitution and vice versa. He also admits of other combinations.[5] In such cases children are demoted to lower classes or promoted to upper classes by appropriately channeling their education. In the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* also there is some scope for social mobility, but on a quite different basis. As the caste system does not appear to have become rigid at that stage, a *kṣatriya* or a *vaiśya* or a *śūdra* could become a *brāhman*.[6] At a sacrifice the *kṣatriya* as a sacrificer could offer *soma,* curds, or water to the officiating priest. If the priest chose *soma,* which was a drink appropriate to the *brāhman,* the *kṣatriya* as the sacrificer reaped a benefit for his descendants, who at least had the distinguishing characteristics of the *brāhman* caste, and who by the second or third generation could well be assimilated to this caste. The *kṣatriya* achieved an identical result for his progeny if by mistake he himself ate the portion of the sacrifice appropriate for the priest. However, the *kṣatriya's* progeny were in danger of being demoted to the *vaiśya* caste in the second or third generation if at the sacrifice the officiating priest ate curds. A much worse fate attended his progeny in the second or third generation if at the *rājasūya* ceremony the *kṣatriya* drank water, because by this misdeed he condemned them to the *śūdra* caste. Obviously *aqua pura* was rated the lowest beverage at such ceremonies! Just as Plato in his educational plan is indifferent to the fate of the third class and does not pay very much attention to raising them, the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* does not work out in detail the grounds of upward movement from the *vaiśya* and *śūdra* castes. Plato would condemn this whole process of social mobility as conceived by the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* as irrational.

[4] Cf. *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa,* II, 8.4.
[5] *Republic,* III. 413 (p. 104).
[6] *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa,* Vol. II, pp. 484-485.

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The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* justifies social order and social behavior in religious terms by finding a paradigm for men's acts in what gods do. Gods are divided into four castes and are allowed to have *śūdras* as their menials. Therefore, it is in order for men to be similarly divided into four castes, and for *śūdras* to be allotted menial jobs in human society. Gods realized the supreme value of means and could not do without them; when they killed "the sacrifice" they found that they could not perform any sacrificial ceremonies, and hence they had to revive it. Similarly, men cannot do without the wherewithal for action, and it is, therefore, proper for men to worship their means. "United we stand, divided we fall." It was gods who learned this lesson first and it was proper that men should employ the same principle in their actions. Gods resorted to tact and expediency in dealing with their organizational problems. Men could not have a better example to emulate in their interpersonal behavior. Gods were tolerant toward the meanest of human beings so long as they genuinely prayed to them. This was, therefore, a quality for men to develop in their social behavior. On the other hand, the *Republic* accounts for the three classes in society partly on the basis of the genetic myth and partly on the basis of human nature. Plato makes up the fable that some people are born with gold in their constitution, some with silver, and the rest with iron and brass.[7] Those in the first category belong to the class of rulers, those in the second to auxiliaries, and those in the remaining category to the class of artisans and craftsmen. In terms of human nature the rulers displayed reason, the soldiers spirit, and the rest appetite. Moral action was to be justified on rational grounds and not by reference to what gods did. Reason was the gateway to knowledge of what was real. Through it one was able to define not only concepts but also their interconnections in the form of a pyramid, the apex of which was the Idea of the Good. To know in the finest sense was to be able to see things in the context of the Idea of the Good. Such knowledge was indeed virtue according to Plato.[8]

Both the *Republic* and the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* approach the problem of justice in functional terms, but their interpretations of what is to count as functional are different. For Plato the various commonsense theories that are enunciated through the mouths of Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, and Glaucon are not truly functional. If at all, they merely touched the external characteristics of justice. Honesty in words and deeds, doing good to friends and harm to enemies, acting in the interest of the stronger, acting in the interest of the weaker or acting so as to effect a compromise between the strong and the weak, are theories of justice which, according to Plato, do not go to the root of the matter. It turns out that he regarded each class adhering to the functions it was best fitted to perform as the essence of social

[7] *Republic* III. 413 (p. 104).
[8] *Ibid.*, VI. 502 (pp. 211 ff.).

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justice, and each person guiding his appetites and spirit through reason as the most vital internal characteristic of justice in the individual. In the *Republic* Plato rates the capacity to reason as higher than the ability to make detailed laws. In fact, he exposes the futility of much legislation and defends the position of the ruler strictly in terms of his capacity to know and act in the interest of what is good for the ideal city.[9] It is beneath the dignity of the ruler to be tied down by contract to his subjects.

The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa,* on the other hand, converts the moral into the ritual. For it, the technique of performing a sacrifice determines its religious efficacy and its justness. Spontaneity of action, which is implied in Plato's dictum that knowledge is virtue, is replaced in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* by conformity with the laws relating to the conduct of sacrifice. Such laws, if not actually laid down in detail, appear to be implied in the work. Selection and appointment of priests, their duties, and their rewards follow a pattern of instructions.[10] The criterion of fittingness is rigidly followed to establish the validity of any act. It is arbitrarily laid down. For instance, the verses to be recited at sacrificial ceremonies must be in the prescribed style and meter. It is necessary to face a particular direction while reciting them.[11] They have to be related to the specific purposes for which they are intended.[12] The assumption underlying all this is that "what is appropriate at the sacrifice, that is successful."[13] While the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* appears to be duly impressed by the mystique of words and spellbound by its power, Plato was interested in emphasizing the role of reason in knowledge and action. While the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* ties down justice to the concept of law, Plato was interested in its connection with rational morality. The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* does not question the validity of laws and does not seem to realize that there can be unjust laws, whereas in the *Republic* Plato regarded lawmaking in the ordinary sense as below the dignity of a rational man.[14]

Plato's own concept of justice is open to criticism such as that directed against it by Sir Karl Popper: "Summing up, we can say that Plato's theory of justice, as represented in the *Republic* and later works, is a conscious attempt to get the better of the equalitarian, individualistic, and protectionist tendencies of his time, and to re-establish the claims of tribalism by developing a totalitarian moral theory."[15] Philosophically, however, Plato's interpretation of justice is superior to that given in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa.* Insofar

[9] *Ibid.,* IV. 423-424 (pp. 114-115).
[10] *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa,* Vol. II, p. 245.
[11] Cf. *Ibid.,* I, 2. 8.
[12] Introduction, *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (Haug trans.), I, 12-13.
[13] *Ibid.,* Vol. II, p. 265.
[14] *Republic* IV. 423-424 (pp. 114-115).
[15] Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1945), p. 119.

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as reason may be said to liberate thought and action from dogmatism, Plato is a less bitter enemy of the open society than is the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa.*

It may, however, be admitted that both the *Republic* and *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* set up standards of conduct which are vague and uncertain. In the *Republic* Plato himself admits that though he can say what the form of the Good is not, he cannot offer much positive content on its behalf.[16] He also puts forth a theory of knowledge which overlooks the strength of some factors in the human makeup. Although, for instance, one may be said to know what is right, it is possible for one not to do what is right, say, because of the lack of will or an emotional attachment for it. In the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* also no consistent account is given of the divine entities. What gods do appears to be an imaginary extension of what men would do or might do if they were more perfect. The standard proposed for action is, therefore, not really the objective divine standard as it is made out to be, but a fallible human standard. In the absence of any rational justification for action, human behavior is still left without a rudder in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa.* The criterion of appropriateness appears plausible, but the term 'appropriate' is rather vague. One can use it in moral as well as nonmoral contexts. The formula "what is appropriate at the sacrifice, that is successful" is too mechanical, and on the basis of it the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* makes an uncertain leap from the mechanical to the moral.

Expertise in some form or other is advocated in the *Republic* and in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa.* Plato argues for intellectual expertise whereas the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* expects religious expertise as the essence of morality. Both, therefore, end up by leaving too much power concentrated in the hands of one section of the community. While Plato talks about reason as directing spirit and appetite in the just individual souls, these souls invariably belong exclusively to those in the ruling class. As F. M. Cornford points out: "Only the philosophers have the necessary insight into what is good for the community as a whole. . . . The Auxiliaries will have only a right belief accepted on the authority of the rulers."[17] The lesser breed will only have opinions. The capacity to reason is, therefore, not liberally and democratically distributed in the community which makes Plato's ideal city state. A large majority in it is left to the mercy of the few elite. In either case it is difficult to see how moral responsibility can be attached to a large section of the populace. All the same, Plato expects every individual to do the job for which he is best suited and thereby introduces the concept of individual responsibility. The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* also advocates that moral responsibility for particular acts is to be borne not only by the agent who performs them but also by his descendants.

[16] *Republic* VI. 502 (p. 212). See also Karl Popper, *op. cit.*, pp. 274-275, n.32.
[17] *Republic*, p. 116.

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In both the works, however, we find the absence of moral choice for the majority. In the *Republic* the majority is to obey the philosopher king, and in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* there is no choice for it but to act in conformity with the laws of the rituals laid down by the priestly class.

Both the *Republic* and the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* underline the importance of teamwork. This assumes a common purpose toward which everyone is working. However, neither cooperation nor common purpose need necessarily indicate morality. There is teamwork for evil as well as for good purposes. Also, the common purpose itself can be either good or evil. A purpose does not insure its morality by just being or becoming common. Hence neither the *Republic* nor the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* has succeeded in establishing true morality. The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* has in fact not gone beyond customary morality. Plato has gone beyond convention, and the group behavior of ants and bees, by adding the dimension of awareness of the principles underlying such actions. However, cooperation, even with awareness of the principles underlying it, does not necessarily amount to mutuality on equal terms. It is still a functional concept and does not do full justice to the essence of personality and to interpersonal relations. It is possible to cooperate without being truly moral.

Both in the *Republic* and in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* there is a good deal of emphasis on biological patterns. The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* is inspired by the ideals of safety, security, self-preservation, and race preservation; survival depends upon efficient adaptation through adequate performance of rituals. Martin Haug writes: "The sacred words pronounced by the Hotar effect . . . the spiritual birth of the sacrificer . . . and make him attain to his full life term, which is a hundred years; but they are at the same time a weapon by means of which the sacrificer's enemies, or he himself (if the Hotar have any evil designs against him) can be killed. . . ."[18] In his ideal city state Plato uses eugenics to ensure the production of the best specimens. However, the city state's survival does not depend entirely on the use of eugenics; Plato also stresses the importance to survival of what he regards to be the right type of education.[19] Whereas the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* supplements the biological by the religious factor, Plato supplements it by the philosophical.

Morality is subsumed under logic in the *Republic* as well as in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*. The ritualism of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* regards religious knowledge as power on the assumption that the meanings of words are eternal and unalterable. The repetition of words under prescribed verbal conditions increases their power. In the battle of verbal formulas the most powerful one wins. The strongest formula to neutralize the evil consequences of other

[18] Introduction, *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (Haug trans.), I, 75.
[19] Cf. *Republic* VIII-IX, when Plato speaks of the decline of society and of the soul when one deviates from the ideal of the philosopher king.

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competing formulas is that *Vāg Ojaḥ*.[20] The words and their connections supply the pattern of action and are the determinants of morality. In the same way Plato's Ideas or Forms are eternal and unchangeable and when, by means of Plato's dialectic, they are combined in a certain way under the overarching Idea of the Good, we have the pattern of morality. However, the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* does not seem to realize that words have as much meaning as men determine to put into them, and that they are not ends in themselves but means employed in communication and as such cannot determine in advance the morality of what we do. The difficulty about the Platonic Forms is similar, in some respects, to the above, because the relationship between the world of reality and the world of appearance, and the relationship between theory and practice, does not emerge clearly from Plato's allegory of the cave.[21] Both models are thus inadequate insofar as they fail to produce a viable relationship between words and action or Ideas and actions.

Both the *Republic* and the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* set off ostensibly to find a just organization in the interest of human beings, but the final impression they give is the same, namely, the devaluation of man. The glorification of sacrifice is carried to such an extent in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* that it seems that man lives only for sacrifice and not for himself. The theory that the mere utterance of certain verbal formulas can make men moral shows that men are at the mercy of such formulas and are slaves to them rather than their masters. In the *Republic* Plato goes into a detailed analysis of social structure to find out the true meaning of justice in the individual souls, and gives an elaborate educational plan to produce just rulers, and yet in the final analysis he makes a large majority of individuals totally subservient to the city state. The ideals of good management, efficiency, and playing a specific role in society are attractive as means. It is, therefore, all the more tragic that instead of their instrumental significance being recognized, they are converted into intrinsically good ends, and human beings are demoted from the status of agents to that of instruments in both the *Republic* and the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*.

This analysis of the *Republic* and the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* shows some of the limitations of institutionalized morality. While the philosophical regimentation of the former and the religious regimentation of the latter may have appeal to totalitarians and total planners, those who advocate the moral principles of liberal democracy cannot afford to sweep these theories under the carpet, because it is only by keeping a critical eye open to watch the movements of the enemies of the open society that effective measures can be launched to protect it against them, should they turn up either in their original or a new guise.

[20] *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, Vol. II, p. 170.
[21] *Republic* VI. 509-516 (pp. 222-230).

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Esho Mikogami, A refutation of the Sāṁkhya theory in the Yogācārabhūmi

Recent studies have shown the great importance of Buddhist theories in the general evolution of Indian speculation. As far as the theory of knowledge is concerned, the doctrines of Yogācāra Buddhism occupy an important place. The *Yogācārabhūmi* is the masterpiece of Asaṅga, one of the eminent scholars of the Yogācāra school. In this work Asaṅga has refuted his opponent's views, which are divided into sixteen items.

Three of the items concern the Sāṁkhya theory ascribed to Vārṣagaṇya, a great scholar of Sāṁkhya, who lived in the fourth century A.D.[1] In this paper, it is my aim to clarify the item which Asaṅga entitles "Refutation of the theory which states that the effect appears from its cause."

It is not easy to clarify this debate for several reasons. The opponent's views are ambiguous and the argument itself is not clear. The standpoint of Asaṅga in regard to these polemic items is also ambiguous. Moreover, although portions of Asaṅga's standpoint can be clearly seen, we are confronted with fragments from which it is difficult to deduce a coherent standpoint of his thought as a whole. Under these circumstances, however, an attempt to clarify this debate is necessary, at least as a stage in the study of the theory of knowledge in the *Yogācārabhūmi,* for this debate leads to the establishment of a criterion for determining which parts represent the standpoint of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and which parts represent that of the Sāṁkhya.

The theory which states that an effect appears from its cause is known in India by the name *hetuphalābhivyaktivāda.* This theory is closely connected with the theory which states that an effect preexists in its cause, generally known as *satkāryavāda,* but called *hetuphalasadvāda* in the *Yogācārabhūmi.* With regard to the theory of causation, the Sāṁkhya holds that the production of an effect only means an actual transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the cause, that the effect exists in the cause in a potential form, and that just a little loosening of the obstructions which stand in the way of the appearance of the effect will produce the desired effect.

Asaṅga's argument reads as follows:[2] (1) Here, one who holds the theory which states that effect appears from cause should be criticized.

Do you mean that the obstruction (*āvaraṇa*) to the appearance of effect exists when a cause which has the obstruction (*āvaraṇa-kāraṇa*) to the appearance of effect exists, or when it does not exist?

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[1] Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, "Note on Vārṣagaṇya and the Yogācārabhūmi," *Indo-Iranian Journal* VI (1962), 137-140; G. Oberhammer, "The Authorship of the *ṣaṣṭitantram*," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens und archiv für indische philosophie* (*WZKSO*) IV (1960), 71-91; "Die Erkentnislehre des Klassischen Sāṁkhya Systems Von Erich Frauwallner," *WZKSO* II (1958), 84-129; Esho Mikogami, "A Refutation of the Theory of Paramānu in the Yogācārabhūmi," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* XV, no. 2 (1967), 261-264.

[2] My own free translation from Asaṅga's *Yogācārabhūmi*, ed. V. Bhatacharya (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1957), pp. 120-122.

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If you say it does not exist, then there is a contradiction that the appearance of effect is obstructed although the cause which has the obstruction to the appearance of effect is absent.

If you say it exists, then there is a contradiction that the cause bound with its effect is not obstructed although the cause which has the obstruction exists. Just as when water in a pot is covered by darkness, the pot is also covered by it.

If you say the cause bound with its effect is also obstructed by the cause which has the obstruction, then there is a contradiction that the cause bound with its effect cannot appear although its effect which exists in the cause appears.

(2) Is the nature of existence the cause which has the obstruction or is the nature of effect the cause which has the obstruction?

If you say the nature of effect is the cause which has the obstruction, then there is a contradiction that that which exists never appears although its cause exists.

If you say the nature of effect is the cause which has the obstruction, then there is a contradiction that a thing is cause and effect at the same time. Just as a sprout is the effect of a seed and the cause of a stalk. Then there is a contradiction that something is appearing and is nonappearing at the same time.

(3) Do you mean that that which appears is different from cause, or not?

If you say it is not different, then there is a contradiction that that which always appears appears.

If you say it is different, then do you mean that that which appears has cause, or that which appears has no cause?

If you say that which appears has no cause, then there is a contradiction that a thing appears from no cause. If you say that which appears has cause, then there is a contradiction that that which appears is that which has become effect and that which does not appear at the same time.

(4) Hence, a theory which states that effect appears from cause is not acceptable in the following cases: (i) that the cause which has the obstruction to the appearance of effect exists, or it does not exist; (ii) that the nature of effect is the cause which has the obstruction, or the nature of existence is; (iii) that that which appears is different from cause, or not.

(5) Therefore anything that does not exist has not the nature of existence and anything that exists has the nature of it. That which does not appear means nonexistence of that which does not exist; that which appears means existence of that which exists.

But I say that even when things exist, the marks of existence are not perceived in the following six cases: (i) remoteness (*viprakarṣāt*), (ii) the four obstructions (*caturbhir āvaraṇākāreṇair āvṛitatvāt*), (iii) subtlety (*sūkṣmāt*), (iv) inattention of mind (*cittavikṣepāt*), (v) defect of the organs

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(*indriyoparamaramopaghātāt*), and (vi) not capable of obtaining the idea corresponding to an object (*tatpratisaṁyuktajñānāpratilambhāt*).

This fifth section is very important in that Asaṅga expresses his thoughts on the theory which states that an effect appears from its cause. The Chinese commentator explains that this portion refers to the established doctrine of the *Yogācārabhūmi* in which Asaṅga refutes the Sāṁkhya theory as not acceptable.[3] In this connection Professor Ui holds a different opinion, in which he points out the interesting fact that the six cases stated above are very similar to the seventh verse of the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*.[4]

The seventh verse reads as follows:

Things remain imperceptible on account of (1) remoteness (*atidūrāt*), (2) great nearness (*sāmīpyāt*), (3) defect of the organs (*indriyaghātāt*), (4) inattention of the mind (*mano 'navasthānāt*), (5) subtlety (*saṅkṣmyāt*), (6) obstructions (*vyavadhānāt*), (7) predominance (*abhibhavāt*), and (8) intermixture with like objects (*samānābhihārāt*).[5]

According to Professor Ui, the six cases referred to above were adopted from the Sāṁkhya theory and it is doubtful that this section refers to the doctrine of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

Now, there arises the question of whether this section refers to the doctrine of the *Yogācārabhūmi* or not. Paying due consideration to their contextual meaning in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, it is very clear that this section does refer to the doctrine of *Yogācārabhūmi*. Throughout these debates, 'I' refers to Asaṅga and 'you' refers to the opponent. In the above sentence, that is, "I say that even when things exist, the marks of existence are not perceived in the following six cases," 'I' refers to Asaṅga and the 'that' clause refers to the opinion of Asaṅga himself.

Thus Professor Ui's point brings us to the problem of whether the ideas of the six cases belong to the Yogācāra or to the Sāṁkhya. In this regard, we may refer to the interpretations on the seventh verse of the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*.

The *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* states: "Now one might urge: the Nature and the Spirit are not perceived; that which is not perceived in this world, does not exist; therefore, the two also do not exist, like a second head or a third hand. To this it is to be said: in this world, things even when existing, are not perceived due to eight causes."[6] (*Sāṁkhya Kārikā's* seventh verse is stated here.)

We can learn from this passage that the seventh verse is designed for the

[3] Yugaronki, *Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo* (Tokyo: Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo Kanko Kai, 1927), 42, 344 b-c.
[4] Hakuju Ui, *Yugaron Kenkyu* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1958), pp. 227-228.
[5] See *Sāṁkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, ed. with trans. by T. G. Mainkar (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1964), pp. 21-22.
[6] *Ibid.*

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arguments defending the existence, though unmanifested (*avyakta*), of the Nature (*pradhāna*) and the Spirit (*puruṣa*).

One is unexpectedly surprised when one examines the portion in which Asaṅga expresses his critical thought on the theory of the Sāṁkhya—which states that an effect appears from its cause—and compares it with the passage in the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*.

The *Yogācārabhūmi* reads: "Therefore anything that does not exist has not the nature of existence and anything that exists has the nature of it. That which does not appear means non-existence of that which does not exist; that which appears means existence of that which exists." This rather ambiguous passage means: If a thing exists, it appears to an observer, but if a thing does not exist, it does not appear to an observer; that the object does not appear to an observer means that the object does not exist, and that the object appears to an observer means that the object exists.

The above section precisely corresponds to the criticism of the opponent who rejects the existence of the Nature and the Spirit in the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*.

Nevertheless, the statement in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, "But I say that even when things exist, the marks of existence are not perceived in the following six cases," refers to the established doctrine of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. But in the case of the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, the statement corresponding to it refers to the answer of the Sāṁkhya to the opponent.

According to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, this section refers to the established doctrine of the *Yogācārabhūmi* in which Asaṅga denies the existence of a thing which does not appear. On the contrary, according to the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, this section refers to the arguments defending the theory which admits the existence of a thing which does not appear.

If this section concerning the six cases belongs to the Sāṁkhya, the refutation of the Sāṁkhya theory in the *Yogācārabhūmi* will become meaningless. On the other hand, unless we presume that this section belongs to the Sāṁkhya, we cannot understand the passage from the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* as quoted above.

To solve this puzzle, we may refer to a different description from the standpoint of the Sāṁkhya in the *Yuktidīpikā*. It is as follows:[7] "If it is understood that all things beyond the senses are perceived by a kind of inference (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*), then it follows that these things which are imperceptible by another instrument are also perceived by it." (This remark is then followed by the seventh verse of the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* and its interpretation from the standpoint of the opponent.) "Therefore, it is not reasonable that all things beyond senses are things which are perceived by inference."

[7] See *Yuktidīpikā*, ed. Pulinbehari Chakravarti (Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing and Publishing House, 1938), pp. 51-52.

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To refute the opponent's criticism, it goes on to say: "If there is anything imperceptible by another instrument, then it can be perceived by a kind of inference (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*). (After this is placed the interpretation of the seventh verse of the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* from the standpoint of the Sāṁkhya.)

This shows us the following facts: The seventh verse was used by the opponent to refute the Sāṁkhya theory. But with the passage of time the Sāṁkhya adopted the opponent's view to cover the weak point in the Sāṁkhya theory.

Let us note the fact that Asaṅga refuted the Sāṁkhya theory ascribed to Vārṣaganya and not the theory of the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*. Under these circumstances, the section in question refers to the established doctrine of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

The examination of this debate leads us to the following conclusions. The standpoint of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is that anything that exists is perceived and anything that does not exist is not perceived. There are six exceptional cases. Asaṅga criticizes the Sāṁkhya theory which states that the effect appears from the cause, by pointing out the fact that things which appear exist and things which do not appear do not exist. Therefore, this Sāṁkhya theory becomes contradictory because it holds the view that the effect which appears exists and the cause which does not appear also exists.

The Sāṁkhya's opinion on this polemic is as follows: The effect that appears exists and the cause that does not appear exists, because we can see the eight cases in which even though things exist they do not appear to an observer. But it must be pointed out that the eight cases in the Sāṁkhya theory were adopted at a later time.

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Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism, *by Maurice Meisner.* Harvard East Asian Series 27. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. xvii + 326. $4.95.

Li Ta-chao is well-known as one of the founders of the Chinese Communist party. Considering Western concern with modern China's political history, it is surprising that full-length studies of this important man and of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the other founder, are so long in appearing. None on Ch'en has appeared, but two studies on Li (including the present one) appeared in 1967. In this case the wait was well worthwhile.

Professor Meisner adroitly traces the intellectual evolution of Li Ta-chao, the first important Chinese interpreter of Marxist theory. In addition he examines meticulously the reception and transformation of Marxist ideas in China. This is no sterile study of the so-called compatibilities or incompatibilities of Communism and Chinese tradition. The study presumes neither an unchanging doctrinaire Communism nor an immutable Chinese tradition. The most significant and lively discussion revolves around the combination in Li Ta-chao of a voluntaristic interpretation of Marxism and a militant nationalism. Voluntarism, long a neglected area in the study of modern Chinese intellectual history, is an important key to the cross-cultural activism of ideas in general, and to the understanding of the link between the earlier generation of Chinese liberal-democratic revolutionaries and Mao Tse-tung in particular. It helps unite ideas and isms with urges and impulses, and may have provided the basis for the modes and moods of modern China's response to the onrush of ideas in the twentieth century.

Li Ta-chao's notions of "Present" and "Youth," his struggle with "consciousness" and the determinism of the class struggle, his romantic populism and how it is involved with his conceptions of communism, nationalism and the peasantry, and Li's uses of nationalism and internationalism all have to do somehow with voluntarism. Professor Meisner has sifted and evaluated these ideas with admirable clarity. If there is any shortcoming in this otherwise excellent book, it would be in the placement of Li's populism, a significant contribution to modern Chinese revolutionary thinking. The author prefers to see Li's populism as Russian-inspired and rooted in the narodnik movement. This Russian strain was no doubt there and its influence was sometimes of notable proportions, but certainly Li had dwelled upon this subject long before (1913, for example, in his "Great Sorrow") his distinctly Russian and Marxian writings after 1918. In harking back to populist tradition in China's past, Li was quite in company with the early socialists and anarchists who also paraded the discovery of this "virtue" in the Chinese past. Perhaps it was this "proud voice from the people" (Li was also a patriot) that made it attractive for Li to adopt Bergsonian voluntarist ideas, rather than the other way around. On populism, Li's notions would also benefit from comparisons with those of the notable Liang Sou-min, curiously not mentioned in the book.

This book is excellent intellectual history. It veers away, with rich results, from the event-by-event, party line-by-party line treatment of Chinese communism and Chinese political history. Men have indeed acted and made history in China's

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recent decades, and this study of Li Ta-chao shows clearly that they have done so at least partially on the basis of what they think. Readers of this work will also agree that "what people think" also provides rewarding entry into the historical experiences of peoples and epochs.

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Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China, *by Joseph R. Levenson.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967. Pp. xii + 256. $1.50. Paper.

Originally published in 1953, this work went through a revised edition in 1959 and now appears in its first California paperbound edition. The intervening years have seen fuller studies of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, but they have not diminished the brilliance of this compact work. Its theses and hypotheses are still challenging and will certainly continue to enliven discussions in seminars and courses on modern China.

More than a mere biography, the present study seeks to "maintain an interplay between history and the individual, bringing historical analysis to bear upon Liang's writings and returning with what Liang's writings reveal to throw more light upon history." Liang's varied career as journalist, essayist, philosopher, and historian of China's critical years of cultural transformation provide rich fare for this way of studying life and its historical meaning and meaningfulness. Professor Levenson brings to the study of Liang, in addition, a language interlaced with idioms of various disciplines—history, philosophy, anthropology, and psychology. This language, in turn, is used to develop fully the basic theme of the tension between history and value. Liang, tied to his tradition by history, nevertheless saw value in China's adjustment to modern times. Several shifts of intellectual posture occurred in Liang's career from the 1890s through the 1920s; each time Liang rationalized (and thus tried to ease) the conflict within himself.

The theme of the conflict of history and value is a rich one indeed. As used here, it helps to clarify other terms and concepts that accompanied China's rapidly changing times and altering moods: culturalism and nationalism, tradition and traditionalism, cultural synthesis and syncretism, and notions of personal, national, and cultural identities. The book will be remembered for its exploration and explanation of these vital terms and their import for cultural history.

Yet, one wonders if the history-value theme of contention is not overdrawn, if Liang is not made to "represent" too much this tugging of the two polar forces. The attempt to evoke "history" from Liang's writings has turned history into value itself. Liang's own history (he was an active man, and the true extensions of his activities are not adequately handled here) appears somewhat shabby com-

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pared to the history he was supposed to represent, and to the psychologically significant moments the author makes Liang live through. Witness, for instance, the "crack-up", "secret worry", and "tortured analysis" of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao.

The author, however, did not do the above to chide Liang. He did it to understand Liang. For here is a compassionate rendering of the individual, the country, and the culture as all three come under the bitter and tragic requirements of fundamental change. Levenson succeeds in bringing to Liang and modern China what Dilthey calls historical sympathy.

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Structure and Change in Indian Society, *edited by Milton Singer* and *Bernard S. Cohn.* Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968. Pp. xvi + 507. $10.00.

This is a volume of papers presented to a symposium on social structure and social change in India convened in June, 1965, under the auspices of the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research and the Committee on Southern Asian Studies of the University of Chicago. It is a comprehensive and excellent presentation of anthropological research in progress, and, in this sense, it recalls, and to an extent replicates, the seminar in Chicago on the same subject in 1954 under Robert Redfield which resulted in the seminal volume, *Village India,* edited by McKim Marriott. In contrast to that earlier conference, however, which seemed informed by the somewhat naive notion that cumulative information about varieties of village life within the civilizational context of India would yield understandings of the nature and development of Indian society, this volume suggests something of a crisis situation in the analysis of Indian society.

Twenty papers of very high quality make up the volume. They reflect the maturity and capability of South Asian anthropologists in the United States and help to explain why studies of Indian society have been so instrumental in shaping Indian studies in this country and abroad. Papers are arranged under six sections: caste and social structure (Cohn, Mandelbaum, and Harper); the structure of intercaste relations (Schwartzberg, Orenstein, Marriott, and Elder); changes in the caste system (Srinivas, Rowe, and Lynch); caste in politics, economics, and law (Nicholas, Hazlehurst, and Galanter); the joint family (Kolenda, Patterson, Gould, and Singer); and language and social structure (Bright, Ramanujam, and McCormack). Most of the authors (fourteen of the twenty) are anthropologists, and the issues examined in the volume are those which are the central concern of anthropologists. This is manifest in the sectional categories under which the papers are arranged, where caste occupies center stage; it is also manifest in the details and techniques of analysis throughout the volume. The breadth of the issues examined within the context of caste and family, and the sophistication both in

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method and in the substantive knowledge about Indian society and culture, provide impressive testimony to the progress which has been made in the study of Indian society since the seminar in 1954. And, as Professor Singer observes (p. viii), conceptual and methodological growth in the field of South Asian anthropology "has not yet reached its peak." Those of us in related social science and humanistic fields who have benefited from and have been fundamentally influenced by the work of South Asian anthropologists can only confirm Singer's estimate of the contribution and promise of anthropologists to South Asian studies.

But, as one contemplates the future against the accomplishments of the past decade or so, there are reasons to be concerned. These reasons have in general to do with the rather ponderous weight of essentially ideological categories upon the analyses of contemporary social structure in India, its development, and its tendencies. The parallels which suggest themselves are easily misunderstood, and one hesitates, on that account, to raise them. Yet, it is striking how like Marxist social analysis, or analyses undertaken by church scholars who are committed to a particular sectarian ideology, the analyses of some of the scholars in this volume are. Sastric postulates of pollution, *varṇa,* and *jāti,* for example, continue to be used as analytical categories by some even when such categories have almost no meaning, or at least no demonstrable meaning, for those whose behaviors are sought to be understood. One is thus reminded of that scholarship which uses enshrined, ideologically defined, concepts requiring endless tinkering and qualification to keep them from befouling the very exposition they are intended to facilitate. The concept of "sanskritization" for the South Asian anthropologist appears to be approaching this dysfunctional state. It is on this account, I believe, that Singer is constrained to point out that ". . . the social anthropology of South Asia . . . is thought by many social anthropologists as peripheral to the mainstream of social anthropology. . . ." (p. vii) notwithstanding the impressive scholarship on Indian social organization from the time of W. H. R. Rivers early in the century. The lien of Indian cultural categories upon social analysis has been discussed in the "house organ" of South Asian social anthropology, *Contributions to Indian Sociology* (edited by L. Dumont and D. Pocock), and it is notable that in the present volume the name of F. G. Bailey looms so large. Bailey has been among the most insistent of the social anthropologists that concepts from the main body of sociology be used by Indianists with a view to more meaningful comparability. The influence of his work is evident in all but a few essays in this volume, and, in most cases, he is cited not just for the richness of his ethnographic data, but, I would contend, because his analysis is relatively free from culture-bound analytical categories.

There seems to be yet another consequence of the continued reliance of social anthropologists upon cultural categories familiar to classical Indology. Singer refers to it in his preface to the volume, pp. viii and ix, where he speaks of the "empirical mindedness of the conference" and the "empirical local studies" that continue to engage most scholars. Generalization, whether conceptual or spatial, is ventured upon infrequently in this volume. One of course appreciates the concern with detail and the close touch which is maintained with the specific

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contexts of the studies reported. Yet, it is strange that in a volume like this, which has a stock-taking as well as a reportorial purpose, so little of a theoretical nature should emerge. I take this to be a result, in part at least, of the limiting effect of continued reliance upon categories of analysis which are so tied to the culture of those studied. Because cultural categories like "pollution," *varṇa,* and "sanskritization" do not readily cognize variations in time and place—the very stuff of India's diversity—and cannot be readily brought to bear upon many aspects of development and change, those who use the categories are often constrained to operate within the quite circumscribed spatial and temporal contexts in which these categories have validity, or they must depart completely from the confines of space and time and thus take a sastric tone. Fortunately, the latter course is rarely taken, though it too is represented in the volume; but the consequences in terms of generalizations about processes and structure in India are also there.

There is one other sense in which future social anthropology in South Asia may be said to have entered a critical phase. Questions of social change, which occupy an important sector of research, are posed against an almost uncharted historical background. Thus it is that an increasing number of anthropologists working in India are only part-time field anthropologists; many spend a goodly portion of their time in a kind of archival anthropology at provincial and district record offices. They ransack gazetteers and administrative reports, published and unpublished, for the historical information necessary to place the kinds of social, political, and economic changes in which they are interested into some kind of time perspective. Several papers of the present volume are reports of such excursions into documentary research; many of the papers rely on some kind of documentary research carried out by the author or, more often, depend on the work of another scholar. The results of such efforts to fill in the recent past as a means of gauging present changes are among the most interesting examples of social history being published. However, this judgment is more a comment upon the impoverished state of current research in the social history of India than upon the quality of the anthropologist acting as historian. Since it is field research for which the anthropologist is trained and to which he properly devotes most of his time spent in collecting data, the historical dimension, so crucial for discussing changes in society, is very often inadequate.

This volume, then, rather dramatically illustrates the problems of a discipline whose techniques and many of whose most essential interests were framed for societies possessing neither civilizational heritages for which there are rich extant texts offering engaging, if not compelling, categories of analysis, nor pasts for which there are substantial extant records. The Indian civilizational heritage cannot be ignored, of course; it is still a nurtured and valued tradition. But, the use of its concepts and categories for analysis appears limited and, perhaps, dysfunctional. Similarly, the vastness and complexity of historical materials from the medieval and more recent past of India make it difficult for the anthropologist to be both historian and ethnologist. To some extent, the "empirical mindedness" of the studies in this volume appears to be a backing away from both of these

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hazards by South Asian anthropologists, without their having as yet found firm ground in modern sociology upon which to stand.

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Conversations: Christian and Buddhist (Encounters in Japan), *by Dom Aelred Graham.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968. Pp. xvi + 206. $4.95.

A more appropriate title for this book would be "Roman Catholic and Mahāyāna Buddhist Dialogues," since the participants are primarily Roman Catholics and Mahāyānists. The impetus for such an undertaking was given by the Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, Second Vatican Council, 28 October 1965, which encouraged dialogue and collaboration with the followers of other religions. In *Zen Catholicism,* published in 1963, Dom A. Graham suggested that Catholicism would be enriched by insights from the Eastern religions, and raised the question whether there was any possibility of linking Zen and Catholic Christianity.

The book consists of thirteen discussions between Graham and Mahāyāna Buddhists in Japan: noted authorities, heads of temples, scholars, and teachers in Japanese universities. Two of these interviews are with Westerners who have studied Buddhism in Japan at some length. These interviews, conducted through interpreters, were taped and later transcribed. They were incorporated in the book in question and answer form and in chronological order. Since the questions and answers were spontaneous, the book does not present a comprehensive orderly treatment of the doctrines and practices of either Mahāyāna Buddhism or Roman Catholicism. A gamut of topics such as Zen, comparison of Rinzai and Soto doctrines, LSD, God, enlightenment, *zazen, dharma,* emptiness, religion, ethics, theology, psychology, philosophy, monastic life, worship, etc., are discussed. The list of terms that may call for explanation and the index are valuable assets to this volume.

The book contributes more to the history of religion than to philosophy. The East-West dialogue furnishes valuable information concerning contemporary Roman Catholic and Mahāyāna Buddhist thought. The participants make a genuine attempt to communicate, and exhibit a spirit of humility, respect, and willingness to learn from each other.

I believe that interviews with representatives of the Shingon, Nichiren, and Tendai sects would have enhanced the value of the book. Another contribution would have been a summary, commentary, or evaluation of the dialogues. In addition, a more systematic presentation of the material would have been possible if guide questions had been discussed in each interview and the material edited. Nevertheless, the serious student as well as the general reader should find food for thought in these East-West conversations.

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Language and Symbolic Systems, *by Yuen Ren Chao.* Cambridge: At the University Press, 1968. Pp. xv + 240. $5.00 cloth; $1.95 paper.

This is an elegantly concise (two hundred forty pages including index) yet richly informative (seventy-two topics in twelve chapters) book on the science of linguistics (phonetics, phonemics, vocabulary, grammar, meaning, classification of languages, bilingualism, and language change) and how linguistics is related to writing, life, and symbolic systems in general. No one who reads the book carefully can go away without being vastly stimulated by many problems of language and quickly gaining insights into various aspects of linguistic science. A large number of refreshing and ingenious examples serve to illuminate the author's points. There is also this novel feature of the book: both modern and classical Chinese have been introduced as illustrations. Of course, this is hardly surprising, as the author is an internationally renowned scholar in Chinese linguistics whose many contributions in general linguistics and the teaching of Chinese language and Mandarin grammar have established the Chinese language as an important testing ground for linguistic theoretical constructions.

The author has discussed a number of questions which in one way or another prove to be philosophically significant. For example, it is clear from Professor Chao's description of linguistic units such as phonemes and morphemes that differentiations of meaning must be presupposed as criteria of distinction; that is, different phonemes will make a difference in meaning in the constitution of a larger unit—the morpheme—and different morphemes are the smallest units which have different meanings in relative frames. Thus it is apparent that the formal basis of the study of linguistics cannot be separated from considerations of meaning which need not be linguistic in nature and which need not be uniformly determined in all languages. This means that definitions of phoneme and morpheme cannot be made without reference to a particular language. This is also true of the notion of word. For according to Professor Chao, various criteria such as free and bound occurrence, versatility and restricted occurrence, and reference to functional frames and pauses must be employed to identify a word in a language, and thus, we might say, reference to meaning must be implicitly presupposed in such identification. This is illustrated in the case of the modern Chinese *tzu*. *Tzu* is not exactly equivalent to "word" in Indo-European languages. Instead it must be understood as the embodiment of a unified meaning which need not exist in other languages and which perhaps can be separated into explicit component meanings of more than one *word* in other languages. This then implies that the definition of the notion of word must be made with regard to a given language and that the distribution of word meanings must be regarded as a matter of variation from language to language.

Not only has Professor Chao recognized that the nature of a word differs from language to language, he also has recognized that problems of morphology, syntax, and their demarcation involved in IC (immediate constituent) analysis also vary from language to language. They vary in regard to order, modulation, phonetic modification, and membership of form class. They also vary in regard to generative structures such as those expressed by kernel sentences and transformational rules.

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In this connection Professor Chao does not deny the relevance of transformational grammar as advanced by Noam Chomsky. In fact, Professor Chao points out that the meaning of a sentence or an IC construction is normally determined by a normal (or kernel) construction related to it in some ways. Of course this determination must be relativized to each individual language in question. We may indeed call this a principle of determination of meanings by background sentences in a language.

Professor Chao holds the view that meaning could be included in the study of linguistics. He considers that the study of meaning can begin either with comparing meanings of forms on the basis of the forms of the same meaning (used interchangeably and recognized as having the same meaning) or with correlating linguistic forms with features of things such as numbers or kinship relations. In general he considers meanings of linguistic forms as having to do either with objects of the world or with the attitudes of the speakers toward other persons, referents of their speech, or their acts of speaking. They are therefore, if we may infer from Professor Chao's view, matters by which our referring to things and our expressing of ideas are possible. In this sense meanings are distinct from one another but are not independent of one another. Professor Chao's discussion of the distinction between lexical and grammatical meaning, on the one hand, and the distinction between referential and behavioral meaning, on the other, seems to provide a basis for making clear the above point.

Professor Chao further points out that synonymy, like many other aspects of meaning, is a matter of degree. He does not give a reason for this. But one may suggest that part of the reason consists in the fact that different individual synonyms would have different background sentences and generative structures as matrical determinants of their meanings. One may also point out that the distinction between synonymy and homophones or homonyms can be conceived as a matter of degree. For as no two different synonymous words are exactly of the same meaning, each of them can be regarded as a type which has two homonymous instances or tokens each of which has a different meaning. Professor Chao also recognizes differences of meaning as well as the meaningfulness of linguistic forms as a matter of degree. In connection with the problem of the meaningfulness of a linguistic form, he formulates the important principle that the greater the variety of forms of a given type is, the more informative or meaningful is each of the forms. This can be of course explained as resulting from the fact that the more specific a nonredundant form is, the narrower the scope of application it will have.

Before concluding my observations on Professor Chao's discussion of the problem of meaning and its implications, I wish to point out that in the light of his view on the relativity of determination of morphology, syntax, and meaning in individual languages, Professor Chao naturally reaches the Wittgensteinian conclusions that meanings and linguistic distinctions are to be learned in the contexts of use of language in life situations, and that one has to rely upon such contexts of use to make a correct analysis of language.

Professor Chao has clearly argued that language is primarily spoken and forms a part of life. Thus language can be conceived as a set of habits exhibiting itself

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in terms of a family of dialects of various styles. But by way of isomorphism and extension, written languages and other forms of symbolism can be invented on the basis of spoken language. As Professor Chao puts it: "Isomorphs are paradigmatically the same and extensions are syntagmatically the same as language" (p. 122). Thus, according to Professor Chao, a symbolic system is a generalization of language and language is an example of a symbolic system. Following Peirce and Morris, Professor Chao conceives a symbol as something which can be conveniently produced and has a conventionalized and usually arbitrary relation to what is symbolized. Likewise, he also distinguishes symbols from icons and recognizes that levels of language, such as symbols of symbols, are possible. Furthermore, he enumerates ten requirements for good symbols, including such requirements as simplicity, elegance, universality, etc. He recognizes that these requirements are often in conflict and relative weights are difficult to determine. In this sense they are mere generalizations based on different languages and relative to different purposes of uses. Each concept, such as simplicity, has to be relatively described or defined in a language system and cannot be specified independently of a language system. A certain pragmatism must therefore be accommodated in formulating a *good* symbolic system.

Finally, we note that Professor Chao is apt to emphasize that translation is not a simple two-term relation between two languages or two texts, but is a three-term relation involving, besides two languages or two texts, the situation of use. Thus translation depends upon considerations of purposes of translation as well as types of translated materials. As translation requires setting up a standard of equivalence, one must recognize that there are many standards of equivalence and that there are many ways of setting up such standards. Because of this, Professor Chao points out that instead of dichotomy between a literal and a free translation of text, there can in general be a whole spectrum of literalness and idiomaticity with regard to the constituent elements for translation. Furthermore, as there is more than one dimension of meaning, so translation has more than one semantic dimension of fidelity to cope with. Given that one can normally draw a distinction between semantic and functional translation, a good translation will have to preserve both semantic and functional relevancies.

In conclusion, I believe that reading Professor Chao's book can be rewarding for both the specialist and nonspecialist. This book perhaps can be also used as a brief introduction to linguistic science in a course such as philosophy of language.

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Chinese Thought and Institutions, *edited by John K. Fairbank.* Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Pp. xiii + 438. $2.95. Paper.

This is a recent paperback edition of a book originally published in 1957. It is a sister volume to *Studies in Chinese Thought* (edited by Arthur Wright, and pub-

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lished in 1953). Both of these books belong to the series called Comparative Studies of Cultures and Civilizations. As pointed out in the Foreword, this book consists of papers by specialists in Chinese civilization who were not concerned with Chinese thought as a separate body of propositions, but with Chinese thought reflected in or related to political and biographical events. Specifically, the papers collected in this book deal with interrelations of Confucian and other Chinese ideas and political institutions, social controls, power structures of gentry-scholar administration, and personalities as well as career orientations of the Confucian intellectual class. Together they give the impression of a basic and general concern with the problems of the Confucian personality and the Confucian state. The predominant pattern of presentation is characterized by a historical description of or exploration into certain socio-political events in terms of ideas or ideals (values) or a historical description of or exploration into ideas or ideals (values) in terms of certain socio-political events. The emphasis is more often on the socio-political roles of ideas or ideals (values). There are twelve papers of such a nature distributed through the two main divisions of the book: Part I, the Role of Ideas in the Exercise of State Power; Part II, Thought and Officialdom in the Social Order.

Two articles dealing with the methodology and concept of an intellectual history of China, which do not belong to the above-mentioned divisions, are worth independent philosophical comments. The first article, written by John Fairbank, and titled "Introduction: Problems of Method and of Content," affirms that analytical skills of social science are necessary tools for studies of regional histories. These skills, according to Fairbank, can be utilized to analyze the influence of ideas on events, careers, and policies in historical situations. It is not clear, however, what analytical skills of social science Fairbank has in mind. Nevertheless, Fairbank agrees with his fellow contributor, Benjamin Schwartz, in seeking to understand ideas in a context of meaning, attitude, and feeling and in connection with unique times, persons, and places. He further suggests that various cultural experiences of the Chinese people can be understood by analyzing new facts, applying new interpretations, and adducing new hypotheses other than those developed in studies of Western subjects. This method of analysis, interpretation, and construction of hypotheses is certainly a valuable one, as the results of its application are impressively displayed in this volume. For example, Arthur Wright's paper on the formation of Sui ideology (581-604) convincingly shows that the first Sui emperor as a political agent was also a thinker and an ideology-molder. But sometimes there could be pitfalls in this approach which Fairbank does not point out. One such pitfall is that the historical writer could attribute too much to the mind of a historical agent. The reason for this is simple: a historical situation could be meaningful in many ways as the historian sees it, but the historical agent involved in the situation need not himself have consciously recognized this. An example of such over-attribution is the case concerning the political rather than scientific functions of astronomy in the Han court, as studied in Eberhard's paper. It is not clear whether Eberhard himself recognizes a possible ambiguity in his study.

One form of explanation along the line of methodology formulated by Fairbank

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is noteworthy, that is, analyzing one particular native Chinese concept for its cross-level yet unified explanatory value. This is evidenced in Yang Lien-sheng's paper "The Concept of Pao as a Basis for Social Relations in China." In his paper Fairbank further points out the significance of grasping intellectual developments in traditional China for evaluating the ideological prospects of Communist China. Fairbank does not indicate how the traditional heritage of China actually affects the socio-political institutions and their ideological foundations in Communist China. A close and careful investigation into this problem is therefore needed.

Benjamin Schwartz's article on the intellectual history of China aims to establish a concept of intellectual history that can be applied to the Chinese field. Schwartz considers intellectual development as a part of the total existential complex of history, and on this basis considers intellectual history as a study of the intellectual development within the historical context. Specifically, Schwartz defines intellectual history as a study of men's conscious responses to the historical situations in which they find themselves. Clearly this idea of an intellectual history permits and needs elaboration. Schwartz is certainly right in insisting that a man's ideas must be in one way or another tied to his specific time and place. He is also right in holding that a lived situation is highly problematic and indeterminate. It is further correct for him to warn us that a real situation *in processu* may differ very much from the situation reconstructed by a historian in retrospect. But he is wrong in suggesting that an intellectual historian must be able to perceive a historical situation in the eyes of the historical agent who was involved in the situation. For this means that the historian can only describe the problematic and indeterminate nature of a historical situation and *cannot* see more than what a historical agent had seen. This would seem to make historical inquiry unilluminating.

Concerning the relation of ideas to times, persons, and places, Schwartz does not hold that this relation is a simple causal one, that is, that a given situation caused a given idea. On the contrary, Schwartz suggests that an idea or a state of feeling can be regarded as a response to situations in some cases and as an animating and contributing factor to the formation of historical situations in others. It is not clear, however, whether Schwartz wishes to say that ideas are either responses or stimuli relative to different situations, but not both. Clearly ideas as parts of historical process can form both consequent and antecedent conditions of historical events. It seems important always to look for situations to which ideas are responses and situations in which the same ideas are animating and contributing factors. It is also important that an intellectual historian should always look for the ideological presuppositions as well as the ideological products of a situation. If these are right views, then Schwartz's use of the term "responses" could be misleading, for it merely suggests the conditioned aspects of ideas, but not their conditioning forces.

Not only is Schwartz's use of the term "responses" misleading; his use of the term "conscious responses" is also misleading. Schwartz has himself recognized that there are other things than ideas in one's mental life and these include "emotional attitudes" and "propensities of feeling." Now it is not clear whether these other mental properties must be conscious for a person, but conscious or non-

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conscious, their ability to reflect a situation or to determine a historical event is not less historically important than ideas. It often does not require self-consciousness of one's attitudes and feelings to act in accordance with one's attitudes and feelings. In fact, many historical explanations in terms of psychological attitudes depend upon the assumption that the historical agents' psychological attitudes need not be understood by the historical agents themselves, nor by their contemporaries, but could only be said to be understood by a conscientious historian involved in an overall theory and hypothesis.

In his discussion of the idea of intellectual history, Schwartz has stressed the importance of an adequate appreciation of the philosophical content of ideas for a historian of intellectual history. This is certainly a sound view. Without a careful grasp of the meaning of an idea or a doctrine, the historian's use of terminology like "naturalism," "materialism," etc., will be highly ambiguous and quite empty. The historian will then not be able to judge the agreements and disagreements or the positive and negative aspects of an ideological development. This may be regarded as a semantic precaution, but it requires more than analysis of meaning on a superficial linguistic level: it requires a general cultivation and appreciation of philosophical understanding. This requirement could, however, present a serious problem for the historian: namely, how a historian could be qualified to relate a system of ideas to a historical situation without pretending or assuming to have understood the given system of ideas correctly.

As we have seen, Schwartz admits a limited creativity of men in their conscious responses to their situations. This means that the conscious responses of men to their situations are something more than the effects of historical situations as a whole. On this basis, Schwartz does not think that a historian should apply genetic explanations to account for ideas. This view no doubt implies that a historian must decipher the meaning of ideas independently of historical situations. This view is also intended by Schwartz as a criticism of the Marxist or any genetic explanation of ideas in terms of social classes. On the other hand, Schwartz is not explicit as to how ideas lead to the shaping of new situations or events. This aspect of intellectual history perhaps needs a general theoretical discussion and investigation rather than being accepted as a mere assumption. At present it is important, as Schwartz urges, to make specific concrete studies in which ideas are shown to be transformed into ideologies and ideologies into forces.

Schwartz correctly distinguishes the understanding of thought from the validating of thought. A historian should not concern himself with the validation of thought, but rather with the understanding of thought in history. However, this raises the question as to whether the historian himself should assume the truth of some propositions in judging the relevance of certain ideas to actions and situations, that is, whether he can be completely objective in his description and understanding of ideas without distinguishing the true and the false of the ideas. One will agree with Schwartz, however, in holding that a historian of ideas cannot free himself from philosophical or ideological prejudice in describing or understanding ideas; but he should keep in mind his commitments in his historical studies and distinguish explicitly between these and his attempt to understand the ideas of others.

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In summary, Schwartz has given us an interesting conception of intellectual history which stands between "the realm of genetic explanations" and "the realm of validification." The historian is supposed to understand ideas as they are and to relate ideas to situations as they are related. He is not to give genetic explanations in terms of material causes. He is to achieve objectivity in his studies as much as he can without disclaiming his involvement with values of his own choice. This approach certainly has its merit and it will not reduce ideas to mere material conditions. Nevertheless, it calls for explanations as to *how* a historian could understand ideas as they are and *why* he must limit himself to understanding ideas as they are. Schwartz does not give such explanations. Perhaps one has to make a distinction between understanding ideas with regard to antecedent and consequent conditions, on the one hand, and understanding ideas with regard to their meaning contents *per se* and their associated intentions, on the other. The historian is never expected to understand ideas in the second sense of understanding; he should be content for his own purposes with understanding ideas in the first sense. This then points to the basic difference between intellectual history and philosophy, the confusion and confounding of which in current Chinese studies has produced such a deplorable state that Chinese intellectual history is often disguised as Chinese philosophy, and a historian of China often pretends to account for Chinese philosophy.

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Readings in Indian History, Politics and Philosophy, *edited by K. Satchidananda Murty*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1967. Pp. 392. $10.00.

All the readings in this rather ambitious anthology are by Indian thinkers. Essays by nine well-known historians which constitute the first section (A) of the first part of the book provide the reader with a variety of conceptions of history, including Hindu, Marxist, and Idealist conceptions. Section B records certain episodes in India's history, the purpose being to give the reader a panoramic view of India's long history and to acquaint him with the richness and diversity of it. These episodes, however, dealt with abstractly and detached from an adequate account of the socio-cultural conditions in which they occurred, are not likely to enhance the reader's appreciation of Indian history or even to make much sense to him. Selections under section C, The Culture of India, show the authors rather on the defensive; "India is spiritual, she really does not have to learn much from the West—her past being full of glory and wisdom." The charge of being otherworldly is considered and rejected. Pannikar is an exception; he rejects such claims as that of self-sufficiency and spirituality as more or less founded on self-deception.

Part 2, Politics, is the best part of the book. It includes an overview of the main concepts concerning the state in ancient India, a sample of different views on the

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ways and means to achieve political independence from the British, and four very important essays which elucidate the concept of a democratic state in a socialist pattern of society—a concept which has guided and continues to guide the decision-making processes in independent India. In addition it includes four articles articulating the policy of nonalignment and peaceful coexistence which forms the core of India's foreign policy. Two other sections contain political theorizing which, though not without its influence, still is not part of the mainstream of Indian thinking and practice. Paths to Freedom includes a fair representation from the radical groups and the revolutionaries and thus a recognition of the important role they played in the achievement of independence. This is a welcome inclusion, for in most discussions on the subject the role of these groups tends to be minimized if not totally ignored.

The selections from Gandhi are quite representative of his thought. They bring forth his faith in God, Truth, nonviolence, and *satyagraha* as methods of achieving and retaining freedom. Not even in the face of foreign aggression is the faith in nonviolence to be given up. How then is such a situation to be met? A typical Gandhian response would be:

> Thus, supposing that a modern edition of Nero descended upon India, the representatives of the state will let him in but tell him that he will get no assistance from the people. They will prefer death to submission. The second way would be non-violent resistance by the people who have been trained in the non-violent way. They would offer themselves unarmed as fodder for the aggressor's cannon. The underlying belief in either case is that even a Nero is not devoid of a heart. The unexpected spectacle of endless rows upon rows of men and women's simply dying rather than surrender to the will of an aggressor must ultimately melt him and his soldiery. (P. 183)

Part 3, Philosophy, is introduced through three survey articles which acquaint the reader with the more or less current view of Indian philosophy as well as with a point of view more critical and quite opposite to it. The chapter on Naturalism represents the often neglected materialist strand in Indian philosophy. These two sections are followed by five more sections—Types of Theism, Varieties of Idealism, Islamic Thought, Some Attempts at System Building, and Ethics. The categories used to typify Theism are blurred, vague, and overlapping. Under types of Idealism all we really have are various articles on Advaita Vedānta. The selection from Vivekananda is good and puts across the spirit and main tenets of Advaitic philosophy in a cogent and reasoned manner.

A section on Islamic thought stands isolated without comparable sections on Sikhism, Jainism, or even Buddhism. The last is represented by a single essay, which needless to say does not by any means even indicate the rich and variegated tradition of Buddhist philosophy.

The selections in this book on the whole tend to confirm the prevalent attitude toward Indian thought and philosophy—lofty idealism and a faith in the supremacy of the spiritual. However, the rather defensive attitude of "in our past we have achieved and lived the highest" is also only too evident and, in my opinion, tends to hinder a flow of thought in new and independent channels. The selections under Some Attempts at System Building aim to represent philosophical activity which

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is not primarily interpretative. But perhaps in line with the system-building tradition they present to us writing which is extremely difficult to grasp. Readers will differ as to whether this difficulty is due to great profoundness of thought or rather to muddled thinking and obscure expression.

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Non-violence and Aggression (A Study of Gandhi's Moral Equivalent of War), *by H. J. N. Horsburgh.* London: Oxford University Press, 1968. Pp. 199. $5.60.

In *Non-Violence and Aggression,* Horsburgh explains (1) why nonviolence as Gandhi presents it is the only type of defense consistent with a democratic way of life and (2) why he feels that some kind of nonviolent policy will have to be accepted soon by all of the major world powers.

According to Gandhi, no man should interfere violently with the life of another because no man can know the absolute truth. If one person forces another to his standpoint violently, without trying to see the truth in the other's position, he may miss an important insight. There is also the possibility that any person might be wrong in his own thinking, so the safest course is to discuss differences and come to a compromise. If this is impossible and one is forced to resist an idea or aggression more actively, then this resistance must be nonviolent and engaged in to show one's opponents the truth, not to win a personal victory.

In Horsburgh's view these Gandhian values of nonviolence and truth must be the primary principles of any liberal democratic society which emphasizes individual dignity and freedom. In any struggle every nation is ultimately endeavoring to defend its "way of life," or those basic beliefs, living habits, and practices which determine and provide the background for that nation's activities. Any violent type of defense is corrosive to a society whose way of life is based upon the worth and dignity of the individual. When a nation knows it has the power to kill millions of people at any time, it develops a callousness to human life which must undermine any ideal of human worth. According to Horsburgh, a major reason for the factional violence in the United States must be the knowledge that Americans live with that they can devastate the whole world with relative ease. As he writes, "A civilization that can contemplate such actions as an immanent possibility . . . is a civilization that cannot be expected to show much indignation when napalm bombs descend on peasant villages in Vietnam" (p. 114).

The problem arising from this analysis, of course, is that only certain nations are called upon to protect their way of life nonviolently. A police-controlled society, for example, would benefit from any use of violence that would inculcate the fear upon which that society was founded. Horsburgh admits that a nonviolent society would be at a grave disadvantage, especially during wartime when military ex-

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pediency does not bow to world opinion. He also admits that it is highly unlikely that any nation will adopt a policy of unilateral disarmament on the grounds that it will protect its way of life.

However, for other reasons Horsburgh sees nonviolence becoming more important in international affairs. Every nation feels compelled to maintain a nuclear arsenal sufficiently large to deter any enemy, but no nation is willing to risk total annihilation by attacking first. Thus, under an umbrella of nuclear threat, nations will have to find other ways of solving their problems. Horsburgh believes that nonviolent methods will recommend themselves. Especially in cases of ideological disputes, anticolonial movements, and racial alliances, moral justification and thus world opinion will be on the side of nonviolence.

In a Gandhian sense such a practical approach could not be considered nonviolence at all. Non-violence adopted out of fear or convenience does not require any personal commitment to love and respect one's opponents, and this for Gandhi is the whole meaning of nonviolence. For him such a policy would be worse than violence because it would be a lie and cowardly.

Besides this, however, there is an unclear point in Horsburgh's account. Nonviolence must be a defensive policy and its strength must lie either in its moral impact upon observers or in active nonviolent resistance to aggression. If both sides in an argument are nonviolent, public opinion will not sway one way or the other, nor will there be any aggression to be countered. The only nonviolent technique that remains is discussion, but this is exactly what has been attempted in world organizations like the United Nations. On the basis of past experience, such discussions are apparently futile. The only thing that nuclear stockpiles seem to deter is nuclear warfare. Political differences are still settled with conventional weapons.

From Horsburgh's account we can infer that any kind of nonviolent defense based upon Gandhian principles is unlikely to be accepted by nations today under present world circumstances. It even seems likely that nonviolence adopted from expediency would fail as a tool in settling international problems. And even if nonviolence adopted from expediency was possible, it certainly would not be an example of Gandhi's moral equivalent of war.

Carol Wilson
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The Buddhist Nirvana and Its Western Interpreters, *by Guy Richard Welbon.* Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1968. Pp. xi + 320. $8.50.

The question concerning the essential nature of *nirvāṇa* is one which has been debated by Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike for more than two thousand years. Is it a positive state or a negative one? Eternal bliss or ultimate annihilation?

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Communion or extinction? All of these views have been offered at one time or another, but none of them have been universally accepted. The present volume by Dr. Welbon undertakes to examine the opinions and interpretations which the foremost scholars of the non-Buddhist West have contributed to the discussion over the past several centuries. The author begins with a brief outline of Western Europe's contacts with and impressions of Buddhism up to the end of the eighteenth century, and then proceeds with a detailed consideration of that fertile period from the early 1800s to the eve of World War II. The Buddhist studies of such eminent Sanskrit, Pāli, and Tibetan scholars as H. T. Colebrooke, Alexander Csoma, Brian Houghton Hodgson, Eugène Burnouf, Jules Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, Jean Baptiste François Obry, Philippe Edouard Foucaux, F. Max Müller, James D'Alwis, Robert Caesar Childers, Thomas William and Caroline Augusta Foley, Rhys Davids, Th. Stcherbatsky, Arthur Berriedale Keith, and Louis de La Vallée Poussin are presented and thoughtfully assessed. In one particularly interesting and insightful chapter, the author takes account of three nonspecialists' estimates of *nirvāṇa* and draws attention to the influence which Buddhist teaching had on the creative endeavors of Schopenhauer, Wagner, and Nietzsche.

Welbon stresses the fact that in examining these interpretations of *nirvāṇa* we are actually being given a comprehensive view of each scholar's insights into Buddhism. He notes that "their evaluations, never based exclusively on philological and historico-critical considerations, in every instance reflect the individual scholar's own personal commitment, his *sitz im leben,* and his understanding of the essence of Buddhism. The response to the question of nirvāṇa's meaning is at the same time an answer more or less complete to all questions about Buddhism" (p. viii).

Throughout the book Welbon's expositions of and comments upon the various interpretations are lucid and informative. They offer the reader a genuine insight into the problems that Westerners have faced when confronting Buddhism and attempting to render it intelligible. He also points up a number of methodological considerations which those working in the comparative field would be well-advised to consider. After raising questions concerning the extent to which cultural and social presuppositions determine the conduct and conclusions of the study of alien traditions, he warns that "To impose our own categories on the data provided by the Buddhist source materials is to run the risk of violating their intentionality and, consequently, to violate the whole interpretive enterprise" (p. 300). Dr. Welbon also draws our attention to other pitfalls which the comparative scholar should be aware of and invites us to avoid them by observing the mistakes of those who have preceded us.

The book is absorbing, stimulating, and very well written. It will prove to be particularly valuable to anyone interested in either Buddhism or comparative thought.

Edward J. Quigley
University of Hawaii

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Indian Philosophy of Value, *by Unto Tähtinen.* Turku: Turun Yliopisto, 1968. Pp. 124. (Price not given.) Paper.

This treatise is concerned with what its author feels is "the basic notion of Indian Philosophy, that of value." In it, Dr. Tähtinen attempts to establish the thesis that "Indian Philosophy is fundamentally rather a philosophy of value than one concerned with reality" (Preface).

He begins by noting that "value" is a contemporary Western concept which may be defined as the ". . . experience of an object which ought to be" (p. 14). With this preliminary definition in mind, he entertains a brief survey of some of the principal concepts of Indian philosophy in order to determine whether or not it contains any similar notions. He concludes that it does and defines the Indian concept of value as ". . . that consciously desired happiness (*sukha*) or consciously desired absence of suffering (*duḥkha-abhāva*) which is permanent or is a means to it" (p. 20). He feels that not only is this idea of value present in Indian thought but that it actually constitutes the *sine qua non* of all Indian philosophizing. He remarks that

> it was the significance of spiritual value, explored by the early *Upaniṣadic* thinkers, that created Indian philosophy. Every later and every other trend of thought is a reflection of it; or a further development of the value-doctrine or an effort to repudiate it in some sense.
>
> Indian philosophy is not the outcome of curiosity about nature or society, but of the study of what is good for man. It is the notion of good or value which is intrinsic to Indian thought—not knowledge or existence. (P. 34)

The author attempts to support this assertion by demonstrating that those concepts which occupy a place of fundamental importance in the structure of Indian thought are basically value-oriented. The greater part of the book is concerned with a detailed examination of the four *puruṣārthas* (values) which are recognized in Indian philosophy. Dr. Tähtinen maintains that these value concepts of *dharma, artha, kāma,* and *mokṣa* are the essential and pivotal ideas without which the various Indian systems cannot be understood or appreciated. In addition to these, he also recognizes the existence of other "metaphysical" and "speculative" concepts, but he maintains that they have only a secondary or derivative importance. They are subservient to the search for value, and it is this search which must be recognized as the primary and most basic concern of Indian philosophy.

The author certainly succeeds in convincing us that Indian philosophy has a strong practical orientation, but this is by no means a novel achievement. He is not quite so successful, however, in establishing his thesis that it is concerned more with value than with reality. It is at least open to question whether or not this claim is adequately substantiated by the material presented and the arguments advanced.

Nonetheless, the book is certainly worthwhile in that it provides a comprehensive treatment of the *puruṣārthas* and offers a good introduction to the social philosophy of India. The author tends to be repetitious in a few places, but otherwise the work is interesting and well written.

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Jaina Ethics, *by Dayanand Bhargava.* Delhi, Varanasi, Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1968. Pp. xvi + 296. Rs. 20-00.

This work was first submitted by Dr. Bhargava for his doctorate at the University of Delhi. It has been revised so that the general reader as well as the student can follow the subject with sustained interest. It embodies a comprehensive and systematic study of the Jaina view of life in its entirety—a view that has had immense impact on both Buddhism and Hinduism.

The work begins with the question "What is ethics?" After defining the nature of ethics in both Western and Eastern terms, Bhargava points out that the central problem in almost all Indian ethics is liberation from misery. Although this problem has been approached differently by the different schools, it almost always centers on the doctrine of *karman*—this is especially true in Jainism. Therefore, Bhargava elaborates on this doctrine, in relation to the problem of misery, from the points of view of all the Indian schools. He ends the first chapter by pointing to the struggle in Indian philosophy to justify free will in the light of the rather fatalistic nature of *karman.*

Next, Bhargava gives the metaphysical background of Jaina ethics by elaborating in great detail and depth the Jaina view that there is the self (*jīva*) and the nonself (*ajīva*); that there is a flow of karmic matter (*āśrava*) from the nonself into the self, thus causing bondage (*bandha*). This flow must be checked (*saṁvara*) and the already collected karmic matter must be shed (*nirjarā*) to gain liberation (*mokṣa*). In his elaboration, Bhargava treats the concepts of self (empirical and transcendental), nonself, misery, karmic matter, removal of misery and liberation in a clear, lucid, and precise analysis—again from the points of view of all six Indian systems. Thus the analysis is invaluable for comparative work within Indian philosophy in general.

Both vice and virtue bind the soul by effecting the above-mentioned inflow of karmic matter. Thus the Jaina ethic is one of "transcendental morality" beyond good and evil. But at the same time, only the practical path of the three jewels (right conduct, right faith, and right knowledge) can lead to liberation. Therefore, Bhargava spends much time distinguishing between transcendental and practical conduct, both in terms of the Jaina monk and the Jaina layman.

Besides stopping the karmic flow, shedding of such karmic matter as may already be accumulated by the soul is necessary. So penance, especially in relation to meditation, is also examined. Finally, Bhargava outlines the stages of spiritual development from ignorance to liberation and ends with an appendix consisting of a very extensive account and listing of Jainist ethical literature, a bibliography, and three indexes.

It is my feeling that by describing all the aspects of Jaina ethics and by tracing their origin to basic principles in Jaina philosophy, Bhargava has cast Jaina ethics in its proper philosophical perspective. But beyond this, he has discussed the ethical thought of the six systems of Indian philosophy and Buddhism wherever relevant. The author has enhanced the importance of his work by enlarging its scope to cover the entire Indian tradition. Thus, *Jaina Ethics* is not only a scholarly contribution to Jaina studies, but to Indian philosophy in general. Finally, to con-

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clude, I would suggest—as does the author, who always keeps the problems of modern society in view—that the question of the utility of Jaina ethical ideals for the problems of humanity and world peace should certainly be left open.

DONALD W. MITCHELL
University of Hawaii

On Indian Mahayana Buddhism, *by D. T. Suzuki. Edited with an Introduction by Edward Conze.* TB 1403. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. Pp. 284. $2.45. Paper.

While the bulk of Dr. Suzuki's work deals with Zen in China and Japan, he also concerned himself with earlier Mahāyāna as established in the Indian Buddhist Sūtras. For, as he realized, it is very difficult to understand Zen without a knowledge of the earlier tradition. For example, the Zen doctrine of emptiness and direct intuitive insight is greatly influenced by the Indian Prajñāpāramitā (as can be seen in the *Platform Sūtra* of the Sixth Patriarch). Further, the Zen position on the relation between emptiness and logic, and its strong emphasis on the mind, are both reactions to and developments from the Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda schools.

While all this may be true, Suzuki's studies of the Indian Mahāyāna have not had the remarkable effect on Europeans and Americans that his direct expositions of Zen have had. So the essays in this book, which have been reprinted from previously published sources, are an attempt to bring to public view this important part of Buddhist theory.

The development of this earlier Buddhism is in two stages. The first, completed about A.D. 150, corresponds to what is traditionally known as "the second turning of the wheel of the Dharma" (the sermon of Benares being the first). This stage consists of three main points: The Bodhisattva ideal, the rise of elaborate myths, and an ontology centering on the doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) as grasped through direct insight (*prajñā*).

Chapter seven in this book characterizes the first two points. It is a long study of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* (or *Avataṁsaka*) *Sūtra* and greatly elaborates on the nature of the Bodhisattva, especially as distinguished from the Śrāvaka—the follower of the Theravāda tradition. The discourse is a myth rich in imagery and creative in description; so much so that it certainly must stem from an imagination that is in direct touch with the spirit of man. Chapter two on the "Story of Ever-Weeping," chapter three on "Emptiness," and chapter four on the "Effortless Life" also describe the Bodhisattva ideal and are rich examples of myth.

The third point of this first stage (on the doctrine of emptiness and intuition) is made explicit in the first chapter, which is on the philosophy and religion of the Prajñāpāramitā. This chapter is by far the most important from a philosophical standpoint. It contains no myths but rather directly studies philosophical teachings and their religious application in depth.

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The second stage is completed about A.D. 350 and corresponds to the third "turning of the wheel of the Dharma." Unlike the first stage, which dealt with the outer world, this stage turns inward and studies the nature of the mind itself. In fact, the Yogācāra school developed an idealism in which all phenomena are simply representations in the Mind—which alone is real. Chapter five on the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* characterizes this stage.

The three remaining chapters do not deal with any particular stage of development but rather enrich the overall perspective of Indian Mahāyāna in general. Chapter six is on the position of faith in Pure Land Buddhism as grounded in India; chapter eight tries to get to the basis of the enlightenment-experience of the Buddha; chapter nine points out an interesting relation between Meister Eckhart and Mahāyāna thought. The book also contains a bibliographical note, a glossary of Sanskrit terms, and an introduction—all by Edward Conze.

As perhaps can be seen by the above description, if a reader approaches this book looking for vigorous philosophical analysis with emphasis on points of detail, except for the first chapter he will certainly be disappointed. For in these essays, Suzuki wants to portray the spirit of the doctrine as the expression of the Buddhist life-style and world view stemming from meditational experience. He is not just interested in the Buddhist philosophical theories, but also in how these theories relate to living in the light of spiritual insight. And it is here that the worth of this book is found.

Donald W. Mitchell
University of Hawaii

Buddhism: A 'Mystery Religion'?, *by Paul Lévy*. New York: Schocken Books, 1968. Pp. 111. $1.75. Paper.

This is a paperback reissue of a book published in 1957 by the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London. In six lectures, each expanded into chapters, Paul Lévy has presented a well-documented classical as well as modern treatment of the characteristics of the Buddhist Order. His approach is to give a factual analysis of the Buddhist communities from the early to the contemporary period and to seek a rationale in the ordination and initiation ceremonies from their very inception. In this he has relied heavily on the works of past Buddhist scholars, such as Przyluski, Oldenberg, Minayeff, Kern, Müller, Senart, and Poussin, but he has also readily taken exception to their views and thereby advanced his own conclusions. He has, for example, consistently maintained a naturalistic interpretation of the mythological elements found in such profusion in the Buddhist texts, such as references with respect to the rain, drought, rain God, and appearances of various personalities. Thus he contends that even if the great Kāśyapa and Ānanda once really existed, their personalities have been used primarily for a historical dramatization of the great annual reunion of the *varṣa*

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(p. 82). The Buddha is sometimes compared to an elephant (which he presumably was in a previous existence and indeed at the time when he was conceived) and he is also the lion of the Śākya clan, so that Ānanda echoes the roaring of the lion when he repeats the Buddha's words. If further examples were needed, the physical appearance of the Great Leader would be witness to this zoomorphism (p. 87).

Lévy is ever in search of the complex reality of religious symbolism. And yet, in the final analysis, he feels that Buddhism in essence is a sort of mystery religion because the principal rites and revelations are kept secret within the initiated elite circle (p. 97). By acknowledging this he feels that, for example, the aspects of the fables and the underlying torture and cruelty of the rites could be better understood.

He concludes:

> In my opinion it has not been sufficiently stressed that Buddhism is solidly based on a rigid system of gifts and exchanges; gifts of food and of a thousand and one material objects; gifts of human creatures who take the place of sacrificial victims. The benefits anticipated from the gifts by their givers concern in particular prolonged survival and eternal bliss. This type of religion is not primitive, for it implies a developed social structure, but the element that does go back much further into the past is the mythologico-ritual complex centered around ordination and which I have attempted to examine in the preceding lectures. (P. 108)

Such being his conclusions, it is rather difficult for the reader to accommodate the principal doctrines of Buddhism with respect to their roles and significance in the nature of the rituals or acts of ordination and initiation, since such doctrines are mentioned only in passing and never treated systematically or in depth. Despite this difficulty, the reviewer found his approach bold, refreshing, and interesting.

KENNETH K. INADA
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The Religious Life of Man (Chinese Religion: An Introduction), *by Laurence G. Thompson.* Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Co., Inc., 1969. Pp. 119. (Price not given.)

This introductory series is intended to present "clear, nontechnical descriptions and interpretations of religious life." To telescope the whole of Chinese religion within the compass of some one hundred pages, without doing considerable violence to the subject matter, is certainly a demanding task. Mr. Thompson's work is remarkable for its ability to select and compress material while still preserving accuracy.

Chapter one offers an exposition of the philosophical presuppositions which underlie Chinese religious thought. Here fundamental concepts such as *yin-yang* and *tao* are briefly but carefully explained, attention being appropriately drawn to the multiple connotations of these key terms.

In chapters two through five, the focus is primarily upon social and historical

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aspects of Chinese religion, rather than the philosophical. Nevertheless, the student of Chinese philosophy will detect recurring philosophical relevance. When, for example, the topic of demons and deities is taken up in chapter two, their derivation is traced to *yin-yang* philosophy. Ancestor worship is sympathetically interpreted in chapter three. It is introduced only after *tsu* ("clan"), *li* ("propriety"), and *hsiao* ("filiality") have been discussed in some detail. Chapters four and five provide interesting comments on such topics as the pantheon of present-day gods in Taiwan Province and the intimate kinship between politics and religion. Concluding material in chapter six is devoted to Buddhism and Taoism. Four major schools of Chinese Buddhism, T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, Ching-t'u, and Ch'an, are effectively outlined in order to underscore basic varieties within Chinese thought. Finally, religious Taoism is characterized with its accretions from alchemy (which originated in China), necromancy, and shamanism. A post-script on the disruption of the Chinese tradition and an appendix on the Confucian canon complete the work.

Thompson's informal, relaxed style makes his work highly readable. For the beginning student of religion, his book represents an unusually clear guide; for the philosophy student, it conveniently makes available a surprising amount of background information. Perhaps the author's main contribution is to help dispel the prevalent stereotype which holds that the Chinese mind has been altogether preoccupied with ethics to the exclusion of religion.

Earle J. Coleman
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Śaṁkara and Bradley, *by S. N. L. Shrivastava.* Delhi, Varanasi, Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1968. Pp. 270. Rs. 25-00.

There is little novelty in proposing a comparison between Śaṁkara and Bradley. Shrivastava, however, justifies his contribution with the remark that "full fledged comparative studies of these two great thinkers have not so far been undertaken. A few articles in periodicals and some brief references in books are all that we have on the subject." Thus the author's primary objective is to provide a systematic, definitive treatment of critical issues common to Śaṁkara and Bradley. Moreover, he recognizes a need to clarify certain misunderstandings and refute improper charges. Among the charges Shrivastava has in mind is that of "illusionism," which has been frequently leveled against Śaṁkara and, in a sense, against Bradley. Here he is quite successful; citing extensive passages from both philosophers, he effectively overthrows the accusation.

Beginning with a compact but detailed introduction, which literally contains the essence of all which is to follow, the book is divided into thirteen chapters and features an exhaustive bibliography. Topics considered in the first half dozen chapters include: the general philosophical approach of Śaṁkara and Bradley, their conceptions of God and the Absolute, the problem of the self, and the status of the

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external world. Remaining chapters deal with the nature of immediate experience, noncontradiction as the touchstone of reality, *māyā* as the principle of inexplicability, and the relevance of Śaṁkara's philosophy to contemporary scientific and philosophical thought. Here interesting observations drawn from twentieth-century science, with its quest for a unified theory of explanation, and existentialism, with its emphasis upon the self, are demonstrated to be compatible with Śaṁkara's world view.

It was William James who characterized Bradley's Absolute as a "metaphysical monster." Shrivastava would be somewhat disposed to agree. He detects little value in Bradley's notion of the Absolute, except at those points where it coalesces with the Vedāntic position. This is not, however, to disparage his criticisms, which are both consistent and forceful. Most importantly, Shrivastava avoids an exercise in superficial comparison by repeatedly suggesting precisely how Śaṁkara's absolutism represents an advance over that of Bradley.

Shrivastava is to be commended for his comprehensive coverage of fundamental issues, those which would be of greatest interest to any student of Śaṁkara and Bradley. The most notable weakness of this book is a formal one. It would profit considerably from careful editing. The author is prone to state his theses in the introductory chapter, turn to them individually throughout the text, treat each in some detail, and later offer unnecessary recapitulations. While such a procedure can be of unmistakable pedagogical value, the author has simply overdone it. Such redundancy does not, of course, detract from the overall merit of his work.

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CRITICAL EXISTENTIALISM. By *Nicola Abbagnano*. Translated and edited by *Nino Langiulli*. Anchor Book A642. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1969. Pp. lxx + 247. $1.45. Paper.

ZOROASTER'S INFLUENCE ON ANAXAGORAS, THE GREEK TRAGEDIANS, AND SOCRATES. By *Ruhi Afnan*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1969. Pp. 161. $5.00.

SŌKA GAKKAI, BUILDERS OF THE THIRD CIVILIZATION: AMERICAN AND JAPANESE MEMBERS. By *James Allen Dator*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969. Pp. xiii + 171. $7.95.

VALUE THEORY AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES. By *Rollo Handy*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1969. Pp. xii + 198. $8.00.

THE LOGIC OF RELATIONSHIP. By *Frederick S. Johnston, Jr.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1968. Pp. 110. $4.00.

NIETZSCHE (PHILOSOPHER, PSYCHOLOGIST, ANTICHRIST). By *Walter Kaufmann*. 3d ed. Vintage Book V-436. New York: Random House, 1968. Pp. xviii + 524. $2.45. Paper.

BASIC WRITINGS OF NIETZSCHE. Translated and edited, with Commentaries by *Walter Kaufmann*. New York: The Modern Library, 1968. Pp. xiv + 845. $4.95.

JOHN LOCKE: EMPIRICIST, ATOMIST, CONCEPTUALIST AND AGNOSTIC. By *John Louis Kraus*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1968. Pp. 202. $4.95.

BUDDHA, MARX, AND GOD. By *Trevor Ling*. London, Melbourne, Toronto, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966. Pp. xii + 227. $8.00.

THE POSTURE OF CONTEMPLATION. By *Frederick C. Lyman, Jr.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1969. Pp. 123. $3.95.

CURRENT ISSUES IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY: NEW DEPARTURES IN COLLEGES AND SEMINARIES. Edited by *George F. McLean*. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1968. Pp. vi + 186. (Price not given.) Paper.

PHILOSOPHY AND CONTEMPORARY MAN. Edited by *George F. McLean*. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1968. Pp. vi + 187. (Price not given.) Paper.

THE SOURCES OF EXISTENTIALISM AS PHILOSOPHY. Edited by *Fernando R. Molina*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1969. Pp. x + 230. $1.95. Paper.

THE WILL TO POWER. By *Friedrich Nietzsche*. Translated by *Walter Kaufmann* and *R. J. Hollingdale*. Edited by *Walter Kaufmann*. Vintage Book V-437. New York: Random House, 1968. Pp. xxxii + 575. $2.95. Paper.

GREEK PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS (A HISTORICAL LEXICON). By *F. E. Peters*. New York: New York University Press, 1967. Pp. xii + 234. $7.95.

ARISTOTLE AND THE ARABS (THE ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION IN ISLAM). By *F. E. Peters*. New York: New York University Press, 1968. Pp. xxiv + 303. $9.50.

CHINA TODAY. Edited by *William J. Richardson*. New York: Maryknoll Publications Friendship Press, 1969. Pp. xii + 317. $6.50.

THE HINDU WORLD (AN ENCYCLOPEDIC SURVEY OF HINDUISM). By *Benjamin Walker*. Vols. I and II. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. xiii + 608, xi + 695. $35.00 for 2 vols.

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BULLETIN OF THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION INSTITUTE OF CULTURE (Calcutta), XIX (11), November, 1968: *Swami Mukhyananda,* The Concept of God in Vedanta.

EAST AND WEST (Ismeo), 18 (1-2), March-June, 1968: *Ramchandra Trivedi,* Sri Aurobindo's Conception of Philosophy.

JOURNAL OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION (Bombay), XI (39), January-June, 1968: *N. G. Kulkarni,* Wittgenstein's Theory of Experience. *J. N. Chubb,* Kant's Doctrine of Synthetic A Priori Judgements—I. *D. Y. Deshpande,* Kant's Doctrine of Synthetic A Priori Judgements—II.

MONUMENTA NIPPONICA (Tokyo), XXIII (3-4), 1968: *Robert M. Huntington,* Comparison of Western and Japanese Cultures.

RESEARCH JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY (Ranchi), I (2), March, 1968: *S. O. Ramkrishna,* The Role of Reason (yukti) in Advaita Vedanta. *Jean Feys,* Atman in the Early Upanishads.

THE VEDANTA KESARI (Madras), LV (5), September, 1968: *P. Nagaraja Rao,* The Concept of Maya. *Anima Sen Gupta,* Advaita Vedanta and Samkhya on Erroneous Perception.

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ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii announces a Conference on "Heidegger and Eastern Thought" to be held at the University of Hawaii, November 17-21, 1969. The occasion of the Seminar is to honor the eightieth birthday of Martin Heidegger. The following invited participants will present formal papers to the Conference:

J. Glenn Gray (Colorado College)
"The Splendor of Simple Things"

Elizabeth Hirsch (Trenton College)
"Heidegger and the East"

J. L. Mehta (Banaras Hindu University)
"Heidegger and the Comparison of Indian and Western Thought"

Calvin O. Schrag (Purdue University)
"Reason and History in Heidegger"

Takeshi Umehara (Kyoto, Japan)
"Heidegger and Buddhism"

Proceedings of the Conference will be published in a special issue of *Philosophy East and West*. For further information write to Professor Albert Borgmann, Chairman, Conference Committee, Department of Philosophy, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822.

Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction
by Eliot Deutsch

Advaita Vedānta is historically and currently the most important and pervasive philosophical system in India. It encompasses a discipline of spiritual experience as well as a technical philosophy, and since the time of Śaṁkara in the ninth century some of the greatest intellects in India have contributed to its development. Covering the basic metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical ideas of Vedānta, Eliot Deutsch in his reconstruction has here lifted the system out of its historical-cultural context and has concentrated attention on those ideas which have universal and enduring philosophical value.

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Verlag Otto Harrassowitz, Taunusstr. 5, Wiesbaden, announces the publication of the *Journal of Asian History*, edited by Denis Sinor. The Journal will be published twice a year. The annual subscription rate is $8.00.

This new periodical is intended to fill a gap which both general historians and orientalists have long felt to exist in the coverage of Asian studies. There is at present no scholarly journal specializing in the history of Asia. Highly technical contributions to some aspect of Asian history appear regularly in highly specialized journals which, as a rule, are not habitually consulted by historians, while historical journals carry but few articles dealing with the non-Western world.

The *Journal of Asian History* intends to cover historical research on any period and all the regions of Asia with the exception of the ancient Near East. The word *history* will be taken in its broadest sense, comprising all the disciplines of the social sciences and humanities when concerned with the elucidation of the past.

It is hoped that the Journal will serve not only the specialists but also the growing number of historians who in their research and in their teaching are sometimes painfully aware of the difficulty of finding comprehensive, comprehensible, and up-to-date presentations of topics taken from Asian history. For their sake the Journal will regularly carry review articles and selected and annotated bibliographies, both American and European.

The Journal is conceived as an international organ. It will publish articles in English, French, German, and Russian, and intends to serve as a link between the various schools of history and of orientalism.

Correspondence regarding editorial matters should be addressed to: Professor Denis Sinor, Asian Studies Program, Indiana University, Goodbody Hall, Bloomington, Indiana. On matters of subscription, advertisement, etc., please write to the publisher.

The Proceedings of the twenty-seventh International Congress of Orientalists, held at the University of Michigan, August 13-19, 1967, will be published by the end of 1969. They will contain a complete account of the activities of the Congress, abstracts of all papers read at it, and a list of all participants together with their addresses.

The Proceedings will be edited by Professor Denis Sinor and published by Verlag Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden; they will be part of the Oriental Series of the Asian Studies Research Institute of Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, U.S.A.

The price, inclusive of postage, will be DM140, or U.S. $35.

The International Association for Tamil Research (President: Professor Jean Filliozat, Collège de France) announces the publication of *Journal of Tamil Studies*. The members of the Board of Editors of the Journal are: Dr. M. Andronov (U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, U.S.S.R.); Dr. R. E. Asher (University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland); Dr. Albert B. Franklin (Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas); Prof. Dr. K. L. Janert (Seminar für Indologie der Universität zu Köln, Cologne, Germany); Mr. S. Singaravelu (University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia).

Also, Mr. A. Subbiah (I.A.T.R., Thamilakam, Madras, India); Prof. V. I. Subramoniam, Associate Chief Editor (University of Kerala, Trivandrum, India); Prof. Xavier S. Thani Nayagam, Chief Editor (University of Malaya, Kuala

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Lumpur, Malaysia); Dr. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson (University of Ceylon, Peradeniya, Ceylon); and Dr. Kamil Zvelebil (Charles University, Prague, Czechoslovakia).

The Editors will undertake the responsibility of contacting scholars in the respective geographical areas assigned to them and of securing an uninterrupted supply of research articles suitable for the Journal.

The Chief Editor will nominate a number of editorial consultants and book reviewers, and add to their number as and when necessary. Before an article is accepted for publication, the Co-ordinating Editor will send it to two or more such consultants for opinions as to suitability for publication, and thereafter refer it to the Chief Editor, whose decision will be final. The Review Editor will similarly send each book, etc., received for review to one of the book reviewers.

The fields of studies for which research articles may be received for publication are listed in an appendix but are by no means exhaustive. Dravidian and Indological studies of a general nature, even remotely allied to Tamil Studies, are also welcome; so are articles of general interest relating to any field the principles of which will be applicable to Tamil Studies.

The annual subscription is U.S. $2 or its equivalent for all members of the I.A.T.R., and this subscription for the Journal is of course in addition to their subscription to the I.A.T.R. For nonmembers of the I.A.T.R., the subscription to the Journal is Rs. 20 for Indian subscribers and U.S. $4 for non-Indian subscribers to the Journal. The Journal commences publication in 1969.

Articles for publication should be sent in triplicate to:

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The *Catalog of the Hoose Library of Philosophy*, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, has been published in six volumes by G. K. Hall & Co. of Boston.

The Hoose Library of Philosophy contains 37,000 volumes ranging from medieval manuscripts and incunabula to the latest works of present-day philosophers and scholars. From its inception in 1924 under the patronage of the Seeley Wintersmith Mudd Foundation and the direction of Ralph Tyler Flewelling, the purpose has been to assemble a broadly-based collection for philosophical research.

While exhibiting general strength in metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics, and value theory, and the philosophy of religion, the library's holdings reflect a special interest in German philosophy, with some emphasis on Leibniz and Kant. In another area, a large concentration of textual criticism and analysis constitutes

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an important resource for the study of Classical philosophy. There are also substantial holdings in personalism, phenomenology, and Latin American philosophy.

This catalog is available in six volumes at the price of $400.00 in the U.S., $440.00 outside the U.S.

Descriptive material on this publication is available on request. Inquiries and orders may be sent to the publisher, G. K. Hall & Co., 70 Lincoln Street, Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A. 02111.

The Department of Philosophy at Rockford College is pleased to announce that Professor Eliseo Vivas of Northwestern University will join the faculty of Rockford College in September, 1969, following his retirement from Northwestern. Prof. Vivas has chosen to teach the introductory course in philosophy the first semester, and aesthetics the second. He will also teach one course in the English department each semester.

The American Hegel Society was formed at the Wofford Symposium on Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, held in November, 1968 at the University of South Alabama, Mobile, Alabama.

Darrel Christensen (Wofford College) was elected Chairman; Robert L. Perkins (University of South Alabama) was elected Secretary-Treasurer; Frederick G. Weiss (Purdue University, Indianapolis) will publish a newsletter, and Otho Mel Adkins (Pasadena College) will serve as West Coast representative.

The theme for the 1970 meeting will soon be announced. Inquiries should be directed to the secretary.

The Foundation for Creative Philosophy announces an International Conference for Philosophy of Creativity to be held in the University Center, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, October 16-18, 1969, in an effort to analyze critically creative behavior and to develop a philosophy of creativity which may serve as the basic guideline for criticism of personal and institutional conduct.

Six sessions logically organized as symposia will include: (1) defining creativity as operative in the fine arts; (2) defining creativity as operative in the industrial and professional arts; (3) philosophy of creativity as the basis for therapy in personal and interpersonal relations; (4) philosophy of creativity as the basis for therapy in the renewal and reconstruction of government and related institutions; (5) philosophy of creativity as guide for reconstruction of all fields within educational institutions and their management; (6) projection of specific research to be done by professors and their students and the correlation of this research for the advancement of an operative philosophy of creativity.

Some of the main participants will include Charles D. Tenney, a Whitehead Scholar in philosophy of creativity; R. Buckminster Fuller, who is given to designing creative utilization of the world's resources; Charles L. Palmgren, Director of the Center for Creative Interchange; Carl J. Friedrich, philosopher of government and related institutions; and the four philosophers who together constitute the official board of directors of the Foundation for Creative Philosophy: John W. Davis, Lewis E. Hahn, Wm. S. Minor, and Howard L. Parsons.

Further information may be obtained from Wm. S. Minor, Director, 1301 W. Freeman, Carbondale, Illinois 62901.

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

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